

# Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia

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Foreword by Sidney Jones  
Translated by Natalia Laskowska





Policing  
Religious Conflicts  
in Indonesia



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POLICING RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA  
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## FOREWORD

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In these eight meticulously researched case studies, Rizal Panggabean, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and their colleagues illuminate two critical issues in post-Soeharto Indonesia: the prevalence of religious conflict and the institutional weaknesses of the police. Both are common problems in new multicultural democracies. Tackling them together helps underscore the complexities of both.

The institutes involved in this study (PUSAD Paramadina and MPRK UGM) have developed a formidable reputation for work on religious conflict, combining rigorous research with practical advocacy, looking for lessons that might be learned to manage such conflicts more effectively and prevent violence in the future. They start from a commitment to tolerance and pluralism and to democracy as a political system that should allow both to flourish. What they have found, however, is that in some areas of Indonesia, democracy can add complications: intolerant civil society organizations using freedom of expression to incite hatred of religious “deviants” and elected officials afraid to antagonize key constituencies or eager to use religious issues as a way of garnering votes.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The role of local elections in exacerbating religious conflict is the subject of another superb study, covering some of the same conflicts as those

Thus, when sectarian conflicts or disputes over the construction of minority houses of worship erupt, multiple interests quickly become involved, going far beyond the contending parties and making resolution more difficult. Enter the police, enforcers of the law in democratic Indonesia. They are perhaps the most vilified actors in government with a reputation for corruption and abuse, although good officers in positions of authority can sometimes transcend the institutional culture. Depending on when they decide to move and what actions they take, police can fuel or cool a conflict.

It is sobering to realize that one of the “success” stories of policing in this volume involves attacks on the Ahmadiyah community in Manis Lor, Kuningan in 2007 and 2010 where:

- the police took no preventive action as the problem escalated before 2007 (the best they could do was put up a banner saying “We are all brothers”);
- they were powerless to prevent the local government from closing three mosques or a mob from gathering on 18 December 2007 and vandalizing two of the mosques and eight Ahmadiyah homes as well as wounding seven people;
- while they charged six men with violence, prosecutors only *asked* for two months sentences and the judges gave them less;
- tensions steadily escalated again in June–July 2010 even though the police had full were in touch with all sides;
- the police chief accompanied the municipal police in the closing of an Ahmadiyah mosque and four smaller prayerhouses, in coordination with the local government despite the fact that these actions violated a 2008 decree;

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analysed here, by a partner institution at Gajah Mada University. See Moh. Iqbal Ahnaf, Samsul Maarif, Budy Asyari-Afwan and Muhammad Afdillah, *Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik dalam Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi dan Kupang* (Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies/CRCS, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, [February] 2015).

- in the midst of rising tensions, police were powerless to prevent a meeting of hardline groups on 29 July 2010 attended by over 1,000 individuals mobilized by text message and bent on violence;
- despite deploying hundreds of troops and using tear gas, police were powerless to prevent the mob arming itself with bricks, rocks and sharp objects, wounding five people and damaging more homes; and
- no one was arrested.

If this is successful policing, it makes one realize how low the bar is set. In this case, the police chief is seen to have performed well in 2010 because she realized the potential for violence, mustered enough officers to confront it, and had non-lethal means — teargas — on hand to control the mob. No one in the Ahmadiyah community had to be relocated, and no further violence in Manis Lor has taken place. The last is important, although how much this is due to policing and how much to other factors is a question.

The fact remains that no effective preventive or deterrent measures were in place before the 29 July meeting. In the lead-up to the mob incitement, the police seem to have been reduced to the role of message-carriers, urging the Ahmadiyah to accede to some of the demands of the hardliners, and urging the hardliners to avoid violence. Neither effort at “persuasion” was ever going to work: the police toolkit of possible responses to violence has to be much more sophisticated. In this case, at least the key police actors at the district level were well-intentioned men who were genuinely trying to fulfill their duty to protect.

The obstacles to improving policing, not just of religious conflict but of any disputes likely to produce an angry crowd, are many. The police themselves cited several. They had no instructions on how to handle the case from their superiors or the central government, and in an institution that remains highly centralized, local police often fear to act without orders. The relevant laws were unclear and

contradictory. The local ulama council insisted that the Ahmadiyah were guilty of blasphemy under a 1965 law; the 2008 decree suggested they could worship as long they did not proselytize. The police had enough human rights training to understand they could not force anyone to renounce his or her beliefs, but they were also clearly reluctant to take on the mob and the mob's political backers. The latter included the district head and many members of the district council who had turned banning the Ahmadiyah into a campaign promise. Once the mob had massed, the police were afraid of taking any action that might lead them to be accused of human rights violations. One reason they did not arrest anyone was that they knew no one would be willing to testify against the hardline provocateurs for fear of retribution. (Witness protection in Indonesia is in its infancy.)

Beyond the obstacles that were specific to Manis Lor, there are broader issues that hamper good policing. Institutionally there are no incentives to building a genuine community policing program. Having good relations with the community does not produce promotions. There are no useful or enforceable procedures for handling social conflict; a disastrous attempt to produce one for handling "anarchy" in October 2010 (Protap No.1/X/2010) ended up amounting to orders to shoot on site. There are no guidelines on hate speech, and an understandable reluctance in the civil society community to countenance any measure that could be seen as returning to the provisions of the criminal code used during the Soeharto days to punish dissent — including provisions on incitement and spreading hatred. Police and other officials, when faced with a conflict, often have a tendency to fall back on trying to negotiate a middle way, even when one side is clearly in the wrong. Enforcing the law and defending constitutional principles such as freedom of religion sometimes become secondary.

The recommendations to the police at the end of this volume are common-sense lessons from both the "successes" and failures this book describes. In the call for better training, better intelligence,

more interaction with the community, and respect for due process, they echo many of the calls for police reform that have been made in Indonesia, mostly without much success, since Soeharto fell. Many of the lessons learned are similar to those noted in a very different context by the former chief of police in Papua, Inspector General Tito Karnavian, in his book *Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih*.<sup>2</sup> The problem is that local police officers cannot themselves bring about change — or at least, they may be able to improve practices for the duration of their tenure but assignments to district and provincial commands tend to be short and improvements rarely survive the departure of the reformer.

It is striking to see in these eight case studies, as an earlier study by the same group,<sup>3</sup> how much effective policing depends on individual leadership, rather than any institutional imperative. For reforms to have a chance of being implemented, they have to come from the top, making the choice of national police commander by the president absolutely critical. Unless proven commitment to reform, professionalism and incorruptibility are demanded at the top, the obstacles toward effective policing of religious conflicts, and all other conflicts, are likely to continue.

There is hope for change, however, and it lies in the socially engaged academics who produced this study. The spirit of intellectual inquiry paired with an ongoing commitment to reform is very much alive, and this book is proof.

September 2015

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<sup>2</sup>Muhammad Tito Karnavian, *Bhayangkara di Bumi Cenderawasih* (Jakarta: ISPI Strategic Series, 2014).

<sup>3</sup>Ihsan Ali-Fauzi et al., *Kontroversi Gereja di Jakarta* (Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies/CRCs, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2011). The book was translated into English as *Disputed Churches in Jakarta*, tr. Rebecca Lunnon (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy, Paramadina Foundation, 2014). The electronic files of both books are available online at PUSAD Paramadina's website: <http://www.paramadina-pusad.or.id>



## PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

The translation of this book into English is something we did not plan for. When the design for the research was formulated in mid-2012, one of the objectives was to provide a good material on policing religious conflicts in Indonesia, based on a research, to be used in workshops attended by the police and civil society leaders — including religious leaders. The results of the research was published in early 2014. Later that year, an abridged version of the book was published, intended as a source of case studies for workshop on policing religious conflicts in the country.

Workshops for police has been a focus of the Master Program in Peace and Conflict Resolution (Magister Perdamaian dan Resolusi Konflik, MPRK), Gadjah Mada University. From 2005 to 2009, MPRK organized workshops in 25 provinces of Indonesia, funded by the New Zealand Aid. These workshops, with the duration that varied from one to two weeks, focus on particular subjects such as intergroup relations, nonviolent intervention, and community policing. From 2009, Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi, PUSAD) in cooperation with MPRK and the Asia Foundation, organized a new series of workshop using a different strategy, by inviting the police and civil society leaders to come to a two-day workshop convened in several cities in Java and Bali.

These workshops become an excellent place for the police and civil society leaders to share experience and exchange ideas. At the

high point of the workshops, the two sides exchange some fixed ideas. Members of the community, according to the police, do not obey the law or do not cooperate with the police in maintaining law and order, especially when it comes to issues that divide the community such as religious and sectarian issues. When members of the community do not comply with the law, or what the police ask them to do, conflicts will escalate and the police force need to intervene. One senior police officer said in one of the workshops that religious conflict is a fireball thrown to the police, as if nothing the police could do to prevent the fireball from erupting.

The police, according to the community leaders, gave weak or belated responses to incidents of religious conflict. Occasionally, the police passively watching such incidents; sometimes the police take sides in the conflict instead of enforcing the law. The community leaders, in other words, think the police are doing many things wrong, as if nothing the religious leaders could do to maintain calm and reduce tension in the community — through consultation, dialogue or negotiation to prevent violence from taking place.

To move beyond this situation of “the police said and the community said,” we need to learn from the actual policing of religious conflict. Unfortunately for us, there were no good materials on the real policing of religious conflicts – on how the community and the police were able to reduce tension and prevent violence, and on how the police, the community, and the local government cooperate in policing religious conflict or on how they failed to do so. Despite the increasing attention given by human rights institutions, for example, on how the police deal with conflicts related to religious freedom, incidents of religious violence remain rare. In addition, reports on the role of the police in dealing with religious violence are based on individual cases when and where violence took place.

Therefore, we decided to design a research that look into cases of success and failure of policing religious disputes, and we pair cases according to this criteria. We select polarizing issues in many communities, namely sectarian disputes and conflicts over places



of worships, and cast a wider perspective of policing, involving many actors such as the police, the local government, civil society organization, the conflicting parties, the media, and public opinion. Since we did not have enough baseline information, case selection became a complicated issue. We finally decided to focus on eight cases based on stories and discussions during the workshops.

The translation of the book into English, we hope, will spread the results of the research. It will contribute to the studies of policing in Indonesia in general, which often times missing in many publications on policing studies.

We would like to express our sincere thanks and appreciation to Sandra Hamid from the Asia foundation for supporting the research, Natalia Laskowska for translating the book into English, and for Sidney Jones for writing the foreword for the English edition.\*\*\*

Jakarta, August 20, 2015

Rizal Panggabean  
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi



## PREFACE TO THE INDONESIAN EDITION

There is good news and bad news about the recent developments in the management of religious life in the post-New Order Indonesia. The incidents of collective inter-religious violence such as those which took place in Ambon, South Maluku, and Poso (Central Sulawesi) declined remarkably ten years ago. More recently, however, reports have been indicating the rise of inter-religious conflicts, especially over the places of worship, as well as intra-religious (sectarian) conflicts within Islam, particularly in relation to the Ahmadiyya and Shi'a communities.

Although often discussed, very rarely these problems have been reviewed in terms of policing. This is quite unfortunate because since the separation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) and the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, POLRI) in 1999, the police has been gradually taking over the major role of maintaining security and public order.

This is what prompted the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi, PUSAD), the Paramadina Foundation, to carry out a research on the subject of religious conflicts policing in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The present book is based on research undertaken between January 2012 and September 2013.

Many persons contributed to the completion of this research, acting both as individuals and on behalf of institutions. Without

their help it would be difficult to imagine the completion of the research and the publication.

We wish to express our gratitude first of all to the interviewees: members of the police, local political leaders, religious leaders and leaders of the mass organizations, executives of the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), the Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, FKUB), and all others who agreed to be interviewed. The information they provided was most valuable, without which we would find it impossible to answer our research questions.

We also would like to thank our field assistants: Muhammad Afdillah, Reynold Uran, Krist Ngga'a, Muhammad Soleh Dahlan, and Syafaat Mohamad. Their familiarities with the fields has ensured the efficiency of our fieldwork. Indirectly, we are also indebted to the institutions and individuals from the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, KontraS) and the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) in Jakarta; Magister Program in Peace and Conflict Resolution (Magister Perdamaian dan Resolusi Konflik, MPRK), and the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), both at the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta; as well as the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) in Surabaya.

Many thanks to Greg Fealy, Sidney Jones, Zainal Abidin Bagir, Haris Azhar, and Asfinawati. Their inputs, at various stages of this work, helped us to sharpen our research questions.

Finally, our utmost appreciation goes to Sandra Hamid and other colleagues from The Asia Foundation, Jakarta office, who not only provided the financial assistance for the research but also the intellectual and moral support for our efforts in finding creative solutions to the problems, which at times made us frustrated.

Jakarta, 25 December 2013

The Authors

## PART I

### INTRODUCTION



# 1

## STUDYING POLICING OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA

This book originated from the research on policing of religious conflicts in the post-New Order Indonesia. We specify two types of religious conflicts in this study that have been on the rise in recent years: (1) the intra-religious or sectarian conflicts caused by the anti-Ahmadi and anti-Shi'a attitudes, and (2) the inter-religious conflicts over the places of worship.

Our research asks two main questions. First, why policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship has been effective in some cases but has not been so in others? Second, what explains the variation of policing success and failure in these conflicts?

The research examined three main sets of variables that can explain the variation in policing. First, we examined the effect of *structural* variables such as legal and procedural frameworks used by the police, the character of the local police organization, the resources and culture of policing, local politics, and the pressure of public opinion. Second, we explore *knowledge-related* variables including police personnel's understanding of the legal and procedural framework, the understanding of conflict issues, and the perception of the

conflicts faced. Finally, we explore the impact of variation in level and types of *interaction* between the conflicting sides and between the parties to the conflict and the police.

This chapter discusses the need for the research (and the book), shows by how far the problem has been discussed in the existing literature; and describes how this research was designed and carried out. Towards the end of this chapter we describe the organization of our research and findings in this book.

### **The Need to Study Policing of Religious Conflicts**

Some of the developments in the management of religious life in the post-New Order Indonesia have been encouraging, some not at all. The incidents of collective inter-religious violence such as those which took place in Ambon, South Maluku and Poso (Central Sulawesi) declined remarkably ten years ago. However, reports are indicating the rise of inter-religious conflicts, especially over the places of worship – their construction, their use, their location, etc. According to the organizations monitoring human rights, including religious freedom, there has been a rise in intra-religious sectarian conflicts, most of which are in relation to the Ahmadi and Shi'a communities.

The question is, in the middle of it all, how does the Indonesian National Police (Polri) play its role? This question needs to be asked, because since its separation from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999, Polri has been gradually taking over the major role of maintaining security and public order. This issue is explicitly stated in the Act No. 2/2002 about the National Police, Article 13, that the principal task of the police is to maintain security and public order; enforce the law; and provide protection and service to the public.

Substantial evidence indicates the failure of the police in responding to conflicts related to places of worship and in handling sectarian violence. Because of the sensitivity surrounding religious conflicts, the police often do not dare to act decisively against the



parties which clearly violate the rights of other groups to exercise their freedom of belief, or they submit to the pressure of the dominant social groups (Asfinawati et al. 2008; KontraS 2012a; ICG 2008 and 2012). Although police's underperformance in such conflicts is well recorded, its spatial variations must still be reviewed and analysed further because examples of effective policing have also emerged (Ali-Fauzi et al. 2009b).

This research was driven by an assumption that performance of the police in dealing with religious conflicts, as well as with all other matters, cannot be viewed in isolation from the surrounding political and institutional context. The failure or success of policing must be situated within existing structures of opportunities and constraints that influence it.

First of all, the police is a state apparatus to uphold the constitution and take orders from political leaders. As stated by Lipsky, "Police may be 'conceived' as 'street-level bureaucrats' who 'represent' government to people" (Lipsky 1980, quoted by della Porta & Reiter 1998: 1). Therefore, the failure of the police to manage religious conflicts must also be seen as the inability or unwillingness of the state in dealing with the problem. This is reflected in the availability or absence of legal frameworks, legislation which guarantees religious freedom and which regulates how the state agencies and authorities, including the police, should act in order to protect that freedom. It is also reflected in the actual support for decisive and appropriate policing which comes from the authorities – executive, legislative, and judicial – and the political elites.

In terms of the society, the success or failure of policing must also be seen from the extent to which the elites and the members of the society, as well as the mass media, are supporting decisive and proper policing. To use the words of Schneider, "Police forces mirror the societies in which they are embedded" (2008: 138). In the context of handling religious conflicts in Indonesia, the police operates amidst challenges which include: the decreasing appreciation of the principle *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* which until now has been considered the

symbol of diversity and tolerance (Muhtadi 2011; Salim HS 2011); the existence of hard-line organizations which undermine the authority of the state (Wilson 2008; Hadiwinata 2009; Jones 2013); and the problems related to Indonesia's democracy which, for example during elections, provide the space to "sell" religion for political advantage (ICG 2008; Bush 2008; Hamid 2012).

The performance of policing must also be seen in the context of roles played by religious leaders and organizations in supporting or inhibiting the implementation of police tasks. Thus far, they seem to be unwilling to decisively oppose the actions that restrain and violate the principle of religious freedom despite its protection being fully guaranteed by the constitution. More alarming yet are the situations when religious leaders either openly or covertly support or condone the above actions (see, for instance, Bruinessen 2013 and Ricklefs 2012). A comparative example can be given here with regard to their attitudes in opposing terrorism: terrorist violence is denounced, but the violence pertaining to sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship is not. Leaders of mass Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah openly oppose terrorism as incompatible with Islam, the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) has issued a fatwa forbidding terrorism. However, this kind of steadiness and courage is not present when conflicts break out over places of worship or when incidents of sectarian violence take place (Ichwan 2013).

How comprehensive has been the study of policing of religious conflicts in Indonesia? Until now the number of studies is very limited. Moreover, existing studies have tend to focus only on religious conflicts or only on the reforms of the police forces in the post-New Order Indonesia not so much on the intersection of policing and religious conflicts.

Studies or general reports concerning religious conflicts have been undertaken by institutions which monitor human rights in Indonesia, particularly in reference to religious freedom. These include the Wahid Institute, Setara Institute, Center for Religious

and Cross-Cultural Studies (Gadjah Mada University) and Human Rights Watch (for the most recent reports from these institutions see Cholil 2013; Naipospos 2013; Azhari 2012; and HRW 2013). Similar studies have also been carried out by others that employ various perspectives, such as human rights, state regulations, social regulations, and the majority-minority relations. For example Salim (2011) examines the conflicts over places of worship in case studies of two churches, Indonesian Christian Church (Gereja Kristen Indonesia, GKI) Yasmin, in Bogor, and Parish (Paroki) St. Joannes Baptista in Parung. He describes in detail the chronology of the two cases and discusses the role of the government, the Interfaith Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, FKUB), and the society in the conflict resolution. The study carried out by Crouch (2010) examines how the Joint Ministerial Regulation (Peraturan Bersama Menteri, PBM), issued in 2006 in order to fix the previous legislation, raises new problems related to the construction and use of places of worship. It also shows how the clauses of the regulation have been utilized by certain groups to inhibit the construction of new places of worship or renovation of the already existing ones.

Other works related to the conflicts over places of worship mention the role of the police, but only briefly. For example Asfinawati et al. (2008) assess the incidents of conflicts related to the Christian places of worship in several places in Indonesia, especially in the West Java, and highlights the failure of the police to protect the religious freedom of minority groups. Meanwhile, the study of Ali-Fauzi et al. (2011) reviews several cases of conflicts involving churches in Jakarta and surrounding areas, some of these conflicts have been settled but some other, including those related to the role of police, are ongoing.

Elsewhere, in Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi (2011) and in Ali-Fauzi et al. (2012), although briefly, the conflicts over places of worship are already discussed and located in the context of the protection of religious freedom. Highlighted as well is the role played by two sectors, namely the state – especially the police – and the civil socie-

ty, in protecting religious freedom in Indonesia. Although not based on systematic empirical studies, both books emphasize that in order to maintain peace and freedom of religion effective police action is needed and that the police should collaborate with the civil society organizations.

In addition to the conflicts related to places of worship, the existing studies on religious conflicts in Indonesia also cover sectarian conflicts, that is conflicts involving different sects within a particular religion, especially Islam. The most often observed by the institutions monitoring religious freedom and increasingly frequent among them have been the incidents of attacks against the Ahmadi and lately also against the Shi'a communities (Cholil 2013; Naipospos 2013; Azhari 2012; and HRW 2013).

Apart from general reports also in-depth studies have been carried out. For example, not long after the government issued the Joint Decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama, SKB) on 9 June 2008, which "froze" the activities of Ahmadiyya, the International Crisis Group (ICG) studied and reported on how the SKB came out due to long-term controversies with regard to the existence of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia). According to ICG (2008: 1), "This joint decree reveals how the radical elements which did not receive much support in Indonesian politics, have managed to create contacts within the government and to apply the standard advocacy techniques of the civil society in order to influence the government policy." Other studies discuss the situation of Ahmadiyya on the local level. Hakim (2005), for example, examines the attack on Ahmadis in East Lombok which occurred in September 2002. According to him, the Muslim group which assaulted the Ahmadis considered them as deviating from the path of *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah*. In addition to this, the Ahmadis were also accused of being aggressive in their proselytizing, and of causing anger in the society.

Attacks on the Ahmadi community, have also occurred in other parts of the island, beside the eastern part of Lombok, as

well as in some locations on West Java, especially in Manir Lor, Kuningan. An outstanding study is available in Asfinawati et al. (2008), where several cases of attacks against Ahmadiyya in West Java were investigated. According to this investigation, there was a certain pattern behind the attacks, including the fatwa issued by the *ulama* whereby Ahmadiyya was deemed a heretical sect; the presence of Muslim thugs who would press on the government to ban the sect; and the apparent failures of the police in taking a firm action to protect the minority religious groups. The authors of the study insisted that in order to guarantee religious freedom, the police must act decisively to protect this freedom, the government must protect the victims (also the persons displaced by conflicts), and the laws regarding religious freedom must be reformed.

Assyaukanie (2009) examines the relationship between the fatwas issued by the highest religious authorities, such as MUI, and the incidents of sectarian violence in Indonesia. According to this study, the fatwas in several places sparked violence and intolerance against certain religious sects and also brought extensive implications on religious life in Indonesia by being institutionalized into the existing religious social networks through the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) among others. The study, however, does not answer why the same fatwas did not lead to violence in different regions.

Other studies highlight the aspects of legislation which result in suspending the right of citizens to freedom of religion or belief. One of the tasks of the House of Representatives (DPR) is to formulate and produce laws that protect and guarantee religious freedom. A study by the Setara Institute concluded that so far there have been no operational rules which would translate the provisions concerning religious freedom stipulated by the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the new Bill of the Guarantees of Freedom of Religion/Belief (RUU Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan – under deliberation in the House of Representatives, 2009-2014) is expected to be

a bill that is not discriminatory and segregative like the Bill of 2003 (Hasani et al. 2011: 53-64; see also Crouch 2013).

Apart from the above mentioned, a number of special in-depth studies were conducted on the effect of the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on blasphemy, which is regarded as one of the “culprits” in the acts of violence against minority religious groups (see especially Crouch 2012, Bagir 2013; and Sihombing 2012). A study was also carried out to analyse why the attempts of various circles to request that the above Act be reviewed by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) ended in failure. According to Margiyono et al., the failure was caused by three factors: (1) the Court’s decision was based on the socio-political considerations and influenced by pressure from the majority group; (2) the conservative perspective of judges; and (3) the judges of the Constitutional Court did not take into account the sociological and anthropological diversity of the Indonesian society (Margiyono et al. 2010: 109-112).

The above discussion shows that in the studies on sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship, not enough attention has yet been given to the role of the police in dealing with these conflicts. The same conclusion can we draw from the general trend of police studies in the post-Reformasi era. This is evident for example in the very informative and interesting study of ICG (2012) titled “The Deadly Cost of Poor Policing,” which is based on three cases of public outrage against the police members in Buol (Central Sulawesi), Kampar (Riau), and Jeneponto (South Sulawesi). In this study the ICG evaluated the community policing (*polmas*) program which is very close to the issue of religious conflicts within the society, and which the police themselves consider an “essential pillar” and a “flagship” of the police reform agenda. According to the ICG, the implementation of the Police Regulation (*Perkap*) which sets the community policing was not optimal because the willingness of the police to learn the new and important issues was relatively low. The ICG quoted a police general who said that police officers were “too lazy to read the manual and they would say they have never seen it

if asked, because in fact [they] do not care" (ICG 2012: 6). In addition to this, there are no mandatory classes on community policing in the 26 State Police Schools in Indonesia (ICG 2012: 7).

Another and more recent study on police reform by Widodo Umar (2009) also does not discuss religious conflicts, despite the fact that the argument is clearly associated with this problem. He criticizes that Polri is directly under the president and that it is a working partner of the committees of the House of Representatives, which opens the possibility of political intervention from policy makers and threatens the autonomy of the police. He also criticizes the policy of developing the district units into a "pyramid-flat", which makes regional police a "fully integrated umbrella", as this can slow down the process of making important decisions. He also suggests that these changes contradict the spirit of democracy which is for strengthening the policy of decentralization (Umar 2009: 4).

In the scarcity of research on the subject, the study and advocacy of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, KontraS) on the role of the police is a breakthrough. In 2012, KontraS (2012a) published the results of their monitoring report on the role of the police in protecting the rights to religion, belief, and worship of minority groups in Jakarta, West Java and Banten. The monitoring was carried out during August and September 2011, with a focus on the case of the Ahmadiyya communities in Manis Lor, Kebayoran Lama, Cikeusik, and the Christian communities of Batak Christian Protestant Church (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, HKBP) in Ciketing and GKI Yasmin. KontraS concluded that the police were often hesitant and indecisive in guarding the principles of the constitution and human rights when they faced pressure from the majority groups and ambiguous legal policies. The police were also seen as not prioritising the early detection mechanisms and lacked the strategy in dealing with the hate speech and hate crimes.

Kontras underlined the inconsistencies between the police action with regard to the use of its internal instruments in the field. Kontras observed that there were many police instruments which provided a strong basis for the protection of minority groups, such as the Police Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on principles and standards of human rights in executing the tasks of the National Police or the Police Regulation No. 7 of 2008 on the basic guidelines and implementation of community policing strategy.

The Kontras report provides data and insights that are useful for analysis of policing of religious conflicts. Although still focused on major cases, their report offered a balanced review of the variations in police performance: where it successfully managed to minimize turbulences as it was seen in Manis Lor and Kebayoran Lama, but also where it was unsuccessful as in the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, the case of HKBP in Ciketing and of the GKI Yasmin.

As a follow-up to the monitoring report, Kontras published guidelines for the police for protection of rights of religious minorities (Kontras 2012b). The handbook is intended for the police personnel in order to give them insight into the matters pertaining to freedom of belief, religion, and worship from the human rights perspective. Protection of human rights discussed in that book is not only derived from the universal principles such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but also from the Indonesian constitution and policies and norms of the police institution itself.

The Kontras manual is important for strengthening the capacity of the police in the field of protection of belief, religion, and worship. Beside the various guarantees of the rights, a number of insights which the police be made aware of, are also discussed: functions and principles of ideal policing; the practice of policing in Indonesia with regard to the right to belief, religion and worship; forms of restrictions of religious beliefs; symbols of hatred and how to counter them; the use of repression for containing violence in the name of



religion etc. The manual shows that the norms and the law to defend the minority beliefs and religious groups already exist and are firmly embedded in the Indonesian context in general and specifically institutionalised for the police.

The question is why, in spite of all that, the police are often hesitant to carry out their duties to protect the right of religious groups to their beliefs and worship? Let us hope it does not signal that at a certain level there are limitations to the human rights perspective. The fact that the police officers know the principles of human rights in the constitution and the norms of the police institution does not necessarily mean that they are willing or able to enforce them. Put differently, there is no direct and automatic relationship between one's knowledge and one's actual behaviour. There are other factors that determine whether a person is willing or able to perform in accordance with the obligations which are already known to her or him.

The research we present here sought to cover the issues which were not discussed in the studies mentioned above. Therefore, we not only focused on the police knowledge with regard to the principles and norms of human rights, although this aspect is certainly very important, but also on the overall context that plays an important role in the policing of religious conflicts. This research takes a closer look at the positive cases, the "lessons learned" that can become examples to be applied elsewhere. Such cases include the policing of the anti-Shi'a conflict in Bangil and the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis Lor, which have often been overlooked in the reports of policing performance.

### **Religious Conflicts and Policing of Religious Conflicts: Concepts and Definitions**

Before proceeding further, there are two main concepts in the research underlying this book which need to be explained in detail, namely: (1) religious conflicts; and (2) policing of religious conflicts. A brief discussion regarding both of them is presented below.

*Religious Conflicts*

By “religious conflicts” we mean “hostilities involving values, claims, and identities based on religious issues or issues that are framed in religious slogans or expressions” (Alam 2009: 155; Ali-Fauzi, Alam, dan Panggabean 2009: 9). Religious conflicts are divided into two major categories, the inter-religious conflicts and the intra-religious conflicts. In this research, inter-religious conflicts are limited to the conflicts over places of worship. For intra-religious conflicts, or sectarian conflicts, we restricted the analysis to the sectarian conflicts among Muslims.

Conflicts over construction of places of worship encompass several conflict issues and factors, such as the Joint Ministerial Regulation (PBM) on the construction of places of worship, and the mechanisms of intimidation. Identity politics constitutes one of the larger social contexts of this conflict. Meanwhile, sectarian conflicts include religious particularisms based on a religious doctrine, the majority-minority relations, religious legal opinions or fatwas, thugery, and intimidation against particular sects.

Sectarian conflicts and the conflicts over places of worship can assume the shape of (1) bilateral collision, when two groups clash in an open conflict, (2) unilateral attack, when one group attacks another group, and (3) open unrest that covers the entire city and involves more parties. The clashes could involve a religious group versus another religious group, or a religious group versus the security forces such as the police and civil guards (police belonging to the local government). Attacks can occur against one person or a group of people, against property or places of worship belonging to a group of people, and against the governmental institutions or property.

In sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship, attacks may assume one or more of the multiple forms of violence, such as intimidation, sweeping, expulsion, hostage-taking, kidnapping, detention, torture, torture until death, murder, shooting, confiscation, sealing, destruction, damage accompanied by looting or burning (of

the particular group's places of worship or real estate), or bombing.

In this study we also sought to assess the various aspects of involvement of the security apparatus in the incidents of religious conflicts. These aspects include: presence of the security forces, timing of their presence, factions or unit of the security forces involved, and the forms of action undertaken by them. Actions of security forces can be divided into several kinds: leaving the crowd alone, overseeing or guarding the crowd, calming down the crowd, dissolving/dispersing the crowd, arrests and other actions allowed by the law enforcement.

#### *Policing of Religious Conflicts*

In this research on policing of religious conflicts we adopt and adapt the model developed by della Porta and Rieter (1998) in order to understand why the police handling of the events of protest or conflict vary in different times and places. The definition they used for policing of protests is here adapted as "policing of religious conflicts" understood as "actions which are carried out by the police in dealing with an incident or incidents of religious conflicts."<sup>1</sup>


In accordance with the della Porta and Rieter's model, a number of factors can be listed as having an important influence on the way the police handles incidents of religious conflicts, the effect of which is understood to be working at two levels. At the first level, policing is influenced by (a) the institutional character of police, (b) political culture and professional culture of the police forces, (c) the configurations of the political power, (d) public opinion, and (e) the police interaction with the actors in the conflict. All these influences are then filtered at the second level, through the (f) police knowledge, which is defined as the police perception of the external reality affecting the policing of conflicts in the field.

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<sup>1</sup>The term "policing" has lately been used more often as it is perceived as more neutral than the term "repression" which is applied to the actors of conflicts or protests, or the term "law enforcement" which is applied to the authorities facing the public or protesters. However, the meanings of these terms are similar.

Factors at work in the first level are referred to as the “structure of opportunities and constraints”, both political and cultural, whose influence on the action of policing in the field is facilitated or mediated by the police knowledge which is at work on the second level. Put in an illustration, figure 1 shows the relationship of structure, knowledge and police action:

Figure 1  
The Relationship of Structure, Knowledge and Police Action



### 1. Structure of Opportunities and Constraints

The structure of opportunities and constraints affecting the existing policing measures has both the relatively stable features as well as volatile ones. The stability refers to (1) the design of the police institution and (2) the structure of the police culture. The volatility refers to (1) the configuration of power, (2) public opinion, and (3) the interactions between the police and the parties to the conflict.

One of the relatively stable components of the structure of opportunities and constraints is the institutional character of the police which is influenced by (1) the legal framework (including legislation which governs constitutional rights, including religious freedom, the police obligation to protect this freedom, and so on) and the organizational structure of the police; (2) the character of the police organization, especially in relation to three factors: the degree

of centralization, the level of accountability, and the level of militarization. Apart from the institutional variables, cultural structure is also a relatively stable one. Cultural structure refers to the political culture, especially the idea of the state and constitutional rights, as well as the professional culture of the police.

The unstable structure of opportunities and constraints refers to the power configuration that determines the position or policy of policing. For example, in the comparative study on Italy and Germany, della Porta (1995) showed that the policing of protests was “softer” and more tolerant when government strongholds were held by the left-wing, while under the reign of the right-wing camps “harsher” strategies of policing protests were selected.

The position of the government and its actual policy is also influenced by the pressure of public opinion such as political parties, interest groups, civil society organizations, and – in case of religious conflicts – also by religious groups or religious organizations. The public opinion associated with policing is usually split into two camps: the one which wants the government to use “harsher” policing strategies, called by della Porta and Rieter, the “law enforcement coalition”, and the one which wants the government to take a “softer” strategy, the “civil rights coalition.”

In the context of policing in Indonesia, such polarization is more appropriately used in cases of non-religious conflicts. The camp called the “civil rights coalition” is often criticising “harsh” policing strategies, and instead demands “softer” policing in handling of non-religious conflicts such as land disputes, industrial conflicts, etc. However, in the context of policing religious conflicts, the polarization takes a different shape. Since the religious conflicts generally entail violations of religious freedom and violence against religious minorities, law enforcement demands are voiced usually by the “civil rights coalition” which emphasises the right to freedom of religion. Their opposition here, that is the camp which is more likely to defend the religious rights of the majority, perhaps can be referred to as “majoritarian” camp.

In the interaction between the public opinion and the position or policy of the government, della Porta and Rieter put the media as a third party, which to some extent plays the role of the “majoritarian” camp’s spokesperson and at other times positions itself as a spokesperson for the “civil rights coalition” camp. The media can also act on the basis of “its own logic.”

The important thing to be discussed with regard to the role of media is the media bias in creating certain frames of the events of conflict or protests. Their bias can be caused by the ideological position, personal bias (of a journalist or editor), or the pragmatic-commercial interests.

Another factor affecting the policing is the interaction between the police and the actors involved in the conflict. The effects of this interaction can influence policing strategies towards specific events or the long-term policing strategies. The influence on latter is referred to by della Porta and Rieter as “elephant’s memory” in the sense that the history of the interaction between the police and parties to the conflict constitutes an important element affecting the current policing practices. An example of influence on the policing strategy in specific events can be the situation whereby a protest or a rally is seen by the police as having exceeded the given deadlines which prompts them to change the policing strategy from persuasion to harsher tactics such as dispersing or arresting the demonstrators.<sup>2</sup> An example of influence on the long-term interaction between the police and protesters or parties to the conflict is when the police unit becomes no longer capable of handling certain types of protests and conflicts and the police has to form a special unit to address them.

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<sup>2</sup>Quoting Monjardet (1990), della Porta and Reiter mention that there are at least three mechanisms in police intervention that result in escalation: (1) the dialectic of centralization and autonomy in police units; (2) the difficulty to coordinate different groups; and (3) uncertainty about the purpose of the intervention (della Porta and Rieter 1998: 21).

## 2. The Police Knowledge

As it was already mentioned earlier, the police knowledge is their perception of their roles and of the external reality they face. Della Porta and Reiter (1998) suggest several reasons why the term “knowledge” is more appropriate than the term “impression”.


First, this issue is related to the “great discretion” owned by the individual police officers. Although the police is equipped with a number of rules and guidelines for action, during the intervention the police officers generally act on the basis of “their assessment of the situation,” and only then on the basis of “rules and regulations.” Thus, the police officer’s perception of external reality is not subordinate to the written rules and regulations, but it is of equal importance for carrying out her or his duties.

Second, the use of the term “knowledge” is considered more appropriate because it is related to the vast and deep knowledge required for the policing. The police cannot simply act on the basis of their impressions, stereotypes or prejudices, but should have in-depth knowledge of the situation they are addressing.

Third, the use of the term “knowledge” is also related to the quality of interconnection between the perception and the external reality. For example, the police make a distinction between “non-professional demonstrators” and “professional demonstrators.” This distinction was born from the processes involving institutional pressure, orders of the superiors, as well as past experiences. It was also influenced by the media, public opinion, and reflection upon the media coverage of the demonstrations. By “knowledge” della Porta and Rieter mean that the police knowledge is what Berger and Luckman (1966) named as “social construction of reality.”

The relationship of all the above factors in influencing the policing activities, as well as variables relevant for determining the style of policing, can be schemed in the following illustration:

Figure 2  
A Model to Explain the Style of Policing



### Variables and Indicators in Policing of Religious Conflicts

A brief discussion on a number of variables explored in our research is given below in order to highlight the structure of the following chapters.

#### 1. Incident of conflict

The incidents of conflict will be described by the following indicators: the date of the incident, the location of the incident, the is-



sue of conflict (sectarian/place of worship), the form of the incident (peaceful protest/assault/demolition), chronology of the incident, trigger factors, the actors involved in the conflict, tools/weapons used, the impact of violence inflicted (fatalities/ material loss), and whether the incident was a new conflict or a recurrence of an old one.

## 2. Policing activities

Policing activities will be described according to their phase (preemptive, prevention, mitigation, post-conflict) and will cover the following aspects: the function of intelligence (*intel*), community affairs (*binmas*), community relations (*humas*), crowd control (*dalmas*), and criminal investigation (*reskrim*), resources deployed (units, number, level), type of action (persuasion, repression, protection of targets or victims); and the timing of policing.

## 3. Police knowledge

Police knowledge refers to the following aspects: (1) police knowledge and understanding of the legal and procedural frameworks of policing religious conflicts; (2) police understanding of the issue of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship; (3) perception and police assessment of the level of threat/disruption of public order.

## 4. Legal and procedural framework of policing and institutional character of the National Police

The legal and procedural framework of policing is explored through the review of: (1) the legal framework related to religious issues (regulations on places of worship, abuse of religion/blasphemy, and the role of the police in the protecting human rights/religious freedom/religious minorities); (2) procedural framework of policing as outlined in a number of regulations (Police Chief Regulation, Standard Operating Procedures) which set the functions and mechanisms of collecting information (*pulbaket*) and crowd control

(*dalmas*); and (3) the institutional character of police reflected in a number of regulations on the organization and administration of the National Police on the level of police stations, district or regional police commands (*polres* and *polda*).

## 5. Police culture

The police culture in this research refers to: (1) culture of the members of the police in terms of their perceptions of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance; and (2) the professional culture of the police in terms of their perception of the role of the police in a democratic system, as well as their stereotypes and prejudices towards the parties to the conflict (both the attackers and the victims).

## 6. Local politics

Local politics is understood as: (1) local policies (as stated in the regional or , gubernatorial regulations, etc.) on the regulations regarding construction of places of worship; and (2) the attitudes of elites at the local level of governance (local government, local parliament) towards the emerging conflict issues.

## 7. Public opinion

Public opinion is understood as the views or attitudes of religious leaders or religious organizations, FKUB, activists of NGOs, and the media coverage regarding: (1) the occurring sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship; and (2) the action of policing sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship carried out by the police.

## 8. Interaction between the police and the parties to the conflict

There are two kinds of interactions between the police and the actors involved in the conflict: (1) the actions and interventions of the police in the sectarian conflict and conflicts over places of worship; and (2) the action taken against the warring parties. These interactions take

place before the occurrence of conflict/violence, upon its occurrence, and after it had occurred. Police represents the power of the state in enforcing the law and maintaining order before, during, and after the incidents of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship.

### Cases Selection and Data Sources

To understand the variations in policing of religious conflicts, this research uses a comparative perspective with the following case-selection method:

1. Sets of eight cases are studied. This amount allows us to give an in-depth and comparative analysis of the problem of religious conflicts policing.
2. The eight cases are divided into two groups based on the information available before the thorough research was carried out. These two groups cover: four cases in which the conflict escalated into violence (failed policing), and four cases in which conflict could be managed with the result that there was no outbreak of violence (successful policing).
3. Of the four cases in which the conflicts did not escalate into violence, as specified above, two involved a sectarian conflict and two other a conflict over places of worship. The same pattern was applied to the four cases of conflicts which escalated into violence.
4. In each case, the research focused on the role played by the police and took into account the factors which shaped it.

With these four selection criteria the research examined and compared the policing of the anti-Ahmadiyya sectarian conflicts in Manis Lor (Kuningan) and Cikeusik (Pandeglang); the anti-Shi'a sectarian conflict in Bangil (Pasuruan) and Sampang (Madura); inter-religious conflicts related to the churches in Bekasi (HKBP Filadelfia) and Bogor (GKI Yasmin); and inter-religious conflicts related to the construction of prayer rooms (*musala*)/mosques in Batu-plat (Kupang) and Wolobheto (Ende).

We relied on various sources, particularly our interviews with leaders and members of the local police forces, local government officials, members of the elite and of local civil society organizations such as FKUB and MUI, religious leaders and youth. We also used the documents related to the conflict events, most of which were unpublished materials such as protocols of meetings, police investigation reports (*Berita Acara Pemeriksaan*, BAP), and many others. We also took advantage of the mass media coverage, slides of presentations delivered on various occasions, as well as video documentations, some of which were uploaded and made public and some were not. For the purpose of comparison, we have also examined reports on religion-related conflicts, governmental regulations related to the subject, and other relevant studies.

To make our descriptions and analyses easier to read, most of the above sources are introduced directly and concisely in the body text, with successive references to the names of the authors, years of publication and – if necessary – the page number (for example, Kontras 2012: 13). Sources obtained from the interviews are also mentioned in this way, with the name or initials – if there were objections to providing the full name – and the date of the interview. Sources to which reference requires more space – media coverage or unpublished materials like investigation reports – are mentioned in footnotes.

### **Structure of the Book**

The book is divided into four major parts which together constitute eleven chapters. After the “Introduction” in Part I, Part II contains descriptions and analyses of cases of sectarian conflicts, in four chapters: chapter 2 and 3 on the anti-Ahmadiyya conflicts in Manis Lor (Kuningan) and Cikeusik (Pandeglang); and chapter 4 and 5 on the anti-Shi’a conflicts in Sampang (Madura) and Bangil (Pasuruan).

In Part III, we present the research findings regarding the cases of inter-religious conflicts associated with the construction of places of worship – churches, mosques or prayer rooms. It consists of four

chapters: chapter 6 and 7 on the conflicts related to HKBP Filadelfia (Bekasi) and GKI Yasmin (Bogor); and chapters 8 and 9 related to the prayer rooms/mosques Nur Musafir (Kupang) and Abdurrahman (Ende).

Finally, in Part IV we present the conclusions and recommendations based on this study. Chapter 10 contains a synthesis of the research findings on all of the above cases, while in chapter 11 we present a number of recommendations for the conflicted parties, police, government (especially local governments), FKUB, civil society organizations, and the media.

In the appendix, we describe our research instruments. These include the list of questions we asked in the interviews, which is meant to serve as an illustration for the reader of how the two main questions of this research were fractioned to the more technical and detailed ones. \*\*\*



## PART II

### POLICING OF SECTARIAN CONFLICTS





## 2

# THE CASE OF ANTI-AHMADIYYA IN MANIS LOR, KUNINGAN

### **Foreword**

The conflict involving the Ahmadis and their opponents in Manis Lor village, Jalaksana district, Kuningan regency, West Java, has a fairly long history. The last event, which took place in 2010, has repeated the pattern present in the previous conflicts.

Having learnt from the past experiences and having first applied the measures of persuasion and negotiation, in 2010, the police exerted a greater force. Police action in this case provides an important lesson that the police can act decisively in spite of the strong majority pressure against the Ahmadiyya community. Limitations, obstacles and challenges faced by the police must continue to be addressed as they give no excuse to the police to resist from acting firmly against the perpetrators of violence. When the police acted decisively, as it did in Manis Lor in 2007 and 2010, violence was halted.

This chapter highlights the above events and the way the police carried out their duties to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section gives a general picture of Kuningan regency and Manis Lor village,

especially in terms of religion. In the second section, we will review the short history of the Manis Lor Ahmadiyya conflict until the 2010 incident. The third section examines the police handling of the conflict with all its strengths and shortcomings. The chapter ends with conclusions and recommendations.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography in Manis Lor**

Kuningan regency is located in the eastern part of West Java and borders with Central Java. Its location as a connecting hub between the East Priangan, Cirebon region, and Central Java makes it very strategic. Kuningan can be accessed via Majalengka and Ciamis from the west and south or through Cirebon from the north. The Manis Lor village in Jalaksana district is situated in the middle of the highway connecting Cirebon and Kuningan.

According to the 2010 census, Kuningan regency was inhabited by 1,037,558 people (Central Statistical Office data — BPS Kabupaten Kuningan 2010: 6), who lived in 32 districts, 15 administrative villages, and 361 villages. As indicated by the same census, Manis Lor village was populated by 4,133 persons of the total 45,257 inhabitants of the Jalaksana district (BPS Kabupaten Kuningan 2010: 7). In 2010, the population of Kuningan based on their religious affiliation was as follows: Islam, 1,003,709; Catholicism, 7,094; Protestantism, 1,711; Buddhism, 375; Hinduism, 28; and “other”, 4 people.<sup>1</sup>

There are no exact figures on the number of Ahmadiyya followers in Kuningan. But various sources mention that there are more than 3000 people. This number is roughly equal to the estimation given by the Ahmadis of Manis Lor themselves. Since the majority of the village inhabitants are Ahmadis, the village head office in Manis Lor is almost always held by a member of Ahmadiyya.

There appear to be no significant occupational or socio-economic differences between the Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis in Manis Lor.

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<sup>1</sup>Ministry of Religious Affairs, Kuningan Regency, quoted in *Kuningan dalam Angka* (2011): 75-76.

Only in terms of residence, Ahmadi settlements are more concentrated in the western part of the village (next to the Cirebon highway), while the non-Ahmadi (and anti-Ahmadi) community lives mostly in the eastern part of the village or around the village's main mosque, Al-Huda.

In everyday activities such as farming and trade, the Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi residents of Manis Lor interact normally. But in matters of worship, the Ahmadi community has its own traditions, one of which does not allow them to pray in a congregation with non-Ahmadis. This urges them to have their own places of worship.<sup>2</sup>

The Ahmadi community of Manis Lor runs one mosque and seven *musala*. The mosque, An-Nur, has a mission house next to it, which is inhabited by the Ahmadi missionaries. In the neighbourhood, there is a junior high school, Amal Bhakti, managed mostly by Ahmadis. During the last ten years, the mosque and the *musala* of Ahmadis have often been the targets of mobs or were sealed by the local government.

### Anti-Ahmadi Conflict in Manis Lor

The Ahmadiyya teachings were introduced to Manis Lor in 1954, by an Ahmadi missionary H. Bashari Hasan who was well received by the local residents. The Manis Lor village head back then, Bening, and the village secretary, Soekrono, were among the first persons to join Ahmadiyya. The number of Ahmadis in Manis Lor continued to increase and soon almost the entire village joined the Ahmadi congregation. Because of its strategic role, on 20 February 1956, the central branch of the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia (JAI) in Kuningan regency was inaugurated in Manis Lor.

The spread of Ahmadi teachings in Manis Lor was not without obstacles and challenges. Kontras (2012a: 7) reports that in 1954, Bening spent five days in police custody at the insistence of Manis

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<sup>2</sup>See the letter of Jemaat Ahmadiyya Indonesia, Manis Lor branch No. 005/JAI/III/2011 15 March 2011, regarding imam and *khatib* during Friday prayers.

Lor clerics who accused him of causing damage to Islam and dividing the society. Kontras also mentions the occurrence of physical assaults against the Manis Lor Ahmadi in 1976, but details are not given.

Beyond that, however, for quite a long time, there was no record of tensions or conflicts with regard to the presence of Ahmadi in Manis Lor. On the contrary, Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi residents cooperated well in various social activities. This was confirmed by Mustafa, vice-chairman of the JAI Kuningan (interview, 20 February 2013). According to him, prior to 2002, "The Ahmadi community was perfectly safe. In the social and community affairs, residents were united and joined together to build the village hall and village mosque." At that time, the public was not as busy as it is now with the pro-contra discourse on the issue of Ahmadiyya.

#### *Conflict Escalation, 2002-2007*

The long peace in Manis Lor was disturbed in 2002.<sup>3</sup> The village head, Yusuf Ahmadi, who at the same time is one of the Ahmadiyya Manis Lor leaders, claims (interview, 18 February 2013) that the atmosphere began to change after a seminar which was held by the Institute for Research and Islamic Studies (LPPI) on 11 August 2002, in Jakarta. In the seminar, which was also attended by a number of Muslim leaders from Kuningan (including Manis Lor), it was stated that Ahmadiyya was misguided and ought to be disbanded. Since then, banners denouncing Ahmadiyya began to pop up along the main road of Manis Lor.

A month after the seminar, on 14 September 2002, a number of Muslim leaders, who were facilitated by the MUI Kuningan, met to urge the local government to disband the Ahmadiyya congregation in Manis Lor. Their demands were put into a written state-

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<sup>3</sup>According to several sources, this began even earlier with destruction of the mosque during Ramadan 2001 (1422 H).

ment on behalf of the MUI Kuningan and forwarded to various governmental institutions of the district, provincial and national level.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, at the local level, the tensions continued. Their shape varied from banners with insults like “Infidel/Deviant Ahmadis” to destruction of At-Taqwa and Al-Hidayah Musala and a number of houses belonging to the Ahmadi community on 24 October 2002. The perpetrators are known to be residents of the village and of the villages neighbouring Manis Lor. One of the groups which aggressively challenges the presence of Ahmadiyya is the Youth of Masjid Al-Huda (Remaja Masjid Al-Huda, RUDAL) in Manis Lor.<sup>5</sup>

Due to various pressures against Ahmadiyya, the district government approached the Ahmadis and the RUDAL. On 3 November 2002, ahead of Ramadan 1423 H, the Kuningan government issued a Joint Decree (SKB) on the prohibition of the teachings and activities of the Ahmadiyya (Kontras 2012a: 7). This decree was signed by the Kuningan regent, H. Arifin Setiamihardja, local government officials (members of the Regional Leaders Consultation or Muspida), chairman of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) Kuningan regency, MUI Kuningan, as well as a number of Kuningan Islamic organizations and Islamic boarding schools leaders.<sup>6</sup>

The issuing of the SKB was followed by numerous assaults against Ahmadis and their property in Manis Lor, the earliest of which took place on 10 November 2002 (the 5 of Ramadan 1423

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<sup>4</sup>See letter No. 72/MUI-Kab/IX/2002 dated 18 September 2002.

<sup>5</sup>Musala At-Taqwa and Al-Hidayah are located in the eastern part of the village which is predominantly non-Ahmadi (Mustafa, vice-chairman of the JAI Manis Lor, interview, 20 February 2013).

<sup>6</sup>The SKB was issued before the regent (*bupati*) election in 2003, in which the then regent Arifin Setiamihardja wanted to run again. The parties who signed the decree were the Kuningan regent, leadership of Kuningan DPRD, chief prosecutor of Kuningan, District Military Command 0615, Kuningan police chief, Secretariat of Kuningan Regency, chairman of the FKPP Kuningan, MUI Kuningan chairman, chairman of the Muhammadiyah Kuningan, NU Kuningan chairman, DPC GUPPI, DPD Nahdlatul Anwar, Anti-Vice Movement (Gerakan Anti Maksiat, GAMAS), Muslim Association (Persatuan Umat Islam, PUI), Robithah Ma’ahid Islamiyah, MDI, Islamic University Al-Ihya, and Thoriqoh Idaroh Syu’biyah.

H), a week after the release of the SKB. The assaults and acts of vandalism were occurring also throughout December 2002, January 2003, until the end of December 2003. Three *musalas* and more than 30 homes of the Ahmadi community were damaged. Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) tells that some of the perpetrators were reported, even caught and handed over directly to the police, but the cases were never followed up and violence continued.

Pressure against the Ahmadis was reinforced by the government discrimination through the coordinating team of the Monitoring of the Mystical Beliefs in the Society (PAKEM). In their report, PAKEM issued a statement that "Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia, Manis Lor branch, is not Islamic" and it "does not want to accept the decree of 2002." PAKEM requested the authorities to "take up more repressive actions in accordance with the recommended steps." What is meant by "repressive actions" here is to probe the Ahmadis considered to be violating the decree (this part was addressed to the Kuningan police), to not register Ahmadi marriages (addressed to the Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs), and to not issue national identity cards to the followers of Ahmadiyya (addressed to the head of Jalaksana sub-district).<sup>7</sup>

A few months later, in February 2003, due to the objections of Ahmadis, general directorate of the Kesbangpol (Agency for Protection of National Unity, Politics, and Public) of the Interior Ministry requested that the decree was withdrawn as it was based on the signatures of the leaders of organizations and religious schools, and thus was not a legal document.<sup>8</sup> However, the measures under-

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<sup>7</sup>PAKEM team letter dated 23 December 2002, No. B-460/0.2.22/ Dsp.5/12/2002 to Kuningan police, No. B-461/0.2.22/ Dsp.5/12/2002 to Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and No. B-462/0.2.22/Dsp.5/12/2002 to the head of Jalaksana sub-district.

<sup>8</sup>Letter of the general directorate of the Kesbangpol No. 450/104/2003 dated 25 February 2003 to Kuningan regent.

taken earlier by the government through the PAKEM and based on the SKB decree were never annulled and intimidation against Ahmadiyya continued.

Realising the weak legal basis of the document, on 20 December 2004, the Kuningan local government re-issued a similar decree. As the previous SKB, the second one also contained prohibition against the teachings and activities of Ahmadiyya in Kuningan, with an additional command of supervision and guidance to the relevant agencies. The difference was that the second decree was signed only by the government: the regent, H. Aang Hamid Suganda (elected in 2003); the chief prosecutor, M. Syaeful; and the head of the Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Drs. H. MA. Syarifuddin.<sup>9</sup>

On 30 July 2005, after the release of the second decree, the government through the municipal police closed the An-Nur Mosque, seven of the Ahmadiyya musalas, as well as the community meeting and mission houses. Ahmadiyya filed a lawsuit related to the SKB to the State Administrative Court, but it was dismissed as a case which was not under the court's jurisdiction. For several months, the congregation meetings and prayers were carried out at private houses. When the atmosphere gradually calmed down, Ahmadi re-opened their mosque and prayer rooms in mid-2006.

Until the end of November 2007, there was no reaction from the anti-Ahmadiyya parties, but soon the Muslim Component of Kuningan Regency (Komponen Muslim Kabupaten Kuningan, KOMPAK) sent a letter to the board of JAI Manis Lor, in which they demanded the JAI members to stop claiming that they were Muslims, to stop their activities, and to dismantle all of their activity sites. If the demands were not met within 15 days, the KOMPAK declared they were "ready to fight and halt the Ahmadiyya in accordance with the

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<sup>9</sup>See the decree signed by the Kuningan regent, Kuningan chief prosecutor, and head of the Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs No. 451.7/KEP.58-Pem.Um/2004, No. KEP-857/0.2.22/ Dsp.5/12/2004 and No. Kd.10.08/6/ST.03/1471/2004, dated 20 December 2004.

instructions of the SKB, and with help of the units of Islamic jihad movement.”<sup>10</sup>

In addition to the letter, they also spread threats through banners mounted around the Manis Lor village. For example, RUDAL declared that “Ahmadis are clearly deviant and misleading. The blood of Ahmadiyya is *halal* (religion), the blood of Ahmadiyya is *haram* (country).”<sup>11</sup> Banner of KOMPAK read “When the action of bureaucracy is barren, the jihad action comes. Avoid anarchy, make sure the Ahmadiyya is finished. Ahmadiyya be miserable in this world, be in hell in the hereafter.” At the entrance to the Manis Lor village a large banner was installed with the SKB and the statement of Anti-Ahmadi Movement (Gerakan Anti Ahmadiyah, GERAH) that read: “Ahmadiyya is absolutely not Islam. Its teachings are heretical and they destroy Islam. A Muslim Who Supports Ahmadiyya = Apostate.” Later the Kuningan police also put up a banner underneath, which read, “We are all brothers, avoid violence and vigilantism.”

When the atmosphere was increasingly tense, the Muspida and Muspika met both sides to find a solution. Shortly afterwards, on 13 December 2007, the Kuningan local government ordered municipal police to shut down three places of worship and a meeting hall

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<sup>10</sup>Letter of KOMPAK No. 01/KM.KK/XI/2007 dated 19 November 2007 was also forwarded to Muspida Kuningan and Muspika Jalaksana. It contained provocative statements such as: “Muslims who do not suppress Ahmadiyya sin every day”; “Halal is the blood of followers, supporters and defenders of Ahmadiyya”; and “More fortunate is a Muslim who dies in prison and goes to paradise than a Muslim who dies outside prison / at home and who is not certain he would enter paradise later.” The letter was signed by representatives of GERAH Manis Lor, chairman of RUDAL Manis Lor, caretaker of Al-Muttaq Madrasah in Manis Lor, chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood Forum (Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, FUI) Kuningan, chairman of the Bima Suci Pencak Silat Association (IPS) Kuningan, chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) Kuningan, chairman of the Laskar Jihad in Kuningan, chairman of the Gabungan Inisiatif Barisan Anak Siliwangi (GIBAS) Kuningan, chairman of the Kuningan People’s Front (Barisan Rakyat Kuningan, BARAK), chairman of the Anti-Vice Movement (Gerakan Anti Maksiat, GAMAS) Kuningan, as well as a number of religious scholars and Islamic boarding schools leaders of Kuningan.

<sup>11</sup>Which broadly means: the blood of Ahmadis can be shed (allowed, despite the fact that bloodshed is forbidden in Islam); the blood of Ahmadis is unclean (to be in the country).



belonging to the Ahmadi community.<sup>12</sup> After negotiating with Ahmadis and under the pressure of KOMPAK, which already gathered a crowd, the municipal police eventually closed down the An-Nur Mosque and At-Takwa and Al-Hidayah Musala.

On 18 December 2007, various organizations under the Association of Indonesian Muslims (Gabungan Umat Islam Indonesia, GUII) which found that closing of the Ahmadiyya places of worship was not enough, deployed about 700 people to Manis Lor. Their target was the An-Nur Mosque. Ahmadis at the site, mostly women, were already sitting on the road and praying together. Since the attackers could not break through police barricades and were several times driven away with tear gas, they entered through the small alleys and targeted the *musalas*. Besides ransacking At-Taqwa and Al-Hidayah Musala, they also destroyed eight houses belonging to Ahmadis and injured seven Ahmadi residents who were trying to protect the prayer rooms.<sup>13</sup>

The December 2007 incident marked the expansion of the anti-Ahmadiyya movement in terms of its scope and identity of the actors. Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) mentioned that while earlier opposition arrived from Kuningan, since 2007 it was also drawn from outside the regency, whereas the local opposition in Manis Lor weakened. The opposing groups involved were not only of Islamic background, but also regional ones such as GIBAS or sports organizations such as Ikatan Pencak Silat (IPS) Bima Suci.

More than that, the incident also marked a change in the attitude of the police against the perpetrators. *First*, the police exerted its power and curbed the mob, even though it failed to anticipate the violent acts of individuals who then entered the village through sideway alleys. *Second*, after the incident the police captured the

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<sup>12</sup>Warrant No. 300/4778/POL.PP./2007 signed by the vice-regent of Kuningan, Aan Suharso.

<sup>13</sup>Detailed chronology of December 2007 events can be seen in the narrative of Muhammad Kodim, "Selasa yang Nestapa di Manis Lor," <http://isamujahid.wordpress.com/manislор-menangis> (accessed 18 October 2012).

perpetrators and followed up their cases until conviction. In this event, six defendants were sentenced to one month and 25 days in jail, minus time spent in arrest — five days less than the two months demanded by the prosecutor. The verdict was almost equal to the period of their detention before the trial, so they were free shortly after the court decision was handed down.<sup>14</sup>

Although he was not satisfied with the court ruling, Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) acknowledged that in this event “the police dared to take severe measures.” This was unprecedented as previous reports of Ahmadis who were subjected to violence were never processed by the police on the grounds of absence of evidence and witnesses.

Amid all its limitations, the police through its decisive action during the 2007 incident has succeeded in curtailing the conflict. Destruction and persecution, which previously often took place, immediately stopped. Commenting on this, one of the members of the police (interview, 19 February 2013) stated, “maybe people are afraid of being imprisoned.”

After the joint decree (SKB) was issued in 2008, Ahmadis reopened their mosque and *musalas*. Intimidating banners including the SKB banner of Kuningan regent was removed. Until the tensions and mass mobilization of 2010, Manis Lor was experiencing a period of calm.

### *July 2010 Incident: Repeating Patterns*

The 2010 incident, like the previous one, began with the demands of Islamic organizations to close the places of worship of the Ahmadis in Manis Lor. They voiced their demands during demonstration on 2 March 2010 and in meetings on 1 and 14 June 2010 (Kontras 2012a: 10). The 14 June 2010 meeting was attended by the MUI, officials from Muspida, religious scholars and leaders

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<sup>14</sup>During the trial hundreds of activists of Islamic organizations held a solidarity action in front of the court. See <http://news.liputan6.com/read/154907/terdakwa-perusakan-masjid-Ahmadiyyah-divonis-bersalah> (accessed 18 October 2012).

of organizations. The signs of crowd mobilization were detected by the Kuningan district police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, who on 17 June passed the information to the Ahmadi community.

As a follow-up to the meeting, the MUI Kuningan composed a letter of recommendation to the regent for closing down the Ahmadi facilities.<sup>15</sup> When the local government informed the Ahmadis about this plan, the community immediately rejected it. Nevertheless, on 25 July 2010, the regent issued a sealing warrant. In the letter, he mentioned the grounds for closing were provided by organizations, religious scholars and the MUI leaders. Unabatedly, the regent ordered the municipal police to seal eight places of Ahmadi worship and community activities.<sup>16</sup>

The sealing of An-Nur Mosque was carried out on 26 July 2010. The head of Kuningan municipal police, Indra Purwanto, assisted by the Kuningan district police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, approached the Ahmadi community to submit the sealing plan and inform of the possibility of an anti-Ahmadi mobilization. The Ahmadis rejected the plan and called for a dialogue to avoid clashes. Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013) immediately coordinated with the regent and the local leaders. Dialogue was scheduled on the evening the same day in Kuningan parliament building, but it failed after the representative of the Ahmadis, Deden Sujana, told he was unable to attend.<sup>17</sup>

The sealing efforts were made again two days later, on 28 July 2010, around 06:30 am. Accompanied by the Kuningan district police, the municipal police sealed the mosque and four *musalas* without awaiting approval of the Ahmadis. The Ahmadis removed the bar and seals that have been installed and pelted municipal police

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<sup>15</sup>This MUI Kuningan recommendation letter to the regent, dated 24 June 2010, No. 38/MUI-kab/VI/2010, was also signed by the leaders of the Kuningan branches of Nahdlatul Ulama, DMI, GARIS, Persis, Muhammadiyah, FKPP, GAMAS, and PUI.

<sup>16</sup>Kuningan regent's decree No. 451.2/2065/SAT.POL.PP dated 25 July 2010, was signed by the Kuningan regent, Aang Hamid Suganda. See also Kontras (2012a: 8).

<sup>17</sup>Notification of absence was submitted in written form. See Kontras 2012a: 8-10 & 33 or Setara 2010: 7.

officers with stones. Sealing efforts finally stopped (Kontras 2012a: 8; see also Setara 2010: 7).

This triggered the organizations which earlier intended to mobilize the masses to Manis Lor village. After the failed sealing, on 29 July 2010, police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February, 2013) received a notification letter of *istigasah* at Al-Huda Mosque, Manis Lor. The news of *istigasah* was widely reported in the local media. One member of the police intelligence (interview, 19 February 2013) said that during that time provocation and calls for mobilization were circulated via SMS (short message service) and phone calls to the religious scholars and citizens of Kuningan.

Jalaksana sub-district police chief, Rudi Rahmat (interview, 21 February 2013), estimated that the crowd present at *istigasah* on 29 July 2010, was between 1,000 to 1,500 people. Aside from Kuningan, the masses arrived from Region III of West Java and Priangan. According to the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013), the masses arrived from Cirebon, Tasikmalaya, Garut, and Cianjur. Organizations involved included the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) Cirebon, GAMAS, Anti-Apostasy and Deviant Sects Movement (Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Alirat Sesat, GAPAS), FPI, FUI, Wali City Communication Forum (Forum Silaturahmi Kota Wali, FOSKAWAL) Cirebon, Reformist Islam Movement (Gerakan Reformis Islam, GARIS) and Siluman Troops (Pasukan Siluman, Silaturahmi Antar Umat Manusia) (see Hasani & Naipospos 2010; Setara Institute 2010: 130; and Kontras 2012a: 9).

During the *istigasah*, leaders of organizations, madrasas, and kiais, took turns in delivering speeches, some of which contained provocation to carry out attacks against Ahmadis. Kuningan Regent, Aang Hamid Suganda, and police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, were present and appealed that no acts of violence be committed.<sup>18</sup> Un-

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<sup>18</sup>Police video documentation, "Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010).wmv".

satisfied with this appeal, around 11:00 am the mob began to move towards An-Nur Mosque. Meanwhile, the Ahmadi residents were already preparing to defend the mosque. They collected stones and put used-tires in the middle of the road. The West Java police mobile brigade and the Kuningan police were on standby where the two parties stood against each other. To avoid recurrence of 2007 events, policemen guarded all alleys leading to the Ahmadi *musalas* in Manis Lor (Jalaksana police head Rudi Rahmat, interview, 21 February 2013). Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, personally lead her officers at the location.

The anti-Ahmadi mob kept on pushing until the confrontation with authorities was inevitable. They pelted officers with stones and were answered with tear gas. The police barricade eventually collapsed. Both parties then engaged in a stone pelting war, but there was no close-range or direct physical clash. Crowd members who faced the Ahmadis were seen waving hard and sharp objects such as stones, wooden beams and sword. The clashes subsided after the noon prayer time. The police then gathered strength and finally managed to disperse the crowd.<sup>19</sup>

Five people were wounded in the incident, all from pelted stones: one member of Ahmadiyya, one officer from the Cirebon mobile brigade, and three from the anti-Ahmadiyya mob. Meanwhile, a number of houses belonging to the Ahmadi community were damaged after being hit by stones (Kontras 2012a: 8-10). No perpetrators were arrested or prosecuted, but the Jalaksana police head, Rudi Rahmat, mentions (interview, 21 February 2013) that after the events, the police chief, Yoyoh, had summoned a number of organizations' leaders and warned them that she would not hesitate to arrest anyone who commits criminal acts.

Since then (and until this report was concluded), there was no more incident of a large-scale conflict involving mob mobilization

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<sup>19</sup>Police video documentation, "Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010).wmv". See also Kontras 2012a: 33.

and large numbers of police troops. However, it does not mean that there is no conflict potential. Discriminatory policies against the Ahmadiis are still occurring; these include demands to remove religion column in electronic identity cards (E-KTP) of Ahmadiis, the rejection to register their marriages and to arrange *hajj* pilgrimage for them, or refusals to build their school libraries.

Series of incidents in Manis Lor reveal a repeating pattern. Stages of protests, demands, threats, sealing, opening the seals and mob mobilization could be found in almost every case. Some of them coincided with periods or events such as (the fasting month of) Ramadan, village head elections or regent elections. What distinguishes each conflict from the previous ones was the level of escalation, from local conflicts in the village, then beyond the district, then beyond the regency. In this case, the Kuningan police managed to learn from the previous experiences.

### **Dynamics of Policing the anti-Ahmadiyya Conflict in Manis Lor**

Because of its long history and recurrence, the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict has been a major concern of the Kuningan police. This section will review how the police handled the conflict in 2010, with all the knowledge, culture and legal-procedural framework it had. In relation to policing activities, we will also discuss the local politics, public opinion, and the police interaction with the parties to the conflict.

#### *Policing Activities*

A month before the events of 29 July 2010, the Kuningan police has detected potential security threats. Police attended the meeting in June 2010 when a number of organizations urged the Kuningan government to curb the activities of Ahmadiyya. Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013), even received information from the anti-Ahmadi group itself in form of a notification letter on the planned *istigasah* at Al-Huda Mosque, Manis Lor (see also Kontras 2012a: 30). Aware of the possibility of mass mobilization

from outside Kuningan, the police intelligence (interview, 19 February 2013) carried out a cross-regional coordination to estimate the mob size.

Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, claimed she always coordinated with the local police. In each report on the situation she sent, she always asked for a back-up from police stations in the region and particularly the mobile brigade detachment C of Cirebon. According to her, the police swiftly responded to reports and provided assistance. West Java police chief, Sutarman, during his visit to the Kuningan police on 28 July 2010, also declared that his side would act decisively against anyone who causes destruction or persecution.<sup>20</sup>

Since 26 July, the police in Manis Lor was already on alert during the sealing attempt. It was recorded that 250 officers of Kuningan police were assisted by the mobile brigade unit of West Java police and one platoon of the district military command (Kodim) while the Office of Highway (Dishub) Kuningan were on standby in Manis Lor.<sup>21</sup> All were under the directions of police chief Yoyoh (Rudi Rahmat, interview, 19 February 2013).

Apart from exerting power, the police applied preventive and persuasive measures towards parties to the conflict. Kontras reported that Nur Rohim, secretary of JAI Manis Lor, was several times visited by police who requested that clashes be avoided (Kontras 2012a: 31). Persuasion was also made towards the anti-Ahmadi organizations, since the meeting in June 2010 until the *istigasah* of 29 July 2010, when the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, urged thousands of members of Islamic organizations not to commit any unlawful acts.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>"Kapolda Jamin Keamanan Kuningan," *Radarcirebon*, 29 July 2010, <http://radarcirebon.com/2010/07/29/kapolda-jamin-keamanan-kuningan/> (accessed 15 October 2012).

<sup>21</sup>"Pengamanan Rencana Penyegelan Tempat ibadat Ahmadiyyah," Polres Kuningan, 27 July 2010, <http://polreskuningan.wordpress.com/2010/07/27/> (accessed 15 October 2012).

<sup>22</sup>Police video documentation "Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010). wmv." See also "Hujan Batu Warnai Penyerangan Jemaat Ahmadiyyah di Kuningan," *Tempo*

When persuasion attempts did not work, the crowd control police (Dalmas) of Kuningan and the mobile brigade unit of West Java police tried to anticipate the events. They formed barricades on the main road towards the village of Manis Lor, while other members of the police guarded each gangway which lead to the Ahmadi settlements (Rudi Rahmat, interview, 19 February 2013). Additional groups of the Kuningan crowd control police and one unit of Cirebon police mobile brigade were brought in after the anti-Ahmadiyyah mob forced the barricade (Kontras 2012a: 32).

Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013), said that at the time of *istigasah* on 29 July 2010, the number of police officers at the site was approximately 900. After supports came, the total number of police on alert in Manis Lor reached about 1,500 officers, 700 of whom came from the Kuningan police. The rest were from the West Java police forces and from the districts around Kuningan. This number was more or less the same as the size of anti-Ahmadi mob which arrived to Manis Lor.<sup>23</sup>

The response to the police strength and action at the time varied. Nur Rohim, secretary general of JAI Manis Lor, as quoted by Kontras, said that the police could not handle the situation and actually pressed the Ahmadi (Kontras 2012a: 31). Meanwhile, according to Yusuf Ahmadi and Mustofa, leaders of JAI Manis Lor (interviews, 18 and 20 February 2013), the police personnel were adequately relegated. Yusuf Ahmadi even considers it the largest troop deployment in West Java. Deden Sujana, who in the event acted as JAI Manis Lor

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*Interaktif*, 28 July 2010, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2010/07/28/178266946/Hujan-Batu-Warnai-Penyegelan-Masjid-Ahmadiyyah-di-Manis-Lor> (accessed 14 October 2011).

<sup>23</sup>Police video documentation "Antisipasi Ahmadiyyah (30-07-2010).wmv." Police chief specifies which units were brought to Manis Lor, namely 600 members of Kuningan police, five companies of Kuningan police mobile brigades, one company of West Java crowd control police, two platoons of Cirebon district crowd control police, one platoon of Cirebon city crowd control police, and one platoon of Majalengka district crowd control police. The video also shows that a number of district military command members were also on standby, but only in the outer ring.



spokesman (personal conversation, 24 March 2013), agreed that the police performed well.<sup>24</sup>

Video documentation and various other sources indicate that the police carried out their duties, ranging from persuasion to repressive efforts such as dispersing the mob with tear gas.<sup>25</sup> Such repressive measures in religious conflicts are usually the last resource and are avoided since they can endanger the police officers (I Nyoman Oka, head of community affairs unit, Kuningan district police, interview, 19 February 2013). In many cases, the police prefer easier steps like evacuating the human targets of conflicts.

Evacuation or relocation of Ahmadis has never been an issue in Kuningan. Ahmadis of Manis Lor number thousands and, according to a member of police intelligence, they could not be evacuated (interview, 19 February 2013). Would evacuation be chosen had the Ahmadi community in Manis Lor been smaller? According to the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013), even in the case of evacuation, the police must keep on securing the situation and cannot let it out of hands. "Secured must be persons and also their possessions."

### *Police Knowledge*

Principles and provisions regarding the protection of minorities and human rights are stated in the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009. All members of the police whom we interviewed admitted they did not know the regulation in detail. In general, however, they acknowledged that violence and human rights violations will not be tolerated. They also agreed that in the present era of democracy the human rights issues must be properly addressed.

Declarations given by the provincial and district police chiefs in the mass media made it quite clear that they would protect human

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<sup>24</sup>Quoted from <https://twitter.com/dedensujana/status/315651732833181696> (accessed 24 March 2013).

<sup>25</sup>Police video documentation, "Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010). wmv." See also Kontras 2012: 31-33.

rights, including freedom of religion and belief, and that they would crack down on offenders. The provincial police chief, for example, warned that he would not let the strong oppress the weak.<sup>26</sup> Meanwhile Yoyoh Indayah, district police chief, stated that she would give protection to all citizens who need it, regardless of their belief (Kontras 2012a: 34).

Yoyoh Indayah admitted (discussion, 6 February 2013) that her non-partisan attitude is often misunderstood by those who oppose Ahmadis. In a meeting, someone once accused her of “spoiling the Ahmadiyya.” She immediately denied and provided the following explanation:

I have never spoiled anyone. My obligation is to protect and save all citizens. There is no provision for me to spoil you or the Ahmadis. Anyone who becomes the target of aggression, clashes and so on — they will be protected. The Ahmadis are protected because there have been indications of threat to their safety. Therefore, we are on alert in the Ahmadi settlement of Manis Lor. If we secure other places, it means nothing. This is similar to other issues such as workers’ demonstrations or demonstrations concerning fuel prices.

She added,

Police are in the middle. If a notification comes to the police that there are mob activities going to occur at the local government’s site, I will conduct a pacification at the targeted place (regardless of my personal views on the workers’ or fuel issues). Similarly, as it was in case of your house. There were people who did not like you and wanted to crash your place. But I was able to halt them, so this did not happen.<sup>27</sup>

Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013) took an effort to make the principle of neutrality and non-partisanship also upheld by her officers: “I always voice it [the principle of neutrality] among the police staff during morning meetings. Our job is to protect and save all citizens, whoever they are. They are all God’s people. All

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<sup>26</sup>“Kapolda Jamin Keamanan Kuningan,” *Radar Cirebon*, 29 July 2010, <http://radarcirebon.com/2010/07/29/kapolda-jamin-keamanan-kuningan/> (accessed 15 October 2012).

<sup>27</sup>Yoyoh Indayah did not specify the name of the person, the place or date of this talk.

have the right to life. We stick to the Law No. 2 (2002), according to which our duty is to protect, defend and save all citizens.”

In line with Yoyoh Indayah, I Nyoman Oka (interview, 19 February 2013) stated that it was not under the police authority to determine whether beliefs held by a person or a group of persons were right or wrong. This, according to him, was a matter in which the police ought to coordinate with other government agencies such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Meanwhile, the police chief of Jalaksana (interview, 21 February 2013) said that the police could not forbid anyone from abandoning her or his faith, as it would be against the principle of human rights. It can be concluded that in religious conflicts the police knows how to act in a neutral way, and its functions are limited to security aspects only.

The problem lies in many confusing governmental rules, ranging from the regional SKBs, through the SKB of the ministers, up to the level of legislation. For example, the Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 was mentioned in a blog post of the Kuningan police in which a text from the *Radar Cirebon* newspaper was quoted. The quotation contained the words of the then head of MUI, H. Hafidin Achmad, who claimed that “the positive law regarding desecration of Islamic teachings is already clearly stated in the Act No. 1/PNPS/1965.” Hence his party denied the accusation that they have acted against human rights principle; more so, they accused that those “parties who support the Ahmadiyya have not fully learnt the human rights legislation.”<sup>28</sup>

Personal attitudes of the police members towards Ahmadi were diverse. Kuningan police intelligence officer (interview, 19 February 2013) shared the observations he made while he stayed together with the Ahmadi community. He did not find the “deviant teachings” of

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<sup>28</sup>Polres Kuningan, “Ajak Kembali ke Ajaran yang Benar,” 13 June 2008, <http://polreskuningan.wordpress.com/2008/06/13/ajak-kembali-ke-ajaran-yang-benar> (accessed 15 October 2012).

which Ahmadiis were accused: “Ahmadiyya claims [it belongs to] Islam. Its azan is the same. Its holy book is the Qur’an. When asked about *Tazkirah*, [they] also would not know. It is difficult to prove. But people ask a lot. We only anticipate.”

According to another source from the Kuningan police (interview, 19 February 2013), Ahmadiyya “is not the real Islam. [...] as a Muslim I know it violates Islam. Islam is not actually like this.”

When personal beliefs were confronted with the human rights principles, an informant from Jalaksana police (interview, 21 February 2013) stated: “As a Muslim, I know [Ahmadiyya] does wrong. Islam actually is not like this. But prohibiting people from believing is difficult and it is not allowed. Moreover, there are human rights principles.” He then continued that acts of violence were not allowed, while at the same time referring to the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad that suggests the urgency to prevent bad deeds.

#### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

In the attack of 2010, the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, adhered to the general principles of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the police force of the Republic of Indonesia. She underlined article 13 on the main tasks of the police and Article 14 (1), in particular point (e) on maintaining order and ensuring public safety, and point (i) on protecting life, body, property, community, and environment from disturbances and disasters, which includes providing aid and relief whilst upholding the human rights. She also remained attached to article 15, according to which in conducting its duties, the police has the authority to help in resolving disputes which may disturb the public order.<sup>29</sup>

Kuningan police relied on these rules to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. I Nyoman Oka, head of community affairs unit, Kuningan district police (interview, 19 February 2013), stated that in July 2010, the conflict in Manis Lor already entered preven-

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<sup>29</sup>Yoyoh Indayah’s presentation slides (discussion, 6 February 2013).

tive stage. That was why the police deployed a larger number of troops.

Such measures were not undertaken without challenges. A member of the district police (interview, 19 February 2013) observed that the number of Kuningan police was only 700 officers while ideally it should be 1400. Meanwhile, the number of officers in Jalaksana who oversee two sub-districts and 25 villages, was as well still far from enough — only 21 persons while it should be 96 (Rudi Rahmat, interview, 21 February 2013).

Since in the security operation of July 2010, thousands of officers were deployed for several days, the operation funds became another problem. Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013) mentioned that the costs of security operation in July 2010 exceeded the police operational budget. But according to her that should not be a reason to weaken the security: “Just take the first step, other matters come later. Just do not take it lightly. If possible, make the number of officers double the mob. If there is a shortage [in funds] we report to the provincial police. If they cannot [help], we would report to the headquarters [of the Indonesian National Police].”

In order to deal with the limited funds, the police received help from the Kuningan government. As for the consumption of her personnel, Yoyoh Indayah had to indebt to some surrounding restaurants, “Thank God, people trust us — and luckily, there were also our members who owned restaurants.” Everything was later paid back in instalments from the operations budget (Yoyoh Indayah, interview, 6 February 2013).

Another obstacle which was noted by the members of Kuningan police whom we interviewed was the lack of clarity in government regulations regarding Ahmadiyya. A member of Kuningan police intelligence (interview 19 February 2013) said that recurrence of conflict is due to the lack of clear directions from the central government. According to him, the existing regulations were still unfixed and could easily be utilized by certain parties, either for political or other advantage.

Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013), considers differences in interpretation of religious issues a normal thing. According to her, the police role is to secure that these differences do not lead to clashes. Police also undertakes socialization activities in the communities, so that they would not be easily provoked. Affairs of belief, the police leaves to the MUI and Bakorpakem. In her view, the police does not need special rules for handling religious conflicts: "It is just the same, no additional rules are needed, for there would just be rules with no application. What matters is that the SOP is clarified. Thankfully, we now have the Law No. 7 on handling conflicts."

In the midst of a variety of obstacles and challenges, Kuningan police prevented a violent conflict. When asked why elsewhere the police were not able to prevent violence, sub-district police chief, Rudi Rahmat (interview, 21 February 2013), refused to comment. He only mentioned that in Kuningan, coordination between the district and sub-district police went well, the public was handled well, intelligence and leadership did not underestimate the conflict potential, and police was on alert since long ago. Another police officer (interview, 19 February 2013), said that "each region is different. Here prevention works better and we didn't want to lose control. Also here the potential of the slightest disturbances was reported."

### *Police Culture*

Statements given by the Kuningan police members whom we interviewed about democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance, showed a mixed picture. According to most of them the police were required to respect the principles of human rights in the measures they took, but the human rights were also one of the limits (making them hesitate) to their action. A member of the Kuningan police intelligence (interview, 19 February 2013) complained:

Previously, during interrogations, the police could hit [the suspect] and so on. Police are now more cautious: if people do not like [us], they complain in court, and the police can get hit instead. [When] a small thing happens [we are accused]

of violating human rights. [This is the case] although many police colleagues were victims [and] no one intervened. In Poso nobody intervene. And we are also human beings, we have the right to live, to be healthy. In the course of events of July 2010, police were victims, some were hospitalized. No one exposed this issue. If civilians get scratched, reporters will arrive. But it doesn't matter, that's [our] job, we are used to it.

Apart from the human rights issues, religious issues also made the police particularly careful. They perceived religious conflicts as more sensitive than other. Bripka Lukman (interview, 19 February 2013) observed that "compared to other conflicts, SARA conflicts are more difficult." To him other kinds of commotion (non-religious) can be settled at once. But the impact of SARA conflicts is so big that it needs special handling. He gave the example of 1996 events in Situbondo, where from a small outbreak the conflict spread everywhere.

Precautions are made by the police to avoid repressive measures in religious issues. This is seen in the words of I Nyoman Oka, head of community affairs unit, Kuningan district police (interview, 19 February 2013):

Personally, I prefer the actions which secure the entire group, to prevent escalation. Police was beaten because both sides were against the police. Otherwise we would be accused of acting against human rights. The problem was not yet resolved but the police [action] was already protested against. Repressive measures were avoided. Evidence and witnesses are needed to arrest people. There is a presumption of innocence. If the police makes a wrong step, a pre-trial suit can be filed [against the police]. Therefore, the major concern should be in pre-emptive activities, even if a needle falls down, the police should know it.

Due to this the Kuningan police sought to be as close as possible with the public. Oka mentioned (interview, 19 February 2013), that the Kuningan district police was organizing, in cooperation with the MUI and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a program called "Da'i Kamtibmas" ("Preachers of Kamtibmas"). Every Thursday, preachers in each sub-district took turns in delivering speeches. The par-

ticipants were members of the police and civil servants. Usually, the event started with *yasinan* (the reading of a part of the Koran called “Surah Yasin”, asking forgiveness on behalf of the ill and deceased) and was closed with donations for orphans.<sup>30</sup>

The police organized “counselling” sessions to both the anti-Ahmadiyya groups and the Ahmadiyya itself. A member of the Jalaksana police said (interview, 21 February 2013), “Ahmadiyya indeed violates the religion, they commit a sin. But this [Indonesia] is the state with a law, and [anti-Ahmadiyya] organizations cannot do whatever they want. This is why we provide counselling to both parties.”

Some members of the police still seem to have stereotypes or prejudices against the Ahmadis. From the police officers interviewed, we sometimes heard expressions like: “The Ahmadis are good at making arguments,” or “Ahmadiyya is troublesome, but still needs to be protected.”

One can say that religious views of the police are not much different from the views shared by the majority of the society. But the job and the circumstances require them to protect the Ahmadis. One of the police sources even said that he was doing it with a heavy heart (interview, 19 February 2013): “It is not that we let the Ahmadiyya freely carry out their activities. We can only prevent. But the regent alone cannot, doesn’t dare [to do anything], because of the central authorities. Governor only issued an instruction, but it has not been applied. They keep on performing their activities.”

### *Local Politics*

It is the duty of police to secure government policies which ideally are drafted for the social benefit. Yet not rarely these policies

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<sup>30</sup> Another spiritual activities of the Kuningan police is reading of the *asma al-husna* (99 beautiful names of God in Islam) during the morning assemblies. See “Sholawatan di Masjid Al Aman Polres Kuningan,” 7 February 2011, <http://polreskuningan.wordpress.com/category/sejuta-kawan/> (accessed 20 October 2012), and “Pengajian Kamisan dan Asmaul Husna,” 9 February 2009, <http://polreskuningan.wordpress.com/2009/01/09/pengajian-kamis-an-dan-asmaul-husna/> (accessed 20 October 2012).



have caused controversies within the society. In case of Ahmadiyya, Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) argued that the government policies were laden with political interests. According to him this could be seen from the SKB being issued right before the local election in 2003. Or in the 2008 election campaign, for example, Kuningan regent candidate, Aang Hamid Suganda, promised to close down the places of Ahmadiyya's activity (Bagir et al. 2011: 45).

Political moments such as the timing of regional or local elections bring about further risk to be exploited by "selling" the Ahmadiyya issue. One respondent from JAI Manis Lor (interview, 18 February 2013) suspected that the tension turned higher because "there was a party who demanded 'annual bonus' (*tunjangan hari raya*, THR), but they didn't get it. The orientation is not the faith anymore, but money." No further explanation was given on what was meant by "annual bonus" and who were the parties who filed it.

The local parliament's attitude in this case is not much different from that of the regent and Muspida. On 26 July 2010, the parliament held a meeting with the regent and the local government officials in the main assembly room. When the atmosphere became tense, it was decided that the parliament together with organizations, local government and the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakorpakem) would go to Jakarta to request clarification from the ministers and the president. They also agreed to form a special team which would report the results of monitoring the Ahmadiyya Kuningan to the minister and the president.<sup>31</sup> One of the local parliament's member, Nana Rusdiana, is the chairperson of BARAK which keenly airs anti-Ahmadiyya slogans.

The Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs also could not do much. As noted earlier, in 2005, the ministry along with the regent and the chief prosecutor of Kuningan signed the SKB. Muhammad Nurdin, the shari'a administrator at the Kuningan of-

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<sup>31</sup>"Desa Manis Lor Masih Tegang," *Radar Cirebon*, 28 July 2010, <http://radarcirebon.com/2010/07/28/desa-manis-lor-masih-tegang/> (accessed 15 October 2012).

fice of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 21 February 2013) claimed that it was only providing “counselling” to the Ahmadis. The ministry has a list of Ahmadis who “returned to Islam.” Nur-din also admitted that the ministry was still upholding the ban on recording the marriages of the Ahmadi citizens.

The Kuningan’s local government policies related to Ahmadiyya make the police task of safeguarding peace in the area more difficult. Due to the SKB, several times during the sealing of the Ahmadiyya places of worship, the police was confronted by both parties, the Ahmadis and those who opposed them. Yoyoh Indayah, (interview, 6 February 2013) complained that she often had to act on her own as the Kuningan police chief, for the duties of other agencies were not set on motion. The reason was the lack of “fuel” (budget).

### *Public Opinion*

Government policies related to Ahmadiyya in Kuningan have been heavily influenced by the MUI, FKUB, religious scholars and leaders of several organizations. MUI Kuningan, in accordance with the fatwa of the MUI headquarters, also issued a fatwa rendering Ahmadiyya “deviationist and misleading.” In addition to issuing a fatwa, MUI with religious scholars and leaders of Islamic organizations submitted to the regent a list of recommendations for sealing of the Ahmadi assets. For the MUI Kuningan, “sealing is a small step and a wise policy to remind the Ahmadiyya to follow the points of SKB.”<sup>32</sup> The MUI acknowledged that it would not be responsible for the Islamic organizations which might take their own steps if the sealing attempts fail.<sup>33</sup>

It seems, however, that the MUI was responsible. KH Achidin Noor, the vice-chairman of MUI Kuningan and the head of FKUB

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<sup>32</sup>MUI’s recommendation letter No. 38/MUI.Kab/VII/2010. See also the monitoring report of Komnas HAM at <http://www.komnasham.go.id/pemantauan-dan-penyelidikan/298-penyegelan-masjid-Ahmadiyyah-di-ManisLor> (accessed on 15 October 2010).

<sup>33</sup>“Desa Manis Lor Masih Tegang,” *Radar Cirebon*, 28 July 2010, <http://radarcirebon.com/2010/07/28/desa-manis-lor-masih-tegang/> (accessed 15 October 2012).

Kuningan, (interview, 19 February 2013) stated that when six persons arrested by the police were taken to the court, there was an indirect advocacy of the MUI. Achidin did not explain the events in detail and only mentioned that the MUI was taken as an expert witness in the case. But from the number six, we know that this was related to the attack of 2007. He said:

We communicated with the judge so that no new problems would occur after the verdict. There was a deal and it was completed, no excess to follow. The MUI is sometimes pulled by organizations to follow but it does not. If you want a demonstration and so on, do it at your own responsibility, report to the police. If anything happens later the MUI will defend you. But if the MUI joins, who would be defending [the other organizations]?

For Eman Sulaeman, secretary of the FPI Kuningan (interview, 20 February 2013), "MUI is like a parent." MUI is always asked for the opinion if there is a motion: "The head of the MUI said that if now there is evil and immorality, [we] leave it to you. If help is needed, just tell. They never follow, because they are old. They are our teachers. We cannot be in conflict with them."

Because many of the MUI members sit in the FKUB, the issue of "deviationist and misleading groups" became the major concern of FKUB Kuningan along with the matter of "illegal places of worship." FKUB Kuningan consists of 17 members, one Catholic, one Protestant, one Buddhist, one Confucian, and 13 Muslim, one of whom comes from the organization GARIS. According to Achidin (interview, 19 February 19 2013) since its establishment, the FKUB Kuningan has never issued a recommendation for establishment of places of worship. But several times it gave warnings related to "illegal places of worship" and "cults." With regard to Ahmadiyya, Achidin stated that other religious groups should not intervene because this is an internal affair of Muslims.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Proceedings of the FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs meeting at Wisma Permata, 18 November 2010.

The standpoints of the large Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are virtually indistinguishable from the MUI. The local chairmen of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah signed the SKB of 2002 and the MUI's recommendations to the Kuningan regent in 2010.

The NU Kuningan chairman, KH. Mahmud Solehudin, even delivered a speech during the *istigasah* on 29 July 2010.<sup>35</sup> However, the attitude of the younger generation within the two organizations is different. The Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah, JIMM), for example, is more concerned about the Ahmadiyya and together with other institutions it supported the Ahmadis in the 2007 event.

Both the local and the national mass media are not helping much, in this case, on the contrary, they sometimes even heated up the atmosphere. The online media such as *mediaumat.com* for example published news titled "Ahmadiyya triggers conflict in Manis Lor."<sup>36</sup> The national media, on the other hand, once came with a headline "Ahmadis in amok."<sup>37</sup> Yet there are also media such as the *Radar Cirebon* and *Tempo* which are relatively neutral and also report on the measures taken by the police.

The bigger social organizations sided with the attackers or even became attackers themselves. But there were quite a few non-governmental institutions which stood with the Ahmadiyya. Already during the events of 2002, the Ahmadiyya was in touch with the Inter-religious Cooperation Network (Jaringan Kerja Antar Umat Beragama, Jakatarub), based in West Java.

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<sup>35</sup>See MUI's recommendation letter No. 38/MUI.Kab/VII/2010. See also "Penutupan Tempat Ibadat Ahmadiyyah Kembali Ricuh," *Pikiran Rakyat*, 29 July 2010, <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/node/118828> (accessed 15 October 2012).

<sup>36</sup>"Ahmadiyyah Picu Konflik Manis Lor," *Mediaumat*, 21 October 2010, <http://mediaumat.com/fokus/1989-42-Ahmadiyyah-picu-konflik-manis-lor.html> (accessed 15 October 2012).

<sup>37</sup>"Ricuh Penyegehan: Jemaat Ahmadiyyah Mengamuk," *Metrotvnews*, <http://metrotvnews.com/index.php/metromain/newsvideo/2010/07/28/110025> (accessed 15 October 2012).

In 2007, more advocacy groups were involved and they went straight to Manis Lor. Some of them, such as the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) Bandung, Desantara Depok, Fahmina Cirebon, PBHI Bandung, and JIMM, associated in the Working Group for Religious Freedom Monitoring and Advocacy (Jaringan Kerja Pemantauan dan Advokasi Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan). Beside them, also the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan, AKKBB) has sent a letter to the Kuningan police chief to demand action against threats expressed in the letter of the Komponen Muslim Kuningan.

In the midst of public pressure, the police chief of Jalaksana remains confident. He believes that not all Muslims want to fight and attack. According to him (interview, 21 February 2013), if all Muslims wanted to fight, the number of people who came to Manis Lor would be millions. "Not all Muslims hate the Ahmadiyya. The proof is in the 2010 event, when only around 1500 people came to demonstrate against them. When we talk about the Muslim community, which Muslim community do we mean? There are millions of Muslims." Nevertheless, he stays on alert and does not underestimate the slightest security threats.

Jalaksana police chief, Rudi Rahmat (interview, 21 February 2013), adds that his party is close to and listens to the views of the anti-Ahmadi forces. However, the police under the Kuningan police chief sticks to the rules. Messages which she delivers to the anti-Ahmadiyya group are clear and explicit:

In the 2010 confrontation, some of the policemen were wounded. After that, the chief, Mrs. Yoyoh, immediately took a stand, and I believe this is why she succeeded. She summoned all the organizations to the police station, the FPI, GIBAS, GAMAS, and others, to give them an ultimatum. She said something like: "If anything happens, I know you are the ones whom I will arrest. You can protest, but do not use violence. Persecution and murder is a violation of law. If you have a problem, consult it with us and the local government." From then until now there have no longer been physical clashes, only complaints with regard to issues like the construction of school libraries and [Ahmadiyya] group activities in Manis Lor.

*Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

This rigorousness made the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah not very popular among the FPI. According to Eman Sulaeman, one of the FPI Kuningan leaders, the current police chief is better than Yoyoh Indayah with regard to matter of Ahmadiyya. Sulaeman said “a woman and a man can have the same rank, but men’s and women’s way of thinking is different. Women are highly emotional. Men make more mature decisions, while women are labile” (interview 20 February 2013). The current police chief, thus far, does not have any record of handling large-scale conflicts, like those of 2007 and 2010.

But the FPI is close with the district police and always informs the police on where it should crack down on “immorality.” Eman Sulaeman, admitted that in case of gambling and immorality, the police was reliable. It was only the case of Ahmadiyya where, according to him, the police have not been successful. But he added that the FPI could understand the police as there were many obstacles to disbanding Ahmadiyya in Kuningan. According to him, the central government could not disband it, let alone the regency (interview, 20 February 2013).

A member of the Kuningan police intelligence (interview, 19 February 2013) confirmed that the police remained close with the FPI in order to maintain a safe and conducive atmosphere in Kuningan. This closeness, he claimed, was useful to reduce the possibility of a conflict bursting into violence which would cause many casualties. The police chief of Jalaksana (interview, 21 February 2013), observed that if the police relationship with people was good, if anyone tried to do strange things, they would first feel ashamed towards the police. Meanwhile, for Eman Sulaeman, the partnership with the police was for “forbidding the evil and immorality” (interview, 20 February 2013).

The police can indeed reduce violence, but not without sacrifices. For example, before the end of Ramadan holidays in 2012, rumours were circulating that the Ahmadiyya would hold a

meeting at a national level. Jalaksana police chief immediately checked the location and found tents installed for the *halal bi halal* celebration. He then requested, upon the order from the district police chief, that the tents were taken down and the celebration were held quietly outside Kuningan. Ahmadiyya removed the tents (interview, 21 February 2013). Tension was indeed avoided, but at the cost of Ahmadis.

Other costs include anxiety experienced by the Ahmadis of Manis Lor. After the events of 2007 and 2010, the police very swiftly deploys its personnel to Manis Lor, in case of any potential tension. The police were continuously on alert to the point when Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) asked them not to be on stand-by in the village as this caused a general anxiety. Yusuf Ahmadi asked that the police troops and equipment be on alert at the police station especially its location was not so far from the village of Manis Lor. This was different from the previous years when Ahmadiyya painstakingly tried to draw the attention of the police and their protection.

## Conclusions

Ahmadiyya-related sectarian conflict in Manis Lor has a fairly long history. Smaller grievances occurred upon the establishment of the community in Manis Lor in the 1950s, and under the New Order, in the 1980s, when the MUI issued a fatwa on Ahmadiyya. But later, the times were peaceful for the Ahmadi community. Until 2001. The conflict which initially involved actors from across the sub-district, expanded beyond it. The anti-Ahmadi groups resorted to persecution, acts of vandalism, and arson in Manis Lor and its neighbourhood.

The 2007 events mark two important developments in the Manis Lor conflict. Apart from involving a wider group of actors, territory and background-wise, the events of 2007 also marked a change in police attitude which was shown by decisiveness in capturing and bringing to the court the six attackers who were later sentenced to

one month and 25 days in jail. Even though the Ahmadiyya was not satisfied with the sentence, this action proved to produce a deterring effect on the perpetrators. The acts of vandalism immediately stopped.

The 2010 events repeated the pattern seen in the previous conflicts, from the protests, through demands, threats, sealing, assault, and so on. Having learnt from the past experience, the police exerted greater force. Entrance of the attackers through small alleys which happened in 2007, was anticipated in 2010 when the police personnel was deployed to guard all entrances to the village of Manis Lor. Clashes were avoided and injuries minimized. No one was prosecuted after this event, but after the incident, the police chief warned several organizations that police would not hesitate to take action if they commit unlawful acts.

By the time this report was completed at the end of 2013, the 2010 incident was the last conflict involving a massive police pacification. But this does not mean that the conflict potential is no longer there. Discriminatory policies against the Ahmadis are still being made. By the time this text was written, the Ahmadis received no clarification with regard to their electronic identity cards (E-KTP), they still found it difficult to register marriages and to perform the hajj pilgrimage.

The police action in Manis Lor provided an important lesson that the police could act decisively, despite the strong pressure from the majority group. Limitations, obstacles and challenges faced by the police, although they still must be addressed, did not become an excuse for the police to not act firmly against the perpetrators of violence. Firm action against violence in Manis Lor in 2007 and 2010, has proven to halt violence. Having learnt from the experiences in other places, the police in Manis Lor recognised that relocation of potential victims was not a solution.

If the police could learn from its mistakes, the government should too. Sealing the places of worship, as it was practiced since 2002, has proven not to ease tensions. Government budget



constraints provide no excuse to let things out of hands. Institutions such as FKUB and Ministry of Religious Affairs are certainly not “fire-fighters” who should only get involved when the conflicts escalate.

Finally, the police must be strengthened and must receive support to be able to carry out their duties without submitting to the pressure of majority. NGOs advocating religious freedom and protection of human rights should not be defeated by intolerant organizations such as the FPI in their access to the police. Police officers who excel in managing religious conflicts should be appreciated in order to become an example for the police in other areas.\*\*\*



## THE CASE OF ANTI-AHMADIYYA IN CIKEUSIK, PANDEGLANG

### **Foreword**

On 6 February 2011, Cikeusik, a sub-district of Pandeglang, Banten, suddenly appeared in the limelight and received the coverage of both the national and international media. It all began with a mass rejection of the Ahmadi community in Kampung Peundeuy of Umbulan village, Cikeusik, which was led by Ismail Suparman. The police had known from the beginning about the existing tensions, but it failed to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. Three members of Ahmadiyya lost their lives, many others were injured.

Inappropriate policing strategy, poorly run intelligence, and lack of trust between the conflicted parties and the police capability to deal with conflicts, were important factors contributing to the outbreak of violence. Moreover, the minimal support from the society, religious leaders, as well as the government officials, made the policing action in the Cikeusik conflict even more difficult.

This chapter presents an outline, review and analysis of the policing of the anti-Ahmadi conflict in Cikeusik. The chapter is divid-

ed into five sections. Following the introduction, the second part describes the general demographic background of the Cikeusik district and the Pandeglang regency. The third part briefly discusses the history of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, the beginnings of the conflict, anti-Ahmadi mobilization, and the incident of violence on 6 February 2011. The fourth part discusses the dynamics of conflict policing seen in terms of policing activities, police knowledge, legal-procedural frameworks of policing, the institutional character of the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the police interaction with the parties to the conflict. Finally, the fifth part provides conclusions and discussion on the causes of the policing failure in Cikeusik, as well as some important lessons that should be learnt in order to improve the policing of sectarian conflicts.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Cikeusik and Pandeglang**

Pandeglang is located in the southwest part of Banten province. It borders with Serang district from the north, Lebak district from the east, the Indian Ocean from the south, and the Sunda Strait from the west. The total area of Pandeglang equals to 274,689.91 hectares or 2,747 km<sup>2</sup>, and is divided into 35 districts, 322 villages and 13 administrative villages.<sup>1</sup>

In 2010, based on the May 2010 census, Pandeglang was inhabited by 1,149,610 people. In terms of religion, there were 1,154,375 Muslims, 2,344 Protestants, 258 Catholics, 2,353 Buddhists, and 1,552 Hindus. It appears clear from these data that the Pandeglang is dominated by Muslims. This is also clear from the number of places of prayer: mosques, 1,730; musala, 2,246; three Protestant churches; and one Buddhist temple (Kementrian Agama Propinsi Banten 2010).

There is no exact data on the number of Ahmadis in Pandeglang, but two districts of Pandeglang, Cisata and Cikeusik, are

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<sup>1</sup>Kabupaten Pandeglang, *Gambaran Umum*, <http://www.pandeglangkab.go.id> (accessed 5 April 2013).

often associated with JAI. Until recently, there were about four Ahmadi families in Cisata. In Cikeusik there were 25 followers of Ahmadiyya, but all of them have moved after the violent incident which took place on 6 February 2011 (Yusuf Baihaki, treasurer of MUI Pandeglang, member of FKUB Pandeglang, interview, 11 February 2013).

Cikeusik borders with Lebak regency in the east, Angsana and Munjul districts in the north, Cibaliung and Cibatu districts in the west, and the Java Sea in south. Cikeusik consists of fourteen villages, one of them Umbulan, where the anti-Ahmadi violence broke out (Yayan Sofyan, Cikeusik secretary, interview, 14 February 2013).

Most of the Cikeusik inhabitants are farmers. In the 1950s, many residents of Cikeusik came from Cirebon, West Java. This migration resulted in ethnic mix of local residents (Sundanese of Banten) and Cirebon natives. In terms of religion, the majority of the population is Muslim. Almost every village in Cikeusik has an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*); in Cikeusik, there are about ten of them (Yayan Sofyan, interview, 14 February 2013).

### **Anti-Ahmadiyya Conflict in Cikeusik**

The Ahmadiyya presence in Cikeusik is connected to the JAI branch in Rangkasbitung regency, Banten, which was established in July 1958. From this branch grew new ones like Cilegon and Serang branches. The important figure in the spread of Ahmadi teachings in Banten was Basiumawijaya.

Around 1989, the Ahmadi *dakwah* in Banten was led by Khairudin Barus. Through the Tablig Committee of Banten (Komite Tablig Banten, KTB) which he initiated, each branch of Ahmadiyya in Banten established a mission. One of the KTB missionary goals was Cikeusik, which was under the Jemaat Kebayoran mission. In the 1990s, Khairudin and members of the Jemaat Kebayoran preached in Cikeusik (Rahman 2013: 10-17). Below is how one villager from the Umbulan village (R, interview, 28 February 2013) described his experience of being invited by Khairudin to join Ahmadiyya:

Around 1991, Khairudin Barus invited me and other people to come by bus to visit the Ahmadiyya centre in Parung. One of those who joined the group was Matori, father of Suparman, the present chairman of the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik. Some of those who went with us maybe already knew, while others, including me, did not know the purpose of our visit to Parung. There we were all introduced to the teachings of Ahmadiyya. Some of us earlier knew about the Ahmadis, some, me included, did not. I knew that Khairudin Barus was a rich farmer, not an Ahmadi preacher. Once introduced to the teachings, we were all invited to join Ahmadiyya. Some residents wanted to and were initiated, some were not ready, including me and Matori.

In 1992, Suparman joined the Ahmadiyya community, although earlier he opposed it. As a student of the well-known Mathlaul Anwar Religious High School, he even once disputed with Khairudin. But later he became interested in Ahmadiyya and was initiated as its member. After that he decided to study at Mubarak [Ahmadiyya] Campus in Bogor. Later, together with Khairudin he introduced Ahmadiyya to Cikeusik (Rahman 2013: 19).

The presence of Ahmadiyya had not been without resistance from the local religious leaders. Around 1992, some of them and village officials accused Suparman of disrupting security and reported him to Cikeusik District Military Command (Koramil). Suparman was asked to stop his missionary activities, but he ignored the request and had several times argued about religion with the Koramil soldiers.

According to one version, on one evening five soldiers came to Suparman's house and asked him to stop his *dakwah*. Since he refused, they beat him in front of the lodge near the Cibaliung bridge (Rahman 2013: 20-21). After that incident Khairudin decided to suspend the *dakwah* activities. He invited Suparman to move to Jakarta and placed him at the Mubarak Campus in Bogor. In 1994, he brought Suparman to preach in the Philippines (Rahman 2013: 22). Since then some people in Cikeusik left Ahmadiyya, some remained, but they kept inviting new members (R, resident of Umbulan village, interview, 28 February 2013).

In 2005, Suparman returned to Indonesia, but not to Cikeusik. From 2005 to 2009, he was active in the Balikpapan branch of Ah-

madiyya in Jakarta. Although he was in Jakarta, he would often come to visit his parents in Cikeusik. Only recently, in August 2009, he was officially appointed as a *mubalig* (missionary) for Cikeusik and the surrounding areas (Rahman 2013: 22). According to AS (member of Ahmadiyya, interview, 11 May 2013), in April 2010, Suparman settled in a house in Peundeuy neighbourhood of Umbulan, Cikeusik. The house was the center of Ahmadiyya activities and was often referred to as a mission house.

Suparman's reactivation of JAI in Cikeusik was faced with opposition which even increased after he moved to the mission house:

Suparman's activity in that house enraged the local clerics. To prevent unwanted things from happening, several times I approached him and asked him to pray together with other residents. I often reminded Suparman not to perform Friday prayers at that house and to just go outside. Whenever I said that, there was just arguing. Suparman was good at religious disputes (A, secretary of Umbulan village, interview, 14 February 2013).

The clerics were more and more angry when a rumor spread that Suparman wanted to build the largest Ahmadi place of mission in Indonesia. Another rumor had it that Suparman also encouraged people to join Ahmadiyya through material rewards. This worried the *ulama*, because most of the people in Cikeusik were poor (R, resident of Umbulan, interview, 28 February 2013). One of the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik members (AS, interview, 11 May 2013) denies this. He also denied that Ahmadiyya Cikeusik was a closed community. According to him they mingled with the locals and were involved in community activities and voluntary work. The village chief was trying to resolve the conflict. However, rather than doing it in a neutral way, he only deepened the anti-Ahmadi tensions by asking Suparman to disband the Ahmadiyya community and by provoking other residents to do the same.

In April 2010, for example, Johar, the village chief, delivered a speech during a village celebration where he told people to stop calling him "chief Johar" if he was proven unable to disband Ahmadiyya. On another occasion and in different place, he said that

Ahmadiyya must be disbanded because it was already ruining the society.<sup>2</sup> Commenting on the attitude and involvement of the village chief, the Umbulan village secretary (interview, 14 February 2013) said: "As a government official the chief should be neutral, non-partisan. But since it is a political office, [he] is subject to majority pressure. Chief Johar was often reprimanded by the anti-Ahmadi group: when are you going to disband the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, chief Johar?"

Anti-Ahmadiyya provocations were also made during sermons. One cleric from Umbulan, who at the same time was the Chairman of the MUI Cikeusik, said that he always reminded people not to follow the teachings of Ahmadiyya as they were deviationist and misleading. He also indicated that Ahmadis were apostates since (as he claimed) their teachings did not recognize Muhammad as the last prophet but Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and that *Tazkirah* was their holy book. According to him, the Ahmadi teachings deviated from the Sunna which was already adopted by the society (AM, interview, 27 February 2013). In addition to these, one of the residents remembered (R, interview, 28 February 2013) his experience: "I've once come to [listen to] a sermon in one of the districts of Pandeglang. It was about the apostasy of Ahmadis. The speaker said the blood of Ahmadis was lawful to be shed."

In August 2010, Suparman was called personally by the Umbulan village chief to whom he arrived accompanied by Atep Suratép. The one hour meeting did not bring any results. Suparman explained he was an Ahmadi missionary and Atep Suratép was his secretary. The village chief asked Suparman to leave Ahmadiyya. But the request was rejected.<sup>3</sup>

Having failed in intimidating Suparman, the village chief eventually had local authorities involved in his efforts to disband Ah-

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<sup>2</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suparman atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Banten police, 24 February 2011), p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Johar atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Banten police, 22 February 2011), p. 6.



madiyya. This began in September 2010, when the chief officially called Suparman to the village office. The meeting was attended by Suparman, the village chief and a few officials from Cikeusik village. The chief again recommended that Suparman should leave Ahmadiyya. But Suparman still refused.

In the same month, the village reported the issue to the Cikeusik district. In consequence, both Suparman and Atep were summoned to the district office.<sup>4</sup> Suparman several times met the district officials and was asked to leave Ahmadiyya. He refused.

According to the village secretary (interview, 14 February 2013) the grounds for Suparman's refusal was the fact that JAI was a legal entity recognized by the government. Suparman even showed evidence of this in the meetings. Suparman also believed that the Ahmadi teachings were not "deviationist" and "misleading" as alleged by the MUI and the local clerics. Suparman often argued with them to prove that Ahmadiyya belonged to Islam.

Around October 2010, the district officials decided to contact Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakorpakem) in Pandeglang. The Bakorpakem held a meeting with Suparman at the Cikeusik district office. The meeting was also attended by the village chief, district secretary, MUI Pandeglang and Cikeusik, and the local *ulama*. Like in the previous meetings, Suparman was asked to leave Ahmadiyya, which he again refused.<sup>5</sup>

Attempts to press the JAI Cikeusik were also made by other parties. At the College of Social and Political Sciences (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, STISIP) in Banten Raya, Pandeglang, a group of students from Cikeusik demanded that Atep Suratep, a member of the academic community, was removed from the campus. If their demands were not met, they threatened to leave the campus themselves (ABD, Cikeusik resident, interview, 14 February 2013).

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<sup>4</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Johar," p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Johar," p. 6.

Around November 2010, Kiai Muhamad with a group of 15 people formed the Cikeusik Muslim Movement (Gerakan Muslim Cikeusik, GMC) and demonstrated against Ahmadiyya at the Cikeusik police headquarters. This initiative originated from the Majelis Ta'lim in Kampung Cikareo, Cikawaris village.<sup>6</sup> In the same month, leaflets accusing Ahmadis of "misguidance" were distributed by the GMC.

A meeting between Suparman and the anti-Ahmadiyya group was again held on 18 November 2010. Since the situation in Cikeusik was tense, the meeting took place at the office of the State Prosecutor (Kejaksaan Negeri, Kejari) in Pandeglang. Suparman, Atep and some other members of Ahmadiyya (Deden Sujana, Hasan Basri, Dade Sulaiman and a few more) arrived at the prosecutor's office, but only Suparman and Atep were allowed into the meeting room. During the meeting, Suparman was asked to sign a statement containing: (a) suspension of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik; (b) declaration of participating more in activities of the local community; (c) personal resignation. Suparman again rejected the demand and made his own statement which contained: (a) readiness to obey the 2008 SKB of three ministers; and (b) readiness to participate in community's social affairs. His statement was eventually accepted.<sup>7</sup>

Although the decision was already made, the parties who wanted Suparman out of Ahmadiyya – the Umbulan Village Chief and the MUI Cikeusik – were not satisfied with it. To them the agreement still allowed the existence of Ahmadis in Cikeusik, while they wanted the community to be disbanded and Suparman with his followers to repent. If Suparman did not want to repent he had to leave Cikeusik (interview, AM, Chairman of the MUI Cikeusik, 27 February 2013).

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<sup>6</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Hasanudin atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroiyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Banten police, 7 February 2011), pp. 1-5. See also Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Usep Sugandi atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroiyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 11 February 2011), pp. 1-4.

<sup>7</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suparman," hal. 5.

Ultimately, they decided to discuss the decision with the residents of Cikeusik. They also asked that K.H. Ujang Muhammad Arif joined to help overcome the Cikeusik Ahmadis.<sup>8</sup> Besides being a charismatic and influential cleric in Pandeglang and Rangkas Bitung, K.H. Ujang was also known for having played a major role in dissolution of several movements which were perceived as deviationist in Cibitung district, Pandeglang.<sup>9</sup>

K.H. Ujang was first reached in mid-January 2011. At that time, Sofwan, a teacher at Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTS) Hunibera, Cikuruh Wetan, met Kiai Baghawi, the second secretary of MUI Cikeusik. He asked Baghawi to get in touch with K.H. Ujang, and invited him as a speaker at the *tablig akbar* event in Ranca Senang. They aimed at pressuring Suparman. Baghawi contacted K.H. Ujang who expressed his readiness, even though the date of the event was not yet settled awaiting confirmation from the Cikeusik community.<sup>10</sup>

K.H. Ujang tried to receive support by sending text messages (SMS) to several *kiais*. From mid-January till 27, he sent the following messages: "*Asl., Tolong dikompakeun ulama, kiai, santri, jawara, masyarakat untuk ngagempur Ahmadiyah di Cikeusik. Upami aya sms ti abdi supaya turun sebarkeun (K.H Ujang Cgls).*"<sup>11</sup> Translation of this message from Sundanese would more or less be: "*Asl., Please unite the ulama, kiai, students, jawara, and public to destroy the Ahmadis in Cikeusik. If there is an SMS from me, share it (K.H. Ujang Cigeulis).*"

Having contacted K.H. Ujang, Sofwan immediately gathered community leaders, among them Kiai Muhammad, the leader of the GMC. The meeting resulted in an agreement that the *tablig akbar*

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<sup>8</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Johar," pp. 7-8.

<sup>9</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Tersangka KH. Ujang Muhammad Arif bin Abuya Surya atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 17 February 2011), p. 2.

<sup>10</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Sofwan," p. 3.

<sup>11</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, "Tersangka KH. Ujang Muhammad Arif bin Abuya Surya atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 16 February 2011), p. 5.

would be held on 6 February 2011, at 9:00 am. Then Sofwan updated K.H. Ujang on the results of the meeting. Two days later K.H. Ujang told Sofwan to focus the event on the crux of the matter, namely dissolution [of Ahmadi]<sup>12</sup> with the mass mobilization and without the *tablig akbar*. Sofwan agreed.<sup>13</sup>

When Sodikin, a Pandeglang trader, told Kiai Babay of the plans to disband the Ahmadiyya, they started to invite more and more actors from outside Cikeusik. Kiai Babay was a young *kiai* of the Pagelaran district in Pandeglang, well known in Cikeusik and an associate of K.H. Ujang. On 27 January 2011, at 8:00 pm, Sodikin came to the house Kiai Babay. During the meeting Sodikin proposed to contact Idris, a *jawara* (a local strongman) from Mandalawangi district, Pandeglang. Soon Idris, along with Roy came to the house of Kiai Babay. Then the four of them spoke about the plans to disband Ahmadiyya.<sup>14</sup>

On 28 January 2011, K.H. Ujang again sent an SMS to the *kiais*, students and the members of community. Its contents was: "Assalamualikum, an invitation to the *kiais*, *ulama*, students, and community to dissolve Ahmadiyya of Cikeusik on Sunday, 6 February/3 Maulud (K.H. Ujang Cgls). Spread! Do not send to the police." Most of the people who received it decided to follow the SMS invitation. Thus, K.H. Ujang estimated that the crowd would be about a thousand people.<sup>15</sup>

The SMS was forwarded by those who received it either in the same form or slightly modified. Umbulan village resident (R, interview, 28 February 2013) recounts:

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<sup>12</sup>No mention on the way (peaceful or violent) in which the dissolution would be carried out. Police Investigation Report (BAP) III, "Tersangka KH. Ujang Muhammad Arif bin Abuya Surya atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Banten police, 5 March 2011), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Sofwan," p. 3.

<sup>14</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Saksi Ahmad Bai Mahdi alias Kiyai Babay atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 21 February 2011), pp. 6-7.

<sup>15</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Tersangka KH. Ujang," p. 5-6.

I received the SMS about dissolution of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik from a friend, from a local *kiai* and from an unknown number. Because I agree with the dissolution of Ahmadiyya I forwarded it to some numbers on my cell phone. I even bought new [SIM] cards to pass it further. I sent this text in the same and in a different format. In the different one, for example, I added that if you do not want Ahmadis in Pandeglang, then you have to come to the event of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik dissolution on Sunday, 6 February 2011. Almost the entire community of Cikeusik received the text messages and they also spread them.

K.H. Ujang also requested support from the FPI member in Pontang, Serang, Ustad T.B. Sidiq. Earlier he met with Kiai Sobri, the Secretary General of the FPI, during the *maulid* (birth of the Prophet Muhammad) celebration in Cibulakan. During that meeting, he informed Sobri that on Sunday, 6 February 2011, at 9:00 or 10:00 am, dissolution of Ahmadiyya would be carried out.<sup>16</sup>

On 29 January, Kiai Babay invited Idris to his house. Idris came together with Pandi, Pai and Roy. They discussed the dissolution plan and on the same day decided to meet AA aka Deden. At AA's home they met another thirty people. They agreed that the residents of Panimbang, Pagelaran, and Menes (all in Pandeglang) should also be asked to gather on 6 February 2011, at 6:30 am in Panimbang.<sup>17</sup>

Plans to disband Ahmadiyya eventually reached the Ahmadis. On 2 February 2011, Atep Suratep informed the police, the military, and the local office of Kesbang. On 4 February 2011, Atep informed Hasan Basri (Ahmadi missionary, Banten), Dade Sulaiman (main administrator of Ahmadiyya Rangkas Bitung and Cikeusik), and Suparman.<sup>18</sup>

On 4 February 2011, Kiai Babay again invited Idris to his house. K.H. Ujang and Sodikin were also present. During the meeting they decided that dissolution of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik would be made on

<sup>16</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Tersangka KH. Ujang," p. 3.

<sup>17</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka Idris atas Perkara Pidana Pengroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 17 February 2011), p. 3.

<sup>18</sup>While informing his colleagues, Atep Suratep did not use the word "dissolution" but "assault" on Ahmadiyya Cikeusik. Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Atep Suratep atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 24 February 2011), p. 6.

behalf of the Pandeglang society and that to distinguish themselves from the Ahmadis they would wear blue ribbons. Later on the same day they went to AA's house to notify him on the outcome of the meeting.<sup>19</sup>

The very socially respected position of *kiais*, reinforced by a huge number of religious schools, especially in Cikeusik, allowed to mobilize support for the action to dissolve the Ahmadiyya. Nearing that day, K.H. Ujang divided duties among the *kiais* and chose the rallying point. Crowds approaching from Cibaliung, Labuan, Mandalawangi, Cimanggu Cibitung, and Sumur would gather at Babakan Mosque under K.H. Ujang, Kiai Pei, Kiai Nahwan, and Kiai Babay. Crowds from Munjul and Cikeusik would gather at Cangkore under Kiai Baghowi, Sofwan and Umbulan village chief. Crowds from Malimping and Cisemut would meet at Umbulan T-junction and would be lead by Ustad Endang.<sup>20</sup>

On 5 February 2011, at 3:00 am, the Cikeusik police chief and military commander came to Suparman's house to deliver a summons to Cikeusik police headquarters to clarify Suparman's wife's, Haina Toang Aquino, immigration status. Due to this, Suparman with his wife, their child and Atep Suratep until 10:00 am were held at the Cikeusik police station. Afterwards they were shifted to the Pandeglang police headquarters. While there, Suparman informed Mulyadi and Tarno, members of the Ahmadyya Cikeusik about the planned assault and told them to evacuate all valuable items.<sup>21</sup> On the same day, around 4:30 pm, Idris with his friends arrived to Kiai Babay's house in order to leave together for the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik site.<sup>22</sup>

In the evening, at 8:00 pm, one of the Ahmadis informed Deden Sujana that Suparman remained at the Pandeglang police, so there

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<sup>19</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, Saksi Ahmad Bai Mahdi alias Kiyai Babay atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 18 February 2011), p. 3.

<sup>20</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, "Tersangka K.H. Ujang," p. 7.

<sup>21</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suparman," p. 4.

<sup>22</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka Idris," p. 3.

was no one in the mission house at that time. Upon receiving this information, Deden decided to go to Cikeusik and to see Suparman.<sup>23</sup> At 10:00 pm, he called two Ahmadis, Danang and Maulana, to accompany him.<sup>24</sup> Not long after, a few more Ahmadis from Jakarta, Roni Pasaroni, Bebi, Arif Rahman Hakim, Warsono, and Irwan followed Deden. Other Ahmadis from Bogor (Candra, Masihudin, Ferdias) and Serang (Arif Rahman Ahmadi, Alfi, Yus Asaf, Afif, Yudi) came along. On two cars, seventeen of them went to Cikeusik.<sup>25</sup>

On 6 February 2011, around 7:00 am, K.H. Ujang together with T.B. Sidiq, Sodikin and a few more people were heading to one of the meeting points, Babakan Mosque in Cibaliung.<sup>26</sup> The group led by Kiai Babay, Idris and AA was also coming there.<sup>27</sup> A crowd of hundreds gathered and blue ribbons were distributed. By cars and motorbikes they all together went to another meeting point, the Cangkore Mosque.<sup>28</sup>

At the same time Deden Sujana's group arrived at Suparman's house. They were greeted by the Ahmadis who arrived there earlier. Introducing themselves to the hosts, Deden said they came upon the instruction of the National Amir, but this information they should keep to themselves. He also said that Suparman's house needed to be protected and that he would be in the front while others would position themselves in accordance with their skills. He also urged that unless in an emergency situation, they should not leave the house.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka H. Ir. Deden Sujana atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 17 February 2011), p. 4.

<sup>24</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Danang atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 3 March 2011), p. 2. See also Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka H. Ir. Deden Sujana," p. 4.

<sup>25</sup>The Jakarta group went to Cikeusik after Deden called Bebi. The Bogor group went to Cikeusik after Roni Pasaroni called Tubagus Candra. The Serang group followed after Imron Saleh, an Ahmadi from Serang, summoned them. See more in Rahman 2013: 30-32.

<sup>26</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, "Tersangka KH. Ujang," p. 5.

<sup>27</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka Idris," p. 4.

<sup>28</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Saksi Ahmad Bai Mahdi," p. 3.

<sup>29</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Arif Rahman Ahmadi atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 8 March 2011), p. 6.

The arrival of the group was noticed by the local residents. One of them (R, interview, 28 February 2013) recalled:

On Sunday morning, around 7:00 am, I saw two cars at Suparman's house. I felt anxious as on that day Ahmadiyya was to be disbanded and Suparman was already at the police station, but there were some guests arriving at his house. Fearing that something bad might happen, I evacuated my family members. I met Suprpto, Babinmas of Umbulan village, Cikeusik district. I told him that there were guests at Suparman's house who arrived on two cars.

Upon receiving this information, Suprpto called the chief of Umbulan village, Johar. They later arrived at Suparman's house and asked the Ahmadis to leave the building as there was a mob on the way to the place. Their advice was not followed.<sup>30</sup> Soon afterwards Suprpto with Hasan, chief of the criminal investigation (Reskrim) unit of Cikeusik district police, arrived at Suparman's house to meet Deden. Hasan also informed Deden about the situation in Cikeusik and ordered him to leave the house. But Deden decided to stay.<sup>31</sup>

Around 10:00 am, a crowd of hundreds arrived at the Cangkore Mosque and Umbulan T-junction. When K.H Ujang's group reached the Cangkore Mosque, they were thousands. Soon an instruction was given: "Come forward... attack, Ahmadis have already defied the police order to go away." Around 10:30 am, Kiai Babay ordered the crowd to approach Suparman's house which was a few hundred meters away from the Cangkore Mosque.<sup>32</sup>

When the attackers reached Suparman's house, Idris and some of his friends were in the front. They started to shout "kafir" and ordered the police to step aside. The police managed to block them in the courtyard, but the barrier broke. One person from the group threw rocks on the house, others came closer shouting words like "Disband and get rid of Ahmadiyya in Pandeglang."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suprpto atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 14 February 2011), p. 3.

<sup>31</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Saksi Hasanudin atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Banten police, 14 February 2011), p. 3.

<sup>32</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka Idris," p. 4.

<sup>33</sup>Parts of these events were documented in a video titled "Anti-Ahmadiyah:



A few of the Ahmadis went out of the house. Deden Sujana hit Idris. Later a group of people attacked Deden, someone hit him with a rock. Several Ahmadis were involved in the fight, bamboo sticks and stones were used by both sides. Deden and another person managed to push Idris and his companions away from the courtyard. Idris and his group took out machetes and ordered the crowd waiting on Cibaliung bridge to attack. The mob approached Superman's house and started pelting it.<sup>34</sup>

Since they were greatly outnumbered by the attackers, Ahmadis were unable to hold and began to move away from Superman's house. The mob was chasing those who were trying to save themselves.

Behind the house the mob was beating Deden and a few other Ahmadis with knives, sticks and beams.<sup>35</sup> One of the Umbulan village residents (R, interview, 28 February 2013) who witnessed this, narrated the following:

The strength of the anti-Ahmadi mob multiplied when over a thousand people came from the side of Ranca Senang Mosque, Cikeusik. The crowd became twice as big, there were altogether two-three thousand people. The mob was even more angered when it heard that Sarta, Umbulan resident, was slashed by a person assumed to be from Ahmadiyya. The mob pelted Superman's house, destroyed the roof and parabola, damaged and burnt two cars and one motorbike belonging to Ahmadis. Some of the Ahmadis run to the Cibaliung river, those who could not swim were caught by the mob. They were beaten with knives, sticks and stones. Later they were brought to the crowd around Superman's house. There they were again kicked and beaten with knives, sticks and stones.

Not all Ahmadis were battered by the mob. According to one of the Umbulan village officials (D, interview, 27 February 2013), some managed to escape:

Those Ahmadis who did not run to the river, got away. Others were taken by village officers to the Cikeusik district [office]. The mob run to and made sweeping from house to house. Ahmadis who were brought to the district office were almost caught in the mob amok. Fortunately, the police made a swift evacuation.

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Violence in Cikeusik, Banten, Indonesia," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLb9VSI9BCw> (accessed 12 November 2012).

<sup>34</sup>Watch the video "Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik."

<sup>35</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Tersangka H. Ir. Deden Sujana," p. 5.

One of the Ahmadis who survived (Y, interview, 22 December 2013) said that he ran to the Cibaliung river and for several hours hid in the bushes. He managed to run to the fields when the mob left the river bank. Soon a small child approached and told him to hide in the house of an Ahmadi resident who was not yet evacuated. On the next day, he came back in trauma to Serang, using public transportation. On the way almost every passenger was talking about the incident. According to him, some of the passengers mentioned that those who committed violence were paid.

Three Ahmadis were killed in the incident (Roni Pasaroni, Warsono, and Tubagus Candra), others were wounded. All members of the JAI were expelled from Cikeusik. The anti-Ahmadi mob also threatened to kill Superman if he came back. Ahmadis were allowed to stay in Cikeusik under condition that they leave Ahmadiyya (R, Umbulan village resident, interview, 28 February 2011). The houses and fields belonging to the JAI were abandoned (A, Umbulan village official, interview, 14 February 2011). Later Ahmadis also experienced difficulties with administration. One of them from Cikeusik (AS, interview, 11 May 2013) admitted it was difficult to obtain the relocation letter since the village officials were unwilling to process it.

## **Dynamics of Policing the anti-Ahmadiyya Conflict in Cikeusik**

### *Policing Activities*

The police already knew of the tensions around Ahmadiyya. Cikeusik district police received a report on Superman's activities at the mission house and knew that some of the local residents did not accept it. In the beginning, the police carried out supervision, persuasion, and approached the conflicted parties:

Before Superman activated the JAI Cikeusik, Ahmadis prayed with other residents in the nearby mosque. But when Superman became active and used his house as a place of worship, some of the residents started to complain. In order that the situation remained safe, the Cikeusik police often visited Superman and reminded him to mix more in religious affairs with the local residents. With [joining in] other activities, for example communal work, the Ahmadis had no prob-

lem. The police also reminded the residents who opposed Suparman's religious activities, to resist from vigilantism (A, chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 16 February 2013).

Police also monitored the conflict escalation by following the exchange between Ahmadis and the anti-Ahmadi group during the meetings at the district office and the office of the state prosecutor in Pandeglang. On the meeting at the state prosecutor's, on 18 November 2010, in Pandeglang, the chief of intelligence unit of Pandeglang police gave a briefing on the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8 of 2006 (Working Meeting of the House of Representatives, 2011) regarding the development of religious harmony. The Cikeusik police chief also shared the results of the meeting in a speech to Cikeusik residents, whom he urged to remain patient and calm in addressing the matter of Ahmadiyya.<sup>36</sup>

However, the police appeal was disregarded by the anti-Ahmadi group. They planned to dissolve Ahmadiyya without the government involvement, but through mobilizing masses. They did not report their plans to the police.

When the police eventually learnt about the dissolution plans, the measures it took included intelligence reviews, coordination with police units, and means of persuasion to impede those plans. On 1 January 2011, chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police made a report (No. Pol: R/LI-01/II/2011/PULBAKET), containing information on the plans of dissolving Ahmadiyya Cikeusik by the local religious and community leaders.<sup>37</sup>

On 2 January 2011, the police chief called the intelligence and ordered that the Development Board for Security and Order

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<sup>36</sup>Police Investigation Report, "Saksi Johar," p. 7.

<sup>37</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang Tanggal 6 Februari 2011," slides presented at the workshop on "Penganggulangan Tindakan Anarki: Penanganan Konflik Sosial oleh Polri Sesuai dengan Prinsip dan Standar HAM," organized by Ditbangpes Sespimti Polri, in cooperation with Yayasan Lembaga Hukum Indonesia and The Asia Foundation, Lembang, 28 November 2013.

(Babinkantibmas) appealed to the residents to avoid actions yielding disorder.<sup>38</sup>

Upon these instructions, the intelligence approached *kiais* and members of the community to seek information. According to the intelligence chief of Cikeusik police (interview, 16 February 2013), almost all *kiais* and residents encountered received the SMS call for dissolution of Ahmadiyya. However, according to him, these persons were not certain whether they would attend it or not. He also made a special report for the Pandeglang police on the situation in Cikeusik.

On 3 February 2011, the police intelligence unit issued a special information about the plans to disband Ahmadiyya. It also contained a description of the situation of Ahmadis in Cikeusik who, according to the village chief, were still safe (Working Meeting of the House of Representatives, 2011). On the same day, around 10:00 am, the Pandeglang police intelligence disguised as students called Kiai Muhamad to ask if indeed there were plans of dissolution. Kiai Muhamad confirmed that the dissolution would take place but he was still waiting for support. The local police had banned it in order to keep Cikeusik safe, yet Kiai Muhamad rejected the ban because he considered Ahmadiyya deviationist.<sup>39</sup>

On 4 February 2011, between 08:00 am and 12:00 pm, the Pandeglang police held the monthly display on operation (GO) which was attended by the section chiefs, unit chiefs, and district chiefs of the Pandeglang police. Discussed were the information regarding the plans of dissolution of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik and the security measures for the inauguration of Pandeglang regent and vice-regent. Between 3:00 and 8:00 pm, at the district military command (Kodim 0601), the Pandeglang police organised a meeting with Muspida on

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<sup>38</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Mad Supur atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan" (Serang: Polda Banten, 14 February 2011), pp. 2-5.

<sup>39</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Yayasan Supriyatna atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan" (Serang: Banten police, 13 Februari 2011), pp. 3-4.

the coordination of handling the Cikeusik conflict. The meeting was attended by Pandeglang police chief, the prosecutor, Dandim 0601, Kodim 0601 intelligence, chief of police intelligence, criminal investigation unit chief, and official of Kesbang Linmas Pandeglang. In the meeting it was decided that Suparman and Atep Suratep must be quickly evacuated.<sup>40</sup>

For the police evacuation was the easiest of preventive measures since deployment of police forces would not necessarily guarantee that violence could be avoided. Protection of life is the priority and as long as evacuation can be done, it would be done (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013). The aim of evacuation was also to ease the conflict which was escalating towards disturbances of security and public order, and because the police failed to convince the anti-Ahmadi group to resist from their dissolution attempts. Police also did not know the size of the crowd which would arrive. At some point the police even concluded the dissolution attempts would not happen because there was not enough support.<sup>41</sup>

Since the police assumed the dissolution plan was targeted at Suparman and Atep Suratep, to evacuate the two of them became the priority (chief of police intelligence, Cikeusik, interview, 16 February 2013). The police assumed that if they were evacuated, the dissolution attempt would not take place or even if it would, the number of participants should not be great. Upon such calculations, the number of police officers deployed to the site was adjusted to the task — safeguarding Suparman's house.

The evacuation was easily carried out. The police feared violating the rights if the evacuation had to be forced if Suparman and Atep Suratep refused to be evacuated upon the reasons presented to

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<sup>40</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

<sup>41</sup>"Tujuh Polisi Divonis Tak Disiplin Terkait Bentrokan Cikeusik," *Republika*, 28 February 2011, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/hukum/11/02/28/166575-tujuh-polisi-divonis-tak-disiplin-terkait-bentrokan-cikeusik> (accessed 12 November 2012).

them. Therefore, following the advice of Cikeusik intelligence unit, the police called Suparman's wife with regard to her immigration status. The evacuation strategy ensured that Suparman and Atep Suratep would follow her to Cikeusik police headquarters (chief of police intelligence, Cikeusik, interview, 16 February 2013).

On 5 February 2011, at 03:00 am, the police carried out the evacuation by issuing summons to Suparman's wife. Around 10:00 am, they were moved to Pandeglang police headquarters. Earlier, around 08:00 am, Suparman told Atep to make a written request for protection to the Cikeusik police. Although written, the letter did not receive delivery confirmation. When Suparman arrived at Pandeglang police headquarters, the police explained: "Mr Suparman, don't make prejudgements against us. You and your family are taken into security because tomorrow there will be an attack. Rather than life, better that property is sacrificed as it can be regained."<sup>42</sup>

The police also informed the *kiais* that Suparman was already at Pandeglang police station (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 16 February 2013). This, however, did not discourage them from their plans to dissolve Ahmadiyya. Feeling that the process of Suparman's evacuation went smoothly, the police decreased the level of vigilance and assumed that the situation was conducive and that the masses would not turn up or if they did, they would come in lesser numbers.<sup>43</sup>

Perhaps the police was contented with the success in evacuating Suparman and Atep as with this action they had prioritized life over possessions. However, for Suparman and Atep this had lowered their trust in police commitment to protect citizens. Their lack of trust was reinforced by the absence of police to protect their homes when they were taken away. Therefore, they contacted other Ahmadis to come and keep Suparman's house safe.

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<sup>42</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suparman," p. 4.

<sup>43</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

Concerns of the Ahmadis over Suparman's house were not without a reason. They were caused not only by the lack of trust in the police, but also the frequent destruction of Ahmadi assets elsewhere and the general nonreaction of the security apparatus. Ahmadis who arrived to Cikeusik did not want the community possessions to be destroyed (WR, JAI missionary, interview, 22 December 2013).

Although Suparman was already evacuated and the police let the *kiais* know of it, they still tried to protect the house. On 5 February 2011, around 12:00 am, Yayat Supriyatna with a team from Kominda reached the house of K.H. Ujang to inquire about the dissolution plans. They received an information that the plans would be carried out but only by the members of Cikeusik community. The police tried to convince K.H. Ujang to cancel the mobilization, but he refused.<sup>44</sup>

On 6 February 2011, at 03:00 am, Pandeglang police chief lead a ceremony at Pandeglang police headquarters on the pacification of the mob. Around 4:00 am, 33 members of Sabhara Polres Pandeglang unit (including 26 members of Dalmas, head of Sabhara, head of Turjawali, PS. Kanit I Dalmas, PS. Kasubnit I Dalmas, two vehicles of Dalmas, and one vehicle of Kasat) were deployed to Suparman's house.<sup>45</sup> Around 7:00 am, Suprpto, one of the criminal investigators, was also on the way to the house.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, the Cikeusik police chief sent 18 officers to Suparman's house. The police chief urged to evacuate the Ahmadis in case they were at the house.<sup>47</sup>

The police predictions regarding the situation on the day of the planned dissolution proved to be wrong. Evacuation had no effect. The anti-Ahmadi mob was approaching Cikeusik, gathering at the meeting point selected by K.H. Ujang. The expected 300 people who

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<sup>44</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Yayat Supriyatna," pp. 3-4.

<sup>45</sup>Chief of Pandeglang regency police, "Lampiran Sprin Kapolres Pandeglang No: Sprin/286/II/2011" (Pandeglang: 4 February 2011).

<sup>46</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suprpto," p. 3.

<sup>47</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Mad Supur," p. 5

would only come from Cikeusik,<sup>48</sup> turned out to be thousands coming from both Cikeusik and outside.

The mobilization was far beyond the predictions when the presence of the JAI group was noticed at Suparman's house just ahead of the anti-Ahmadi gathering. Suprpto who earlier went to Suparman's house knew of the Ahmadi group from Rasna, Suparman's neighbour. His advice that they leave the house was not followed.<sup>49</sup> Suprpto finally reported the matter to the head of criminal investigations.

Soon, around 9:30 am, Hasan, the head of criminal investigations, approached the group in Suparman's house. The following is the transcript from their (Hasan, Deden, and other Ahmadis) meeting, obtained from the thesis of Rahman (2013: 43-46) and from the widely circulated video documentation:

Hasan (H): The point is this... We're only anticipating as there's a rumor that a few groups want to come here. My advice is that, yeah... I'm just hoping it [clash] won't happen, that there won't be casualties, nor material loss.

Deden (D): I happen to be the head of Ahmadiyya National Security and I wanted to take a look at this location as I heard a group of people who wished to destroy the public order, wanted to ransack this house. They come under the guise of religious organizations and have some obscure intentions. We, the Ahmadis, as you know, when did we ever make any noise...? While they, you see, are shouting "Allahu akbar" while throwing stones, shouting "Allahu akbar" while setting fire.

H: Talking of God, talking of God while rioting.

D: So as the head of security, I arrived to check the situation, because we heard that Ahmadis here were abused, and that there was a conspiracy of organizations disguised as religious ones with some village officials. What's the problem? Why do they have to hate the Ahmadis? If they don't want dialogue... but don't burn, don't curse, don't expel, don't pelt with stones. This is a country with law. Let the law be equally enforced. Moreover, there is the SKB of ministers, religious issues are the matter of the central government, not the local ones. [Here] it seems the village chief is involved, so is Muspika. Come on, this is not allowed. Suppose a tiger wants to attack Mr. Parman [Suparman], then you don't shoot Mr. Parman but chase away the tiger.

H: Speaking of Muspika... on Sunday there was a sermon session, we have banished them. Even them the GMC has indoctrinated, giving Muspika the goal

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<sup>48</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

<sup>49</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Suprpto," p. 3.



to disband [Ahmadiyya] within one month, although it can't be so... Finally, we held meetings with Mr. Parman, with the village officials, up to the district level, four times it was, if I'm not mistaken. We even reported it to the Muspida, also Muspida has played their role here. We do not take sides, we are neither pro-Ahmadiyya nor pro-GMC. We, Kamtibmas and Harkamtibmas are the police. [We] hope nothing serious happens, like bloodshed, etc. The point is, what the GMC wanted was that Ahmadi mingled more with us [the community]. The most striking was that Mr. Superman's family didn't want to pray on Fridays in the mosque with the congregation. It's okay [if they don't] on other days, but not on Friday.

D: So, Sir, if we're talking about faith...

H: Right...

D: There are dozens of groups in the Islamic world, so in matters of faith, let's have a dialogue, there are different interpretations. Like Shi'as and Sunnis, bombing each other's mosques. A mosque is bombed, next day another will be. Aren't we ashamed of it, Sir? Is Indonesia really going to go this way?

H: This is being done by irresponsible people.

D: That is why I'd be grateful if you could stand for all the groups. Because we are tired of lawlessness.

H: We too don't know which [group] is the most correct one [in matters of faith].

D: So our arrival here is just to check, we have absolutely no intention of revenge. But if they start beating us, it's impossible to remain silent. If we're beaten, our cars are burned, should we be silent?

H:<sup>50</sup> Well, Sir, I have monitored Cibaliung and Cigeulis. There are some people coming on motorcycles and cars, we are anticipating so that they don't precede us. We, the police, including Dalmas were deployed here, prediction was that when they see so many of us, they'd resign. This is anticipation, but we don't know... fine if a few people come, but if hundreds or thousands? We are also humans, if it's possible, yes, we'll hold, but if not, then what can be done. For example, as for me, I will stay here, God knows if our heads were thrown by stones. Yes, humans, there's little good in us, but a lot of evil. So we'll see the situation, if it becomes dangerous, it's better to escape.

D: But if you cannot, Sir, just let it. Let there be clashes. Won't it be exciting? Well, are we expected to remain silent? So if indeed...

Other Ahmadi: We are ready, every day we've been...

H: I definitely hope this is not going to happen.

D: But if you see that police can't hold it, just let it, at worst there'll be a blood-bath. This is gonna be exciting, no?

After this, the head of criminal investigations left Superman's house and at the very same moment all police troops from Pandeglang and Cikeusik arrived to the location. There were 59 police officers at the spot. The head of criminal investigations immediate-

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<sup>50</sup>From this part, the dialogue can be followed in the video "Dialog Polisi dan Jemaat Ahmadiyah Sebelum Tragedi Cikeusik," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ojex2RC1kY8> (accessed 12 November 2012).

ly reported to the district police chief, chief of intelligence and the head of Samapta on Deden's group.<sup>51</sup> Police at the location began to watch the area around Superman's house and the bridge on Ciba-liung river. Two Dalmas vehicles were also on standby in front of Superman's house, until one of them was moved to the bridge.<sup>52</sup> The police also had secured a lance found at Superman's house (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 15 February 2013).

At the crucial moment, the most authorized person, the police chief of Pandeglang, was not present. This made the strategy of handling the conflict unclear. Information about the conflict and the dissolution also was not fully conveyed to the leadership, neither at the Pandeglang regency, nor at the Banten province level. Consequently, there was no instruction from the leadership on how to deal with the unexpected situation.<sup>53</sup> Due to this the stationing troops also were not well-directed.

Eventually, the district police chief decided to approach Deden. Yet this attempt failed as the anti-Ahmadi mob had crossed the bridge<sup>54</sup> and forced evacuation was not possible as the police feared to be accused of rights violation. Dalmas troops on the bridge managed to block the crowd, but the mob started to attack and curse them for protecting the Ahmadis. The police barricade was penetrated by the crowd which soon reached Superman's house (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 16 February 2013).

The anti-Ahmadi mob which entered the yard of Superman's house was stopped by the Cikeusik police chief and a few other police officers. The police asked them to refrain, but the mob forced its

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<sup>51</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Mad Supur," p. 3.

<sup>52</sup>Video "Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik."

<sup>53</sup>"Polda Banten akui tak dapat Informasi Lengkap," <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4d58ed8dd9b72/kapolda-banten-akui-tak-dapat-informasi-lengkap> (accessed 12 November 2012).

<sup>54</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP), "Saksi Mad Supur," p. 3.

way to Suparman's house. When the fight broke out, police tried to intervene. As it did not succeed, the police left the scene when the anti-Ahmadi mob and the Ahmadis started to pelt each other with rocks.<sup>55</sup>

When the mob battered the Ahmadis and destroyed Suparman's house, the police came back to the location.<sup>56</sup> The police did not apply means of repression, but only evacuated the injured victims as they feared the mob would attack the police instead (Kadit III Intelkam Polda Banten, interview, 23 May 2013).

Some of the Ahmadis who tried to escape were brought to the district office. Police later evacuated them.<sup>57</sup> In such situation forced evacuation is what the police can do as the priority is protection of life (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).

According to police, there were no omissions in dealing with the conflict in Cikeusik. They have done as much as possible to minimize the number of casualties and protected them with the Dalmat vehicle. The victims who died were the Ahmadis who ran to the river and the police did not know that any of them were attacked. The number of officers was limited and there were even less of them since they went to accompany the surviving victims. Police had to intervene when the bodies of dead victims were squashed. The police car was full of survivors and the police was trying to find another vehicle to transport the bodies. Apart from carrying out the evacuation, the police was recording the incident with mobile phones in order to identify the perpetrators of violence (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 16 February 2013).

Police forces from Banten were deployed to assist the personnel at the location. They consisted of 68 members of sabhara, nine of intelkam, 10 of reskrim, 100 of mobile brigade, eight of dokkes (doc-

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<sup>55</sup>Video "Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik."

<sup>56</sup>Video "Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik."

<sup>57</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, "Saksi Hasanudin," p. 4.

tors and health), 13 of propam (profession and security). In addition to that, 30 members of Dalmas Cilegon, and 35 members of Dalmas Lebak were also deployed. Later, Banten police also deployed additional powers – 75 Brimob officers to identify and cope with witnesses and perpetrators, and to collect evidence after the incident of violence.<sup>58</sup>

But when exactly were the Banten police forces deployed? In this research we came across discrepant data. Komnas HAM (National Commission for Human Rights) informs that around 9:30 am, 155 troops from Banten police were brought as a follow up to the Pandeglang police chief's report on the increasing anti-Ahmadi masses approaching Suparman's house. Pandeglang police chief who was then still on the way to Cikeusik, requested assistance through a phone call (Komnas HAM 2011: 64). But according to other information, at 11:20 am, Banten police chief coordinated on a mobile phone with the Pandeglang police chief and ordered Karoops to back up the Pandeglang police with the personnel of Banten police. Then Karoops informed the chief of operations to come to Cikeusik as soon as possible. At 11:30 am, the Banten police chief, chief of Sabhara, chief of Reskrim, and the head of mobile brigade headed towards Cikeusik.<sup>59</sup>

Regardless of the above time difference in the arrival of support, one fact is indisputable: they arrived too late. It took about eight hours to reach Cikeusik from Serang. Why the troops were not deployed well in advance? Because, according to police, when Suparman was at the police station, the police chief assumed the situation was under control. This assumption proved to be wrong. The situation changed when the anti-Ahmadi masses arrived in numbers far beyond the estimates. Apart from this, 17 Ahmadi arrived from outside of Cikeusik and did not want to be evacuated (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).

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<sup>58</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

<sup>59</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

In consequence, the Banten police specified four subject matters of legal proceedings: (a) enforcing punishment with regard to Government Regulation No. 2 of 2003 upon officers who acted with negligence while on duty; (b) enforcing punishment with regard to Police Regulation No. 7 of 2006 on the police code of ethics; (c) enforcing punishment upon police officers who committed criminal violations in handling the Cikeusik conflict; (d) enforcing punishment upon the civilians who committed criminal acts. The police also set as suspects three non-Ahmadi residents and one member of Ahmadiyya (Komnas HAM 2011: 76-78).

### *Police Knowledge*

Since the fall of the New Order, the democratic forms of policing have been contained in regulations, for example in the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009. The regulation includes the matter of implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of Indonesian police. To what extent did the police know these and other rules?

One of the police informants said he did not know of this regulation. Yet he stated that the police adhered to the principles of human rights and the presumption of innocence, and equality before the law. He also added, "even the best regulations are situational; it's easy to make regulations, but implementing them is not, results are polemical" (chief of intelligence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).

Another informant revealed he did not know anything about the 2009 regulation. Yet he asserted that "in handling of ethno-religious conflicts, human rights principles must be upheld, regardless of one's beliefs. That Ahmadi are misguided gives no right to kill them. The police has its duties and principles" (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).

To what extent does the police know the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy (which has often been referred to by the anti-Ahmadi party to justify their actions)? The police who

was handling the Cikeusik case generally did not know this law. But when asked about the blasphemy and abuse of religion, one informant said that the teachings of Ahmadiyya were an example of blasphemy, because, he said, Ahmadis believed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet and *Tazkirah* was their holy scripture (Kadit III Intelkam Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).

According to the police, the sectarian conflict broke out since the local community was not happy with the presence of Ahmadis in Kampung Peundeuy of Umbulan village in Cikeusik.<sup>60</sup> Apart from this, a group of *kiais* believed that Suparman did not obey the agreement he signed earlier. The conflict erupted because both the Ahmadis and the anti-Ahmadi group differently interpreted the 2008 SKB of the three ministers. For the Ahmadis the SKB did not ban the presence of Ahmadiyya, while for their opponents it prohibited both its activities and existence (chief of intelligence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).

#### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

The police action was inappropriate in dealing with the conflict in Cikeusik. The police did not apply the existing legal instruments and the internal police instruments. Police officers did not adhere to the regulations such as the Police Chief Regulation No. 16 of 2006 on guidelines of controlling masses, the Police Chief Regulation No. 1 of 2009 on the use of force, and Fixed Procedure No. 1 of 2010 on prevention of disorder.<sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless, on 4 February 2011, the police chief of Pandeglang, Alex Fauzi Rasad, issued an order to 33 officers of Sabhara/ Dalmas (order Sprin/286/II/2011) to protect the house and property of Suparman.<sup>62</sup> On 5 February 2011, the district police chief also issued an

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<sup>60</sup>Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, "Saksi Hasanudin," pp. 2-5.

<sup>61</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

<sup>62</sup>Pandeglang district police chief, "Surat Perintah Nomor: Sprin/286/ II/2011" (Pandeglang: 4 February 2011).

order (Sprin/02/II/2011) to 18 police officers to protect Suparman's house.<sup>63</sup>

In dealing with the Cikeusik conflict, the police was avoiding law enforcement; instead, it focused on communication with the parties to the conflict. The police also saw the conflict through the lens of existing regulations (Kadit III Intelkam Polda Banten, interview, 23 May 2013). Yet, at the end, when the conflict escalated to violence, the police enforced the law in settling the issue.

According to the police, the conflict regarding Ahmadiyya could not be handled through dialogue and consultations, since both the Ahmadis and their opponents firmly stuck to their respective views. The solution would be in government regulations, however the existing ones were not explicit enough. The SKB of three ministers can be variously interpreted by the conflicting parties. The police is only authorized to maintain security and order, and to oversee the existing regulations (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).

### *Police Culture*

An informant whom we asked about democracy, human rights, and tolerance, said he did not understand those things. However, he added that the police nowadays could not act arbitrarily. Every citizen has an equal right to protection. He also said that the role of the police was to maintain security and order by operating in a neutral manner (chief of intelligence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 15 February 2013).

One of the police informants admitted that conflicts involving religion were more sensitive and needed to be handled very carefully. In case of mishandling, the police could be punished by the state and public (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013). Despite this, the conflict in Cikeusik was handled like any other conflict where applied should be the measures of pre-emptive

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<sup>63</sup>Cikeusik sub-district police chief, "Surat Perintah Nomor: Sprin/02/ II/2011" (Cikeusik: 5 February 2011).

approach, prevention, repression, law enforcement and restoration. All these except for repression were employed by the police in the Cikeusik conflict (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).

The *kiais* who opposed the presence of Ahmadis in Cikeusik claimed that they defended the Sunni community. To what extent was the police influenced by this declaration? One of the police informants admitted that he was a Sunni. However, as a policeman, he said, he ought to act in a neutral way. If a majority group suppresses a minority, the police would subject them to existing rules. The function of the police is to maintain order in accordance with the rules, not to determine whether beliefs are right or wrong (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).

Is it possible that in the city known as a city of “a thousand religious scholars” and “a million *santris*” can exist groups who are considered heretical? Police informant perceived this as “very unlikely”. It is not easy to find in Pandeglang community leaders or *ulama* whose views are not narrow. If a minority wants to live in Pandeglang, they must carry out their religious activities outside Pandeglang. If not, they could be expelled like Ahmadis and the followers of Ustad Juned whose teachings included skipping Friday prayers (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).

### *Local Politics*

The conflict in Cikeusik became a political commodity during Pandeglang local elections in 2010. In his campaign, one of the candidates for the regent’s office promised that if elected, he would disband the Ahmadi community in Cikeusik. He also added that he was the only candidate capable of doing this (member of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 2013).

Apart from this, during Umbulan village chief election, all candidates promised to disband Ahmadiyya. Later, after the win, the chosen candidate, Johar, continued to provoke the dissolution of Ahmadiyya (member of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 2013).



Pronouncements of the local governments with regard to the attack on Ahmadiyya were also very partisan. In line with the views of the anti-Ahmadi *kiais*, the governor of Banten, Ratu Atut Chosiyah, expressed her hopes that Ahmadis would return to the true teachings of Islam.<sup>64</sup> She and the regent of Pandeglang have even issued bans on Ahmadiyya.<sup>65</sup>

### *Public Opinion*

The dynamics of the conflict in Cikeusik and its relation to the attitude of administrations cannot be separated from the public opinion. The public opinion with regard to Ahmadiyya was shaped by the MUI, Islamic organisations (NU, Muhammadiyah etc.), anti-Ahmadi groups, NGOs, and mass-media.

The attitude of MUI Cikeusik towards Ahmadis was not different from the central MUI which saw them as “misguided and deviationist”. MUI Cikeusik was also trying to persuade Suparman and his community to abandon their beliefs. Apart from this, the MUI Cikeusik also called the local residents not to follow the teachings of Ahmadiyya. The appeal of the MUI Cikeusik to disband the Ahmadiyya was also conveyed to the local community leaders and *ulama* (MUI Cikeusik chairman, interview, 27 February 2013).

With regard to religious affairs, the police informant admitted they often requested the feedback from the MUI (chief of intelligence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013). Another informant said that although the MUI was the main reference for dealing with conflicts related to Ahmadiyya, the police acted in a neutral way to protect all Indonesian citizens (chief of intelligence

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<sup>64</sup>“Gubernur: Semoga Jemaah Ahmadiyah Insaf,” *kompas.com*, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/02/07/22074364/Gubernur.Semoga.Jemaah.Ahmadiyah.Insaf> (access 15 October 2012).

<sup>65</sup>See Banten governor’s ordinance No. 5 of 2011, “Larangan Aktivitas Penganut, Anggota, dan/atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di Wilayah Propinsi Banten” (Serang: Banten governor, 1 March 2011). See also Pandeglang regent’s ordinance No. 5 of 2011, “Larangan Aktivitas Ahmadiyah di Kabupaten Pandeglang” (Pandeglang: Pandeglang regent, 21 February 2011).

unit, Cikeusik police, interview, 15 February 2013). The MUI is considered an institution authorized to determine whether a belief is right or wrong, since it comprises *ulama* who know the matters of religion (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).

Beside the MUI Cikeusik, FKUB Pandeglang was also influential in the conflict over the presence of Ahmadiyya. FKUB Pandeglang cooperated with the MUI, the prosecutor and the Pandeglang police in providing “guidance” to the members of Ahmadiyya in the region by, for example, carrying out a religious dialogue (FKUB member, interview, 11 February 2013).

Although in institutional terms the NU was not involved in the attacks against the Cikeusik Ahmadi, some of the NU *ulama* followed K.H. Ujang’s call to dissolve Ahmadiyya. NU was involved more in “handling the Ahmadiyya case” in Kampung Cisereh of Cisata district. There, NU collaborated with the MUI in counselling attempts to make the members of Ahmadiyya repent (Komnas HAM 2011: 62-63).

However, not all *ulama* in Cikeusik agreed with the dissolution. One of them, who is also the son of MUI Pandeglang chairman, admitted that he did not agree with the attempts to dissolve Ahmadiyya, especially by means of violence. “The matters of faith are private; one is not entitled to interfere with other people’s beliefs”, he said (interview, 14 February 2013). Unfortunately, such voices were not audible when the conflict started. The Cikeusik community heard much more about alleged deviations and the need to disband the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik.

In the beginnings of the conflict there was no media coverage. Yet it became huge when the conflict escalated into violence. The media reporting was polarized, some referred to the anti-Ahmadi incident as “clashes”, some as “attack”.<sup>66</sup> Each had grounds: for example “clashes” were based on the fact that both sides used violence.

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<sup>66</sup> Andreas Harsono, “Indonesia’s Religious Violence: The Reluctance of Reporters to Tell the Story,” <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/16/indonesia-s-religious-violence-reluctance-reporters-tell-story> (accessed 15 October 2013).

Different ways of reporting the incident had an impact on the attitudes of both the public and the administration. For example, when it was reported as “clashes”, the public would view it as inevitable since both parties to the conflict used violence. The term “clashes” was also employed during the court proceedings in the Cikeusik case.

#### *Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

The conflict over the presence of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik was occurring repeatedly between 1992 and 2011. The mass mobilization of 2011, however, was unprecedented. According to the Ahmadis recurrence of the conflict was due to resentments of some parties within the public and the government over the presence of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik (member of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 2013).

There is no definite information about the police handling of the Ahmadiyya-related conflict in 1992. But at the beginnings of the 2011 conflict, the police were able to inhibit it when the mobilization took place under the banner of GMC lead by Kiai Muhammad. At the time, the police has at least successfully channelled the GMC’s demand through a forum at Muspida, which resulted in a written agreement of both conflicting parties. When the conflict began to involve the masses from outside Cikeusik, that is when the anti-Ahmadi mobilization was led by K.H. Ujang on 6 February 2011, the police was only able to secure Suparman, his wife, child and Atep Suratep, and failed to impede the mobilization which led to the deaths of three Ahmadis.

Police basically followed the development of the conflict, they were always involved in the meetings related to Ahmadiyya. An informant from the MUI mentioned that when the MUI met the local *ulama* to discuss Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, the police were there as well (AM, interview, 27 February 2013). In addition to following the MUI meetings, the police also meet and coordinated with the local authorities to discuss the issue of Ahmadiyya, for example through

the Muspika and Muspida (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik police, interview, 15 February 2013).

According to Ahmadis, the police action was very inadequate. They claimed the police tended to side with the anti-Ahmadi group, which was proven by the police failure to prevent violence. Shortage in personnel could not be considered the reason. Even the police who were guarding the scene were not serious in blocking the mob. Ahmadis also said that the police evacuated the victims only after the latter were battered (member of Ahmadi Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 2013).

But the disappointment over police performance was also expressed by the anti-Ahmadi group. One of the Umbulan village residents who confessed he agreed with the dissolution of Ahmadiyya, said the police were too concerned about the Ahmadis. The police even banned the dissolution plan, and that was why the *ulama* did not inform them about it (R, interview, 28 February 2013).

The main actors behind the mass mobilization against Ahmadiyya were the *ulama*, the Umbulan village chief, *jawara* and students of religious schools, who occupy upper positions in the Cikeusik social stratification. They used their influence to garner support and mass mobilization for the incident of 6 February 2011. The police had already known some of them personally, especially those from the GMC (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik police, interview, 13 February 2013). However, there were no institutional relations between the police and the anti-Ahmadi group in Cikeusik.

Law enforcement efforts were undertaken by the police after the incident. Police arrested several people and examined witnesses. After that, all the police files were transferred to the Banten High Court. The court found several members of the anti-Ahmadi movement guilty: K.H. Ujang Muhamad Arif (6 months imprisonment), Kiai Endang (6 months imprisonment), K.H. Muhamad Munir (6 months imprisonment), Idris (5 months and 15 days imprisonment), Muhamad (6 months imprisonment), Ujang (6 months imprisonment), Saad Baharudin (6 months imprisonment), Adam Damini

(6 months imprisonment), Yusuf Abidin (6 months imprisonment), Yusri (6 months imprisonment), Muhamad Rohidin (6 months imprisonment), and Dani (3 months imprisonment and court fee of IDR 2,000). From the Ahmadiyya side the court sentenced Deden Sujana to 6 months in prison minus the arrest period. The police also cracked down on its own members who did not perform their duties properly, for example by degrading them, delaying promotions and even by taking some into custody.<sup>67</sup>

## Conclusions

The anti-Ahmadiyya violence in Cikeusik is an example of failed policing of sectarian conflicts. Failure does not indicate that the police did not work, because the police made preemptive and preventive efforts before the incident took place. The failure resulted from inappropriate policing strategy which even did not follow the basic regulations such as the Police Chief Regulation No. 9 of 2008 on handling demonstrations, the Police Chief Regulation No. 16 of 2006 on guidelines of controlling masses, the Police Chief Regulation No. 1 of 2009 on the use of force, and the Fixed Procedure No. 1 of 2010 on prevention of disorder.

When the conflict surfaced, the police already knew it was a threat to order and security. The police chose to communicate with Ahmadiyya and the anti-Ahmadi group for the sake of not letting, to borrow the police language, the AG (*Ancaman Gangguan*, "threat of disturbance") turn into the GN (*Gangguan Nyata*, "real disturbance"). Police urged the warring parties to maintain order and security, and not to breach the law. The police also approached both parties and facilitated a dialogue between them. But efforts still did not impede the conflict.

The police knew that the anti-Ahmadi group was going to carry out their dissolution plan unilaterally, without reporting it to the

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<sup>67</sup>Deputy Chief of Banten Police, "Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. Pandeglang."

police or other government representatives. Anticipating this, the police chose to maintain communication with them, as it did in the beginnings of the conflict. The police intelligence gathered information, called and approached the leaders of the anti-Ahmadi group in order to convince them to cancel the dissolution plans. But here the police failed. It also failed in estimating the number of the group's supporters.

The indecisive police persuasion allowed the opponents of Ahmadiyya to carry out the dissolution. When the mob was approaching, there were no explicit warnings or threats from the side of the police. According to the Police Chief Regulation No. 9 of 2008 on handling demonstrations, the police could use force to stop the dissolution activities, as they were not reported and the participants did not follow police advice. It could be that the police were afraid to face the anti-Ahmadi mob and became overly cautious.

That situation made the police choose a different strategy while dealing with the Ahmadiyya. Police decided to evacuate the key Ahmadiyya Cikeusik figures, Suparman and Atep Suratep. The successful evacuation influenced the police estimates with regard to the dissolution plans, they assumed the anti-Ahmadi masses would not show up, or if they did, the numbers would not be huge since Suparman was already absent. These predictions affected the number and tasks of the police personnel deployed. Only 59 officers were assigned to protect Suparman's house and evacuate the members of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik who could still be at the site.

The police apparently was not aware that the parties to the conflict did not trust in its ability to handle it. To the anti-Ahmadi group Suparman's evacuation did not guarantee that he would "repent" or that Ahmadiyya Cikeusik would be disbanded. Dissolution was still carried out and with a huge mass mobilization. On the other hand, to the Ahmadis, the police in its attempts to protect Suparman's house did not guarantee it would remain undamaged. The Ahmadis from Cikeusik and from outside were requested to guard the house which was a JAI asset.

Policing strategies were not the best and the lack of trust towards the police resulted in wrong predictions regarding the planned dissolution. Warring parties ultimately chose their own ways of resolving the conflict. The conflict escalated into violence. In accordance with the Police Chief Regulation No. 1 of 2009 on the use of force, and the Fixed Procedure No. 1 of 2010 on prevention of disorder, the police could use repression to prevent the escalation. Fearing attacks from the anti-Ahmadi mob, the police only evacuated the casualties and gave a verbal warning to the masses.

Policing action on the day of dissolution was also far from adequate because the police chiefs, in this case the police chief of Pandeglang and the police chief of Banten province, were not present at the location. The absence of leadership made it unclear who and how should take responsibility for handling the conflict. In addition, the information about the conflict and dissolution was not fully conveyed to the leadership. Consequently, there were no instructions on how to deal with the situation when it exceeded the police expectations. It also resulted in inaccurate stationing of troops, not in line with the Police Chief Regulation No. 16 of 2006 on guidelines of controlling masses.

Policing action in Cikeusik did not run properly also because of external influences of religious leaders and local government officials. The religious and community leaders of anti-Ahmadiyya views together with the Umbulan village chief provoked and mobilized citizens to disband the group. In fact, they gave false information to the police regarding the dissolution plans. Although there were leaders and officials who opposed the plans to disband Ahmadiyya, their voices were not heard since the public opinion was more inclined to the anti-Ahmadi sentiments. The police was left alone and increasingly burdened by the conflict.

The model of policing in Cikeusik could not be used in dealing with sectarian conflicts in other places. Even if the police predictions with regard to the dissolution were correct, the evacuation of the targeted group would not necessarily impede the conflict. Evac-

uation strategy in Cikeusik showed that it did not guarantee the conflict would not escalate into violence. Evacuation is not a neutral strategy for conflict resolution and is insensitive to the guarantees of religious freedom and protection from fear.

In order to prevent the Cikeusik incident from occurring again, the police must take several steps. First, it has to build public trust. The police must convince the public that it maintains the order and security in accordance with the principle of neutrality and existing law. The police must also convince the members of the society that without their cooperation in dealing with conflicts it is impossible to keep peace and security.

Second, the police should improve the procedures of handling sectarian conflicts, both on the pre-emptive and preventive levels as well as on the level of law enforcement. This can be settled by a special police chief regulation or a fixed procedure of handling religious conflicts. The existing regulations and procedures indeed control the police mechanisms of dealing with conflicts. But when confronted with a religious conflict, the police is too cautious in handling it. This caution can have negative effects: the police may fear to deal with the conflict. With the special regulation with regard to religious conflicts, the negative effects of police caution could be reduced. The regulation and the fixed procedure should be supported by new legislation on religious conflicts in Indonesia. There should be, for example, laws on the matter of hate speech. Religious violence occurs when it is preceded by hate speech. The police should encourage the House of Representatives (DPR) to formulate and draft such law.<sup>\*\*\*</sup>



## THE CASE OF ANTI-SHI'A IN SAMPANG, MADURA

### Foreword

Sampang regency on the island of Madura, East Java, has received an increased national and international coverage following several incidents of conflict between the Sunni majority and a small local Shi'a community. Two of the incidents which attracted huge attention took place on 29 December 2011 and 26 August 2012. But the discord between the two groups has lasted longer, at least since 2006. The two incidents of this sectarian, intra-Muslim conflict, which took place in Omben and Karang Penang districts of Sampang, were of particular importance since they lead to loss of life, left dozens of houses burnt, and resulted in expulsion of Shi'a residents from their hometown.

The findings of this research show that the policing process in Sampang went through various stages of the long-lasting conflict. Judging from its results, however, the policing was not always successful. Fatalities indicate that the police failed to prevent the tensions from escalating into violence.

In this chapter, two matters are discussed: the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict in Sampang and the aspects of policing of this conflict. The aspects of policing are presented one by one, and preceded by a

short description of the formation and development of the conflict. The chapter ends with several conclusions.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography in Sampang**

Sampang is located on the island of Madura, East Java, 110 km from Surabaya, the capital of East Java. The district consists of fourteen sub-districts. According to the 2010 census, the total population amounted to 877,772 people.

The Sunni-Shi'a conflict discussed here occurred in two sub-districts: Omben, with population of 77,396, and Karang Penang, with population of 66,639. Both sub-districts are situated in the western part of Sampang. All inhabitants of these sub-districts are Muslims, belonging to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), just like most of the residents of Sampang and of Madura in general.<sup>1</sup>

The most violent manifestation of the conflict unfolded in two villages: Karang Gayam (Omben) and Blu'uran (Karang Penang). In 2011, the population of Blu'uran was 14,664, and of Karang Gayam was 5,158. Special attention needs to be given to two neighbourhoods in these villages, namely Nangkernang (Karang Gayam, Omben) and Gading Laok (Blu'uran, Karang Penang). Neither of the villages can be reached by a paved road. When the rainy season arrives, visiting them is even more difficult because of slippery walkways.

Like other sub-districts of Indonesia, Omben and Karang Penang have their police stations in the rank of sub-district police; altogether they were around two dozen officers stationed here, who were led by a sub-district police chief.

### **Sunni-Shi'a Conflict in Sampang**

The communities of Omben and Karang Penang, as the Sampang society in general, are characterised by a high social cohesion. Agriculture is the main economic activity in both sub-districts.

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<sup>1</sup>BPS Sampang, *Sampang dalam Angka 2012*, p. 84.

There is no industry.<sup>2</sup> The institution of *gerjih* functions on the family and village level as a self-help and solidarity mechanism. Many extended families form housing estates, *taneyan lanjhang*, with a cattle enclosure and surrounded by agricultural lands where they grow corn, chilli, rice, or tobacco, depending on the season and soil. The buildings which stand out are the *musalas*, mosques and religious schools. *Kiais* have much social influence due to their roles in religious rituals such as the remembrance of the Prophet's birthday, and in community life in general. Status is an important factor, especially in the *kiais* relation to their students, where it assumes a hierarchical order, similar to a patron-client relationship. *Kiais* are associated in various organizations such as NU, MUI, Consultation Body of the Ulama of Madurese Boarding Schools (Badan Musyawarah Ulama se-Madura, BASSRA), and Ulama Consultation Forum (Forum Musyawarah Ulama, FMU).

The above indicates that there are numerous tools of social control which originate both from the local tradition and religion, and which sustain and legitimize the social cohesion. However, the efforts to sustain the tradition and high social cohesion also contain disintegration features, as they often assume aggressive form, such as *carok*. Persons who openly transgress the norms and traditions commit *tengkah* and can be subject to violence in line with the customary law of Sampang.

The emergence of Shi'as in Sampang, and the conflict with the Sunni majority which followed, must be seen in the context of a very traditional and norms-conscious society. Policing of the Sunni-Shi'a conflict and constraints met by the police have to be understood in relation to the social background of Sampang, and especially of Omben and Karang Penang.

Police, as a state institution, often seeks the help of *kiais* because of their influence and access to the society. The police needs *kiais* in order to maintain security and order, to reduce crime, and to social-

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<sup>2</sup>BPS Sampang, *Sampang dalam Angka 2012*, p. 221.

ize police activities. The police also see the role of *kiais* as informal community leaders. Cooperation with them is considered as having a direct impact on the network of their followers. “If a *kiai* says so, usually the situation is quickly resolved” — thus spoke upon one occasion Kombes Kadarusman, officer of East Java province police.<sup>3</sup>

In other words, *kiais* are the partners of police in maintaining security and public order. However, when the *kiais* as a social class join one of the parties to the conflict, the peacekeeping activities of the police, which are the most responsible for it among all state institutions, can be terminated or hindered.

In the following part, the synopsis of the Sunni-Shi’a conflict is divided into three periods.

### *Sunni-Shi’a Conflict 1980-2003*

In the 1980s, Makmun, a *kiai* from Omben, Sampang, became attracted to Shi’a Islam which was then popular because of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 Revolution in Iran which overthrew the Shah’s dictatorship. Has *Kiai* Makmun become a Shi’a himself? This is still disputed. However, those who consider him so, like neighbours, family and close friends, agree he did not practice Shi’a Islam openly, nor did he preach it to the community, except for his own children of whom some followed him. *Kiai* Makmun had several daughters and sons, among them Iklil al-Milal, Ali Murtado alias Tajul Muluk (born 1973), and Rois al-Hukama.

In the end of 1980s, *Kiai* Makmun sent two of his sons, Tajul Muluk and Rois al-Hukama to study at the Yayasan Pesantren Islam (YAPI), a religious boarding school in Bangil, Pasuruan. Founded in 1976, it is known as an influential Shi’a educational institution (Zulkifli 2009: 62). Tajul Muluk studied at YAPI from 1987 until

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<sup>3</sup>Delivered during a discussion entitled “The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.

1991. This was not accepted by some members of Kiai Makmun's extended family, particularly Kiai Karrar, who opposed the boys being sent to the Shi'a boarding school and was trying to make them come back to Madura and study at his own *madrasah*. Kiai Karrar is Tajul Muluk's uncle.

Finally, having graduated from YAPI, Tajul Muluk spent a few months of 1993 at Kiai Karrar's school. He was later sent to Saudi Arabia to learn Sunni Islam, but instead he became a laborer. In the meantime he would learn from the Saudi Arabian Shi'a scholars, especially from Muhammad Liwa' Mahdi in Qatif (Tajul Muluk, interview, 27 March 2013).

In 1999, Tajul Muluk returned from Saudi Arabia to Omben. His younger brother assisted him in managing their father's *madrasah*. He began to preach the Shi'a teachings to the members of his family and neighbours. But beside this, he also began to perceive some local practices as not right. In his community, he became a kind of reformer of social-religious affairs. He encouraged the community to protect livestock from thieves by organizing patrols. With his parents and siblings, he stressed the importance of education and of making savings in order that families could afford to educate their children to the level as high as possible and were not forced to have them taught at *madrasahs* by incompetent clerics who themselves were "only *madrasah* graduates" (Tajul Muluk, interview, 27 March 2013).

There is a cultural obligation among all families of Sampang to celebrate *maulid* or the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. It is an honor for a family to host these celebrations. Food is prepared for everyone who arrives, with chicken, goat or beef besides rice and other side dishes. The *maulid* tradition has become a communal feast, which for the whole month moves from one house to another. A *kiai* would be invited with his wife and children, and would give a speech or sermon on religion. When the celebration is over, the hosts would give an envelope with money to the *kiai*. The amount varies depending on the financial situation, but it is usually be-

tween IDR 150,000 and IDR 500,000. Envelopes with lesser amounts are also given to *kiai*'s wife and children. Sometimes other visitors too come to shake hands with the *kiai* and present him an envelope containing money.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the institutionalized religious practice, there is also a material aspect of *maulid* celebration. Or, as observed by a former police officer from Sampang police, there was an economic side in the controversy between Tajul Muluk and Omben *kiais*. It is not only during the *maulid* celebrations that the residents hand over money to *kiais*; instead, this also happens on the occasions when one leaves Madura to work on Java or elsewhere (chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 7 February 2013). Therefrom comes the sarcastically-tinted expression that the month of *maulid* is the harvest period for the Sampangs, and generally for the Madura *kiais*. It is not seldom that a family has to sell livestock, pawn valuables or is in debt only because they must host the *maulid* feast. Tajul Muluk claimed that money should not be given to *kiais* during *maulid*, but a *kiai* ought to give money to the poor. Apart from this, which was not less important, Tajul introduced a new custom that *maulid* celebration is to be held once and at one place — at the mosque. This, according to him, would remove the burden from families and would allow them to save more for their children's education (interview, 27 March 2013).

### *Sunni-Shi'a Conflict 2004-2010*

Since 2004, Tajul has been more openly introducing Shi'a teachings and people from outside the immediate family began to join his

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<sup>4</sup>In other Indonesian Muslim communities outside Madura, as in mainland Java, *maulid* celebrations from house to house did not become a tradition. It is celebrated once, at a mosque, and it is attended by all residents. A *kiai* would deliver a lecture and would receive a honorarium. However, in some places in Aceh, it looks similar to Madura: in one day we can visit several *maulid* celebrations and at each lunch would be served. In the Christian community Christmas celebration is usually also held at one place, except for certain Christian communities, like in Tentena, Poso, Central Sulawesi, where Christmas takes place throughout December and its celebrations are held from house to house, with eating, singing, and listening to pastor's sermons.

group. Slowly but surely, the number of followers was increasing: from 30 families in 2004, it became 120 families in 2011. In the opinion of those who were against him, the expansion of the group was very fast, and if not stopped it would even become faster. Tajul and his followers were sending their children to Shi'a boarding schools in the East and Central Java. There were more and more students who in the future could preach their parents' religious legacy. Apart from this, the mosque was refurbished and enlarged, and a learning room was added. This arose protests from Tajul's opponents. Several times the construction materials for the mosque were blocked by them at the entrance to Nangkernang neighbourhood of Karang Gayam. Those incidents had to be resolved through the police intervention.

Several *kiais*, including Kiai Karrar, began to oppose Tajul and the discord led to an open conflict. Meetings were held between Tajul and *kiais* who opposed him and accused him of deviationist understanding of religion. Attempts to resolve the conflict within the extended family of Kiai Makmun and Kiai Karrar, both of whom are known as descendants of Batu Ampar, were unsuccessful. A bigger conflict was avoided since some of Tajul's opponents respected and revered Kiai Makmun, a charismatic religious leader, scholar, and an important member of the *kiais* group in Sampang. One of Kiai Makmun's students, who now himself is a *kiai* and a NU Sampang figure, said, "if it were allowed to worship anyone else than Allah, people would worship Kiai Makmun" (Kiai Abdul Mannan, interview, 30 April 2013).

Kiai Makmun died in 2006, and the conflict entered a new phase since Tajul not only lost a father but also a protector. He wanted to connect *maulid* with the celebration of the 40<sup>th</sup> day after his father's death. He also wished to invite several *kiais* and Shi'a *habaib* from Bangkalan and Sumenep, outside of Sampang. A rumor was spread that twelve Shi'a preachers from Kuwait would arrive for Tajul Muluk's *maulid* celebration. This almost lead to clashes when the followers of Tajul and their opponents got into an argument and

reached for sticks and machetes. The police intervened and in order to prevent violence, the *maulid* celebration was cancelled (Tajul Muluk, interview, 1 May 2013).

Kiai Karrar began to expand the conflict by bringing it to the wider forum of Madurese *ulama*, including the ones of BASSRA. On 20 February 2006, several *ulama* from four regencies of Madura invited Tajul to meet them. *Kiais* wished to inquire about the allegations that he was spreading the Shi'a teachings which they considered heretical. Tajul was requested to leave Shi'a Islam for Sunnism. It was agreed that he would deliver a response within a week, and it was hoped that in his response he would "revert" to Sunni Islam. Later, on 26 February, when Tajul did not respond, the FMU of Pamekasan and Sampang held a meeting in Pamekasan. Tajul was again requested to leave Shi'a teachings and revert to Sunni Islam "in order to avoid the physical clashes and the clash of understandings." At the same time, the *kiais* announced that Tajul was still refusing to accept their demands. In a statement given after the meeting, they requested the MUI of Madura to issue a fatwa on the danger of deviationists groups, "including the Shi'a." Several members of the police, among them the police chief of Omben, were present to supervise the meeting (police chief of Omben, interview, 7 February 2013; Tajul Muluk, interview, 1 May 2013).

Tensions rose again in 2009. On 26 October, the local government, MUI Sampang, the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, representatives of NU and Bakorpakem, met together in Sampang. The aim of the meeting was to find the solution to the Shi'a problem in Karang Gayam, Omben. In a statement issued after the meeting, Tajul was asked to stop the Shi'a worship and missionary activities. It was mentioned that Tajul would approve the request, and was willing to face the legal consequences had he continued the Shi'a practice. Bakorpakem, MUI, and NU would monitor and supervise the Shi'a followers. They also promised to maintain order when Tajul would fulfil their demands.

Tajul was requested to sign the "agreement". The head of the MUI, the head of the NU, the head of the local office of the Ministry



of Religious Affairs, the head of the local government, the head of Bakesbangpol, and a number of *ulama* all signed it too as witnesses.<sup>5</sup>

These meetings were intended to suppress Tajul and his followers. It is interesting to see that the parties who pressurized him seemed to believe that this kind of approach would succeed. Even more interesting is that the signed agreement became the basis for and legitimization of the confrontation which took place later.

Certainly, Tajul did not really mean to adhere to the demands of the so-called agreement. He admitted that the police requested him to sign it even though he did not agree, because later on he could always admit that he signed it under pressure. But Tajul also felt that he could accept the phrase “return to *ahl as-sunnah wa l-jama'ah*” as long as there was no word “mazhab” in front of “*ahl as-sunnah*,” because, according to him, Shi'as too belong to the *ahl as-sunnah* (interview, 27 March 2013).

#### *Sunni-Shi'a conflict 2011-2013*

The relations between the parties to the conflict had passed the stage where working together and reaching compromises was not possible. Both sides stuck to their respective convictions. In the words of the head of Kesbanglinmas Sampang, “The majority wanted 100, the minority wanted 100 — each wanted to get 100” (interview, 7 February 2013). One side did not want their habits, customs, influence, and followers disturbed, the other side did not want their rights and freedom disturbed just because their religious practices and beliefs were seen as new and different. Since neither wanted to give up their respective positions, the hostility increased.

In this context, the government's attitude was minimalist. “Universal principles of human rights,” said a government official, “cannot be accepted there as of yet.” He confessed to have spoken with a few *kiais* about the external pressures on the Sampang local gov-

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<sup>5</sup>Photocopy of the mentioned agreement as well as of several other agreements are available in researchers' archive.

ernment to protect the Shi'as from inhuman treatment, looting, and neglect of their rights. But this was not acknowledged. "Do I have to confront the *kiais*? Won't it be better if we confront them?" (head of Kesbanglinmas, interview, 7 February 2013). In other words, the local government was faced with the *kiais* whose strength was greater than its own, which made it impossible to implement the "universal principles of human rights."

According to several government officials, including the regent, domination of *kiais* over the Sunni majority in Sampang was a "local ethics" that could not be ignored and had to be both the reference and starting point in all community affairs. Demands that children of Shi'a families did not attend YAPI and other Shi'a boarding schools on Java "should be obeyed, even though the law allows" one to be schooled where one wished. The *kiais* "already envisioned the future problem: one Tajul Muluk and there is already such a confusion. In ten years from now when people who were schooled at YAPI and Pekalongan come back, what would happen then?" (Omben police chief, interview, 7 February 2013). Tajul Muluk and the Shi'a community of Omben resisted the local ethics which contradicted the law, and they suffered consequences. The local government accepted this, complied and provided explanation in a form of a negative stereotype: when angry, the Madurese would not be afraid of authorities.

In 2011, there were several important incidents involving the conflicted parties. On 4 April 2011, Tajul was going to host the *maulid* celebrations. As always in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran, tensions would become high during the *maulid* period. Hundreds of armed men approached Tajul demanding that he abandoned the intention to host the celebrations. They argued that Tajul agreed (the agreement made on 26 October 2009) to stop the Shi'a activities or to stand trial upon violating the agreement. Fearing for Tajul's safety, the police forced his evacuation to Sampang police headquarters. This was the beginning of a process that lasted several months and ended up with Tajul Muluk being relocated in July

2011, for one year period, to Malang, at the expense of the local and provincial governments.

Although relocated to Malang, Tajul was able to return to his village several times. He would travel from Malang to Sampang and back in order to see his wife and to visit the tomb of his father. But each time he was back, usually for several days up to two weeks, he gave sermons and held meetings with his followers. In mid-December 2011, one of the houses in Karang Gayam, which Tajul most often visited, was burnt down by his opponents. Residents of the house were safe and the material damage was minimal. However, this incident was followed by a bigger arson attack which attracted much wider attention.

On 29 December 2011, the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang reached its peak. The attacks were precisely directed and coordinated. First, around 9:30 am, Tajul's house in Nangkernang neighbourhood, Karang Gayam, Omben, was set on fire. The attackers burnt the house, three classrooms, prayer room, five bedrooms of students and teachers, two bathrooms, twelve computers, satellite dish, kiosk, and cowshed. Then they moved to their next target, the house of Iklil al-Milal, Tajul's older brother, in Gading Laok, Blu'uran, Karang Penang, located approximately five kilometers from Tajul's house. At noon they set fire to the house, bathroom (not in the main house), and piles of construction wood. Three mango trees were cut and torn down. Finally, the attackers went to their last target, the house of Ustad Saiful Ulum, Tajul Muluk's brother-in-law, in Solong Daya, Karang Gayam, Omben, approximately five kilometers from the house of Iklil al-Milal. At about 3:00 pm, the attackers set fire to the house, kitchen, bathroom, and prayer room. Having reached three different targets which were relatively far apart, the attackers stopped.

The atmosphere of anxiety struck the Shi'a community to the point that after the arson attacks they gathered to stay all together. Due to security reasons in case of further attacks, the limited sanitation and space in the house where they assembled, the police evac-

uated 250 of them to the Sampang Sports Centre, where they stayed for two weeks, before later sending them back to their homes.

The police arrested one arsonist, Musikrah, and brought him to the court. He was sentenced to less than four months and set free. The police also caught another one named Saripin. However, due to strong protests from the *kiais* and the community, he was released without trial. Tajul Muluk, who suffered most due to the attack, was also arrested, tried, and sentenced to two years in prison. When he appealed, the punishment was raised to four years. The reason was that he spread deviationist teachings and caused unrest in the society.

In the mid-2012, the children of Shi'a families returned to Omben for Ramadan holidays. For the police it was a matter between parents and children, but for the Sunni residents this was a trigger to several issues which, according to them, were settled due to the "agreements" reached earlier. The first issue was that the Shi'a community was forming cadres by sending their children to Shi'a schools in East and Central Java, while the Sunnis wished they were sent to Sunni schools in and around Sampang. They felt that, as it was expressed by one *kiai* of the MUI Sampang, "what was the point of imprisoning Tajul if in ten years these children finish their education at Shi'a schools, hundreds of new Tajuls would come, and they would be even better trained than Tajul himself" (secretary of the MUI Sampang, interview, 25 February 2013).

In the context of the built-up hostilities, Tajul's opponents declared he had violated the Madurese norms and codes of honor, which could result in acts of revenge and murder. The violation to them was the fact that he had "bred something new where the 99,99 percent were Sunnis" (head of Kesbanglinmas Sampang, interview, 7 February 2013). The Shi'a community in Sampang was increasingly seen as a disease that must be removed. To put it in the words of a MUI Sampang representative, if a person suffered from severe diabetes, then the affected limb must be amputated — "if not cut off, it [the disease] would spread everywhere. And what would

be left?" (Secretary of the MUI Sampang, interview, 25 February 2013).

Because of this, on 26 August 2012, a week after the Eid celebration, the Sunni residents of Omben, blocked the Shi'a students from returning to their schools. The two groups who have long been hostile towards each other, were caught in a quarrel. As more and more people gathered, violence could not be avoided. The few members of the Omben police were helpless. A fight broke out with the use of machetes, sickles, batons, stones, and *bondet* (a home-made explosive used by fishermen to catch fish). One member of the Shi'a community, Chamamah, was killed and dozens of others from both groups were wounded. Some of the police members were also injured. Besides, 26 Shi'a households were burnt down in Gading Laok neighbourhood of Blu'uran, Karang Penang, and 23 in Nangkernang neighbourhood of Karang Gayam, Omben (the houses were made of bamboo and straw and burnt easily). In the afternoon, the members of Shi'a community took refuge in the Sampang Sports Centre. On 20 June 2013, they were moved to Puspo Argo housing estate in Sidoarjo.

After the incident, the police indicated six suspects who were tried with various results: one suspect, Mukhsin, was sentenced to ten months imprisonment for beatings; Mat Safi was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment for torture; Saniwan, eight months for beatings; Saripin, eight months for beatings; and Hadiri, four years for beatings. Meanwhile, Roisul al-Hukama, the brother of Tajul Muluk, who played a particular role in this conflict (see further below), and for whom initially two years imprisonment were demanded, was found not guilty – a decision that hurt the Shi'a community's sense of justice.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation), "Putusan Bebas bagi Pelaku Kerusuhan Sampang Mencederai Rasa Keadilan Masyarakat," <http://www.ylbhi.or.id/2013/05/putusan-bebas-bagi-pelaku-kerusuhan-sampang-mencederai-rasa-keadilan-masyarakat/> (accessed 13 November 2013).

## **Dynamics of Policing the Conflict in Sampang**

### *Policing Activities*

In the long duration of the conflict, the police officers of Sampang, particularly from the Omben sub-district police, changed many times, especially at the managerial level. A few important notes need to be taken with regard to these changes. The Sampang police chief was holding the same post before the incident in December 2011 and after it, until 2013. Omben and Karang Penang police chiefs were also serving at their positions when the December 2011 incident took place, and they were still there at the time of August 2012 incident and afterwards. Sampang police officer who also had long followed the conflict, Kompol M. Jusuf, has been serving in Sampang from the first incident, holding various positions, as a the head of Bimas (at the time of December 2011 incident) and the head of Planning (at the time of August 2012 incident). In the Omben police, most of the officers have also been serving long in Omben, and after the December 2011 incident, three more officers joined them, becoming together a 23-member force.

Therefore, both the Sampang and Omben police had adequate knowledge about the conflict. In fact, some of the higher-ranking officers (district and sub-district police chiefs) were requested to remain at their posts to handle the Sunni-Shi'a conflict. The Sampang police was also strengthened by a new head of Intelkam after the December 2011 incident, who was serving there at least until 2013, when this report was written.

In the incident of 29 December 2011, the police, particularly in Omben, had information on mass mobilization of both parties. This was admitted both by the police (Omben police chief, interview, 28 March 2013) as well as by an NGO which monitors the conflict in Sampang.<sup>7</sup> A day before the incident, the police chief of Omben called Ikhlil al-Milal, one of the Omben Shi'a leaders, a brother of

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<sup>7</sup>Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), "Negara Gagal Melindungi Jamaah Syiah Sampang," *Syahadah* 16, January 2012, p. 4.

Tajul Muluk, to the police station and informed him about the possibility of an attack on the following day. On the morning of 29 December, when the crowds began to gather, Ikliil called the police and confirmed that the "threats of which he was informed were indeed true."<sup>8</sup>

However, intelligence was not accompanied by adequate measures to prevent violence. The police themselves admitted that very few officers were present at the location before and during the December incident. According to the report of the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), "the capacity of police personnel deployed in the field was insufficient to stop the violence. In fact, the police at the location were merely looking at the burning houses and *musala*."<sup>9</sup> Initially, there was only one policeman and one soldier at the scene of crime.<sup>10</sup> And they were unable to ward off the attacks.

The number of police officers was increased right after the arson attack of 29 December 2011. In addition to Omben police, officers from Sampang were deployed under the command of their police chief. Police pacified the masses, dispersed the crowd, and persuaded those who carried sickles and sharp weapons to leave. A few days after the incident, the police returned to Omben and seized sharp weapons, including 23 sickles and swords. This was protested by the Shi'as who claimed they needed weapons for self-defence. But this was exactly what the police feared since they slept in groups with unsheathed swords and sickles. The police did not carry out a similar weapon-seizing from the Sunni residents.

In normal circumstances the police would be much more involved. According to a police officer from the provincial police (Polda), when a situation becomes tense the district police (Polsek)

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<sup>8</sup>Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), "Pengungsi Syiah Dipaksa-Pulangkan tanpa Jaminan Keamanan," *Syahadah* 16, January 2012, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup>Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), "Negara Gagal Melindungi Jamaah Syiah Sampang," *Syahadah* 16, January 2012, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup>Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), "Pengungsi Syiah Dipaksa-Pulangkan tanpa Jaminan Keamanan," *Syahadah* 16, January 2012, p. 5.

handles it, yet when attacks or clashes occur, the provincial police (Polda) would be deployed.<sup>11</sup> When security tasks are performed, officers are deployed from several units, such as intelligence, Sabhara, and Samapta. In tense situations police mobile brigades would arrive from Sampang. In Sampang also the military from Koramil (and Kodim, depending on circumstances) would join the police. On 29 December 2011, at 9:30 am, there were two forces (military and police) present when the burning began. An hour after that, at 10:30 am, “25-armed members of mobile brigade arrived to the scene. Unfortunately, they also did not undertake any preventative actions, some just enjoyed sitting in the prayer room next to the madrasah.”<sup>12</sup>

The police sent more troops right after the attack, with 435 officers were deployed to the location. They consisted of 175 members of Sampang district police, 50 Sabhara from East Java provincial police, 150 troops of mobile brigades, 30 operations officers from Pamekasan district police, and 30 soldiers from Kodim Sampang. The police referred to this deployment as “preventive measures,” in the sense that it was meant to prevent the incident from reoccurring. The police and the military later evacuated the Shi’a residents (first to the district office, later to Sampang Sports Centre) and guarded those who refused to be evacuated.<sup>13</sup>

With regard to the incident which took place on 26 of August 2012, the police admitted the forces deployed were not adequate. Several reasons were given to justify this. First, the atmosphere of “Lebaran Ketupat” holiday made the 23-member police force busy

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<sup>11</sup>Delivered during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.

<sup>12</sup>Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), “Pengungsi Syiah Dipaksa-Pulangkan tanpa Jaminan Keamanan,” *Syahadah* 16 Januari 2012, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup>Presentation slide made by a police officer (of Polda East Java) at a workshop entitled “Overcoming Anarchic Activities: Tackling Social Conflict by the Police based on Human Rights Principles and Procedures,” organized by Ditbangpes Sespimti Polri, in cooperation with Yayasan Lembaga Hukum Indonesia and The Asia Foundation, in Lembang, on 28 November 2013.



enough with their routine security duties. Another reason is the relatively far distance which could not be made on four-wheeled vehicles, the scene as well was quite broad as people gathered in several places. In contrast to the settlement areas in Javanese villages, the ones in Omben are not localized in one place but spread along various plantations and fields. The distance from one Shi'a household to another can amount to two to five kilometers. But the most important reason was the quick outbreak and mass mobilization, which was made even more rapid with the help of loudspeakers in mosques and the circulation of rumors. Within three hours the number of Omben and Karang Penang residents who were mobilized reached thousands. "Five thousand people were there surely," said a police member.<sup>14</sup> When masses arrived in thousands, there was no adequate police force that could be sent to the location.<sup>15</sup>

Of course, after the arson attack the number of police increased with the support of arriving from the East Java police. However, later in the afternoon the challenges faced were already different, from prevention and handling of conflict, to post-incident mitigation. In the post-incident phase, the security forces deployed were quite enough: Four SSK (company-level units) from the mobile brigade of East Java police, two SSK from Sabhara of East Java police, one SST (platoon-level unit) from Pamekasan district police, and three military SSK from Batalion Rider Kodam Brawijaya. Similarly to the 29 December 2011 incident, security forces could have been sent in case of open violence. The police and soldiers whose number could reach over a thousand, were not deployed in advance.

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<sup>14</sup>A statement made during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled "The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom," organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.

<sup>15</sup>Presentation slide made by a police officer (of Polda East Java) at a workshop entitled "Overcoming Anarchic Activities: Tackling Social Conflict by the Police based on Human Rights Principles and Procedures," organized by Ditbangpes Ses-pimti Polri, in cooperation with Yayasan Lembaga Hukum Indonesia and The Asia Foundation, in Lembang, on 28 November 2013.

In the 26 August 2012 incident, several policing activities were employed, including community relations, documentation, and persuasion. No repression was applied despite the occurrence of fighting, arson, and murder. The atmosphere of conflict, and the unequal balance of power between the police and the masses did not allow repression. Police worried the violence would expand and they themselves might become victims of mob attacks.

In the 26 August 2012 incident, the police again relied on evacuation as the measures to handle the post-incident situation. Shi'as were evacuated first to the district office and then, on the same day in the afternoon, to the Sampang Sports Centre. Since more than 60 homes were burnt, they no longer had a place to stay. This many houses could be burnt by the anti-Shi'a groups because the police did not have sufficient strength to impede the clashes or ward off the masses. The police also found it easier to protect the Shi'a leaders and their followers in the post-conflict phase if they were grouped in one place in Sampang.<sup>16</sup>

In the post-conflict phase, the police carried out a law enforcement action against six suspects. One of them, Roisul al-Hukama, was released which raised objections of many.

### *Police Knowledge*

The Sampang police subscribe to the constitutional provisions on democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance. Their knowledge of these issues is not detailed but just general. Police admits that the matter of belief belongs to civil rights and cannot be contested. According to the chief of intelligence unit of Sampang police, in matters of belief "as it is stipulated in the constitution, we cannot reject [to protect] anyone," and Tajul Muluk can believe in

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<sup>16</sup>A statement made during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled "The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom," organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.

what he does. "Want to worship stones? No problem," he added. Ritual differences between Sunnis and Shi'as, such as the way hands are put during prayer, are not to blame because each group has its own beliefs behind these differences. People also have the right to stay in their own houses and on their own land. The duty of the police is to maintain public safety (interview, 1 May 2013).

But the conflict between Shi'as and Sunnis was not merely a matter of belief and worship. Conflicts of this kind may occur with minimal disruptions of public order. The Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Omben expanded and escalated due to the behaviour of both parties. Two brothers, Tajul Muluk and Roisul al-Hukama, who earlier were like-minded, later parted for several reasons, which included financial problems, jealousy over women, and some more. The separation made Tajul Muluk lose a supporter and defender whom he used to find in his brother. Apart from this, having left the Shi'a community, Rois, through speeches in various places and through loudspeakers in mosques, was spreading his views on what he thought were the mistakes and errors of Tajul and his followers in the field of religious belief and worship. This conflict culminated in the 29 December 2011 incident.

The local community context also affected the police performance. What in many societies constitutes the rights and freedoms of worship and belief, in Sampang was not so. Some of the Sampang police members and government officials interviewed speaking of the local context pointed towards several issues. First, the inhabitants of Omben and Karang Penang were not yet capable of acknowledging the rights and freedoms as set forth by law. This is an important fact which affected the police performance. In the words of a police officer, "social tolerance, religious tolerance" were not there (chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 1 May 2013).

Yet more importantly, the police and the local government treated this fact as a parameter which could not be tampered with, a frame to constrain their performance in Sampang. According to a

police officer from Sampang police, in their actions against the Shi'a community, Sunnis were against the law. But in Sampang, such acts of law-breaking could not be dealt with. "[We should] bring the issue back to the [above-mentioned] problem of human resources, Sir," said the policeman, "depending on the culture." The local residents receive only religious knowledge. "It's not wrong. But in my opinion, its implementation sometimes doesn't fit." He compared the situation here with the one in Sidoarjo: "In my place [where he grew up], in Sidoarjo, there are various religious groups" and they are able to live together (police intelligence, Sampang, interview, 1 May 2013).

Sometimes, as it was mentioned in other sections, the police and the local government referred to this problem as the "local ethics." In understanding of the Sampang and of the East Java police, the local ethics constituted the main determinant. According to the East Java police chief, the law enforcement is "the last resort after the solution is not achieved by the means of the local ethics."<sup>17</sup>

Law enforcement is the last resort — such is the core of mentality and perception of the Sampang police as the law enforcement institution. This contradicts the police views on religious freedom as a right which should be protected. The police would not give this protection because of the importance of the "local ethics."

### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

The police are aware of their duties and functions as defined in the Police Act — maintaining security, protecting citizens, and enforcing the law. At the same time, the police are also aware that the contemporary legislation actually does not put on them the main

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<sup>17</sup>Opening speech delivered by the East Java police chief during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled "The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom," organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.

responsibility of handling social conflicts. Act No. 7 of 2012 on managing social conflicts places the local governments as, to use the words of the chief of the Sampang police intelligence unit, “leading sector in the management of social conflicts.” Similarly, Presidential Instruction No. 1 emphasizes what the officer of the East Java police called the “synergy between the local governments and agencies, including the police and the military” in dealing with social conflicts.

However, in practice, the police felt they were left alone, both in upholding the constitution and in taking responsibility for failures. The local government of Sampang “just ignored the handling of the Sampang conflict,” said a police officer.<sup>18</sup>

The failure was also related to the 2012 local elections in Sampang. The Sunni-Shi'a conflict became one of the campaign themes. Incumbent regent, Noer Tjahya, on several occasions openly expressed his displeasure with the Shi'as who, according to him, should revert to Sunnism or should be expelled from Sampang. Candidates who competed with him were also against the Shi'as and sided with the Sunni group.

East Java police gave special attention to the problem of communal conflicts through a program titled “East Java in One Grip” (*Jawa Timur Dalam Satu Genggaman*). In the program, which began in mid-July 2012, a total of 8,000 villages in East Java, each of which had a police officer, were to be connected through a website run by Babinkamtibmas. Babinkamtibmas patrols villages, monitors criminal activity, and establishes partnerships with community leaders, religious leaders, youth leaders, and traditional (*adat*) leaders. Incidents of conflict and crime that occur in the region, including remote areas, can be quickly reported to the police. “Within minutes we could handle a particular event,” said the East Java police

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<sup>18</sup>A statement made during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.

chief, Inspector General Hadiatmoko.<sup>19</sup> The system became a part of the Integrated Police Service Center of East Java Police. “East Java in One Grip” program was also a response to the local problems, including that of Sampang. Nevertheless, the fact that the incident which occurred on 26 August 2012 was not prevented, shows the program’s limitations.

### *Police Culture*

Although the absolute majority of police in Sampang are Muslims, they are trying to distance themselves from the warring parties. The police officers also emphasized the specificity of the Sampang community in their reverence of *kiais*, to which they referred to as the “local ethics.” During *maulid*, the police also observed differences between the whole month house-to-house celebrations in Sampang and one day mosque events in East Java (place of origin of some of the policemen). They also compared the low-degree of tolerance in Sampang with relatively better situation in other places, such as Surabaya and Sidoarjo.

A police officer admitted that in his neighbourhood in Surabaya, there were various ethnic groups, persons from Ambon, Papua, Manado, Java, etc. And also there were many religions. “Not to mention the *Kejawen* groups.” There is a temple, a church, and mosques of NU and of Muhammadiyah. “On Christmas we all celebrate Christmas; on Buddhist celebrations we join the feasts when invited to eat together,” he said laughing. “Differences do not upset me. But in this environment (Omben), things are very sensitive” (Omben police chief, interview, 6 February 2013 and 28 March 2013). Another officer said that in his neighbourhood, in Sidoarjo, there are Muslims who have beards and wear long ankle-length trousers, yet they pray with other Muslims although different from them; when in *tarawih* prayers there is a difference in the number of *rakaat*, some

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<sup>19</sup>Kapolri: Harus Dikontrol Program Jatim Dalam Satu Genggaman,” <http://infopoljatim.com/> (accessed 24 May 2013).

participate, while some do not. There is a difference but we accept each other. "No problem, there's no issue," he said, it is because people are more tolerant. But "here, it's a different culture" (chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 1 May 2013).

In matters of belief, the police cannot supervise anyone because the constitution guarantees the freedom of belief. Chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police (interview, 1 May 2013) said:

Tajul Muluk and Shi'as follow what they believe. Families are free to send their children to boarding schools, including to Shi'a schools; this is their right, the police cannot interfere. Similarly, when there is a difference within the community with regard to *maulid* tradition, the police could not determine who is right and who is wrong.

In fact, in personal views of several police officers in Sampang, some innovations done by Tajul were right and good. Unfortunately, the good ones were delivered in a confrontational way, and in the environment where the audience did not tolerate them.

Thus, part of the problem between the warring parties of Sampang lied in the issues mentioned above. Shi'as wanted to send their children back to the boarding schools on Java, but were opposed by Sunnis who by force and intimidation wanted them to return home. In the *maulid* tradition, a *kiai* comes from one celebration to another and receives money from the hosts and guests. According Tajul Muluk, it should not be so for and it was the *kiai* who was supposed to give money to the poor. Both sides were ready to defend their views through confrontation. There was no religious tolerance (chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 1 May 2013).

The police perceived the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang as a more sensitive one than, for example, conflicts over natural resources and borders and which, therefore, should be handled with more care. The police did not want to be seen as partisan by any of the warring parties. The parties to the conflict had their religious and cultural justifications for self-defence, which led them to defy the authorities. For example, according to those who opposed the Shi'as, Tajul Muluk and his followers breached

the local cultural norms and the aggressive vengeance against them could be excused. "This is a matter of honor, Sir; you should not get involved," they said to the police on 26 August 2012. In the 29 December 2011 incident, hundreds of people holding machetes and swords forced the police chief and district military commander back from the conflict scene. "Culture influences the thinking and behaviour of people," said the Omben police chief (interview, 6 February 2013) and the local Madurese culture affected not only the minds and behaviour of Omben and Karang Gayam residents, but also the policing strategy there.

It was difficult for both sides in this conflict to coexist peacefully because differences in convictions and religious practices had an impact on kinship and social life in general. The important dates for the community, such as *maulid*, circumcision, marriage, and inheritance, brought controversies and hostile expressions to which the police chief of Omben referred as "rude phrases," which employed terms such as "*haram*" (forbidden), "*kafir*" (infidel), "*hell*," etc. Of course, incidents of violence on 29 December 2011 and 26 August 2012, especially the latter, complicated the reconciliation of Sunnis and Shi'as who lived in the same villages and were still tied by the bonds of kinship.

After the 29 December 2011 incident, the police and the parties to the conflict tried to associate. According to the Omben police chief, there were attempts and appeals for "mingling" and "bridging" even before the 29 December incident. Association means that Sunnis and Shi'as would pray together in the same mosque. While praying, "ones had their arms bent, ones had their arms straight," said the police chief referring to the difference between Sunnis and Shi'as in the position of hands during prayer. However, these peace-building attempts, which according to the police chief were "derived from the universal concepts," were challenged by the "local ethics" and *kinais*. "The universal concepts which we advocated were rejected by the local ethics" (interview, 6 February 2013).



### Public Opinion

The MUI Sampang has been involved in the conflict in Omben and Karang Penang since 2006, after Kiai Makmun died. The tensions increased after Tajul Muluk insisted that the *maulid* celebrations be held together at mosque. Since then, the local MUI favoured Sunnis and opposed Tajul Muluk and his followers. In the view of the MUI Sampang, this was the side which they were supposed to take. In several meetings, the MUI Sampang proposed the way out which they found the most appropriate, that is the "return" of Tajul Muluk and his followers to the Sunni school of thought.

These efforts were unsuccessful. The MUI and the network of Madurese *ulama* (BASSRA) did not only render Tajul Muluk and Shi'as of Sampang heretics, but also actively lobbied to have the East Java branch of the MUI and the central MUI do the same. They succeeded with the MUI of East Java which in February 2012 issued a fatwa declaring Shi'as deviationist. But they failed with the central MUI.

MUI, BASSRA and NU Sampang did not use their influence to decrease the polarization in the community which was already polarized before they became formally involved in the conflict. Also the *ulama* did not make bridging attempts as they had already joined one of the conflicted parties, the Sunni group. The *ulama* voiced, represented, and pursued the interests of the Sunni side.

The police and the local government of Sampang, which in many cases relied on the *ulama* and *kiais* in guiding the community, could not do this in relation to the Sunni-Shi'a conflict. The *ulama* could not become actors of reconciliation, could not help in bridging the warring Muslims, instead, they became a part of the problem themselves. These are some of the fundamental weaknesses of the Sampang *ulama* from the perspective of policing and conflict resolution.

FKUB (Interfaith Harmony Forum) does not exist in Sampang. Regent Noer Tjahja declared that as long as he would be the regent, he would not formalize the establishment of FKUB in Sampang. According to him this attitude would be in line with the wishes of the *ulama*. The regent did not want FKUB in Sampang because one of its functions

is to provide recommendations with regard to construction of places of worship. "This is what I do not like, and what the Sampang residents do not like either," he said. He was willing to risk his position in the regent's office, but "as long as I am the regent of Sampang, the FKUB would not be established." In Bangkalan there is a church, in Pamekasan there is a fairly large church, and in Sumenep there is more than one church, but not in Sampang. The regent asserted, "let Sampang be unique with its local ethics," including the fact of there being only one kind of places of worship, mosques.<sup>20</sup> It is interesting that the regent presented such statements in broad daylight, at a public event, at the regent's office, and in the context of Sampang local election which was to be held "on the 12<sup>th</sup> of the 12<sup>th</sup> month, year 12, if there's no apocalypse. In case of apocalypse, the election will be held in the hereafter."

This event showed that the constraints of policing the Sunni-Shi'a conflict and reconciliation efforts came from the regent and the strength of the *ulama* and *kiais* who were a part of the group opposing the Shi'as. One of the reconciliation efforts was made by the Muhammadiyah University in Malang, under the leadership of Syamsul Arifin (who incidentally was born in Sampang), but it was stopped since the "local ethics" was against it. Similarly, institutions which defend human rights, such as Kontras in Jakarta and the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) in Surabaya, or the advocacy organizations of the Shi'a community such as Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI), faced difficulties in the field due to the power of *kiais* who, according to one of the local government officials, had "harsh dispositions." Local ethics as the key factor influencing public opinion became non-ethical in the context of conflict resolution. When the reconciliation efforts of the lower level took place at the refugee camps in Sidoarjo, local ethics again impeded reconciliation.

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<sup>20</sup>This video, "Ceramah Noer Tjahya di Pendopo Kabupaten," is available on <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTn7Kzizj2g?> (accessed 24 May 2012). The same thing was said by the regent on various occasions in 2012, ahead of the election, with the intention of seeking the voters' support. Noer Tjahja, however, lost and was third among the five candidates in the December 2012 election.

### Local Politics

As already mentioned earlier, the Sampang regent, Noer Tjahja (in office from February 2008 until February 2013) was not hiding his attitude towards the Shi'as in public. Furthermore, he wanted the Shi'as to be expelled from Sampang. According to him, "99.99 percent" of Sampang population were Sunnis led by the *ulama* and *kiais*. In a meeting at the regent's office which was attended by the *ulama*, he requested the military and the police to expel the Shi'as from Sampang so that the majority would not be "contaminated". On other occasions too, such as *maulid* celebration and Musrembang in Omben, the regent expressed the same views, that the Shi'as were deviationist and should be expelled from Sampang and Madura.<sup>21</sup>

Regional House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) of Sampang also sided with the anti-Shi'a majority. In a meeting at the Sampang police office headquarters, on 26 October 2009, its chairman together with government officials as well as the representatives of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Sampang and Bakesbangpol Sampang, became witnesses when Tajul Muluk again was pressed to sign the declaration in which he "agreed to stop rituals and the spread" of Shi'a teachings "because they disturbed the public." If Tajul Muluk complied with the agreement, "Pakem, MUI, NU, and the NGOs would be ready to lessen the social turmoil." Also the leaders of the Sampang MUI and NU signed it as witnesses.<sup>22</sup>

The Ministry of Religious Affairs also played a limited role, and it too tended to side with one of the parties to the conflict, the anti-Shi'a group. The police wanted the ministry to be more involved in the conflict resolution as the issues of religion and religious guidance was under its control. However, because of the budget reasons, the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Sampang did not do much, except for its brief involvement after the 26 August 2012 incident

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<sup>21</sup>Video "Ceramah Noer Tjahya di Pendopo Kabupaten."

<sup>22</sup>Photocopy of this agreement is available in researchers' archives.

(Ministry of Religious Affairs official, interview, 1 May 2013). It must be kept in mind, that the then Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali, during his short visit to the Shi'a refugee camp at the Sampang Sports Centre, after the 26 August incident, said that the conflict in Sampang was not a religious conflict. While it might seem improper if seen from the perspective of how the conflict evolved, the purpose of the statement given by the minister was to show that the problem was outside of the Ministry of Religious Affairs jurisdiction and, thus, not of its concern.

The role played by the government, especially local government of Sampang, was neither neutral nor impartial as it sided with one of the parties to the conflict, i.e. the more powerful Sunni group. The reason was that the local government followed the "local ethics." As mentioned by a local government official, the local ethics was embedded in culture, the obedience towards *kiais* was in the culture of Madura. "I do not submit and pledge obedience to the *kiais*, but people in the conflict area do," he said. However, he felt there was no other choice but to follow the local ethics. "Can a culture be changed offhand?" A consequence thereof was that in case when the local ethics was against the ways of handling a conflict, those ways should be avoided. "Should something that is rejected be continued?" If there is a conflict between the local ethics and the human rights approach, the former would be chosen. "I think that the local ethics is something that cannot be replaced by rights" (Kakesbangpol Sampang, interview, 30 April 2013).

This condition, together with other factors made the police, which wished to keep the middle ground, face difficulties, either because of lack of support or because of the threat of being identified with the Shi'a group, which in the local context would make them unpopular and could also pose danger. In the words of a government official, if a *kiai* does not accept human rights, there is no point in talking about the right to life, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Opting for human rights, he said, "would lead to more bloodshed" (Kakesbangpol Sampang, interview, 30 April 2013).

The Sampang police saw another problem. They felt the coordination with local government did not work, especially before the 26 August 2012 incident. According to a Sampang police officer, "there was a miss" — miscommunication — between the police and the local government. "If there was coordination, not even in 100 percent, just 80 percent, what happened on 26 August could have been avoided," he said. One of the issues which complicated the coordination was the 2012 local election in Sampang (Kasat Intelkam Sampang, interview, 7 February 2013).

What was meant by coordination, from the police point of view, was that the police and the government should cooperate in the sense of working together, but the government and not the police should become the "leading sector," in accordance with the laws on the management of social conflicts. The government would provide assistance, including funds, for the police field operations. In the police budget, the handling of Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang was a routine operation and thus funded from the regular budget, not as a special operation. Besides funds, water in the conflict area was difficult to obtain and also of poor quality, and the police and military personnel needed both water and sanitation to be able to remain stationed in the field after the December 2011 and August 2012 incidents. The government was also requested to refrain from behaviours which worsened the situation and emotions of the conflicted parties, particularly in the context of elections. Police deplored "negative statements, which heated up the situation," which made it a matter of time for an open conflict in Omben to break out (Kasat Intelkam Sampang, interview, 7 February 2013).

Very regrettable to the security forces, both the police and military, was the address of the regent who requested that they expel the Shi'as from Sampang. Omben police chief said it was "completely beyond our comprehension what the regent said; [we] the police were shocked" (interview, 28 March 2013). The police and the local government officials were trying hard to prevent from spreading the recordings of that event, which was attended by the government

officials, police, and military. But this was of no use because the regent in many cases repeated the incitement. During the election campaign, all candidates for regent's office were against the Shi'a of Sampang.<sup>23</sup>

*Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

The Sunni-Shi'a conflict took a relatively long period to form, since 2004. Parties to the conflict were on one side the Sunni group, which consisted of *kiais*, *ulama* of NU, MUI and BASSRA, local government, and the *blatter* (thugs); and on the other side the Shi'a group led by Tajul Muluk.

In the long process of conflict formation, the police of Omben interacted with the warring parties to maintain security and order. Police officers were present in almost every meeting of *kiais* and *ulama*, both when Tajul Muluk and Shi'a representatives were present and when they were not. The police attended the meetings for the sake of monitoring. In addition to this, the police also facilitated meetings between the warring parties. The police also tried to establish personal relationships with the leaders of both groups.

The clashes between the Sunnis and Shi'as occurred repeatedly, although not throughout the year. One of the conflict periods was the month of Maulid. Every year the police was able to prevent violence on Maulid month, also in the early 2011. The incidents which took place on 29 December 2011 and on 26 August 2012, were the peak of the conflict and, therefore, received extensive attention from the media. Previous incidents in the history of this relatively long conflict had no coverage. Without the police efforts in pacifying the warring parties, violent clashes would undoubtedly be more frequent.

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<sup>23</sup>Noer Tjahja now lives in Surabaya and was not willing to be interviewed when we contacted him for the purpose of this research, on 29 March 2013. If he had hoped that discriminatory expressions would increase the number of votes, he was wrong. He lost the election and was third out of five candidates. He also lost in Omben constituency.

Having gone through the long formation period of the conflict, both Sunnis and Shi'as anticipated greater violence. Both sides applied confrontational tactics, both used verbal attacks, intimidation, and insulted each other equally. Both parties also used loudspeakers in mosques to deliver hostile messages. The police repeatedly asked them to stop, sometimes successfully, but often the two parties did not comply with police appeals. Both parties were also arming themselves, especially with sharp weapons like sickles and machetes.<sup>24</sup> Such weapons were used in the December 2011 and August 2012 incidents, in addition to a Molotov cocktails. In the August 2012 incident explosives were also used, most likely by the Shi'a side. Arson against the Shi'a households made them lose their houses, so the evacuation was inevitable.

In case of both of the violent incidents, the police received information that the conflict was expected to escalate. The police responded by sending officers to the location, so that there already were officers when the clashes began. But the number of police and military who arrived, that is two to four officers, was inadequate. More troops arrived when the clashes were already taking place, and even more after they subsided.<sup>25</sup>

In case of the 29 December 2011 and 26 August 2012 incidents, the police tried to persuade the warring parties to not commit violence, but it failed. According to eyewitnesses, when arson attacks took place, some of the policemen were taking pictures with their phone cameras while some other were just sitting, letting the Sunni attackers burn the houses. The strength of the members of police and military who were at the scene was insufficient to prevent the escalation of conflict into open violence. This led to the assessments, particularly among the Shi'a community, that the police in both incidents tended to favor the attackers.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Dardiri, "Api Kebencian Berkobar di Sampang," *Syahadah* 16, January 2012, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup>Johan Avie and Khoirul Mustamir, "Tragedi Syawal Berdarah," *Syahadah* 24, September 2012, p. 1-5.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

The police admitted the number of officers was inadequate. In fact, according to the police chief of Omben and the chief of intelligence of Sampang police, no matter how many officers would be sent, their number would not be sufficient if both parties wanted to continue fighting and ignored the calls of police officers to stop (chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 7 February 2012; Omben police chief, interview, 28 March 2012). However, this reasoning can be reversed: a thousand of police and military troops in the location, before the massive mobilization occurred and violence broke out, could stop the clashes and give credibility to the police appeals, so that the masses would restrain their will to fight. In fact, as many as a thousand troops were available in the afternoon, after the arson attack took place.

After the 29 December 2011 incident, the police chief of Sampang issued an instruction which included several policing directions. It was meant as a preventive measure so that “the conflict did not occur again,” especially as legal proceedings against Tajul were already conducted. The planned activity was carrying out patrols to Sunni-Shi’a conflict-stricken villages — named “Patroli Monalisa,” abbreviation of *mondok silaturahmi di desa* (staying and makin social relations in villages’). The police carried out public awareness, attended sermons and Friday prayers in both Shi’a and Sunni mosques of Omben and Karang Penang. If there was a policeman who was able to preach, he would deliver a Friday sermon. Otherwise, the police requested some time after the prayers in order to deliver appeals and explanations to the congregations. Sometimes *ulama* and preachers from outside Sampang were also involved. The police called this program “Jumling” or “Jumat Keliling” (Going Around in Friday). Finally, the police provided assistance to both Sunnis and Shi’as in form of food, clean water, goats, mass circumcision, sarong and skullcaps for prayer, pocket money to children, and other help, all in order to establish bonds with the community.

The fact that after the first and second incident no police official in Sampang was replaced or removed is, according to the police,



was the proof that the Sampang district police had undertaken its tasks correctly. Many people initially negatively assessed the performance of the police in Sampang. The President also stated that the intelligence officers were missing. Sampang police did not agree with this assessment. According to the chief of intelligence unit of Sampang police, what they did "exceeded the limits of police competences" and "exceeded the competences of the local government." The visit of the Commission III of the Parliament and Komnas HAM to Sampang after the 26 August 2012 incident, was as well, according to the police, a proof that they have carried out their duties properly.

### Conclusions

This study shows several things concerning the policing of the sectarian Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang. *First*, in terms of the policing process in Sampang, it runs through various stages of the long lasting Sunni-Shi'a conflict. The main drive behind the policing functions is the duty and the mandate of the police to maintain security and order. When the police took action by collecting information, attending meetings of the parties to the conflict, restricting freedom of movement of Shi'a leaders, evacuating members of Shi'a community to Sampang Sports Centre, they did so to maintain security and order. Apart from that, the police put themselves outside the warring parties, and maintained the same distance towards both groups.

*Second*, judging from the results, the policing of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict was not always successful. Two incidents, which occurred on 29 December 2011 and on 26 August 2012, showed the failure of the police in preventing tensions from escalating into open violence which involved both of the warring parties and led to the loss of life and material possessions.

*Third*, the strategy applied by both parties to the conflict, namely the use of violence in communal aggression, is one of the factors behind the failure of the police in handling the incidents of Sunni-Shi'a violence. Determination of the conflicted parties hindered the police

performance. One of the hindrances was mass mobilization in numbers far beyond the capacities of the local police. Although support and additional troops arrived, they came too late to function as a deterrent. Also the activity of religious leaders who became parts of the conflicted groups, narrowed the middle ground, which was the space for the police intervention. *Kiais* and the masses of their followers could only accept a solution which would show their dominance, otherwise they would use aggression which they believed would be effective since they were in much bigger numbers. Finally, the Shi'a group which was much less numerous, did not want to compromise in a way that would make them feel defeated and humiliated.

In such circumstances, the police desisted from the use of violence and repression. Their inadequate strength would threaten the safety of officers and consequently would aggravate the situation. In line with this, warning shots, or the use of weapons to disable the fighting parties, was never employed by the police in the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang, not even during the worst of the incidents on 26 August 2012.

More of the softer measures were undertaken by the police, such as persuasion or asking the groups which were on stand off to retreat. Policing of this kind, which avoided the use of repression allowed the stronger party, which knew there would be no repression, to achieve what it wanted, which here included burning as many houses as possible in order to expel their inhabitants.

Of course, a lot of police units including several units of mobile brigades were deployed when the 26 August 2012 incident took place. However, this huge number of police, which was estimated to be about one thousand, has arrived to the location after the violence reached its peak. Their preventive use has lost its momentum. Hundreds of weapons brought by mobile brigades were never used. Before the violence broke out in the early morning, the number of policemen was very limited – they were only from the district police; and not even all of them were involved, because during “Lebaran

Ketupat" (seventh day after Eid) most of the local police members were in charge of guarding other crowded locations.

What would happen if a thousand policemen were present at the location when the tensions were peaking, for example at 9:00 am on that day? Would such a number of police officers be able to prevent the death of a citizen and the burning of dozens of Shi'a households? Most likely they would. Yet the deployment of such a huge police force required the deployment of forces from the sub-district, district and provincial police all at once, in accordance with the rules of control transition from the lower to the higher level. When it reached the level of provincial police, several additional issues emerged, the most important of which was that tensions had by then escalated into violence and there was not enough time to reach the location or the crime scene in the remote Omben and Karang Penang.

Therefore, the police stressed the importance of prevention. They worked together with all related parties, especially the local government which, according to the police, was the most responsible actor for handling social conflicts. Police repeatedly complained about the lack of involvement from the local government's side in the prevention phase, which made them feel as if they were working alone and had to take all control because of the necessity to maintain security. The police also regretted that on several occasions the regent of Sampang instead of easing the tensions only exacerbated them. The strategy of aggression and domination, the weakness of government in the prevention phase, the absence of adequate deterrent police force at the critical stage when tensions escalated into violence — these were some of the negative traits behind the policing of the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang.\*\*\*



## THE CASE OF ANTI-SHI'A IN BANGIL, PASURUAN

### **Foreword**

The conflict between the Islamic Boarding School Foundation (Yayasan Pesantren Islam, YAPI/Shi'a) and the group Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Aswaja/Sunni) emerged long ago and tended to be always ignited by the attacks from the Aswaja. Interestingly, although there was escalation of hostilities, it has never ended up to be as serious as the case of violence between Sunnis and Shi'as in Sampang. Policing strategy which emphasized the tactics of showing the force and applying persuasion combined with local knowledge and commitment of police officers to be loyal to the constitution, police regulations, procedures, and the principle of neutrality, played the central role in preventing violence in Bangil. The willingness of both parties to the conflict to cooperate with the police and the support of several outside groups, contributed to the success of the policing action.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first one is an introduction presenting the main arguments and the report's structure. The second part presents the data related to the social and religious background of Bangil. The third part discusses the conflict between YAPI and Aswaja, with the focus on the demon-

strations which took place on 20 April 2007, and the incident of verbal attacks which led to physical clashes on 15 February 2011. The fourth part is devoted to the dynamics of policing sectarian conflicts from the perspective of policing activities, police knowledge, legal-procedural framework, institutional character of the police, police culture, public opinion and interactions between the actors of conflict and the police. In the fifth part we draw conclusions from the lessons learnt and give recommendations for strengthening the existing policing activities.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Pasuruan**

In the Pasuruan regency the majority of the society follows Islam. According to the 2010 census, there were 1,458,440 Muslims; 15,955 Hindus; 7,651 Protestants; 1,913 Catholics; 411 Buddhists; 55 Confucianists; and 36 other; while 843 persons did not reply and 27,164 were not asked.

Out of the 1,512,468 residents of Pasuruan, 2,698 live in Kenep village of Beji district, and 4,836 in Bendomungal village, Bangil district. In each of the villages there is a YAPI boarding school, one for boys and one for girls, both of which became the crime scenes.

No exact data on the number of Shi'as in Indonesia or in Bangil is available. Rough calculations allow to estimate that there would be from 500,000 to 2,500,000, or even 5,000,000 followers of Shi'a Islam. The data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2009), an independent research institution from the United States which studies religious issues that intersect with public affairs, indicate that the number of Shi'a Muslims is less than 1% of the total 203 million of Indonesian Muslims.

### **Sunni-Shi'a Conflict in Bangil**

In order to show the dynamics of the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Bangil, the description can be divided with regard to two incidents: the demonstration on 20 April 2007, and the incident of verbal attacks which led to physical clashes on 15 February 2011. Both incidents

were outstanding in terms of the number of protesters in the former and victims of physical assault and destruction in the latter.

*First Incident: Demonstration on 20 April 2007*

Conflictual relations between Sunnis and Shi'as in Bangil were occurring since the beginning of 2007, and started with pelting the house of Habib Ali Ridho, caretaker of the YAPI female boarding school. The incident took place in January 2007 at 10:00, and the stone pelting was carried out by unidentified persons. The school activities remained undisturbed until the 20 April 2007 incident, which attracted much more attention in the history of this conflict and which was a demonstration against the Shi'a teachings.

The course of massive protests was not without preventive efforts. The police officers strived as hard as possible to avoid it by assuming persuasive approach on the community forum. The signs that the anti-Shi'a demonstration might take place were already noticed by the police a month earlier. Therefore, the police immediately initiated meetings with the parties, both the parties to the conflict and others concerned about the security in Bangil.

Three meetings were held, all of them upon instigation of the police intelligence. In the first meeting, on 21 March 2007, religious leaders, leaders of Islamic organizations of Pasuruan, Muspida and community leaders were present. The meeting took place at the Pasuruan regency office and all of its participants agreed to advocate social harmony. Yet it lasted for a limited time.

The second meeting between the Pasuruan police chief and PCNU Bangil was held on 7 April 2007. Despite the fact that the meeting was designed to discuss the efforts of protecting religious life, the participants insisted on expressing their respective views. The meeting ended with no agreement.

The third meeting was held on 19 April 2007, at Pasuruan police headquarters. It was attended by Muspida, Pasuruan religious leaders (including Shi'a leaders), and the field commander of the Association of Young Aswaja (HAMAS) Bangil. This meeting, which was

aimed at discussing the possibilities to prevent the worst option, that is the anti-Shi'a demonstration, ended with fiasco. The demonstration took place the next day, on 20 April 2007. The police authorities, including the police chief, anticipated the demonstration and oversaw the location also by installing police tapes to make it proceed orderly.

After the Friday prayers, around 1,000 people gathered at first at the Bangil main square and then headed towards the office of the state attorney, their final destination. Their demand was the dissolution of the Shi'a group. Starting from the Bangil main square, they walked to the office of YAPI boarding school, Shi'a-affiliated Mutiara Ilmi Primary School, and while expressing their demands through a Bangli radio, they finally reached the state attorney's office. Protesters, most of whom were from the NU, were shouting out their displeasure with the Shi'a doctrine.

During the anti-Shi'a demonstration the weapons included only posters, banners and hate speech. Posters and banners carried messages such as: "Expel from Bangil the followers of Shi'a teachings," "Don't pollute the city of Bangil with deviant teachings," "Shi'a = Jews," "Mut'a = Zina," "Shi'as allow zina," or "Shi'a bastards." One of the protesters yelled in his speech: "The government must immediately dissolve the deviationist Shi'ism. Clean Bangil from Shi'as." Despite the tension, the situation did not escalate into open conflict. No casualties or damage were recorded.

The failure of persuasion measures, taken before 20 April, did not discourage the Pasuruan police. Main tasks were carried out before the demonstration. A number of well-armed police were on guard while the Pasuruan police chief negotiated with the protesters and tried to persuade them to stop. He did not succeed and the protest continued. The demonstrators flooded the main Surabaya-Banyuwangi road, disturbed the mobility and caused traffic jams.

According to police records, the first disruptive action after the events of 20 April was the "sweeping" action by a mob of 200 people on 27 November 2007. Around 10:30 pm, after the Koranic recitation



meeting of Majelis Roudlotussalaf at the house of Habib Umar Assegaf. They plundered the Shi'a Musala Jumbuh, and went to throw stones at Shi'a houses. Although there were no casualties and the damages were insignificant, the incident caused the spread of anxiety in the Shi'a community.

The police was not silent after that event. The next day, on 28 November 2007, the district police chief organized a meeting with NU Pasuruan, Muspida, community leaders, MUI, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Bakorpakem to depress the Sunni-Shi'a conflict. However, according to police records, the results of the meeting did not give a solution, because the Shi'a teachings had to be studied more in-depth. Two days later, the police chief again held a meeting with NU Pasuruan, Muspida, MUI, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Bakorpakem and Shi'a leaders, during which he appealed to all parties to watch their followers and keep the social order in Pasuruan regency.

Stone-pelting incidents were still occurring. On 24 January 2009 around midnight, unidentified persons threw stones at the house of Nuhhabsi, a member of Shi'a community, and broke the front windows. Six months later, on 18 January 2009 at 00:30 am, the stone-pelting again took place, this time against the YAPI boarding school for girls. As in previous incidents, perpetrators were not identified. Nevertheless, the police remained on alert amid the tense situation which at any time could lead to escalation between the two parties.

Seven months later, precisely on 16 August 2009, around 00:30 am, another incident took place. A group of unknown persons which numbered around 60 people, rode together on motorcycles to disturb the Shi'a residents, and threw glass bottles of water on the security guard of the YAPI male boarding school.

Throughout 2010, the provocations against the Shi'a community were not as frequent as in previous years. The police have not recorded any of such incidents.

Nevertheless, the police kept on coordinating and mobilizing support of many parties. From July 2010 until January 2011, the police consistently engaged with various groups, not only the two

conflicted ones. Based on their records, such steps were repeatedly taken in various forms: coordination/meetings, gatherings, social campaigns during religious events, awareness campaigns on traffic in which the police distributed free helmets to the members of Aswaja group and gave them free service with processing driving licences. The police also established the Joint Forum (Forum Bersama) and the Communication Forum of Muslim Organizations (Forum Komunikasi Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Islam).

The temporary peacefulness was enjoyed by the Shi'as and all Bangil residents until 14 February 2011, when it was again disturbed. On that day, at 2:30 am, the girls boarding school of YAPI became a target of vandalism. There were no casualties, but the school property was destroyed, windows broken. The perpetrators were not identified. Having learnt from the cases of attacks which earlier took place in other places, such as Cikeusik and Temanggung, the police did not want to allow any omissions. They were on standby at the girls boarding school of YAPI on the morning of 15 February, a day after receiving an information that members of Aswaja group would be attending a prelection in Singosari, Malang.

### *Second Incident: 15 February 2011*

The unfriendly attitude towards Shi'as remained there until the second incident, on 15 February 2011. The incident was triggered by mutual mocking between the boys of YAPI boarding school and the Aswaja group who were returning from their prelection in Singosari. Before clashing, the Aswaja members started to pelt with stones the YAPI students who were playing football in the schoolyard. According to the then East Java police chief, Inspector General Badrodin Haiti, who commented on the incident, it was ignited by persons who disliked the YAPI, but the attack was not provoked by the Aswaja leadership.

As mentioned earlier, the attack on girls school of YAPI was carried out by unidentified persons on 14 February 2011. The distance between schools is around four kilometers. There were no casualties

in both incidents, and the attacks did not lead to conflict escalation. Night pelting incidents of either stones or eggs had been frequent since 2007.

On 15 February 2011, although apparently unplanned by the Aswaja group, the verbal attack which ended up with physical clashes took place at the male boarding school of YAPI. Around 2:15 pm, about 75 to 100 members of the Aswaja group, on approximately 50 motorbikes were returning from a religious session (*pengajian*) in Singosari. In the session, although mentioning the Shi'a community, the lecturer did not provoke the group to attack them.

While passing by the male boarding school of YAPI, in Kenep village, Beji sub-district, some of them shouted "Shi'a bastards." The students who heard it while playing football in the schoolyard gave a mocking reply. This provoked the Aswaja group who broke into the school area and started throwing stones. The YAPI students, who numbered around 300, responded by rushing them out of the boarding school complex.

Physical clashes subsided around 3:00 pm. The situation returned to order because of the alertness of the security forces. The under-cover police members who were stationed at the location, for instance, fired warning shots into the air to disperse the attackers. The warning shots were enough to make them scared and run away. The policemen from other units also turned up. The police chief, who happened to be passing by the scene, came to separate the two groups. Earlier the police offered protection to YAPI, but it was rejected to prevent the students and their parents from becoming additionally anxious.

The following part gives a detailed and chronological description of the clashes between Aswaja and YAPI students on 15 February 2011:

- 2:05: a group on motorbikes, dressed in Muslim clothing and wearing prayer caps, arrived from the side of Pandaan.
- 2:15: during verbal attacks they broke into the boarding school complex through the main gate. They attacked the security

guard, broke the windows in both the guard post and the guest room. To avoid more destruction, the YAPI students were trying to chase them away.

- 2:20: physical clashes and mutual stone-pelting was not avoided; as a result, students and workers of YAPI became victims. Having met resistance from the YAPI students, the attackers got out from the school complex and the clashes continued outside. Among the attackers, there were also casualties. Warning shots from the police were heard.
- 2:30: police reinforcements of Beji police and Pasuruan police helped to restore the order. At the same time, supporters of the boarding school started to arrive from other areas. As soon as the East Java police chief arrived to the location, direct meetings were held with Muspida and YAPI administration.
- 3:00: all from the YAPI side who were injured were rushed to the Masyitoh Bangil hospital for treatment and medical reports. One person was taken to the ophthalmology clinic, Rumah Sakit Mata Undaan Surabaya.

As a result of the 15 February incident, nine students and two YAPI security guards were injured, some of the school's facilities were damaged, including the guard post. From the attackers side two persons were injured (Kabagops Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). Some of the weapons used at the scene were identified as batons, stones, and bricks from around the YAPI school. The incident resulted in no fatalities. YAPI had repeatedly been subject to small-scale attacks since 2007, and the 15 February incident was the first large-scale conflict occurrence.

Aside from restoring the order, the police also initiated criminal procedure against six suspects, deployed officers to the areas which were considered vulnerable, and carried out persuasive measures through meetings, attending *haul*, staying in good relationships with the leaders of Aswaja and of YAPI, and contributing to establishment of the Communications Forum of Muslim Organizations.

## **Dynamics of Policing the Bangil Conflict**

### *Policing Activities*

The conflict between Sunnis and Shi'as in Bangil became subject to public attention in 2007, after the anti-Shi'a demonstration took place on 20 April 2007. The local police had followed the development of the conflict and was physically present at various forums and meetings even long time before the demonstration took place. All of the four policing actions employed run relatively well: pre-emptive measures taken by intelligence, prevention when the mass mobilization took place, timely response during the incident, and legal process after the clashes.

Intelligence unit was aware of the tensions a few weeks before the anti-Shi'a demonstration on 20 April, and a few days before the clashes on 15 February 2011. Before the demonstration, the Pasuruan police, upon recommendation of intelligence, organized three meetings with several parties in order to prevent the escalation of conflict. The meetings took place on 21 March 2007, 7 April 2007, and 19 April 2007. Of the three meetings, the last two failed to produce an agreement and the demonstration was still held on 20 April.

On 21 March 2007, the district police met with the religious leaders, leaders of Islamic organizations of Pasuruan, Muspida and community leaders at the Pasuruan regency office. All of the participants agreed to advocate social harmony. Yet the results of it did not last long. On 7 April 2007, the police chief met with the NU Bangil but the meeting failed to produce an agreement on protecting social harmony, as all participants insisted on expressing their own views. The meeting on 19 April 2007 at Pasuruan police headquarters was attended by Muspida, Pasuruan religious leaders (including Shi'a leaders), and HAMAS field commander. The meeting failed to prevent the anti-Shi'a demonstration which took place the next day.

The Pasuruan police offered security to YAPI after the stone-pelting on the female boarding school the night before the 15 February incident. The offer, however, was rejected by the YAPI administration who did not want to make the students and their parents even

more anxious (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013; Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).<sup>1</sup> The police anyway sent six officers (intelligence and Sabhara) wearing plainclothes who stayed in the school's vicinity to guard it in case of the worst scenario taking place. The police had their own reasons to offer the security. One of them was that they feared that the violent conflicts such as those in Cikeusik and Temanggung, which took place a few days earlier, could also happen in Bangil.

This security precaution seems to have become a "habit" of the local police. During important religious celebrations, such as *maulid* and *haul habib*, the police officers are deployed to several locations close to the venue, such as village offices and houses of police members, so that they can easily access the events in case something happens (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The number of policemen varies (once a platoon of police was stationed in a village office) and the units involved include Sabhara, intelligence, and sometimes mobile brigade.

Throughout the conflict, there were changes in the personnel of Pasuruan police, but some of the personnel were not subject to rotations, including the head of operations, Jajak Herawan. He has been serving there since 1993, and has been trusted to handle the conflict well. In recent years, he has become the communicator between the police and especially the Shi'as. His long experience as a liaison had a positive impact on the policing performance of the Pasuruan police which was successful in preventing the sectarian conflict. As mentioned in the ICG report (2012) "[and] members of the police who work in the field and are committed to establish good relations, do not have much influence because of frequent rotations." This was confirmed in another point of the ICG report (2012) "rotation undermines sustainability of innovations introduced by the members of the police."

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<sup>1</sup>"Ponpes di Pasuruan Diserang Massa: Kapolda Jatim: Tawaran Pengamanan Polisi Ditolak Ponpes," *Detik Surabaya*, 15 February 2011, <http://surabaya.detik.com/read/2011/02/15/202509/1571605/475/kapolda-jatim-tawaran-pengamanan-polisiditolak-ponpes> (accessed 24 November 2012).

With regard to precaution measures taken by the police in case of mass mobilization, the police were ready and informed in both cases, on 20 April 2007 and on 15 February 2011. In the first incident, they had knowledge of the mass mobilization from the meetings which failed to reach an agreement. In case of the second incident, they already knew that the Aswaja group would be attending the religious session in Singosari and would return late in the afternoon. The information came from the YAPI and from the members of the unit deployed in the neighbourhood who contacted the police station to notify about the possibility of an open conflict. The mutual mocking between the YAPI and Aswaja groups happened when the latter were heading to Singosari. This was an early indication of tensions, and this situation was well understood by the police.

To prevent the demonstration on 20 April 2007, the then Pasuruan police chief, Boy Rafli Amar, and the vice-regent of Pasuruan, Muzammil Shaf'i, tried to persuade the protesters to refrain, but the attempts failed. The police sent 400 armed officers and one fire truck to guard the demonstration.

On 15 February 2011, two units were deployed to the field from the Bangil and Beji police, Pasuruan police and East Java police (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). Apart from them, the plain-clothes intelligence officers were also sent to the location.<sup>2</sup>

Once they arrived, they performed a series of policing actions: Intel officers fired shots into the air to disperse the attackers; the heads of Sabhara and Binmas together and their staff told the students to enter the mosque and classrooms while they sent the Aswaja group back to Bangil; the head of criminal investigations examined the crime scene, arrested three suspects (three other suspects were arrested later), identified witnesses, collected evidence, and

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<sup>2</sup>"Kasus Lama, Seharusnya Polisi Tahu Penyerang Ponpes Al Ma'hadul," *Detik.com*, 15 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1619912/kasus-lama-seharusnya-polisi-tahu-penyerang-ponpes-al-ma-hadul> (accessed 14 November 2012); "Kronologi Penyerangan YAPI," 16 February 2011, <http://www.yapibangil.org/Berita-YAPI/kronologi-penyerangan-yapi.html> (accessed 9 November 2012).

secure the scene; the head of traffic control unit and his staff managed the traffic. Later that day, the police approached the leadership of Aswaja, who insisted they did not order the group members to attack the YAPI school.

In addition to that, the district and the sub-district police chief helped in the police action at the location. As the incident occurred at the time when the Pasuruan police chief arrived, he immediately intervened trying to pacify both groups which were throwing stones. Then, he ordered the head of operations and the head of police integrated service (SPKT) to arrive at the scene with one company-level unit (SSK, 180-250 officers) of Polres Siaga, one platoon-level unit (SST, 30-50 officers) of Polres Sabhara, as well as 160 police officers from the nearest police stations, that is from Bangil and Beji. He also requested assistance from Mobile Brigade Unit and Sabhara Directorate of the East Java police for these items: two SSKs of mobile brigade, one SSK of Sabhara, two units of Desist Detachment (Datasemen Tangkal); one SST of Gegana; two tactical cars (kendaraan taktis, Rantis), and one watercannon unit.

The Pasuruan police chief reported to the East Java police chief on the situation at the location. Besides, he also coordinated with religious leaders, Muspida and community leaders, including: the head of NU, K.H. Sonhaji; the head of MUI, K.H. Nurul Huda; and a religious leader K.H. Khoiron Syakur. The police chief requested them to arrive at the location in order to devise the next steps for persuasive measures. At the same time, the police chief of Beji actively participated in helping victims and then taking them to the hospital, where he was accompanied by criminal investigation officers who was also looking for Visum at Repertum (VER). At 5:00 pm, the police chief of East Java arrived at the location.

After the incident, the police conducted three important actions. *First*, law enforcement: based on the article 170 of the Criminal Code, the police processed the reports of alleged criminal acts in the form of violence against persons or property; examined the crime



scene; examined the witnesses; detained six suspects; prepared case files; and submitted the suspects and evidence to the public prosecutor on 24 February 2011. The whole process was relatively fast and unhindered, and it took only nine days since the incident. *Second*, in four places which were considered as possible locations for further escalation, the police deployed its officers to guard, monitor and observe: both the male and female schools of YAPI; the Pasuruan police headquarters; and the vicinity of the scene of the most recent clashes.

*Third*, the police continued opening the line of communication, particularly through joint meetings, between the two conflicted groups and with other socially influential parties. The meetings were held for several weeks, the first one in the evening on 15 February (police records show that the last meeting took place on 22 March 2011). There were various participants, among them the religious leaders of the two conflicted groups, the leaders of NU, Muhammadiyah, MUI, FKUB, administration of the boarding schools, community leaders, and students' parents. Police also socialized and continued campaigning for a safe and peaceful community life during the events of *haul* and meetings with the leadership of the local religious schools. On the 15 February meeting, which was attended by the East Java police chief, Muspida, religious leaders, and community leaders, all agreed that the police should process the case in accordance with law, the religious leaders should control their followers, and the media should promote peace-building advocacy.

In conclusion, the main policing activities (pre-emptive intelligence, prevention upon the occurrence of mass mobilization, response/counter measures at the time of the incident, legal process after clashes) were all executed properly. That is, these actions were coordinated well by the police units and the number of troops deployed was neither excessive nor too little. The Pasuruan police performance can be a role model for dealing with sectarian conflicts.

*Police Knowledge*

The police knowledge of the legal and procedural framework as well as of the occurring religious conflicts is important for processing information related to policing. The police of Pasuruan had enough knowledge, both in terms of quality and quantity. This knowledge they used well and were able to determine the seriousness of the situation which threatened security and public order in Bangil.

In the context of sectarian conflicts, the legal and procedural framework refers to the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy and the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of police, as well as appropriate fixed procedures. The police apparatus knew the act, the regulation and the procedures (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). Police officers also knew and understood that the inherent rights of every individual must not be reduced, restricted, or revoked. These rights include the freedom of religion and worship in accordance with one's religion, freedom to believe, and freedom of conscience, thus "[based on constitution] the state cannot prohibit Shi'as from professing their faith" (Kabagops Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).

In matters of human rights, which are explicitly stated in the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009, the local police officers understood the meaning of protection of personal liberties, the right to security, and the special rights of minorities, and they carried out this task as good as possible. Human rights, democracy, or freedom of religion, told Jajak Herawan, were usually discussed during the morning meetings. And, he pointed: "We are to protect, we are public servants and law enforcement agency. We must protect everyone, even murderers or prostitutes."

In connection with the police understanding of the sectarian conflict in Bangil, the police had adequate knowledge of local issues, especially the Pasuruan police whose personnel had been long

serving in the region. One of them is Jajak Herawan who later was given the responsibility of bridging the communication between the police and particularly the YAPI.

According to Jajak Herawan, the conflict involving the groups of YAPI (Shi'a) and Aswaja (Sunni) occurred because one group disliked the other. The police on various occasions requested both groups to restrain themselves and be tolerant (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). Amid religious disputes, the local police were fully aware that their position and duties could not be determined by their own religious identity, and had to be in line with human rights and values of democracy. "We are in charge of keeping security. Many of us belong to NU. We fear of being provoked, and we are also anxious about fanatics. We must not let any of our staff become influenced [by them]. They also listen to the Aswaja prelections. [But] this is none of our business, our business is security" (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).

Realizing the threat of implications of the conflict, the police very early saw the signs in the community that indicated the possibly of tensions turning into clashes, and was therefore ready to anticipate it. Before the 20 April 2007 demonstration, the police continued with persuasive measures and communication with parties who cared for social harmony in Bangil. Once the persuasion failed, including negotiations on the demonstration day, the police deployed 400 personnel, completely armed with weapons, and a fire truck to guard the demonstration which was expected to attract thousands of people.

For the 15 February incident, the police already predicted the tensions since they knew of the Aswaja group plans to attend the prelection in Singosari. The police were convinced that extra security was needed at the boarding school after the night assault incident on the female school of YAPI, and with the incidents in Cikeusik and Temanggung which took place a few days earlier. The police sent six officers wearing plainclothes who stayed on guard in the school's vicinity.

When the attackers fled, the police officers remain alert, suggesting that they have worked appropriately and in accordance with the fixed procedures. They continued to carry out their duties and responsibilities to protect the public, even though the crisis situation already ended. Aside from processing the criminal aspects of the perpetrators' actions, the police guarded four locations that were considered vulnerable: both boarding schools of YAPI, Pasuruan police headquarters, and the area around the incident location. Through joint meetings the police also continued carrying out the measures of persuasion and communication with both parties to the conflict, local elites, and the members of the community. According to Jajak Herawan, policing actions were appropriate (interview, 27 March 2013).

The success rate of policing in Bangil was influenced by the support of other parties outside the conflicted groups, such as NU, MUI, media, government, local parliament, FKUB, youth organizations/NGOs. Also the Aswaja and YAPI to some extent were ready to cooperate with the police. On the other hand, there were religious sessions and lectures which incited hatred. Such lectures can easily ignite emotions and mass mobilization. Therefore, the police always requested the speakers not to air provocative messages. Sometimes the police requests succeeded, sometimes they failed.

To conclude, the Pasuruan police and the district and sub-district police under it had a good understanding of the legal framework and procedures which they had to follow in their duties. They subscribe to the provisions given in the constitution, including the protection of the right to choose and follow a particular religion or beliefs. Aside from these, the police had adequate knowledge of local issues and the conflict, which they took into account in policing actions and in estimating the level of threat. The success of policing was also inseparable from the cooperation with the government and other groups. The conflicted parties also did not have much choice but to obey the law.

### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

Legal framework refers to the legal framework of policing religious issues, such as the act on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy, regulations which outline the responsibilities of the police in protecting religious freedom in Indonesia, and the police regulations and fixed procedures. Policing religious conflict in Bangil also followed these regulations.

The Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy is by many perceived as a legal tool for justifying violence against other religious groups, especially minorities. The revision of the law is difficult because the Constitutional Court needs to take the middle way. In other words, the Constitutional Court feels it must accommodate it with the facts of religious life in a country where Islamic values are professed by the majority of the population (Muktiono 2012; Margiyono, et al. 2010). Various groups and individuals, including the former President Abdurrahman Wahid, have requested the Court to review this law on 9 February 2010, but the Court, in its decision of 19 April 2010, found that the law was constitutional (Marshall and Shea 2011, 159).

While the above Act is used by many to persecute groups accused of heresy, the Pasuruan police is consistently committed to the highest legal reference in Indonesia. According to Jajak Herawan, the police work related to faith-based conflicts takes the constitution as its reference (interview, 27 March 2013). The constitution of Indonesia says that the state cannot prohibit anyone from adhering to their respective beliefs. Consistency and commitment of law enforcement officers in Pasuruan to follow the constitution is an excellent example of how it is perceived as the basis for the police vision and mission in dealing with sectarian conflicts.

In addition to the legal framework which governs religious affairs, the police also used regulations and procedures as a framework of policing in the field. The police chief may issue specific procedures in line with the law. An example of police action based on such procedures was the security operations after the 15 February

incident, based on the Protap/ III/2011. According to this procedure, officers had to perform security measures as follows:

1. When there are no teaching activities: (a) at YAPI female school, one SSR (20 people) of Sabhara sub-district police is deployed to guard it 24 hours, two members of intelligence and two members of Mobile Detective Unit (Buser) carry out surveillance with one SSR of Sabhara patrol; (b) at YAPI male school, one SSR of Sabhara is deployed to guard 24 hours, two members of intelligence and two members of Buser conduct observations, with one SSR of Sabhara patrol; (c) patrol vehicle is parked in front of the school.
2. When there are teaching activities: (a) at YAPI female school, one SSR of Sabhara sub-district police is deployed to guard it 24 hours, two members of intelligence and two members of Buser carry out surveillance; (b) at YAPI male school, one SST of mobile brigade and one SSR of Sabhara sub-district police are deployed to guard it 24 hours, two members of intelligence and two Buser members carry out surveillance; (c) patrol and mobile brigade vehicle is parked in front of the school; (d) one SST of Sabhara; (e) one SST of mobile brigade.

In conclusion, the priorities of the Pasuruan police were based on the constitution of 1945 and supported by fixed procedures. Police managed to uphold them in all policing actions, regardless of the Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 and the fatwa of East Java MUI according to which the Shi'a teachings were deviationist.

### *Police culture*

Police culture discussed here refers to two kinds of culture, the democratic culture of the police and the professional culture of the police. The first one refers to the Pasuruan police officers views on issues pertaining to democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance. The latter refers to their views on their role in the increasingly democratic Indonesian society and their views on the actors of conflict in Bangil.

In general, in their perceptions on the issues of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance, the police officers are supportive. Moreover, in the present period of transition to democracy, these issues cannot be neglected, and the police needs to adapt to changes in the social system which is now becoming more democratic. The evidence of this is the introduction of the principles of democracy and human rights (including religious freedom) to the police regulations and procedures. According to Nanan Soekarna, deputy chief of Indonesian National police, “[The meaning of democratic policing is that the police] are subject to the principles of democracy and good governance and they conduct modern policing (community policing).”<sup>3</sup>

The idea that the police are subject to the principles of democracy and good governance and that they should conduct modern policing often stands in contradiction with the facts. The social problems considered “sensitive” in many ways make the police attitude seem ambiguous (always swiftly and firmly cracking down on perpetrators in criminal cases; hesitating in sensitive cases). In some of the recent cases, they often sided with the majority groups which were the ones who clearly violated the principles of democracy and good governance (see Kontras 2012a).

In the context of the conflict between Sunnis and Shi'as in Bangil, the perceptions of the police, with regard to their role in the public life of increasingly democratic Indonesia, were positive. There are more than a few policies or laws in Indonesia that are considered the source of the problem: in case of sectarianism especially the Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy, and in case of construction of places of worship, the joint decree (SKB) of two ministers. Despite all these, the local police firmly relied on the

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<sup>3</sup>A statement made in a lecture titled “Democratic Policing: Implementing Community Policing Program,” organized by the Department of Criminology, University of Indonesia, in March 2012. See “Bahas Polisi Demokrasi, UI Hadirkan Wakapolri,” *Okezone*, 21 March 2012, <http://kampus.okezone.com/read/2012/03/21/373/597643/bahas-polisi-demokrasi-ui-hadirkan-wakapolri> (accessed 6 December 2012).

general principles of democracy and human rights as enshrined in the 1945 Constitution.

With regard to the actors involved in the Bagil conflict, the police believed that both groups could coexist and that different beliefs did not have to make them live apart (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). In order to avoid biases, the police performed problem-oriented policing, which was not aimed at handling what was in the interests of just one of the parties to the conflict. In other words, the police officers upheld the principle of neutrality. In his response to one of the YAPI administrators who was urging that perpetrators in Bangli conflict be arrested, the then East Java police chief, Badrodin Haiti, replied raising his voice: "Even if not requested, I will still capture the culprits."<sup>4</sup>

The local police well understood that the measures they took could send a certain message to the public and that they had to be careful in order to avoid the bias. Although under majority pressure, they consistently and strongly believed that partisanship would only complicate the conflict. Thus, according to Jajak Herawan, the police provided security for both parties when their religious activities took place, and they kept distance from each group, not willing to appear as if favouring one of them. When invited to participate in various events, the police as representatives of the security forces would not give speeches but would request the military to do so. Sometimes the police would come late to avoid giving a speech at the beginning of the meeting, so as not to be identified with any of the groups.

The police generally knew what must be done in accordance with the principles of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance, and in particular how to provide protection to groups which could clash because of different beliefs. In addition, there was

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<sup>4</sup>"Pesantren di Pasuruan Diserang, Ulama-Polisi Bergerak Cepat," *Antara*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1620367/pesantren-di-pasuruan-diserang-ulama-polisi-bergerak-cepat> (accessed 14 November 2012).



also the professional culture of the police. One attitude that strongly indicates professionalism is that they worked based on the principle of neutrality and performed problem-oriented policing. In the following part, it will be visible that the police in Pasuruan could act in accordance with their understanding of human rights and democracy due to the support of the wider community.

### *Local politics*

Local politics refers to policies at the level of provinces and cities/regencies which regulate the matters relating to the practice of religion/beliefs and the attitudes of policy makers at the local level (local government and parliament) towards the increasing conflict. Written policies of local governments adhere to the East Java Governor's Regulation No. 55/2012 on the overseeing of religious activities and supervision of deviationist cults in East Java, which basically serves controlling "cults" considered as heretical by the MUI or similar religious institutions. Yet the attitudes of the Pasuruan regent and parliament tended to support efforts aimed at establishing peace in Pasuruan. In this sense, they shared the interests of the local police who sought to maintain security for the sake of peace. The governor's regulation and a fatwa which banned the Shi'a teachings did not influence the police responsibility to protect the citizens' religious rights and the rights of minorities (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).

The latest campaign of the Aswaja group was putting up banners at several places in Bangil which later were removed by the local government. The banners were quoting the fatwa of the MUI East Java which stated that Shi'a teachings were deviationist. It must be kept in mind that the MUI East Java was the only branch of the MUI which issued a fatwa banning the Shi'a teachings.<sup>5</sup> The police regretted that such a fatwa was issued and asked the Kesbangpol and Linmas Pasuruan to remove from the Pasuruan main square the ban-

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<sup>5</sup>For the study showing the impact of fatwas on religious intolerance and violence in Indonesia, see Assyaukanie (2009).

ners which contained it (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). "It's OK to put up a banners, but don't let those banners disturb or agitate others," said the Pasuruan regent, Dade Angga.<sup>6</sup> When the banners were installed, the Regional Leadership Forum (Forum Pimpinan Daerah, Forpimda) and other organizations controlled the situation and the disturbing banners were removed.

If we compare the attitudes of the Sampang regent and the regent of Pasuruan who both faced the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, the Pasuruan regent's approach was clearly and decisively against all forms of violence, also in the name of religion. On the contrary, the Sampang regent, Noer Tjahja, several times delivered speeches which contained hateful messages against the Shi'as. He also asked the police and the military to expel the Shi'a community from Sampang. Such messages threaten Indonesian pluralism.

Apart from taking part in the Forpimda, the regent of Pasuruan showed the commitment to peace-building in the region by participating in other forums held before the demonstration on 20 April 2007. On the day, he took part in a meeting at the Pasuruan regency office between the police and religious leaders, leaders of Islamic organizations of Pasuruan, Muspida and community leaders who all agreed to advocate social harmony. On 19 April 2007, he also participated in a meeting between the police, Muspida, community leaders, Pasuruan religious leaders and HAMAS. Although this meeting failed to dissuade the protesters, the police anticipated their demonstration and guarded the streets of Pasuruan.

In an important meeting after the 15 February 2011 incident, i.e. the Joint Forum (Forum Bersama) meeting on 3 March 2011, the regent was also present along with the Muspida, religious leaders, community leaders, and YAPI. The representatives of Aswaja did not show up. The meeting resulted in significant agreements, 11 of which are presented below:

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<sup>6</sup>"Spanduk Fatwa MUI Soal Syiah, Mengusik Warga Pasuruan," *wartapasuruan.com*, 9 May 2012, <http://www.wartapasuruan.com/2012/05/09/spanduk-fatwa-mui-soal-syiah-mengusik-warga-pasuruan/> (accessed 23 November 2012).

- a. Peace and order are conditions expected by the residents of Pasuruan regency. Therefore, all parties must actively participate [to achieve them].
- b. In all social activities, both individual and group ones, the aspect of security and order must with no exception be taken into account.
- c. The use of loudspeakers in religious sessions must not allow excessive volume so as not to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighbourhood.
- d. It is forbidden to abuse or offend other religions, groups, and [religious] interpretations.
- e. Religious speeches must not provoke others.
- f. Not to impose one's religious beliefs on others who have their own.
- g. It is forbidden to organize marches, convoys or processions with sticks or other tools which according to the police may disturb security.
- h. In an event of disagreement or misunderstanding, the settlement should be reached through dialogue, avoiding violence and, if needed, with assistance of Forum Bersama.
- i. For closing roads must be obtained permission from the police, after a recommendation from the local neighbourhood authorities is issued.
- j. Supervision of implementation [of these points] will be carried out by Forum Bersama which is granted authority to reprimand, to warn and to stop the activities in question.
- k. In case teaching activities violate the law, all parties agree to be subject to the existing law.

The parliament of Pasuruan also supported the peace-building efforts. "I hope all parties will remain calm, not agitated but still thinking critically, so that none of us would be manipulated or easily provoked," commented Bambang Soesatyo, member of the III Commission of the DPRD from the Golkar party.<sup>7</sup> The comment of

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<sup>7</sup>"Pesantren di Pasuruan Diserang, Ulama-Polisi Bergerak Cepat," *Antara*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1620367/pesantren-di-pasuruan-diserang-ulama-polisi-bergerak-cepat> (accessed 14 November 2012).

the legislator was in tune with the approach of the chairman of the Pasuruan parliament, Irsyad Yusuf. At the meeting attended by Forpimda and organizations mentioned above, Irsyad Yusuf approved the 11 points of the agreement: "The parliament accepts. It is for keeping the conducive situation in the region."<sup>8</sup>

Contrary to the results of police analysis, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali, stated: "I received an information that the event in Pasuruan was just an ordinary brawl between students."<sup>9</sup> This view was disconnected from the reality and showed the attitude of denial in order to wash one's hands and avoid responsibility.

In conclusion, the policing became positive because of the healthy attitudes of the regent, the vice-regent, and the local parliament. Regional leaders were active in attending coordination meetings with the police and urged the public to express their aspirations in a right way, and the parliament to support Forum Bersama. They were united for the safe and peaceful Pasuruan. The East Java Governor's Regulation No. 55 of 2012 on the overseeing of religious activities and supervision of deviationist cults in East Java and the fatwa of the MUI East Java, did not affect the decisions of the regent and the local parliament. In these circumstances, the police could work in accordance with the constitution to protect the freedom of religion in Pasuruan, regardless of governor's regulation or the MUI East Java fatwa.

### *Public Opinion*

Public opinion in the context of the sectarian conflict in Bangil is associated with the views of religious leaders, leaders of religious organizations, representatives of FKUB, youth organizations, and

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<sup>8</sup>"Spanduk Fatwa 'Syiah Sesat' Beredar, Forminda Rapatkan Barisan," *beritajatim.com*, 9 May 2012, <http://www.beritajatim.com/detailnews.php/8/> Peristiwa/2012-05-09/134979/Spanduk\_Fatwa\_%27Syiah\_Sesat%27\_Beredar,\_Forminda\_Rapatkan\_Barisan (accessed 2 December 2012).

<sup>9</sup>"Menag: Insiden Pasuruan Hanya Tawuran," *Liputan6.com*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1621245/menag-insiden-pasuruan-hanya-tawuran> (accessed 14 November 2012).

local media on the conflict and on the policing action. Opinion on both issues in Pasuruan was generally positive, as was indicated by the statements of various parties in the mass media, interviews, or written data which were all gathered by the research team during fieldwork.

Views of the local *ulama*, religious leaders, and leaders of local religious organizations on the Shi'a and Sunni relations tended to be tolerant. Religious leaders unrelated to YAPI and Aswaja attended the meeting on 15 February where it was decided that the parties to the conflict should submit to the police. *Ulama* from Sidogiri boarding school, Kraton district, also participated in the meeting held on 16 February 2011. MUI Pasuruan representative was present at the Forum Bersama on 3 March 2011. In both meetings it was requested that all members of the society, including the conflicted groups maintain peace in Pasuruan.

Leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyah took part in mitigating the atmosphere. Chairman of the NU, K.H. Hasyim Muzadi, contacted Kapolwil Malang, Syafrizal Ahlar, to resolve the situation in Bangil when the anti-Shi'a protests were taking place on 20 April 2007. Leaders of both organizations also took part in the closed meeting with Muspida, one day after the events of 15 February 2011.<sup>10</sup> These steps aimed to achieve peace and security in Pasuruan. The Muhammadiyah and NU also cooperated with the police and local government by reducing tensions in the community, and distancing themselves from the Aswaja group (secretary of FKUB Pasuruan, interview, 1 March 2013; Ustad Muhsin Assegaf, interview, 27 March 2013). According to both respondents, the Shi'as generally perceived the NU and Muhammadiyah as unrelated to the intolerant Aswaja.

The response of the central MUI was also positive: "Do not allow violence, differences should be resolved through dialogue, especial-

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<sup>10</sup>"Pesantren di Pasuruan Diserang, Ulama-Polisi Bergerak Cepat," *Antara*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1620367/pesantren-di-pasuruan-diserang-ulama-polisi-bergerak-cepat> (accessed 14 November 2012).

ly differences between Muslims, not by attacking each other," said the MUI chairman K.H. Ma'ruf Amin.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, the MUI Pasuruan was generally cooperating with the police and local government in order to maintain peace. Privately some of the Pasuruan *ulama*, including those of the MUI, considered the Shi'a and some other Islamic movements such as the Ahmadiyya and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia as deviationist, but as an institution and for the sake of public life in Pasuruan, they showed a tolerant attitude towards Shi'as, who were the most prominent of all minority groups in the regency (chairman of the MUI Pasuruan, interview, 1 March 2013).

Apart from the *ulama* and religious organizations, the attitude of the youth activists and NGO groups in Bangil was also pro-peace. The chairman of the Ansor Youth in Bangil, Samsul Hidayat, stated: "We strongly condemn the attack. When understandings are different, still [violence is] not justified. Because Islam does not teach violence."<sup>12</sup> A similar statement was delivered by Bambang Ju, representative of the nationalist United Indonesia Movement (Gerakan Indonesia Bersatu) who in his speech asserted that: "We should not demand it from the authorities, it is our own obligation to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia."<sup>13</sup> The speech was delivered during the peaceful demonstration in front of the Pasuruan police station and in front of the YAPI school, a day after the incident.

The opinion of the FKUB Pasuruan was also important for maintaining harmony. They cooperated with the police and local gov-

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<sup>11</sup>"MUI Sesalkan Penyerangan Pesantren Yapi," *Kompas*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1620660/mui-sesalkan-penyerangan-pesantren-yapi> (accessed 14 November 2012).

<sup>12</sup>"Ponpes di Pasuruan Diserang Massa: Ansor Desak Polisi Tangkap Aktor Utama Penyerangan," *detikSurabaya*, 15 February 2011, <http://surabaya.detik.com/read/2011/02/15/211137/1571612/475/ansor-desak-polisi-tangkap-aktor-utama-penyerangan> (accessed 23 November 2012).

<sup>13</sup>"Ponpes di Pasuruan Diserang: Prihatin Aksi Kekerasan, Massa GIB akan Demo Polres Pasuruan," *detikSurabaya*, 16 February 2011, <http://surabaya.detik.com/read/2011/02/16/161706/1572174/475/prihatin-aksi-kekerasan-massa-gib-akan-demo-polres-pasuruan> (accessed 23 November 2012).

ernment and always voiced the spirit of tolerance amid differences (secretary of the FKUB Pasuruan, interview, 1 March 2013). The FKUB's relationship with the YAPI administration was also good. The media as well through their news coverage provided support when the local government and police asked them not to heat up the situation.

As already mentioned above, the public perception of the Sunni-Shi'a conflict and policing activities in Bangil was constructive. By the public we mean the local *ulama*, the NU and its regional branches, the MUI and the MUI Pasuruan, the FKUB Pasuruan, Ansor Youth in Bangil, United Indonesia Movement, and the mass media. Some of them coordinated with each other and did not hesitate to turn the matter entirely to the police. There was trust in their relationship with the police.

#### *Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

Police interaction with the parties to the conflict is portrayed by the police intervention and reaction. In case of Bangil, the police reaction indicated they understood why the conflict occurred and could well determine the chronology of events involving both groups. In summary, the police described the conflict as recurrent. The most frequent forms of it included (a) mocking, (b) hate speech in religious lectures, (c) stone-pelting, and (d) clashes (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The conflict was recurring because one of the parties, Aswaja, continued to have provocative and intimidating lectures against Shi 'as (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013).

The police conducted a series of efforts to solve the conflict and prevent escalation. Some of them included coordination with Muspida and the military, holding meetings with the warring parties, maintaining good relations with the Aswaja group by distributing to them free helmets and providing free services for obtaining driving licences. During the incident on 15 February 2011, the policing action covered all stages, from persuasion to the legal process. The

conflict escalated but it lasted short and the wide-scale violence was prevented by placing police officers at the scene, and immediately deploying additional personnel to stop the clashes (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).

In addition to the police reaction to the conflict, the interactions can also be seen from the police action before, during, and after the occurrence of violence. The interaction between the police and victims, as well as between the police and perpetrators, was limited to the police duties and responsibilities in Bangil. Based on the information delivered by victims, the police knew that Aswaja group would attend the prelection in Singosari, but it did not expect the clashes at the boarding school on that day. The Aswaja group left for Singosari through another way, not passing by the YAPI male school in Beji (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013; Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The victims also reported to the police that YAPI was repeatedly intimidated. The police responded by offering guards but the offer was rejected by the school which did not want to worry its students and their parents. The police then provided a minimal guard with plainclothes officers (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013; Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The victims were aware of the police presence before, during, and after the clashes. The police intelligence officer fired his gun into the air to disperse the attackers who broke into the boarding school area. According to the victims, the police managed to prevent the violent conflict from expanding.

While handling the Bangil case, the police neither defended the YAPI nor did they have a specific and beneficial relationship with the Aswaja, who even accused the police of siding with YAPI by providing them excessive security – according to the police, these allegations were not true (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The name of Aswaja for the first time was mentioned by the YAPI speaker, Muhammad Alwi, who remembered that when the female school Al Ma'hadul Islam was damaged in 2007, the perpetrators



used Aswaja Bangil attributes.<sup>14</sup> That case was reported to the police.<sup>15</sup>

The number of Aswaja members is relatively small. They are radical and come from various backgrounds, not all from the NU (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013; Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).<sup>16</sup> The incidents in which Aswaja were involved generally included pelting and intimidation (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013). The first of their attacks which resulted in damage, though minor, was against the female boarding school of YAPI in 2007. They tended to use aggressive or confrontational tactics in the conflict, such as intimidation, mocking, pelting, and damaging property (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013).<sup>17</sup> Their involvement in the sectarian conflict in Bangil is now a history.

From the earlier descriptions it can be concluded that the police reaction to the conflict showed that the police had good knowledge of the conflict dynamics. Police intervention was tactically adjusted to the situation encountered before, during, and after the conflict. Police worked in accordance with its duties and procedures while approaching the victims and the perpetrators. They processed every report submitted by the victims and took necessary action, their approach to the parties to the conflict was persuasive, and certainly not one-sided.

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<sup>14</sup>"Ponpes Yapi Sebelumnya Sudah Pernah Diserang 2007 Lalu, Namun Polisi Lakukan Pembiaran," *Republika*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.rimanews.com/read/20110216/16884/ponpes-yapi-sebelumnya-sudah-pernah-diserang-2007-lalu-namun-polisi-lakukan> (accessed 15 November 2012).

<sup>15</sup>"Ponpes Yapi Sebelumnya Sudah Pernah Diserang 2007 Lalu, Namun Polisi Lakukan Pembiaran."

<sup>16</sup>"Penyerangan Yapi karena Perbedaan Madzhab," *Antara*, 16 February 2011, <http://www.yiela.com/view/1620547/penyerangan-yapi-karena-perbedaan-madzhab> (accessed 15 November 2012).

<sup>17</sup>"Ponpes Yapi Sebelumnya Sudah Pernah Diserang 2007 Lalu, Namun Polisi Lakukan Pembiaran."

## Conclusions

Policing of the conflict involving the YAPI (Shi'a) group and the Aswaja (Sunni) group in Bangil was successful. The police managed to reduce unilateral and recurrent anti-Shi'a provocations which peaked in an incident of insults that lead to clashes but were promptly addressed so there was no wider escalation. This success was due to policing strategies and commitment of the police to perform their obligations to serve and protect the public.

Policing strategies are understood as follows. First, the police officers always relied on communication, coordination and cooperation. Communication and cooperation were constant (although it happened that the results were not as expected, like it was ahead of the demonstration on 20<sup>th</sup> April 2007) and carried out before, during, and after the incident. Forms of communication and cooperation in general included negotiations, hearings, gatherings/*haul*, meetings, and forums.

With the strategy of coordination and cooperation, the police did not work alone and, most importantly, this strategy gave a clear message that the sectarian conflict in Bangil was a problem which had to be addressed jointly by all parties. Second, the placement of officers at their posts for a longer time, without rotations, gave them enough time to allow the "go native" approach whereby the officers could gain local knowledge, develop new solutions for problem solving, and become communicators who could bridge the police with society as did Jajak Herawan who started working at Bangil police and with the Shi'a community in 1993.

Good performance of Pasuruan police in dealing with the conflict cannot be separated from a number of important commitments which they held throughout the whole process. They faithfully followed their responsibilities in line with the constitution, not other legal products. Working with the fixed procedures governing their duties in the context of policing religious conflicts (and being sensitive to the contagious effects of conflicts in other places) was to the advantage of their performance. Another, not less important, com-

mitment was maintaining the principle of neutrality. In the context of turbulent majority-minority relations, they were well aware that disproportionate actions or statements would be likely to be perceived as bias. Therefore, they kept distance from both parties to the conflict.

Another important lesson: policing strategy would become lighter and easier if the warring parties, in this case the YAPI and the Aswaja group, were willing to cooperate with the police. Both of them to a certain level were. The existence and the positive role of other parties in overseeing the conflict contributed to creation of a more conducive atmosphere. In Bangil and Pasuruan, there were many people who contributed to this: the mass media, FKUB, the local parliament, the local government, religious leaders and leaders of religious organizations such as the NU, Muhammadiyah, and the MUI, the community leaders from Muspida, and the youth organizations such as Ansor and United Indonesia Movement.

This success story indicates positive prospects for policing of sectarian conflicts. Sectarian conflicts are a sensitive issue which Indonesian police usually fails to handle. A recommendation for policing in Bangil would be retaining the policing strategies and commitment they have been applying so far and strengthening them with knowledge of conflict resolution. Aspects of the conflict (the contagious effects of the conflict, the phases of the conflict, etc.) and its resolution (effective communication, negotiation, facilitation, problem solving, etc.) are very relevant and important, although not the most important of police tasks as is the law enforcement. In addition to this, the police cannot work alone and is not supposed to work alone, especially in case of religious conflicts which can easily stir up communal anger and mobilize masses. The wider the networking and cooperation, also with the warring parties, the easier the police duties in dealing with sectarian conflicts.\*\*\*



## PART III

# POLICING OF CONFLICTS OVER PLACES OF WORSHIP



## OVER PLACES OF WORSHIP: THE CASE OF HKBP FILADELFIA CHURCH, BEKASI

### Foreword

The conflict over the construction of the Batak Christian Protestant Church (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, HKBP) Filadelfia in Jejalen Jaya village, Tambun Utara district, Bekasi regency began in 2007. When the results of this research were compiled in November 2013, there were no signs of the conflict to end. The HKBP Filadelfia congregation was still using the location for their religious purposes, while the local residents were rejecting their right to do so.

Although there have been several incidents of clashes between the members of HKBP and local residents, so far the security forces were able to prevent the tensions from escalating into a wider and open violent conflict. There are several issues which may be considered as important factors contributing to the relatively manageable security situation in the field.

First, preventive measures have been consistently carried out by the security forces. When this research was conducted, for more than a year about 200 police had been deployed every Sunday to guard the location. The security forces deployed consisted of Tambun sub-district police, Bekasi district police, units of guarding pa-

trol and mobile brigade from Metro Jaya regional police, and the army unit from 02 Cikarang military regional command. Besides them, although not always, officers from Bekasi municipal police were also deployed. Secondly, persuasive approach was applied in policing of the conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship. In security efforts, the local police leaders enacted policies to not equip the officers with guns and batons. The same policy was applied by the municipal police. Thirdly, the security forces tried to assume a neutral, non-partisan position towards the parties to the conflict, although this not always succeeded.

In terms of conflict resolution, the police perceived their primary task as maintaining the public order and security. To the police the party who had the authority in resolution of the conflicts over the places of worship was the FKUB and the local government. The policies set by the government (especially the local government) limited the policing tasks. When this research was conducted, the government has not revoked the decree of the Bekasi regent on sealing of the land for the construction of the HKBP Church. At the same time the Bekasi government provided a temporary place of worship for the HKBP Filadelfia at the Teachers' Building (Gedung Guru) in Metland Tambun complex. In line with that policy, the security forces attempted to convince the HKBP Filadelfia to use the temporary facility provided by the government.

This chapter is divided into five sections. After the introduction in the first part, the second part presents the social and religious overview of Bekasi. In the third section the dispute is divided into three periods. The fourth section discusses the dynamics of policing seen from the policing actions, knowledge of the police, the legal-procedural framework of policing and institutional character of the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the police interaction with the actors of conflict. Finally, the fifth section provides a summary as well as a number of important lessons and conclusions.



## A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Bekasi

Based on the 2010 census, the population of Bekasi regency was 2,630,401 of which 2,508,492 (95.37 percent) were Muslims, 80,636 (3.07 percent) Protestants, 19,594 (0.74 percent) Catholics, 11,769 (0.45 percent) of Buddhists, 1,920 (0.07 percent) Hindus, 475 (0.02 percent) Confucianists, and 312 (0.01 percent) others. The rest, 7053 (0.27 per cent) did not answer, and 150 (0.01 per cent) were not asked. In terms of gender, the divide was almost equal: 51.2 percent males and 48.8 percent females.

The total number of places of worship, according to the data of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Bekasi (2013), was 4,427 units. There was 4,387 Muslim places of worship, consisting of 1,450 mosques and 2,937 *musalas* or *langgars*. There were 13 Protestant churches, 11 Catholic churches, one Hindus and 15 Buddhist temples. In the Tambun Utara district alone, there were 65 mosques and 105 *musalas*, and no places of worship of other religious communities.

The land for the planned construction of the HKBP Filadelfia Church is located in RT 01/09 of Jejalén Jaya village, Tambun Utara, Bekasi, West Java province. Jalen neighbourhood (Dusun, or Hamlet, III) is one of the three hamlets in Jejalén Jaya village. The other two hamlets are Gondrong and Kebon neighbourhoods. Consisting of an area around 276.224 hectares, Jejalén Jaya village is divided into 15 RWs and 84 RTs.

According to the data issued by Jejalén Jaya village, in January 2013, the number of its inhabitants was 16,251 persons, with almost equal proportion of men and women. The number of families was 4,727. Majority of the Jejalén Jaya inhabitants are Muslim, 96.1 percent. The rest belong to several other religious communities: Protestant (2.4 percent), Catholic (0.7 percent), Hindu (0.5 percent), and Buddhist (0.3 percent). In terms of education, more than a half of Jejalén Jaya inhabitants completed primary education and almost one fourth of them finished junior high school.

## Conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship

On Monday, 24 December 2012, around 6:00 pm, dozens of Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) Filadelfia members were heading towards the location of their future church in Jalen neighbourhood RT. 01/09, Jejalan Jaya village, Tambun Utara, Bekasi. They wanted to celebrate the Christmas Eve. About 300 meters from their destination, they were stopped by hundreds of local residents who apparently gathered there already in the late afternoon. Security forces, around 200 policemen, were on standby, ready to perform pacification. HKBP Filadelfia leaders managed to approach the policemen and representatives of the local residents to request the protection of their right to pray in the place which was their property. When the negotiations were still ongoing, a commotion broke out. Both sides were pushing each other. Then the members of HKBP were pelted with various objects, including sewage and rotten eggs. In order to avoid further clashes, the security forces tried to separate the members of HKBP from the crowd. Eventually the HKBP left.

The above event was one of the series of episodes from the conflict in which the HKBP Filadelfia and the inhabitants of Jejalan Jaya have been caught since a few years. The main reason of the conflict is the rejection of the plans of the HKBP Filadelfia to build their church on the land located in Jalen RT. 01/09, Jejalan Jaya village. Taking into account the dynamics of the conflict, its shape, intensity and tactics applied, it can be divided into three periods: (1) 2000-2006, (2) 2007-2009, and (3) 2010-2012.

### *2000-2006 Period*

Since April 2000, a number of Protestant Batak families who lived in the Tambun Utara and Tambun Selatan districts established HKBP Filadelfia.<sup>1</sup> At that time the congregation was under Duren Jaya district police. HKBP Filadelfia was led by Pastor Elmun Rumahorbo S.Th., who resided in Villa Bekasi Indah 2 Block C5 No. 35. The house also served as HKBP Filadelfia's office and sometimes the place for their worship practices.

In 2003, the HKBP Filadelfia bought the land in Villa Bekasi Indah 2, Sumber Jaya, Tambun Selatan. They built a *ruko* (shop-house)

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<sup>1</sup>The members of HKBP Filadelfia live in several neighbouring villages: Sumber Jaya, Satria Jaya, Mangun Jaya (located in Tambun Selatan) and Jejalan Jaya (in Tambun Utara).

on this land and then also used it as their place for prayers.<sup>2</sup> One time, when HKBP was holding their service, a number of local residents approached them and insisted that the *ruko* was no longer used as a place of worship. Ultimately, the HKBP's worship activities were moved to the houses of congregation members who lived in the neighbourhood of Villa Bekasi Indah 2, Sumber Jaya, Tambun Selatan.

On Sunday, 2 April 2006, when the HKBP Filadelfia was performing their prayers at the house of Pastor Elmun Rumahorbo, a number of local residents approached them. Residents asked the HKBP to no longer perform their services in the neighbourhood of Villa Bekasi Indah 2. Upon pressure, Pastor Elmun Rumahorbo signed a statement that HKBP Filadelfia would no longer perform their worship in Villa Bekasi Indah 2, especially in the Block C.<sup>3</sup> Because of this the HKBP Filadelfia began to look for another location to build their church.

In June 2006, HKBP Filadelfia finally acquired the land for construction of their church. The area of 1,088 square meters was bought from Mrs Sumiyati. This land plot is located in the Jalen neighbourhood RT 01/09, Jejalan Jaya village. While the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 is under Tambun Selatan administration, Jaya Jejalan belongs to Tambun Utara.

Although the land in Jejalan Jaya village was purchased in 2006, the news of the planned church construction were circulated among local residents since the end of 2005. It appears so from the letter of rejection of the church construction plan which was sent by the local

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<sup>2</sup>This *ruko* has obtained the certificate of occupancy (Hak Guna Bangunan, HGB) No. 10095 and No. 10096 dated 21 October 2003.

<sup>3</sup>According to one of the sources, the residents' opposition towards HKBP was due to frustration over HKBP activities which were disturbing the peace in their neighbourhood. One of the triggers was an incident in which a local resident could not enter the neighbourhood because the entrance was blocked by HKBP vehicles parked on the roadside. According to the source, when the HKBP was reprimanded, its members reacted in a way which local residents perceived as rude and arrogant. Eventually, the HKBP worship activities were opposed.

religious leader H. Naimun, in the name of the Forum of Islamic Study Groups of Jejalen Jaya village, to the village chief.<sup>4</sup>

### *2007-2009 Period*

Despite the objections of local residents, the HKBP Filadelfia continued with their plans to establish a church on the land they had bought. In accordance with the provisions of the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 and No. 8 of 2006, which was issued on 21 March 2006, the HKBP Filadelfia began to seek the support of the local community for their plans. One of the requirements given in the Joint Regulation is that the construction committee must obtain the support of at least 90 prospective users of the place of worship and the support of at least 60 local residents. Another requirement was that the committee must obtain a recommendation from the local FKUB or the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Upon meeting the requirements, the construction permit can be obtained from the local government.

In 2007, the HKBP Filadelfia sought support for the construction of their church. The attitude of H. Sukardi HN, the then Jejalen Jaya village chief, towards the construction plans was positive and he tried to facilitate the process. He said that as a government official, he was obliged to facilitate the needs of citizens with regard to the place of worship. He did not question the beliefs of HKBP Filadelfia. That is why he asked some of the RW leaders to help in finding

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<sup>4</sup>Letter No. 01/FMT-JLJ/2005 dated 26 December 2005, contained an attachment with signatures of 312 residents of Jejalen Jaya (See "Inilah Kronologi Lengkap Kasus HKBP Filadelfia Versi Warga Jejalen Jaya," <http://www.suara-islam.com>, Monday, 7 May 2012 (accessed 8 February 2013). Later H. Naimun also wrote an open letter titled "Untuk Semua Warga Kampung Yang Fikirannya Tidak Kampungan," which was circulated among Jejalen Jaya residents. Parts of Naimun's letter were quoted by the online media. See "Inilah Surat Kyai Pemicu Penolakan Gereja HKBP Filadelfia," <http://www.beritasatu.com>, 18 May 2012 (accessed 5 March 2013); "The Battle Over Bekasi's HKBP Filadelfia Church," <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com>, 19 May 2012 (accessed 28 January 2013).

the support or approval of the local residents.<sup>5</sup> On 11 October 2007, Jejalan Jaya village chief issued a permit for the HKBP Filadelfia to build a church in Jejalan Jaya.<sup>6</sup> The village chief issued the permit because the requirements stipulated in the regulation No. 9 and 8 of 2006 were fulfilled.<sup>7</sup> With the permit from the village chief of Jejalan Jaya, the construction committee of HKBP Fildelfia submitted a request to the head of the Tambun Utara for the construction recommendation.<sup>8</sup>

The efforts to obtain construction permit for the HKBP Filadelfia Church were met with obstacles on the district level. The meetings held by the local district government have actually reversed developments in raising support for the construction.

In the meeting on Friday, 13 December 2007, it was decided that the signatures of the Jejalan Jaya residents who supported the construction of HKBP Filadelfia's church had to be verified.<sup>9</sup> On 18 February 2008, another meeting was held by Tambun Utara district government to discuss the application of the HKBP Filadelfia. To this meeting for clarification, the residents who earlier signed the support statement for the plans to construct the HKBP Filadelfia Church were invited. However, they did not turn up. Those who attended the meeting were the residents who opposed the HKBP Filadelfia plans in their village. Some of the residents who had pre-

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<sup>5</sup>H. Sukardi HN, Jejalan Jaya village chief in 2002-2007 and 2007-2012, interview, 17 February 2013.

<sup>6</sup>Letter No. 451.2/09/X/2007 dated 11 October 2007. This document/letter was the answer to HKBP's request No. 01/ SPI/H6/R5/DXIX/2007.

<sup>7</sup>Earlier, on 25 September 2007, Jejalan Jaya village chief, H. Sukardi HN, approved and signed the list of 117 names of HKBP's members who resided in Jejalan Jaya.

<sup>8</sup>Letter No. 03/SPI/H6/R5/DXIX/2007 dated 29 October 2007, on request for recommendation for church construction permit for HKBP Filadelfia in RT 01 RW 09 Dusun III Jejalan Jaya, Tambun Utara, Bekasi.

<sup>9</sup>The meeting was attended by religious leaders, community leaders, youth leaders, Muspika Tambun Utara, head of KUA Tambun Utara, and village officials. As a follow-up to the meeting, on 14 January 2008, the head of Tambun Utara district issued SK No. 452.2/Kep.11-1/2008 on establishment of a data-checking team with regard to the HKBP Filadelfia's church construction plans. The team was to be led by the head of KUA Tambun Utara and the head of the Economy and Social Section of Tambun Utara district.

viously signed the support statement said they did not know that their signatures were taken for the purpose of the planned church construction.<sup>10</sup> The last meeting was held by the Tambun Utara district government at Jejalen Jaya village hall, on Wednesday, 5 March 2008. Due to the opposition of some of the residents against the church construction (as expressed in the letters from the Islamic Community Communication Forum, FKUI, and several Islamic study clubs of Jejalen Jaya village), the meeting resulted in rejection of the HKBP Filadelfia's plans.<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile, Jejalen Jaya residents who rejected the HKBP Filadelfia plans began to consolidate. On Friday, 22 February 2008, they established the above-mentioned FKUI at At-Taqwa Mosque in Jalen neighbourhood, with Nesan SE as its chairman.<sup>12</sup> Nesan is a former village chief candidate who was defeated by Sukardi in 2007 election. During one of the FKUI actions, he tore a letter from the regent because he thought that the HKBP Filadelfia did not respect the regent's letter on banning its religious activities.<sup>13</sup>

While the waves of rejections intensified, on 2 April 2008, the HKBP Filadelfia Church construction committee applied to the FKUB of Bekasi, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bekasi, and to the Bekasi local government for recommendations. The Ministry of Religious Affairs Bekasi office replied a year later, on 18 August 2009, that it could not yet issue a recommendation for the HKBP Fi-

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<sup>10</sup>The meeting took place at the Jejalen Jaya village office, and was attended by Muspika and the related officials from Tambun Utara Regency, Jejalen Jaya village officials, religious leaders, community leaders, youth leaders, and some of the Jejalen Jaya residents.

<sup>11</sup>The meeting was attended by Muspika Tambun Utara, Jejalen Jaya village officials, religious leaders, community leaders, youth leaders, and some of Jejalen Jaya residents. The HKBP Filadelfia was not present.

<sup>12</sup>The next day FKUI Jejalen Jaya on behalf of the Muslim community of Jejalen Jaya submitted rejection of the planned establishment of HKBP Filadelfia's church to the village chief of Jejalen Jaya. The rejection was stated in a letter of FKUI of Jejalen Jaya No. 01/FKUI-JJ/II/2008 dated 22 February 2008, regarding the refusal of the church construction plans. This letter was used as one of the bases for rejection of the planned establishment of HKBP Filadelfia's church on the meeting on 5 March 2012.

<sup>13</sup>See Ali-Fauzi et al. 2011: 102.

ladelfia Church construction plans.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, the FKUB Bekasi, until this study was completed, has not given a written answer to the HKBP Filadelfia petition.

Around October 2009, leaders and the community of the HKBP Filadelfia held a meeting to discuss the answer of the office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, concerning the petition for recommendation of the church construction. They decided to still use the land belonging to them in Jalen RT 01/09, Jejalan Jaya village, for carrying out their worship activities. They also began preparing the foundations for the construction.

Friday 25 December 2009 was an important moment in the series of episodes in the conflict between the HKBP Filadelfia and local residents. On that day the HKBP for the first time carried out prayers on their land at the same time changing the shape of protests against them from petitions into collective demonstrations, and later into disruptive actions such as blockades preventing the church construction and worship activities of the HKBP Filadelfia in the village Jejalan Jaya.<sup>15</sup> On Sunday, 27 December 2009, HKBP Filadelfia again conducted a service at the site, and local residents again rallied against their devotional activities.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Answer from the Ministry of Religious Affairs Bekasi office to HKBP Filadelfia No. d.10.16/II/1473/2009 dated 18 August 2009, which contained the statement: "For the sake of creating a conducive atmosphere of religious life, the Ministry of Religious Affairs Bekasi office is not yet able to give recommendation for the church construction. Therefore, we recommend that you first approach the public/community/religious leaders and the local government."

<sup>15</sup>On 25 December 2009, at 08:30 am to 10:50 am, around 250-300 people gathered to protest against HKBP's worship activities in the name of residents of Jalen RW 04, 08, 09, 10 and 12 of Jejalan Jaya willage, Tambun Utara district, led by Ustad Naimun (community leader), Aseng (head of youth association), and Ustad Ikrom (head of FKUI). They protested in front of the gate of the HKBP Filadelfia's construction site, chanting *salawat* and *takbir* and calling for ceasing the meetings, activities and church construction. At 10:00 am, a meeting was held with Ustad Naimun, Aseng, Ustad Ikrom and the HKBP Filadelfia leaders – Hutasoit, Simanjuntak and Pastor Palti H. Panjaitan. The meeting was facilitated by Muspika, district and village officials, and the then Bekasi district police chief Drs. Herry Wibowo, MH.

<sup>16</sup>Around 9:15 am, around 100 persons, most of them women from the local neighbourhood led by Ustad Naimun rallied in front of the worship site of HKBP Filadelfia. They demanded that the service and church development activities which did not follow the procedures (no construction permit) were immediately stopped.

Amid increasing rejection of the village residents against the HKBP Filadelfia Church construction plans, on 31 December 2009, the regent of Bekasi issued a letter ordering halt to the HKBP Filadelfia's church construction and worship activities.<sup>17</sup> This policy marked the occurrence of an important incident which influenced the shape of conflict development.

### *2010-2012 Period*

On the Sunday morning of 3 January 2010, the HKBP Filadelfia were about to perform prayers at their land. But they were unable to access it since about 300 people under the leadership of H. Naimun occupied the site. Finally, the village leadership gave the place to the HKBP to hold their service at the Jejalén Jaya village hall. Since the worship activities at the village hall were also questioned by the local residents,<sup>18</sup> on Sunday, 10 January 2010, HKBP Filadelfia again held the service on their land. Having learnt of HKBP activities, a number of community leaders who at that time were attending a religious gathering at Madinatul Munawwaroh Mosque, came to the site where they requested the termination of worship activities. Several governmental officials were also present: the Bekasi district secretary, the chairman of Bekasi local parliament, the head of Agency for Protection of National Unity, Politics, and Public Linmas and the head of Binamitra of Bekasi police.

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At 10:00 am, the protesters dispersed in an orderly manner.

<sup>17</sup>The letter No. 300/675/Kesbangpollinmas/09 dated 31 December 2009, concerning termination of construction and worship activities of the HKBP. Based on the Article 13, 14, 16 and 18 Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 and No. 8 of 2006 on the guidelines for heads of the regions and their deputies on maintaining religious harmony, strengthening the Forum for Religious Harmony, and construction of places of worship, Article 3 of the Bekasi Regency Regulation No. 7 of 1996 on construction permits, the Bekasi government asked the HKBP Filadelfia to: (1) stop the construction activities on RT 01/09 Jejalén Jaya, Tambun Utara, and (2) not use it for worship activities before the permit is processed in accordance with laws and regulations.

<sup>18</sup>In a meeting held between the village chief and the residents in the Jejalén Jaya village hall on 8 January 2010, residents also rejected the use of the village hall for HKBP's worship activities. The residents also rejected the worship activities at the site of the planned church construction.



On 12 January 2010, the Construction Control Team of Bekasi government sealed the HKBP Filadelfia Church construction site in Jalen. The reason behind the sealing was the effort to maintain order and security within the community as well as enforcement of the Regulation No. 7 of 1996 on construction permits. As a result of this sealing, every Sunday since 17 January 2010, the HKBP Filadelfia were holding their services on the street in front of their sealed property.

The HKBP tried to resist the Bekasi government's policy by taking legal measures. The lawsuit was registered in March 2010, at the Administrative Court in Bandung, and followed by court's visit to the location on 14 June 2010. After the proceedings in July 2010, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff (HKBP Filadelfia).<sup>19</sup> In response to the decision of the Administrative Court in Bandung, Bekasi government appealed to the High Court in Jakarta on 15 November 2010. However, the appeal failed and on 30 March 2011, the High Court in Jakarta confirmed the decision of the Administrative Court in Bandung.<sup>20</sup>

Between 2010 and 2011, the HKBP were holding their services in front of their sealed land. The opposition from the local residents was generally expressed in written statements which were filed to various stakeholders. The protests in form of rallies, according to the data collected, were recorded only 3 and 10 January 2010, and on 20 and 28 June 2010. They did not involve violence.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Decision of the Administrative Court in Bandung No. 42/G/2010/PTUN-BDG dated 2 September 2010, with the following verdict: (1) Declaring void the Bekasi regent's letter No. 300/675/Kesbangpol Linmas dated 31 December 2009, regarding the halt to construction and worship activities; (2) Instructing the Bekasi regent to revoke the letter No. 300/675/Kesbangpol Linmas dated 31 December 2009, regarding the halt to construction and worship activities; and (3) Instructing the regent to process the application for permission to construct the place of worship in accordance with the provisions.

<sup>20</sup>Decision of the High Court in Jakarta No. 225/B/2010/PT.TUN/JKT which upholds the ruling of the Administrative Court in Bandung No. 42/G/2010/PTUN-BDG dated 2 September 2010.

<sup>21</sup>On Sunday, 20 June 2010, before the HKBP carried out their service, about 100 people led by Ustad Naimun rallied in front of the construction site of HKBP Filadelfia, demanding (1) Halt to worship activities of HKBP Filadelfia, (2) Revocation of Jejenan Jaya's village chief recommendation over HKBP Filadelfia Church develop-

In 2012, the dynamics of the conflict over the construction of the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship has increased, both in terms of frequency of incidents and their intensity. The tactics of disruption began to be used by the protesting residents. Disruption assumed the shape of collective actions which tended to be aggressive, but not violent. The main goal of that tactics was disruption of activities of the party they opposed.

Throughout 2012, at least 20 protests were recorded, a sharp increase from the previous period where only one incident took place in 2011 and 12 in 2010. In terms of numbers, in 2012 between 100 to 600 people were involved in the mass protests, while previously, the number of protesters generally amounted to dozens, although twice, in late 2009 and early 2010, a few hundred were involved too.

Among the disruption tactics used was organizing prelections or voluntary activities accompanied by playing religious songs through loudspeakers at a location adjacent to where the HKBP Filadelfia held their services. Also increasingly frequent were the actions of occupying the site or hindering access to it.<sup>22</sup> As a result of that tactics, several times there were tensions and clashes between the local residents and members of HKBP — on 26 February 2012,<sup>23</sup> 4 March 2012,<sup>24</sup> 15 April

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ment, and (3) Jejalen Jaya village head to clarify the administrative court's statement which mentioned that only 5 people protested against HKBP's devotional activities/church construction. Then on Monday, 28 June 2010, residents also protested in front of the village office of Jejalen Jaya, demanding that the village chief revoke his earlier letter of recommendation for the establishment of HKBP Filadelfia's church.

<sup>22</sup>One of the sources stated that the disruption tactics was first applied on 22 January 2012. Approximately 20 residents led by H. Naimun were playing Islamic songs next to the location used for HKBP Filadelfia's worship. Other sources mention that these activities began on 1 January 2012.

<sup>23</sup>Based on information from various sources, the mass rejection of HKBP Filadelfia's construction plans was in form of verbal "quarrels" between the field coordinator and protesters. The situation was still under control.

<sup>24</sup>At 8:30 am, when residents of Jejalen Jaya were carrying out their activities on land owned by Ramin, which is located next to the construction site of HKBP Filadelfia, they burnt rubbish on the back of HKBP Filadelfia's prayer place, Samosir (community member and a member of Detachment 88 of the National Police in the rank of 2<sup>nd</sup> inspector) reprimanded Abdul Aziz (Ustad Naimun's son) telling him not to burn rubbish there. When they started to argue, some of the local residents approached them. Samosir panicked, took out his gun and shouted "I am a member"

2012,<sup>25</sup> and 6 May 2012.<sup>26</sup>

The last incident that year took place during Christmas, on 24 and 25 December 2012. When the members of HKBP Filadelfia were heading to their land to celebrate Christmas, hundreds of people met them about 300 meters from the location. After negotiations between the residents and the HKBP Filadelfia failed, the HKBP group was forced to disperse. The next morning a similar incident took place. The HKBP still could not celebrate Christmas on the land they owned. Finally, they went to Tambun police station, and carried out their celebrations there. In the afternoon they went to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta and joined the congregation of GKI Yasmin holding Christmas celebrations in front of the Palace.

## **Dynamics of Policing the HKBP Conflict**

### *Policing Activities*

Involvement of the police in handling the case of conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship was long-term. Types of action, units involved, and the number of officers deployed varied with the dynamics of the conflict.

Conflict resolution involved almost all available units, such as intelligence, criminal investigations unit, Binmas, Sabhara, traffic police and health services. The functions these units represented were seen as complimentary in security activities conducted by the police in handling of the conflict.

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(later the incident was handled by the Internal Affairs Division of Bekasi Police, then transferred to the same division within National Police, and finally to the Police's Central Headquarter, since Samosir was a member of the 88 Special Detachment).

<sup>25</sup>HKBP Filadelfia came back to hold their worship activities in front of the fence of their planned church. They were confronted by the local residents about 200 meters from the location. In this incident Abdul Aziz, son Naimun, threatened to kill Palti H. Panjaitan.

<sup>26</sup>At 8:00 am women from Islamic study group (*majlis taklim*) occupied the site, and about 500 other people blocked the T-junction by the Guru Nora house in RT 02/04 (300 meters before HKBP's land). The 40 members of HKBP Filadelfia who wanted to perform a service at the location, were escorted back to the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 by the security forces.

In this research, the term “policing of religious conflicts” is used to describe the series of police actions in dealing with the conflict. These can be divided into intelligence, mediation and pacification.

## 1. Intelligence

The main task of intelligence is to collect information useful for detecting potential disruptions of the public order and security. Given the secret nature of intelligence activities, not many things that can be looked into with regard to intelligence activities related to the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship. However, there are a number of important issues which should be noted.

First, although the police formally have separate personnel assigned to intelligence activities which are under the organizational structure of the intelligence unit (at the level of district police) or intelligence unit (at the level of sub-district police), the intelligence functions can be carried out by all police officers. As stated by Kasubag Humas of Bekasi district police, AKP Bambang Wahyudi, “A member of the police from the Binmas unit may also carry out the task of collecting various information which is important for the police” (interview, 12 February 2013).

Second, in line with the rapid developments in technology and information, intelligence coordination and communication can also be done quickly. According to one of the intelligence officers of Bekasi police (interview, 14 February 2013), the intelligence officers take advantage of the BBM (Blackberry Messenger) service to communicate their activities and the intelligence information is quickly available. In spite of this, the intelligence officers were still required to make a written report of their activities.

Third, intelligence officers work on a daily basis to collect various information from the public. When a conflict becomes a routine and is ongoing for years, as in the case of HKBP, intelligence information is used as the basis for routine pacification plans. Pacification plans made by the operations section of Bekasi police on Friday or Sat-

urday, were then distributed among the police and other security institutions, such Sabhara of Jakarta police, mobile brigade, district military command and Bekasi municipal police. These plans were routinely performed every Sunday when HKBP Filadelfia wanted to use their land as a place of worship, and when, at the same time, the local residents would mobilize against them (Andri Ananta Yudhistira, Tambun police chief, interview, 3 February 2013).

## 2. Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation and mediation were another kind of involvement of the police officers in handling the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia's church, carried out both in the field and through various meetings. Based on the information obtained, the police officers were involved in the mediation process since the Tambun Utara local government held a number of meetings to discuss the conflict.<sup>27</sup> At that stage, the police officers were from the Tambun district police which at that time was headed by Arif Ismari, and from Tabun Utara sub-district police which was then headed by Aiptu Harmoyo, who both were signed on the attendance list and in the report of one of those meetings.<sup>28</sup> Apart from this, when the Tambun Utara local government established a data-checking team with regard to HKBP Filadelfia's church construction plans, which was chaired by Tambun Utara district head, A. Junaidi Rakhman, security forces were also involved as vice chairmen of the team: Tambun police chief as the first vice chairman and the sub-district military commander (Danramil) of Tambun as the second chairman.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Several meetings on the construction plans of the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship were held by the Tambun Utara district government, on 14 December 2007, 18 February 2008 and 5 March 2008. See description in the previous section.

<sup>28</sup>See minutes of Discussion on the Application for the Church Construction Permit (HKBP Filadelfia) Jejalan Jaya village, Tambun Utara, of 5 March 2008. The security forces who were involved in the initial meetings derived from the district military command 02 Tambun, and were represented by Captain ARM Kayat who then served as a military commander of Tambun 02.

<sup>29</sup>See the decree of Tambun Utara district head No. 452.2/Kep. 11-1/2008 dated 14 January 2008, on establishment of a data-checking team with regard to the HKBP Filadelfia's church construction plans in Jejalan Jaya, Tambun Utara.

The involvement of the district police began when the tensions increased, especially since the HKBP Filadelfia decided to keep using their land on 25 December 2009, which triggered mobilization of the local residents who opposed it. The police of the Bekasi police became the mediators in several meetings between the HKBP and the residents. The police was represented by the Herry Wibowo and Y.S. Muryono the head of Binamitra of the Bekasi district police (who at the time of this research assumed the position of the head of operations of the Bekasi police).

The police officers of the National Police (Polri) were also involved in the process of negotiation and mediation. In the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia's church, a number of female police officers were deployed as part of the negotiation team. The negotiation team numbered about 10 people who came from the traffic police and Binmas unit. The reason to deploy the policewomen was the fact that the group who demonstrated against the establishment of HKBP Filadelfia Church, consisted mostly of women. Similarly, in the HKBP Filadelfia group there was a significant number of women.

The negotiation team tried to convince the HKBP Filadelfia to not carry out their worship activities at the location which was questioned by the local citizens. The HKBP was advised to hold their services in the place provided by the Bekasi local government as a temporary place of worship in Gedung Guru Metland complex, Tambun. That place was about 5 kilometers from the HKBP's land in Jejalan Jaya. Had the persuasion attempts failed and the HKBP Filadelfia insisted on holding their service at their land, the police would let them go to the location and would provide security (Kasubag Humas Bekasi police, Bambang Wahyu-di, interview, 12 February 2013). However, the security activities did not include expulsion of the crowd, so the HKBP could not access their land to perform their worship activities. This has been criticized by the HKBP Filadelfia members who claimed that the police did not carry out their duty to protect citizens (Pastor Palti H. Panjaitan, interview, 12 February 2013).

### 3. Pacification

Pacification activities in conflict resolution were performed by the police since the conflict escalated, that is since Friday, 25 December 2009. On that day the HKBP Filadelfia decided to carry out the Christmas celebrations on their property in Jejalen Jaya. The decision was made after the HKBP Filadelfia received the letter from the Ministry of Religious Affairs Bekasi office, in which it was stated that the requested recommendation for the church construction could not be issued yet. With the number of people protesting ranging between 250-300, as well as with the presence of Bekasi police chief at the location, the troops deployed could no longer be from the level of Tambun district only, but were also deployed from the Bekasi police.

The number of troops deployed varied with the dynamics of the conflict. From the district level police only around 40-60 people could be deployed, but when joint personnel was involved, the number could reach about 460 officers, consisting of one platoon of district police officers, two platoons of Dalmas from Bekasi police, two SSK of Sabhara Polda Metro Jaya, one SSK of mobile brigade, one military platoon, and a platoon of municipal police. For the routine security activities since the beginning of 2013, the number of police deployed was around 250, consisting of: one platoon of district police officers, one SSK of Bekasi police, two SSK of Sabhara Polda Metro Jaya, and one platoon of mobile brigade. This group did not yet include the military platoon and the municipal police officers (Tambun police chief, Andri Ananta Yudhistira, interview, 20 February 2013).

The deployment of troops in considerable amount was done because the police did not want to risk failing to anticipate the situation where tensions could escalate into violence. It was also done because the distance and traffic jams would complicate a quick mobilization of security forces in case more troops were needed. The police preferred to have an adequate number of troops ready at the location.

Routine security activities were taking place every Sunday since 2012, when the tensions escalated. According to the police chief of Tambun, almost all of the local police personnel was familiar with the situation. Similarly, the entire mobile Brigade (Detachment A, B and C) already knew the location and security activities performed there (interview, 10 February 2013).

Routine security activities were carried out in accordance with plans made by the operations section of the Bekasi police. The plans for Sunday were usually delivered on Friday by Bekasi police to related parties, such as the Tambun police, district military command 02 Cikarang, Polda Metro Jaya and municipal police of Bekasi regency. The plans were made based on the analysis of information gathered from Monday to Friday (Tambun police chief, interview, 10 February 2013).

In the beginning the security forces were deployed in front of the land plot of the HKBP Filadelfia. However, since each time there were protests of the local residents who several times pelted the members of HKBP Filadelfia, the police decided to widen the distance between the residents and the congregation. When this research was carried out, the security forces were deployed in front of the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 housing estate which was about 900 meters away from the HKBP land plot. The location for troops deployment was chosen since the HKBP would usually gather first at the HKBP Filadelfia secretariat in Block C of Villa Bekasi Indah 2.

Before 8 am, security forces would arrive at the site and would carry out an appeal led by the Tambun police chief, and a briefing for officers in charge of each unit deployed. Because the officers in charge were changing, the leading officer would each time update them on the most recent status of the case. The updates included the information on the HKBP land which was still sealed by the Bekasi government, the need of applying persuasive approach both towards the local residents and the members of the HKBP to avoid escalation of the conflict, as well as the instruction that the security forces should not carry firearms. The officers who had rifles or pistols were required to deposit them with



the Propam (Internal Affairs Division) officer. Also the municipal police officers should not be equipped with weapons, including batons. According to Deni, the head of security section of the municipal police, this was done in order to avoid the possibility of accidents (interview, 7 February 2013). The mobile brigade unit whose officers were armed and used motorcycles was usually stationed in the rearmost position.

After the 15-minute appeals, the security forces would spread to several positions around the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 housing estate. Negotiators along with the Tambun police chief would come to the HKBP secretariat to meet the HKBP Filadelfia leadership and try to convince them to not hold their service in front of their property in Jejalen, but to use the temporary space provided by the Bekasi local government on the third floor of Gedung Guru in Metland complex, Tambun. When this research was taking place, the security forces were failing to meet the leadership of HKBP who at those times was either ill or leading prayers in front of the Presidential Palace together with the representatives of the GKI Yasmin.

The tactics applied by the security forces in handling the conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia place of worship, were mainly persuasive measures, also at the time when the protesting residents were pelting the members of HKBP with sewage, animal waste etc. At the times when protesters were approaching the church members and the distance between them was no longer maintainable, the police would usually lead the members of HKBP congregation back to the Villa Bekasi Indah 2. The Tambun police chief said that the persuasive approach was applied even towards the disruptive actions of the local residents (which could not be categorized as acts of violence, although they could lead to violence), because the security forces did not want to trigger expansion of the conflict. Although the persuasive approach might have contributed to preventing the conflict from spreading and escalating, it was criticized by the HKBP and NGOs as a lack of decisiveness, or even inaction towards acts of intolerance. This, in the view of HKBP and NGOs, was a failure of security forces in protecting and guaranteeing the right of HKBP Filadelfia to perform their worship activities.

*Police Knowledge*

In this research, what is understood as police knowledge is the police perceptions of their roles and of the external reality they face. Apparently not all police officers had thorough knowledge of regulations related to conflicts and regulations defining the ways of handling them. The junior police officers' knowledge was general and practical because they acted primarily upon instructions of the leaders or commanders of their units. This kind of knowledge was acquired mainly through regular appeals at the police stations or, in case of field operations, through the Chief of Officers Gathering (Acara Pimpinan Pasukan, APP) prior to the start of operations. Broader knowledge of various rules relating to conflicts and dealing with them seemed to be possessed only by the senior police officers. Yet it remains unknown how extensive and in-depth their knowledge was.

From the interviews with a number of police officers who were asked about their roles in conflict resolution, "maintaining security" was mentioned most often. As stated by the Tambun police chief, "Our main function is to maintain security, prevent the conflict from spreading and escalating into violence, as well as preventing casualties. We do not interfere in the matter of places of worship. It is under the authority of the local government" (interview, 3 February 2013).

The way the police perceive the external reality is another important component of police knowledge. According to della Porta and Reiter (1998), although police is equipped with a number of rules and guidelines underlying operations, during the interventions the police generally act first on the basis of their assessment of the situation and only then on the basis of rules and regulations. According to della Porta and Rieter (1998), the police perception of external reality is not subordinate to written rules and regulations, but is of equal importance when the police carry out their duties.

There are a number of factors which shape the police perceptions of external reality. Among them important are those related to

the information obtained by the police from intelligence activities regarding the cases handled, information on similar cases which occurred in other places, as well as their own policing experience. Some of the information obtained might be valid, but some might be not.<sup>30</sup>

This research shows that despite the importance of police perceptions of external reality and their situation assessment for policing activities, the legal framework and government policies provide boundaries or constraints to the options which the police can choose. As mentioned by the Tambun police chief, "One of our tasks, as security forces, is to uphold the government policy both at the national and local level." It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that the police would take an action that openly contradicts the governmental regulations or policies, even if those were legally unsound.

In case of the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship, the Bekasi government's policy was sealing. With its decision the Bekasi government was defeated in the Administrative Court of Bandung, and then again in the High Court in Jakarta. However, by the time this research was completed, the Bekasi government has still not complied with the court decision and did not revoke its decree on sealing the HKBP's land, nor has it removed the seals from the site. The police therefore had to stick to the government's policy. In other words, it seemed unlikely, if not impossible, that the police would take unilateral action and unseal the location, even though the sealing was illegal.

### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

The main legal reference for the police in handling the conflict was the Act No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, in par-

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<sup>30</sup>In a conversation (27 January 2013), the then Bekasi police chief, Haryanta, said "Why is it always a problem with HKBP? Take a look at the case in Ciketing. Also the case in Setu. Then there is the case of Yasmin in Bogor. What's going on?" Associating the Ciketing and Setu cases with HKBP is not wrong, but connecting the case of GKI Yasmin in Bogor with HKBP was certainly a mistake.

ticular its articles 4 and 5, which state that among the duties of the police is to maintain security and public order. Police officers did not refer to the Act No. 7 of 2012 on the management of social conflicts, because the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship in Jejalen Jaya village was not yet seen as a kind of conflict defined by the Act No. 7 of 2012 (Haryanta, the then deputy chief of Bekasi police, interview, 3 February 2013). The police activities undertaken then were still not categorized as "police operations".<sup>31</sup>

In handling the conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship, the security activities were under Bekasi police with the Tambun district police chief acting as field controller (or Kepala Pengamanan Objek, Ka Pam Objek).<sup>32</sup> There was a pacification/security plan prepared by the operations section of Bekasi police. Beside the deployment of the police personnel from the national police, Bekasi police and Tambun district police, the security activities in Jejalen Jaya also involved the support of the Under Operational Control (BKO) unit of the guarding patrol and mobile brigade from the Metro Jaya provincial police. The security forces were also reinforced by military units from the Cikarang sub-district military command (Koramil) and the municipal police of Bekasi.

### *Police Culture*

In various studies on the police, police culture is seen as one of the factors affecting the policing activities. Following della Porta

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<sup>31</sup>"Policing activities" (*kegiatan kepolisian*) is "daily operational activities [by the police] in order to maintain security and public order through pre-emptive, preventive and repressive measures" (article 7 of Police Chief's Regulation No. 3 of 2009 on the police operational system). There is also "policing operations", which refers to "[special] police operation that is run based on an assessment on specific situation to tackle real threats that wouldn't be effective when it handled through regular police activities" (Police Chief's Regulation No. 3 of 2009 on the police operational system).

<sup>32</sup>Operational unit (*Bagops*) at the district police level is in charge of "planning and controlling the administration of police operations, security of public activities and/or government agencies, providing information and documentation as well as controlling the security of police headquarters" (on *Bagops*, see sections 16-18 of Police Chief's Regulation No. 23 of 2010, on the structure and work of the district and sub-district police).

and Reiter (1998), the police culture is understood as both the political culture of the police, particularly their conceptions of the state and constitutional rights, and the professional culture. In this research, the police culture refers to the views of the police officers on human rights, particularly freedom of religion and worship, as well as their views on the conflicts over places of worship and their role in handling them.

The interviews with a number of police officers revealed that the police recognized the freedom of religion and worship as one of the human rights guaranteed by the constitution and law. With regard to human rights, the police have the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of Indonesian police.<sup>33</sup> As told by the Tambun police chief, "The regulation, together with other regulations regarding security procedures have been circulated to all [police] members, mainly through briefings during appeals."

In private, several police officers said they had no problem about the presence of other religions' places of worship. "Even near to my house there is a place of worship of a different religion. Every Sunday they hold a service. I personally do not find this a problem," said one of the police officers. Another member of the police, from Yogyakarta said:

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<sup>33</sup>In Article 5 paragraph (1) of the Police Chief's Regulation it is mentioned that the human rights protection instruments which need to be considered by every member of the police in carrying out duties under Article 27, Article 28 and Article 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, include "the right to freedom of religion and worship according to one's religion" (point d). Paragraph (2) of Article 5 mentions that among human rights that cannot be reduced by anyone and in any circumstances (non-derogable rights), is the "right to [have a] religion" (point d). Furthermore, Article 6 of the Regulation states that the rights referred to in Article 5 paragraph (1) are in the scope of police duties and include: "the right to personal freedom: everyone is free to choose and have political beliefs, expressing opinion in public, embracing a religion, not being enslaved, choosing citizenship without discrimination, having the right to freedom of movement, moving and residing in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia" (point b); "special rights of minority groups, such as ethnic, religious, disabled, sexual [orientation]" (point d).

This problem [conflict over the place of worship] is more related to culture, I think. Where I come from [Yogyakarta], nobody makes an issue about the differences in beliefs or places of prayer. Even when one religious group wants to build their place of worship, other religious communities would help them. Perhaps in Bekasi there is a different culture where such things are a problem.

There are two things that stand out in the police perceptions of their role in handling religious conflicts. First, the police understood their role as the keepers of security and public order. "The police only focuses on security aspects, it doesn't manage religious affairs," said one of the policeman. With regard to the duty to protect the rights of citizens to worship, a police officer said, "This is not to be understood in the sense that the police invites anyone to carry out their worship practices anywhere [they want], and then the police would guard them. If it goes like this, there might be mass rioting. The role of the police is to come to the location where tensions with regard to the place of worship occur, and to prevent the clashes."

Second, the police saw itself as a party which should be neutral, not in favour of any of the parties to the conflict. A member of the police revealed, "Although we have our own religious beliefs, when dealing with religious conflicts we remain [in support of] the Unitary Republic of Indonesia" (interview, 12 February 2013).

Although the police claimed they sided with neither of the parties to the conflict, the involved did not perceive them as neutral. By the persons who rejected the presence of the HKBP Filadelfia Church, the police was seen as defending the HKBP Filadelfia and letting them carry out the worship activities at the location which had no license to be used as a place of worship. "At first we, the police, were seen as defenders of the HKBP. We were insulted, condemned and even pelted. But we still applied [the measures of] persuasion. Now people understand that we are there not to defend the HKBP, but to maintain security and order," said the Tambun police chief (interview, 3 February 2013). In contrast, the HKBP saw the police as siding with the majority since they did not decisively secure their right to worship and were guilty of omission, especially

when they allowed the masses to disrupt the HKBP's worship activities with pelting. While the police was deemed not neutral, some of its officers were even seen as intolerant. However, according to the HKBP, there were officers who actually tried to prevent the clashes. "I was sorry to see the Tambun police chief running around to appease the masses, while other policemen were just standing quiet," said Pastor Palti H. Panjaitan (interview, 12 February 2013).

With regard to the church construction, the police considered it to be under the authority of other agencies. Besides this, there was a procedure that had to be interpreted by the stakeholders, i.e. the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 and No. 8 of 2006 (PBM) on the guidelines for heads of the regions and their deputies on maintaining religious harmony, strengthening the Forum for Religious Harmony, and construction of places of worship.<sup>34</sup> With regard to the case of HKBP Filadelfia, the deputy chief of Bekasi police, AKBP Haryanta, said that "The HKBP has not yet met all the requirements needed to establish a place of worship. They still have a recommendation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and FKUB, which requires them to obtain the construction permit. They have only obtained the neighbourhood's permit. But even that was latter questioned because, according to some, there was a manipulation in the process of collecting signatures from the community members." When asked if there indeed was a manipulation in collecting the signatures from the lo-

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<sup>34</sup>The construction of places of worship requirements are set out in Article 14 of the Joint Regulation, which reads: (1) Construction of a place of worship must meet the administrative and technical requirements. (2) In addition to meeting the requirements referred to in clause (1) the establishment of places of worship must meet the special requirements which include: a) a list of names and numbers National Identity Cards of at least 90 prospective users of the place of worship which is authorized by the local authorities in accordance with the borders of the regions as referred to in Article 13 clause (3); b) the letter of support of at least 60 members of the local community, authorized by the head/village chief; c) written recommendation from the head of the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and d) a written recommendation of the local FKUB. (3) In case the requirements referred to in clause (2) point a) are met while in point b) are not met, the local government is obliged to facilitate a construction site for the place of worship.

cal community, and if so why it was not processed as criminal case of fraud, AKBP Haryanta replied, "It actually could have been done. But we did not want this to have criminal aspects. We want this issue to be solved through deliberations" (interview, 3 February 2013).

### *Local Politics*

In the HKBP Filadelfia case, different attitudes can be seen at the local level of village governance and above it. On the village level, the village chief and several officials below him had a positive attitude towards the construction plans of HKBP's Filadelfia Church. The obstacles appeared when the process of issuing the construction permit reached the district and the regency level.

When asked about this, Sukardi HN, who for two periods served as a village chief (in 2002-2007 and 2007-2012), said "Although I am a Muslim, my job as the village chief was to facilitate the residents' need of a place of worship. I do not question the matter of conscience because it is a private one". According to Sukardi, the presence of another religion did not have to be seen as a threat. "I think that, if *ustad* is right, the presence of other religions can actually strengthen our own faith. We should perceive it as something that encourages us to compete in doing good" (interview, 7 February 2013).

Based on this attitude and as the village chief at the time, Sukardi ordered the Head of RW 09 Bongkon and a few heads of RTs, to help in the search of support from local residents. In this way was obtained the list of 257 people who did not object to the planned construction of HKBP Church. The list was then approved by the village chief who also checked the list of 117 persons who would be using the church. Then the village chief issued a letter approving the planned construction (No. 451.2/09/X/2007 dated 11 October 2007).

Sukardi rejected the allegations that he did not check the list of local residents. "I didn't sign it arbitrarily. I checked one by one. I know everyone," said Sukardi. He also rejected the allegations that there was a manipulation with obtaining signatures or that residents were requested to sign empty forms. "The residents were told that



the form was for the purpose of a planned church construction," he said. According to him, at that time indeed there was one resident who did not sign the form and said, "I will principally follow Pak [chief] RW. Let Pak RW sign it." This, according Sukardi, is what became the evidence of those who claimed there was a manipulation (interview, 17 February 2013).

The issue of manipulation, in addition to the rejection from other residents, became the main reason of the Tambun Utara district government, the Bekasi office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Bekasi government, to not process the request for recommendation for the construction of the HKBP Filadelfia Church. Instead, on 31 December 2009, the Bekasi government issued the decree on sealing of the land plot for the planned church construction (for more on this process see the description of the conflict).

The Bekasi government's decision on sealing of the land for the planned construction of the HKBP Church, although legally defeated in the Administrative Court in Bandung, and then in the High Court in Jakarta, was still not revoked by the time this research was completed. With regard to the court decision, the head of the Bekasi local government's Kesbang pollinmas, Hasan Basri, said that the Bekasi government respected the court ruling on the need to remove the seal. The ruling was presented to the local residents. However, said Hasan, their rejection was still strong, "The government does not want to revoke the sealing policy if this may trigger a larger conflict" (interview, 11 February 2013).

With regard to the use of the site as a place of worship, Hasan requested that the HKBP followed the procedures required for the construction of places of worship since, as of what he knew, the HKBP did not have the construction permit yet, nor the recommendations from the FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. "There were only 3 followers of HKBP who were registered as residents of Jejalan Jaya. Most of the prospective users of the place of worship actually came from the neighbouring villages" (interview, 11 February 2013).

The sealing policy of the Bekasi government was taken into consideration by the police in their performance. During the appeals before deployment of forces for the pacification activities at the site of HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship, police leadership always mentioned that the land plot which belonged to the HKBP was currently sealed by the Bekasi government. The information on the court rulings, as far as we know, has never been delivered during the appeals.

Although the police certainly was not going to act against the government policies (Bekasi government in this case), this did not mean that the police was fully "comfortable" with the situation. Conversations with several police officers revealed that to them the local government did not maximize the efforts to resolve the conflict, although the authority was in its hands. Haryanta, at that time the deputy of Bekasi police chief, compared the then police action to "preventing embers from becoming a big fire," while the police alone could not douse the embers. This was because the police had no authority to do so. "The one who had the fire extinguisher as well as the authority to use it is was the [local] government, not the police. The police task was only to maintain security and public order, preventing tensions from escalating into clashes or violence" (interview, 10 February 2013).

### *Public Opinion*

FKUB Bekasi was formed on 10 July 2007, to run the organization of 2007-2012 period. In 2012-2017, it was chaired by Sulaiman Zachawerus.<sup>35</sup> The FKUB secretary was Sudarno Sumodimedjo of Muhammadiyah Bekasi.

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<sup>35</sup>Sulaiman Zachawerus is the head of Bekasi Muslims Guard (Garda Umat Islam Kota Bekasi, GAMIS). He was born in Jakarta on 25 April 1948, in a family from Ternate-Halmahera, Maluku. He has been active in various endeavours opposing Christianisation of Bekasi. See "KH. Sulaiman Zachawerus: Gerombolan Kristen Membuat Kisruh," <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/upclose/2010/06/24/6120/kh-sulaiman-zachawerus-gerombolan-kristen-%20membuat-kisruh/#sthash.cA7D-Cd2E.dpuf> (accessed 17 March 2014).

According to Sudarno, the FKUB many times came to Jejalen Jaya village when the tensions between the local residents and members of HKBP occurred. The FKUB, together with other parties including the local government and police, have tried to facilitate dialogue and conflict settlement. But it has not produced any results. According to Sudarno, the problem of the HKBP in Bekasi was related to the issue of assimilation and acculturation. "Based on the investigation through 'Operation Candle' (Operasi Lilin) in 2012, there were 123 known locations used for worship, both in houses and *ruko*. Even in the same housing complex where HKBP community resides, there is a house used as a place of worship of the Indonesia Bethel Church (Gereja Bethel Indonesia, GBI) congregation, but the public does not have a problem about it," said Sudarno. According to Sudarno the general interactions between the HKBP and other residents were not good, so even the matter of their place of worship became an issue (interview, 4 March 2013).

With regard to HKBP's application for recommendation for church construction, Sudarno argued that until then the FKUB did not provide a written answer, because the FKUB generally did not want to give responses preventing establishment of places of worship. "However, in reality the opposition against the construction of HKBP's church is very big," he added. Additionally, some questioned the process through which the HKBP obtained the approval from the local residents. "Some people did not know that their signatures were requested for the sake of building a church. They claimed they were told the signature was required to obtain a free ID card and assistance," Sudarno continued.

According to Sudarno, the FKUB, in line with the policy of the local government, advised that HKBP should accept the temporary place of worship offered by the government, while waiting for a more appropriate location, because it was not yet possible to build the church in the problematic location. Meanwhile, Pastor Adrian Matkussa of FKUB said that the HKBP tended to ignore the advice of the FKUB. "If they want it their way, fine. We have given many

suggestions on how to settle the problem. We have also repeatedly facilitated meetings between the HKBP and local residents, but several times the HKBP did not even attend them," said Matkussa (interview, 4 March 2013).

Matkussa is a Protestant representative in the FKUB, and chairman of the Forum of Bekasi Churches Alliance (Forum Persekutuan Gereja se-Kabupaten Bekasi), which consists of 42 Protestant denominations. The Forum of Bekasi Churches Alliance is not connected to the Union of Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, PGI) to which HKBP belongs. Pastor Matkussa told that "So far, the PGI did not get in touch [with them], nor did they ask his opinion with regard to the problem of HKBP's place of worship in Jejalen Jaya village." According to Matkussa, the followers of HKBP have been in the region since the 1990s. They had built a *ruko* in Villa 2 housing estate to be used as their place of worship. But this was objected by other residents. Then they held their meetings in the house of Tigor Tampubolon, also in Villa 2. At the beginning nobody had a problem about it, but then there were rows between the congregation and the residents with regard to parking space. When a resident wanted to park his car, he was blocked by a motorcycle of the congregation member, he asked the motorcycle to be moved, but that caused an angry reaction from the HKBP. "That is what triggered rejection of the HKBP worship activities at the house of one of its members in Villa 2 housing estate," said Matkussa.

Matkussa added, the problem with HKBP is simple, i.e. that the HKBP is seen as disregarding the local residents. "In various meetings *ustad* Naimun and others said that HKBP did not respect them". HKBP only approached the village chief but not the public. "Maybe they approached the local residents, but it seems that only a few." Matkussa himself admitted that when he wanted to get the community support to obtain the construction permit for his church, for several years he was approaching various community leaders. "Imagine, for 10 years I was approaching the community. Only after 10 years I could build my church [in Mangun Jaya, Tambun Selatan]."

So far the Setia Allah Church, which is led by Matkussa, is the only church in Tambun Selatan district with a construction permit.

Both Sudarno and Adrian Matkussa appreciated the work of the police officers in managing the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship. "Every Sunday, for more than a year now, the police continues to deploy troops to prevent clashes. One can imagine how much this much cost in terms of resources and efforts of our friends from the police," said Sudarno.

The negative assessment of police performance has yet come from the NGOs. To Kontras, for example, the police was inactive and allowed the masses to attack the HKBP community so that they were unable to perform their worship at the site of their own land plot. The executive director of Kontras, Haris Azhar, said that "On every Sunday, the Tambun police and even the Tambun police chief, would be present at the scene. But they just stood there." The police was also seen as not neutral and generally giving better protection to the stronger groups and to majority. "The police is not assuming a neutral position to maintain security and public order. In addressing certain groups they seem scared and silent," said Haris.<sup>36</sup>

#### *Interaction Between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

The conflict over HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship has been ongoing for years. The long duration of the conflict and experience of the police in interacting with the parties to the conflict affected the dynamics of policing and measures undertaken by the police.

When the conflict began to escalate in the late 2009, pacification was carried out around the location of disputed land. However, because the tensions and commotion were increasing between the local residents and the HKBP community when the latter performed worship activities on their own land, the police decided to widen the distance between the two conflicted parties.

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<sup>36</sup>See "Kontras: Polisi Titik Lemah Kekerasan HKBP Filadelfia," 6 May 2012, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/05/06/214402025> (accessed 8 February 2013).

Such measures were undertaken, especially when the conflict escalated greatly in 2012. The placement of security forces was shifted to the Villa Bekasi Indah 2, about 900 meters from the location of the HKBP's land used as their place of worship. According to a number of officers, it was done so because the HKBP's secretariat and the house of its leadership in the Villa Bekasi Indah 2, became the meeting point of the HKBP community before they would head further to the location of their planned place of worship. The Villa Bekasi Indah 2 housing was also chosen for deployment because the area was already within Satria Jaya village of Tambun Selatan, while the protesters derived mostly from Jejalen Jaya village of Tambun Utara. "Thus the protesters had no solid base to carry out their protest action here," said the Tambun police chief.

The police admitted that their presence was not to hinder the worship activities of the HKBP, but to persuade them to use the place provided by the Bekasi government at the Gedung Guru in Metland complex, Tambun. "When the HKBP insisted on going to the location of their land, the police would not block them." The police usually accompanied HKBP to the location. But when the protesters attacked them before they arrived, the police did not dissolve the hostile crowd. The police attempted to mediate between both groups, but when the negotiations failed and clashes began, the police usually tried to lead the HKBP back to the Villa Bekasi Indah 2. According to the testimony of one of the police officers, they did not disperse the protesting crowd because they wanted to avoid riots.

When this research was conducted, it seemed that the communication between the police and the leadership of HKBP Filadelfia has worsened. "We were always in communication [with Pastor Palti]. When they wanted to perform their worship activities, usually the Pastor would inform us via SMS. But for the last few weeks our communication was cut off. We tried several times to come to his house, but the Pastor would not open the door. Our text messages were not answered either," said the Tambun police chief (interview, 20 February 2013).

The police began to take legal action against both parties to the conflict. Around November 2012, the police summoned Abdul Aziz, son of H. Naimun, as a witness. Both Abdul Aziz and H. Naimun lead the protests of local residents against the planned construction of the HKBP Filadelfia's church building. In the second call, Abdul Aziz was named as a suspect in the alleged death threats to Pastor Palti H. Panjaitan. In March 2013, the police also initiated legal proceedings against Pastor. Palti H. Panjaitan, who was reported to the Bekasi police by Abdul Aziz on suspicion of beating him during the 24 December 2012 incident.

### **Conclusions**

This research shows that in dealing with the conflict over construction of the HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship in Jejalan Jaya village, Tambun Utara district, Bekasi, the police officers tended to focus on their role as the keepers of security and public order. The police also tried not to side with any of the warring parties, neither the HKBP Filadelfia nor the local residents who rejected the plans of HKBP's church construction. The police was also seen as very cautious. Apparently, the main reason was that the conflict involved religious sentiments. This was demonstrated by the decision to deploy a considerable amount of police personnel, about 200 people, every Sunday in order to anticipate the clashes between the HKBP community and local residents who protested against them. These security activities took place every Sunday, for over a year. The number of troops at the site was based on the considerations regarding the number of protesters and the distance as well as traffic conditions which would not allow a quick mobilization otherwise.

The cautiousness was also visible in the decision of the police leadership to not equip the officers deployed with firearms and batons. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of excessive use of weapons and to avoid the raise of tensions at the location. Despite several incidents of unrest between the residents and HKBP Filadelfia, the police managed to prevent loss of life or

damage to property which often became a case in other religious conflicts.

The research also shows that the role of the security forces, particularly the police, was limited in conflict resolution, because to the police their main task was to prevent clashes or violence, while the resolution of the conflict over places of worship was under government's authority, the Bekasi local government in this case.

Another thing that needs to be underlined is that the policy of the local government became the constraint for policing activities. Although the police have discretion in determining policing tactics, in most cases the policing would not be in conflict with the policy set by the local government. In the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia's place of worship, the sealing of the HKBP's land ordered by Bekasi government was used as a general guideline by the local police in their activities, despite the sealing order being nullified by the decision of the Administrative Court in Bandung, and the High Court in Jakarta.

Bekasi government offered to the HKBP Filadelfia a temporary place of worship facility, first at the Gedung Guru in Metland complex, Tambun, and then at the church of Setia Allah community in Mangun Jaya village, Tambun Selatan. Until now, the HKBP Filadelfia has been rejecting the offer. The police tended to be in favor of the solution provided by the government. The offer to carry out HKBP's worship activities at the place provided by Bekasi government has always been delivered by the police during their persuasion attempts.

So far the police managed to prevent violence in the conflict between the local citizens and the HKBP Filadelfia community, but to several parties, including human rights activists and the HKBP itself, the police failed in their duty to protect the citizens' right to worship. The police officers were deemed unable to provide security and protection to the HKBP, and criticized for allowing the disruptive actions of local residents which prevented the HKBP congregation from exercising their right to worship at the land in Jejalén Jaya village which is their property.\*\*\*



## THE CASE OF GKI YASMIN, BOGOR

### **Foreword**

The conflict over the construction of the GKI Yasmin Church is one of the conflicts that did not end by the time this research was concluded. Although the tensions between the GKI Yasmin community and its opponents have risen since the beginning of the conflict, the incidents at the planned church construction site have not involved violence, as both groups restrained themselves in front of the police.

The police presence, however, was not without criticism. Both parties considered the police as not neutral. According to the GKI Yasmin, the police more often accommodated the demands of their opponents rather than protected the rights of the congregation. On the other hand, the GKI opponents labelled the police as indecisive towards the existence of a church which, according to them, was illegal.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first one is an introduction presenting the arguments and report structure. The second part presents demographic and religious data of Bogor. In the third the GKI Yasmin conflict is divided into three phases: the initial phase (early 2002-April 2010), the second phase (April 2010-March

2011) and the third phase (March 2011-December 2012). The fourth section discusses the dynamics of policing the GKI Yasmin conflict in terms of policing activities, police knowledge, legal-procedural framework of policing, institutional character of the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the police interaction with the parties to the conflict. Finally, the fifth section describes the lessons learnt from this conflict and presents recommendations for better policing.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Bogor**

GKI Yasmin congregation resides in the Taman Yasmin complex, Curug Mekar village, West Bogor district, Bogor city, West Java. According to the 2010 census, the city of Bogor was inhabited by 950,000 people (BPS Kota Bogor 2011: xxi).

In terms of religious affiliation, 90 percent of Bogor residents are Muslim. The rest are Protestants (5%), Catholics (3%), Hindus (1%) and Buddhists (1%). As for the number of places of worship in the city of Bogor, there are 615 mosques, 566 *musalas*, 19 Protestant churches, 8 Catholic churches, 3 Hindu temples and 9 Buddhist temples (BPS Kota Bogor 2011: 38).

GKI Yasmin has become a church after the synod of the Indonesian Christian (Protestant) Churches (Gereja Kristen Indonesia, GKI) – one of the denominations under the Union of Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, PGI) – in the city of Bogor. GKI Yasmin derives from GKI Pengadilan. As a new church, GKI Yasmin was hoped to accommodate the GKI members who lived in Curug Mekar and surrounding villages, and who could no longer be accommodated by the GKI Church in Pengadilan street.

The church construction committee chose Taman Yasmin complex as the location for the new church since the number of GKI members in the complex vicinity was relatively high. Located in the Curug Mekar village, West Bogor district, the Taman Yasmin complex which has been developed by the PT Inti Innovaco, was con-

sidered the most strategic place for the establishment of the second GKI Church in Bogor.<sup>1</sup>

### Conflict over the GKI Yasmin's Place of Worship

The GKI Yasmin conflict can be divided into three phases. The first phase (early 2002-April 2010) is the early process of church construction plans until the acquirement of construction permit. This phase concluded with the municipal government's decision to lock and seal the gates of the future church. The second phase (April 2010-March 2011) is when GKI Yasmin members began to pray in front of the sealed gates. In this phase, the tensions at the church site began to increase. Local residents and their supporters responded to the religious activities at the site with a number of actions, such as demonstrations and *tablig akbar*. In the third phase (March 2011-December 2012), the tensions between the GKI Yasmin community and their opponents heated up, especially when the GKI Yasmin congregation wanted to perform worship activities ahead of Christmas 2012. In that phase, the opponents sought to halt the worship in the vicinity of Taman Yasmin complex.

#### *First Phase (Early 2002-April 2010)*

The beginnings of this phase can be traced to the first attempts the GKI Pengadilan in Bogor undertook to establish a new church. Around 2001, they started searching for the most appropriate location. Because land plots for social facilities and public facilities in Taman Yasmin complex were already used by the mosque, the committee purchased a parcel in Taman Yasmin sector III, right in front of the main Yasmin road. The committee bought the land of 1,721 m<sup>2</sup> from the PT Inti Innovaco.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Taman Yasmin," <http://intiinnovaco.co.id/taman-yasmin>, Intiinnovaco.co.id (accessed 22 May 2013).

<sup>2</sup>"Sejarah Masalah GKI Yasmin (Jayadi Damanik)," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnCflQAMSKY>, Youtube.com (accessed 21 May 2013).

After paying off the land plot, the GKI Yasmin church construction committee applied to municipal government for construction permit. The committee began to disseminate the church development plans to the residents of Taman Yasmin complex on 10 March 2002. About 170 people attended the event and signed a letter that they would not mind the construction. A year later, on 1 March 2003, the committee again held a meeting with youth leaders to discuss the development plans (GKI Yasmin 2010: 4).

On Tuesday, 25 October 2005, the committee submitted a written request for the city mayor's recommendation for the church construction. While waiting for the answer, for the next three months the committee held socialization activities with the residents of Curug Mekar village. On 8 January 2006, 42 residents signed the statement that they did not object to the construction of the church in the village. At the meeting four days later (12 January 2006), 71 persons were present from the RWs 01, 02, 03, 04, 05 and 06 of Curug Mekar village. There were also the RW and RT chairmen, DKM official and community leaders. Two days later, on 14 January 2006, 25 residents signed the statement that they would not mind the construction of the church. The last meeting was held on 15 January 2006, with about 40 residents of sector III/RW 8 of Curug Mekar village (GKI Yasmin 2010: 4-6).

Subsequently, the committee received letters of recommendation for the church construction from the municipal government, the city mayor (15 February 2006), the Department of Environment and Sanitation (3 March 2006), Bogor Land Agency (14 March 2006), Department of Traffic and Transportation of Bogor (15 March 2006), Department of Highways and Irrigation of Bogor (12 April 2006), and the Department of City Planning and Landscape Architecture of Bogor (30 May 2006). On Thursday, 13 July 2006, the mayor of Bogor signed the building permit. Two months later, on 19 August 2006, the committee held a groundbreaking ceremony which was attended by the Bogor municipal government officials, Muspika, village officials and the public. Although not present, the mayor of

Bogor sent a speech which was read by his assistant (Tim GKI Yasmin 2010: 6-9).

In fact, people who objected to the church construction expressed their opposition before the construction permit was issued, during the socialization meetings held by GKI. Chairman of one of RT in Taman Yasmin complex said, as told by the Chairman of RW 08 (interview, 5 July 2010), "I object to the establishment of a church on the grounds of faith." His voice later sparked the rejection among other residents who then associated in the Forkami (Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia).<sup>3</sup> At that time, a number of Islamic organizations in Bogor demonstrated for a number of issues which included the dissolution of Ahmadiyya and refusal of HKBP church construction in Bincarung, Bogor. To these they added their opposition towards the planned construction of the GKI Yasmin Church.<sup>4</sup> On 14 February 2008, the municipal government responded by freezing the construction permit which it had earlier issued to GKI (Tim GKI Yasmin 2010: 12).

The GKI Yasmin appealed against this decision to the Administrative Court in Bandung. After a series of proceedings, on 4 September 2008, the court ruled in favour of the GKI Yasmin against the municipal government.<sup>5</sup> The decision to freeze the construction permit was thus illegal. The Bogor municipal government appealed to the High Court in Jakarta, which upheld the ruling of the Bandung court. Not satisfied with the verdict, the municipal government of Bogor filed for its review by the Supreme Court.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>"Kronologi Singkat soal GKI Yasmin Bogor," Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, <http://www.forkami.com/berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.html> (accessed 15 January 2013).

<sup>4</sup>"Sejarah Masalah GKI Yasmin (Jayadi Damanik)," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnCflQAMSKY>, Youtube.com (accessed 21 May 2013).

<sup>5</sup>GKI Yasmin 2010: 15. See also Bogor Government (2011) and "Kronologi Singkat soal GKI Yasmin Bogor," Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, <http://www.forkami.com/berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.html> (accessed 15 January 2013).

<sup>6</sup>GKI Yasmin 2010: 15. See also Bogor Government (2011) and "Kronologi Singkat soal GKI Yasmin Bogor," Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, <http://www.forkami.com/berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.html> (accessed 15 January 2013).

On the basis of the court's decision, the GKI Yasmin committee resumed the church construction. In the midst of construction works (25 April 2009), a demonstration against the church took place in front of the location. After an argument, the crowd entered the church area. The police who were at the scene, tried to stop the intruders, but they failed to block the crowd which forced its way and halted the construction works. In this incident, H. Ujang Suja'i, the lawyer of GKI Yasmin, was beaten. Ujang reported the offenders to the Bogor police, but when this research was conducted, there was no information regarding the follow-up to the case.

On 4 January 2010, the committee decided to resume the construction of the church. However, the protests repeated and they received a number of threats. For safety reasons, four days later, on 8 January 2010, the construction was stopped. Until then, the church construction committee of GKI Yasmin managed to rise a fence around the land plot and a barrack to store building materials and to be a shelter for workers (GKI Yasmin 2010: 15). Later, they used the barrack as a temporary place for worship.<sup>7</sup>

On Thursday, 11 March 2010, the municipal government through the municipal police installed a paper with the word "sealed" on the gate. The sealing was based on the Regulation No. 14 of 2008 on the construction of towers. According to the GKI Yasmin congregation, the sealing had no clear legal basis, especially as the court has declared the church construction permit was valid. On the basis of the court ruling, the GKI Yasmin ignored the paper seal and would use the temporary building as a place of worship (11 April 2010). They then sent a notification letter regarding the worship plans to the mayor, police chief, and the military with the hope of receiving protection (GKI Yasmin 2010: 17).

Instead of receiving protection, the GKI Yasmin congregation was made unable to carry out their worship at the location. On Sat-

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<sup>7</sup>"Jemaat GKI Yasmin Beribadat di Dalam," *Radar Bogor*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.radar-bogor.co.id/index.php?rbi=berita.detail&id=65732> (accessed 17 May 2013).

urday, 10 April 2010, a day before the GKI Yasmin congregation's planned prayers, municipal police replaced the paper seal with padlocks of the municipal government. Then the GKI Yasmin decided to pray in front of the gate until the municipal government was willing to open it and allow them to use the church site (Bona Sigalingging, spokesman of GKI Yasmin, interview, 12 May 2013).

*Second Phase (April 2010–March 2011)*

The sealing and locking of the church gate became a marking point of the second phase of the GKI Yasmin conflict. In this phase, the GKI Yasmin congregation was carrying out worship activities in front of the church gate as a protest against the government's policy. GKI Yasmin believed that the sealing and locking of the gate was at odds with the court's decision. Whenever the prayers took place, the committee always left time for the church members or human rights and interfaith activists to deliver speeches demanding that the gate be opened (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013). Meanwhile, the Forkami mobilized the masses against the GKI Yasmin congregation on the pavement on the opposite side. Not only the residents of Curug Mekar, but also a number of organizations from the outside were expressing their rejection of the church construction plans in Taman Yasmin.

Until December 2010, GKI Yasmin prayed in front of the gate without hindrances. They only regretted the decision of the Bogor police to park the police cars, including a watercannon car, on the pavement as then they were forced to pray between the police cars (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

The Bogor municipal government opened the lock and the seal on 27 August 2010. Before the padlock was removed, the municipal police also presented the minutes of the decision on the opening. As stated in the minutes, the Bogor municipal government decided to open the padlock on the basis of the consideration that "the GKI construction fulfilled the obligations with the construction permit No. 645.8-372 of 2006, and had a permanent legal basis set by

the Administrative Court's in Bandung decision No. 41/G/2008/PTUN-BDG regarding cancellation of the decision of the head of the Department of Urban Planning and Landscape Architecture of Bogor No. 503/208-DTKP, dated 14 February 2008, on freezing of the permit." The Forkami crowd came to protest and demanded the mayor to reinstall the seal and padlock. In less than 24 hours that demand was satisfied by the municipal police.<sup>8</sup>

Tensions between GKI Yasmin and Forkami at the church location were high on 19 December 2010. The members of GKI congregation removed the padlock themselves. Once open, they draw chairs and service equipment to the barrack they built there earlier. They unlocked the gate in the presence of Bondan Gunawan, interfaith leader and the former Secretary of State in Abdurrahman Wahid's office. Bondan was helping the GKI Yasmin because he believed the government should not shut the places of worship.<sup>9</sup>

The next day (20 December 2010), the masses of Forkami and FUI visited the office of the mayor of Bogor. They asked about the opening of the seal and padlock on the gates of the church. Bambang Gunawan, who represented the Bogor government, said there was no command to open padlock. Bambang stated that it was not done by the Bogor municipal government. That afternoon, the government re-installed the seal and padlock on the basis of Regulation No. 7 of 2006 on building construction. This time, the seal included information on criminal sanctions towards anyone who would cut, remove or damage the seal.<sup>10</sup>

Tensions between GKI Yasmin and its opponents continued. The GKI Yasmin congregation wanted to celebrate Christmas in the

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<sup>8</sup>"Pokok Pikiran GKI Yasmin," *Kabarinews.com*, 13 December 2011, <http://kabarinews.com/pokok-pikiran-gki-yasmin/37640> (accessed 17 May 2013).

<sup>9</sup>"Jemaat Buka Paksa GKI Taman Yasmin," *Okezone.com*, 19 December 2010, <http://news.okezone.com/read/2010/12/19/338/404900/redirect> (accessed 22 May 2013).

<sup>10</sup>"Setelah dibuka Paksa Jemaat, Gereja Yasmin Disegel Lagi," *VOA Islam*, 21 December 2010, <http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesia/2010/12/21/12416/setelah-dibuka-paksa-jemaat-gereja-yasmin-bogor-disegel-lagi/> (accessed 22 May 2013).



church on Saturday (25 December 2010). Since the gate was padlocked, they decided to pray in front of it, which they could not do as the Forkami protesters had already gathered at the site and gave orations through loudspeakers. They demanded that the police and municipal police dispersed GKI Yasmin. The two groups were only about two meters away. Fortunately, the police formed a barricade between them. After negotiations between the police, the municipal government, and GKI Yasmin representatives, GKI Yasmin was allowed to pray for 30 minutes. Then both parties to the conflict left under the watchful eye of the police.<sup>11</sup>

In anticipation of a broader incident, the district military command (Kodim) 0606, Bogor, invited representatives of the municipal government, GKI Yasmin, and Forkami to meet on Friday, 31 December 2010. During the meeting the parties agreed to obey the Supreme Court's decision. The GKI Yasmin would not hold worship activities on the pavement until the Supreme Court decision comes out. On the basis of the agreement, the GKI Yasmin worship took place at the Harmoni building, about 100 meters from the location of the church.

Without the GKI Yasmin knowing, the Supreme Court had already issued the ruling on 9 December 2010, where it rejected the review filed against the decision of the Administrative Court and the High Court by the municipal government. In its decision, the Supreme Court ordered the revocation of freezing of the church construction permit of 2008.<sup>12</sup> Despite this decision, the Bogor government did not open the lock and seal on the gates of the church. In protest the GKI Yasmin again held the prayers on the pavement in front of the church gate (GKI Yasmin 2011: 4).

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<sup>81</sup>"Polisi Barikade GKI Taman Yasmin," *Antaranews.com*, 26 December 2010, <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1293302681/polisi-berikade-gki-taman-yasmin> (accessed 22 May 2013).

<sup>82</sup>Mahkamah Agung, "Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 127 PK/TUN/2009," 9 December 2009.

*Third Phase (March 2011–December 2012)*

In the third phase, the Bogor municipal government responded to the Supreme Court's decision. On 8 March 2011, the freezing of the church construction permit was revoked. On the basis of the court's decision, the permit had a legal effect. However, three days later (on 11 March 2011), the municipal government issued a new decision, that it no longer froze but cancelled the permit of 2006. Bogor municipal government argued that the decision was made on the basis of citizens' resistance, security, and indications of forgery of signatures obtained in the process of permit application. According to GKI Yasmin, letters with these decisions were sent to them on the same day.

The problem of signature forgery in 2006, became the major point in this phase of the conflict. The accusations of fraud were present since January 2010. At that time, Forkami reported a number of residents, including Munir Karta, former chairman of RT 07/03, Curug Mekar who allegedly falsified signatures of residents to facilitate the GKI Yasmin's construction permit. District Court in Bogor convicted Munir in this case (Thursday, 20 January 2011), but the case is now under review.<sup>13</sup>

The Bogor municipal government claimed that the statement of residents who did not object to the church construction was a legally flawed document. According to the head of law division of Bogor municipal government, since the church construction permit was obtained through a legally flawed document, the permit itself was legally flawed. "Suppose you study at IAIN Jakarta and you graduate. But later it was found out that you used a fake ID card. Isn't your graduation invalid?" he said. Thus, the Bogor municipal government revoked the construction permit of GKI Yasmin (interview, 14 February 2013).

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<sup>13</sup>"Kronologi Singkat soal GKI Yasmin Bogor," Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, <http://www.forkami.com/berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.html> (accessed 15 January 2013).

On the other side, Bona Sigalingging had three reasons to reject the grounds of that decision. First, this case was brought early in 2010, after the Administrative Court in Bandung issued a ruling that the permit was legitimate. Second, if the signatures were forged, the file containing them was never attached to the application for construction permit. Third, Ateng, Curug Mekar village chief at that time, stated that the original file with signatures indentified as forged was with him until 2010, while the application for the permit was made by the church committee in 2005. Thus, obviously the file was never attached to the application (interview, 11 April 2013).

The Bogor municipal government stuck to its decision. If GKI Yasmin rejects the decision, as is the case with the Supreme Court's decree, it could plan a new lawsuit (the head of law division of Bogor municipal government, interview, 14 February 2013). Meanwhile, Bona said that this wasn't the case: rather, in his opinion, MA's decree reads that if [we] reject the decree, we could plan a new appeal. The word "could" here means, for Bona, that planning a lawsuit is not a requirement. Meanwhile, in another point, the Supreme Court's ruling used the word "duty" with regard to the municipal government's necessity to comply with court's decision (interview, 11 April 2013).

In the letter containing the decision to revoke the church construction permit, the municipal government also offered compensation in the form of refund of all costs of licenses, the purchased land and the GKI buildings on KH Abdullah bin Nuh street, facilitation of a new alternative location and of a temporary place at Harmoni Building. The municipal government also established a mediation team and a team for preparing the relocation.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>"Permasalahan Pembangunan Gereja GKI Yasmin Kota Bogor," [Kotabogor.go.id](http://kotabogor.go.id), [http://kotabogor.go.id/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=8201](http://kotabogor.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8201) (accessed 24 May 2013). The mediation team was to convince GKI Yasmin to move the location of worship from the pavement to the Harmoni Building. The team for preparing the relocation prepared relocation possibilities. Four places were provided as an alternative: (1) former building of General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) office on Siliwangi street; (2) a house on Kapten Muslihat street; (3) building of the Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja on Jl. Pajajaran; and (4) a building on Kedung Halang Raya street, all in Bogor.

GKI Yasmin rejected the municipal government's proposal for two reasons. First, a similar settlement was made in the case of HKBP Ciketing, Bekasi. Instead of relocation only new problems arose. Until then, the HKBP Ciketing was stranded. The building the government promised never existed. GKI Yasmin rejected the offer because there was no guarantee that the proposal would be fulfilled. According to them, if the legally binding construction permit could be revoked regardless of the Supreme Court's decision, so could be the mere promises. Second, the Supreme Court's decision was not a matter of negotiations. The government, as stated in the Ombudsman's letter, should comply with the decision. For GKI Yasmin the freezing of construction permit was wrong, let alone its revocation (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 11 April 2013).

This situation further heated the tensions when the GKI Yasmin wanted to pray in front of their land. Two days before Sunday, 13 March 2011, the police sent a letter to the GKI Yasmin urging that they do not pray on the pavement in front of the gate for the sake of security and public order. GKI Yasmin wrote back and asked the police to provide protection when they carry out their worship activities at the church gate. Since Saturday night, the police was requesting that neither GKI Yasmin nor its opponents should appear at the location. Some of the GKI Yasmin church members stayed in front of the church. The police wanted to remove them, but the action was cancelled after the GKI Yasmin legal team questioned its basis (GKI Yasmin 2011: 6).

On Sunday morning, the police were on alert around the location. Around 6:30 am, the police forced away the congregation members, who were still in front of the church gate. Later, the police blocked both ends of the KH Abdullah bin Nuh street. At the same time, the Forkami protesters gathered approximately 200 meters from the church site. They asked the police and municipal police officers to disperse the GKI Yasmin congregation. Finally, GKI Yasmin decided to carry out their prayers in a house of a church member in Taman Yasmin complex (GKI Yasmin 2011: 6).

Another incident took place on Sunday, 9 October 2011. Like in the previous week, GKI Yasmin was to pray in front of the gate. This time, the municipal police was more decisive in its attempts to disperse them. According to the municipal police, GKI Yasmin violated the regulations on public order. As a result, the GKI Yasmin members and the municipal police were pushing each other. The municipal police chief fainted in the incident. Both parties (GKI Yasmin and the municipal police chief) reported each other for misconduct.<sup>15</sup>

The most violent incident took place on Sunday, 22 January 2012, when the GKI Yasmin wanted to hold their prayers. Because they could no longer worship in front of the gate, they gathered at one of the houses in Taman Yasmin complex. The municipal police arrived to the house to stop the prayers in order to avoid clashes. The GKI Yasmin did not stop. After the municipal police failed to evacuate them, the Forkami and GARIS who were waiting outside the complex broke through the police barricades and surrounded the house. Under police escort the GKI Yasmin congregation was evacuated from the complex.<sup>16</sup>

Although a number of parties claimed that the GKI Yasmin conflict was purely a matter of law, religious aspects of this conflict cannot be denied. The “apostasy” or “Christianisation” narratives were used by the GKI Yasmin’s opponents throughout the conflict. For example, on a Sunday, 2 January 2011, the Forum Umat Islam (FUI) Bogor held a rally on the side of the *Radar Bogor* newspaper’s building, opposite to the land of GKI Yasmin. As indicated on the flyers, the FUI rally’s theme was “People Unite Against Apostasy.”

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<sup>15</sup>“Kronologi Bentrok Versi Jemaat GKI Yasmin,” News.viva.co.id, 9 October 2011, <http://metro.news.viva.co.id/news/read/253975-kronologi-bentrokan-versi-jemaat-gki-yasmin> (accessed 24 May 2013).

<sup>16</sup>“GKI Yasmin Services Disrupted Again,” Thejakartapost.com, 22 January 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/22/gki-yasmin-services-disrupted-again.html> (accessed 24 May 2013). See also “Rumah Jemaat GKI di Perumahan Yasmin Dikepung Massa,” Tempo.co, 22 January 2012, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/01/22/083378905/Rumah-Jemaat-GKI-di-Perumahan-Yasmin-Dikepung-Massa> (accessed 24 May 2013).

Ahmad Iman, one of the protest leaders, stated that in the area of Taman Yasmin complex there were already several Christianization points. Youth leaders from Curug Mekar also acknowledged that they knew from *kiais* of Bogor that GKI Yasmin's church would become the centre of Christianization in the city (AS, interview, 25 April 2013).

### **Dynamics of Policing the GKI Yasmin Conflict**

The above description shows that the core of the conflict resolution was in the hands of the government. The government's decisions to freeze the church construction permit, lock the church gate, and then to revoke the permit of 2006, resulted in increasing tensions between the two conflicted parties. Every Sunday, since April 2010 to December 2012, the groups would clash at the site of the church. What was the role of the police?

#### *Policing Activities*

The police, as claimed by the head of operations of Bogor police, was present at the location of GKI Yasmin conflict not to resolve the conflict, but to anticipate its escalation. Police prioritized raising awareness in the community, especially among the members of the two conflicted groups, rather than applying repressive measures. The police always reprimanded both parties not to carry out disruptive actions. The police focused its efforts on preventing physical clashes. In this context, the police employed Babinkamtibmas of several police units, especially from the West Bogor police and Tanah Sareal police, to communicate with the parties to the conflict (head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).

In this case, the police knew of the tensions between GKI Yasmin and its opponents since the beginnings of the conflict. The police intelligence unit, both of the district and sub-district level, recorded and reported all information to the leadership. Intelligence also helped to identify the supporters of both parties and where they came from. These data served as information for the police leader-

ship in preparation of the pacification/security plans for the weeks to follow (intelligence officer, Bogor, interview, 13 March 2013).

The police claimed the intelligence and Babinkamtibmas approach was relatively successful. Throughout the conflict, the police did not find anyone from either of the groups to be carrying weapons, let alone to use them to injure their opponents. As long as tensions were expressed in words and neither of the parties was injured, the police would not apply repressive approach. Police approached both sides through persuasion and dialogue (head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).

When both groups faced each other at the scene, the police deployed its personnel in accordance with intelligence reports. The troops under the district police included also sub-district officers (derived from cross-unit forces, including intelligence, Binmas, Polwan, Reskrim, Dalmas, Raimas), and were supported by the BKO unit of the West Java Police (Sabhara), mobile brigade as well as officers of municipal police (head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).

The number of police personnel varied depending on the phase of the conflict. Initially, when the GKI Yasmin congregation began to pray on the pavement, Bogor police deployed on average 150-200 officers. This number increased with the conflict escalation to about 600 officers.<sup>17</sup> When tensions reached the peak during the Christmas of 2011 and in the early 2012, the police deployed around 1,000 personnel to anticipate the physical clashes (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, interview, 25 February 2013).

Whenever pacification took place at the site of the conflict (along KH Abdullah bin Nuh street), the police officers were located at particular positions around it. Police deployed a team of negotiators which was tasked with approaching the conflicted parties to

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<sup>17</sup>"Forum Peduli Kasus Gereja Yasmin Datangi Mabes Polri," BBC Indonesia, 25 January 2012, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita\\_indonesia/2012/01/120125\\_gerejayasminkepolisi.shtml?](http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/01/120125_gerejayasminkepolisi.shtml?) (accessed 27 May 2013).

minimize the possibility of physical clashes. The team of negotiators worked together with the municipal police. The police officers were generally positioned behind the municipal police team, but in some instances they opposed the municipal police, for example when the police allowed the GKI Yasmin to pray. In the view of the municipal police, that was a violation of public order regulations, while for the police the worship activities could not be banned on the grounds of the constitution.<sup>18</sup>

When the situation became more tense, the police chose to evacuate the weaker party, in this case the GKI Yasmin congregation. The police did not apply repressive measures in order to avoid escalation. Repressive measures in sensitive cases such as this one, according to the police, would not solve the problem. Both parties claimed to be right in terms of law. If the police applied repressive measures to either party, the action could be deemed unlawful. A repressive action would also complicate the position of the police as negotiators in case of a violent incident (interviews, head of operations, Bogor police, 13 March 2013, and head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, 25 February 2013).

Policing under the leadership of AKBP Wibowo (2010-2011) was different from the policing model under AKBP Hilman (2011-2012). Both of them were faced by different situations. During the AKBP Wibowo's tenure, the opponents of the church did not carry out their protests in front of the GKI Yasmin congregation. In that period, the GKI opponents were busy investigating the possibility of falsification of signatures and bringing witnesses to the hearings. The police remained alert to anticipate all possibilities and they were on standby at the location (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, interview, 25 February 2013).

GKI Yasmin negatively assessed the performance of the police under AKBP Wibowo. Instead of providing security, the police inhibited

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<sup>18</sup>"Jemaat GKI Yasmin Beribadah, Polisi Tutup Jalan," *Tempo.co*, 16 October 2011, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/10/16/057361608/Jemaat-GKI-Yasmin-Ibadah-Polisi-Tutup-Jalan> (accessed 24 May 2013).



worship practices. At that time, the police parked their cars, trucks, and watercannon vehicles on the pavement where GKI Yasmin congregation would pray. As a result, the prayers had to be carried out between the police cars (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

Under the leadership of AKBP Wibowo, the police communication was minimal. It appears so from the incident on Sunday, 15 February 2011, when the GKI Yasmin congregation prayed in the middle of the road, from which cars were removed already on Saturday. Without communication with the GKI, the police opened the road for public transportation. The church members had to run to the pavements to avoid being hit by cars.

AKBP Hilman became the new police chief when the tensions between the GKI Yasmin and its opponents culminated. AKBP Hilman was sworn in soon after the Bogor municipal government revoked the church building permit (11 March 2011). Then the Forkami opponents of GKI Yasmin perceived their church as illegal, and so they perceived the prayers in front of it. Whenever the GKI congregation prayed, Forkami mobilized the masses with an intent to disperse the congregation. In that situation, AKBP Hilman reduced the enforcement team and put forward the team of negotiators. AKBP Hilman also, as witnessed by Bona, requested to leave everyone who did not belong to the GKI Yasmin. Unfortunately, added Bona, throughout the conflict such attitude was shown only once (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

From the perspective of the police, the policing was already as it should be: being present at the site to anticipate possible clashes. According to the GKI Yasmin, however, the police was not neutral as it did not follow the constitution to protect the citizens' right to worship. Throughout the incident the police tried to accommodate the GKI congregation's worship activities, however, under pressure of the opponents the police could only protect the congregation no longer than for several minutes. After that, the police would ask the GKI to leave for the sake of security (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

In terms of law enforcement, the police handled only one case in a serious manner, the alleged forgery of signatures which was brought upon the complaint of Forkami. The case was brought to the court. Meanwhile, in other cases such as the beating of H. Ujang Sujai in 2009, or the incident of mutual pushing which was reported by both the GKI and the municipal police chief, the police did not follow up (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

### *Police Knowledge*

Police knowledge here refers to the following issues: (1) the police officers' knowledge and understanding of legal and procedural frameworks of policing religious conflicts; (2) the police officers' understanding of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship; (3) the police perception and assessment of the level of threat/disruption of public order.

The police involved in handling the GKI Yasmin conflict were relatively aware of the aspects of human rights. Although they did not have in-depth knowledge of it, all police officers have seen and read the regulation on the implementation of human rights. The police claimed that they were referring to the regulation on human rights in all of their security plans. The police leaders always conveyed the importance of adhering to the principles of human rights in carrying out pacification/security activities at the Yasmin complex (interviews, head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, 25 February 2013, and the deputy of the West Bogor police chief, 13 March 2013).

According to the police, they never banned citizens, in this case the GKI Yasmin, from worship activities. In one incident, for example, the municipal police was disappointed with the Bogor police chief who allowed the GKI Yasmin congregation to carry out their prayers. The police chief argued that they could not ban the citizens from praying. They were present to prevent clashes at the location. However, for the sake of security, the police appealed that the prayers be held at the Harmoni building, which was provided

by the local government. For the police, this appeal did not violate human rights. The willingness of the GKI Yasmin to move to the Harmoni helped the police security efforts (deputy of the West Bogor police chief, interview, 13 March 2013).

The police knew well enough of the sources of tensions in this conflict. Police knew the legal arguments of both parties, the GKI Yasmin and the Forkami. GKI Yasmin relied on the Supreme Court's decision on the legitimacy of the church construction permit. Meanwhile, Forkami held to the municipal government's decision on revoking the 2006 permit. The police knew that they were not in position to resolve the conflict. One of the policemen even said "Now we are just waiting for a decision from above (God) and trying to calm both sides until the problem is solved" (deputy of the West Bogor police chief, interview, 13 March 2013).

Police from the beginning has been mapping the supporters of both parties, based on which they knew exactly that many of the opponents of the church came from outside of Bogor. The police then approached those of them who potentially could cause disorder and immediately drove them back (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, interview, 25 February 2013). According to the GKI Yasmin, however, the opponents from outside the city of Bogor would always be present at the scene (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

#### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

The legal and procedural framework of policing in this research refers to: (1) the legal framework related to issues of religion (regulation on the places of worship, abuse of religion/blasphemy, and the role of the police in the protection of human rights/freedom of religion/religious minorities); (2) procedural framework of policing as outlined in a number of regulations of the police chief and fixed procedures which regulate the functions and mechanisms of Pulbaket, Dumas, Dalmas, Gankuat, Ganunras, Ganki, etc.); and (3) the institutional character of the police as reflected in a number of regulations on the organization and administration of the police, at

the level of provincial police, district police, and sub-district police.

The police perceived this case as any other social/religious conflict. On the grounds of the Act No. 2 of 2002 on the police force of the Republic of Indonesia, the police were present at the conflict site to anticipate tensions involving masses. According to the police, they did not need special rules to deal with the religious conflict which, although more sensitive than other conflicts could still be handled in accordance with the existing regulations (deputy of the West Bogor police chief, interview 13 March 2013).

The police informants from the Bogor police and West Bogor police knew the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 (on implementation of the principles and standards of human rights). The officers of higher rank knew it more in detail. They knew that worship was a citizen's right guaranteed by the constitution. The lower ranking officers, however, had only general knowledge of human rights (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, 25 February 2013).

In the case of GKI Yasmin, the police has not used the local tradition-based approach, except for employing the local language, Sundanese, which was commonly used by the GKI opponents. Yet the customary law was never referred to. All measures undertaken by the police had a legal basis. In land disputes the police would often refer to the customs, but in the case of GKI Yasmin, the police did not act without reference to the existing formal legal frameworks, as this was a sensitive issue (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, 25 February 2013).

### *Police Culture*

Indonesian constitution guarantees freedom of each resident to have and express their opinion in public. The police tried to ensure that the difference of opinions was not delivered in a way that violated the law or led to criminal acts. Yet the police acted very cautiously.

The police did not take any legal action throughout the GKI Yasmin conflict. This decision, especially with respect to the Bogor police, was due to two issues. First, the police wanted to educate the

public in peaceful expression of opinions. Second, the police had to avoid escalation which could lead to casualties. When the situation gets worse, the police evacuates those whose evacuation is the most possible. This strategy applies not only to religious conflicts, but to other social conflicts as well (head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).

In order for the persuasive measures to go well, the police tried to establish good relations with both sides. They claimed they were close enough with the GKI Yasmin congregation, and that they have also established a closer relationship with the GKI's opponents. This approach continued to be applied in the framework of pre-emptive action. Communication with both sides also opened the opportunity to identify the strengths of both parties in order to assess the ability of the police to handle them in the field (head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).

The police viewed religious conflicts as complicated and sensitive because of their relation to abstract matters. They acknowledged that religious conflicts were more complicated than conflicts over land and other social conflicts, since in the religious conflicts the police could not solve the core matter of the conflict or of the dispute over the place of worship. The Bogor police realized that they were not authorized to decide who was right or wrong. Although the conflict over GKI's place of worship had its clear limits, the police still could not act to end it, as the settlement of this case was in the court, not in the hands of the police (head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).

### *Local Politics*

Was there a link between the conflict over GKI Yasmin's place of worship and the local elections? There is no sufficient evidence of such connection. The head of law division of Bogor municipal government claims there was no connection whatsoever. According to him, the case of GKI Yasmin was purely a legal matter (Boris Darusman, interview, 14 February 2013).

For the spokesman of GKI Yasmin the connection between the conflict and election was not impossible. The freezing of construction permit was undertaken after a large demonstration was held against Ahmadiyya and two churches, HKBP Bincarung and GKI Yasmin. According to him, it looked very much as if the mayor submitted to the whims of the protesters, therefore, it could be suspected that the relation with the election was existent. In chronological order, the construction permit was frozen in 2008, a year before the election in which Diani Budiarto, supported by the Islamic far-right Prosperous Justice Party (Parkai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), was re-elected (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

Another aspect of the local political dynamics was escalation with each response to the conflict from the Bogor government. Mayor's decisions were often made after crowd pressure. For example, in 2008, the mayor froze the church construction permit after the mass demonstration demanding its revocation. Upon similar urges in 2010, the municipal government also sealed and locked the gates of the church. The government once opened the seal and locks, on 27 August 2010, but only for 24 hours, due to the "unrest" in the society.

A few months later, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal filed by the Bogor municipal government. On 8 March 2011, the government revoked the permit freezing of 2008 to comply with the Supreme Court's decision. However, on 11 March 2011, it permanently revoked the church construction permit to maintain the public order and security, and also because there were indications of falsification of signatures in the process of obtaining the permit.

The municipal government's policy to revoke the permit strengthened the opponents of church construction. The revocation also became the reason for them to disperse the GKI Yasmin congregation who carried out their worship activities. According to the head of law division of the Bogor municipal government, the government never forbade the worship activities of GKI Yasmin. The government insisted it was not true that the permit revocation

could be interpreted as forbidding worship. According to him, the government appealed to the GKI Yasmin to pray at a more comfortable place which has been provided (Boris Darusman, interview, 14 February 2013).

That appeal was implemented through instructions to the municipal police that there should be no activity of the GKI Yasmin on KH Abdullah bin Nuh street for the sake of maintaining security and public order. Municipal police interpreted these instructions by exerting force to disperse the GKI Yasmin congregation who were praying on the pavement and by forcing them to move to the Harmoni building. To the GKI Yasmin, there was no legal force allowing to prevent citizens from exercising their right to worship, thus, the municipal government has violated their basic right (Bona Sigalinging, interview, 12 May 2013).

Of particular note is the attitude of Diani Budiarto, the mayor of Bogor (2008-2013). He stuck with his decision, although the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), one of the parties which supported him, objected to his disobedience to the Supreme Court's decision, his ignoring of the Ombudsman's recommendation, and violation of human rights. PDI-P officially withdrew its support for Diani. However, the withdrawal of PDI-P's support had no influence on the measures Diani took towards GKI Yasmin. Diani still had the support of PKS and Golkar in the local parliament.

The dynamics of local politics affected the policing action. Escalation often took place as a result of the municipal government's policies. For example, after the municipal government sealed and locked the gate, tensions increased. GKI Yasmin congregation kept on praying on the pavement in front of the gate, while the Forkami masses pushed harder against them after the gate was sealed by the municipal government. The police then deployed more officers than there were previously.

The revocation of the permit resulted in even greater escalation. The support for both sides extended in demographic terms. While

the GKI Yasmin gained the support of the inter-faith institutions in Jakarta and certain members of the Indonesian parliament, the Forkami also gained support of organizations from outside of the city of Bogor. The police deployed more troops to anticipate the possibility of physical clashes. The police was also present as a counterforce to both sides. According to the police, regardless of the policy of the Bogor government, they had to ensure there was no physical contact between the conflicted citizens.

### *Public Opinion*

The public opinion was divided with regard to the case of GKI Yasmin. An official of Nahdlatul Ulama of Bogor, K.H. Asep Zulfikar, requested that Forkami complied with the Supreme Court's decision. "If you do not want to," he said, "just stay in the forest [get lost]." Together with other Muslim leaders, through the organization "Love Peace" of the West Bogor Citizens Forum (Forum Masyarakat Bogor Barat Cinta Damai, FMBBCD), K.H. Asep invited Forkami to take part in dialogue. However, his efforts were unsuccessful.<sup>19</sup> A similar thing was stated by K.H. Said Aqil Sirodj, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. He urged that the issue of the GKI Yasmin be given a permanent solution and all should comply with what was already legally settled.<sup>20</sup>

Nusron Wahid, the chairman of Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor), expressed similar views. He said that the GKI Yasmin already had the legal power to build their place of worship, the decision of the Supreme Court which could not be defeated by some 100-200 signatures, and which was above all social groups. Nusron reminded that the mayor could be ousted because of his incomppliance with the Supreme Court's verdict. If the situation was

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<sup>19</sup>"Rawan Bentrok, Dialog GKI Yasmin batal Digelar," *Tempo.co*, 20 November 2011, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/11/20/083367502/Rawan-Bentrok-Dialog-GKI-Yasmin-Batal-Digelar> (accessed 27 May 2013).

<sup>20</sup>"Tarik Ulur GKI Yasmin," *Icrp-online.org*, 16 November 2011, <http://icrp-online.org/112011/post-779.html> (accessed 27 May 2013).



prolonged, Nusron was worried that state authority would decline in the eyes of the society.<sup>21</sup>

Additional support for the GKI Yasmin also came from a number of non-governmental organizations advocating religious freedom and human rights. Also from individuals. Todung Mulya Lubis, the trustee of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI), send a letter to President Yudhoyono requesting his help with the construction permit which was already granted by the Supreme Court. The President was asked to resolve the problem of GKI Yasmin in order to maintain the government's authority and the integrity of the nation. Todung appreciated the President who led the transition of Indonesia to democracy. However, ironically, the President was unable to solve the case of GKI Yasmin. The case became a sharp rock in the enforcement of human rights in Indonesia.<sup>22</sup>

Some of the inter-faith institutions from Jakarta accompanied GKI Yasmin during prayers. The support came not only from institutions, also from individuals, among them Sinta Nuriyah Wahid, Todung Mulya Lubis, Eva Kusuma Sundari, and Lily Wahid. On several occasions, these organizations and individuals also gave speeches for the GKI to keep the spirit and to fight for their right to build their church on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision.

Eva Kusuma Sundari, a member of the parliamentary Commission III from PDI-P, said that the case of GKI Yasmin was not merely a fight for their right to build a church. According to Eva, the case became the momentum for pointing the misperceptions of some people about Islam and the constitution which guaranteed the freedom of religion and worship. Eva regretted that some people in the

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<sup>21</sup>"Nusron Wahid: Negara Kehilangan Wibawa," NU.or.id, 26 July 2011, <http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,1-id,33161-lang,id-c,warta-t,Nusron+Wahid++Negara+Kehilangan+Wibawa-.phpx> (accessed 27 May 2013).

<sup>22</sup>"Bela GKI, Todung Mulya Lubis Surati Presiden," Tempo.com, 13 November 2011, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/11/13/083366314/Bela-GKI-Todung-Mulya-Lubis-Surati-Presiden> (accessed 27 May 2013).

community and some members of the parliament have snatched the rights of minorities. She believed that the case was strong enough for the President of Indonesia to show his authority in upholding human rights.<sup>23</sup>

Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsudin, stated that this was a problem of a country where law was not enforced. According to him, the state should be serious about resolving the problem. He said that this case was not a problem between Islam and Christianity. He did not want to side with any of the parties, because to him the problem was weak law enforcement.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, Jusuf Kalla expressed readiness to become a mediator in resolving the case of GKI Yasmin. However, he reminded the mediation could be done only if the Bogor community needed it. According to him, the place of worship was the place of peace, thus, the place of worship should not be forced on this or that street. If the place of worship raised animosities, it should be re-evaluated.<sup>25</sup>

Ma'ruf Amin, the chairman of the MUI, declared that the revocation of the GKI Yasmin's church construction permit was right. He referred to the report of the mayor of Bogor and MUI Bogor, which mentioned that signatures were falsified to obtain the permit. He suggested that the resolution of this case should be based on the Joint Ministerial Regulation (PBM) of 2006, which binds all religious councils in seeking a common agreement. Ma'ruf urged that the settlement of this issue be returned to the MUI Bogor and the mayor.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Eva Kusuma Sundari: *Defending Pluralism*, "Thejakartapost.com, 23 April 2012, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/23/eva-kusuma-sundari-defending-pluralism.html> (accessed 27 May 2013).

<sup>24</sup>Din: *Presiden jangan Diam Soal Kasus Yasmin*, "Liputan6.com, 12 February 2012, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/376947/din-presiden-jangan-diam-soal-kasus-yasmin> (accessed 27 May 2013).

<sup>25</sup>JK Siap Mediasi GKI Yasmin, "Kompas.com, 21 February 2012, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/02/21/13564381/JK.Siap.Mediasi.GKI.Yasmin> (accessed 27 December 2013).

<sup>26</sup>KH Maruf Amin: *Tawaran Walikota Bogor Relokasi GKI Yasmin Sudah Tepat*, "Voa-Islam.com, 20 January 2012, <http://m.voa-islam.com/news/indonesia/2012/01/20/17473/kh-maruf-amintawaran-walikota-bogor-relokasi-gki-yasmin-sudah-tepat/> (accessed 27 May 2013).

The FKUB, according to the FKUB Bogor secretary, Ade Sarmili, generally supported the government's plan to relocate GKI Yasmin. According to him, the municipal government was kind enough to provide the budget of approximately three billion IDR to cover the relocation process. The government was ready to bear all the earlier costs related to the construction permit process. The government also proposed three alternative locations together with a new construction permit. According to him, the municipal government has never in the history of Bogor given such an offer to Muslims. Nevertheless, the FKUB would still rely on the PBM of 2006, before giving a recommendation. FKUB would check whether there were no protests at the new locations (Ade Sarmili, interview, 18 February 2012).

*Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

The police communication with both parties was good. The intelligence units and Babinkamtibmas, as well as the police leadership were also relatively close with both sides. When there was a change in leadership of Bogor Police, they would hold socialization events, especially with the parties to the conflict. Such communication allowed the police to work with both groups on preventing violence as means of conflict settlement.

This communication yielded mixed responses. For the GKI Yasmin, the initially good relations were useful for receiving protection during their worship activities in front of the church gate, but later they decided to no longer keep the police informed since the outcome was the same: they were not able to perform worship in front of the gate. They also did not trust the police. Each time they informed the police on their worship plans, the opponents also knew where it would take place. Instead of providing them protection, they felt the police provided intelligence to their opponents (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

Although disappointed with the pattern of policing in the field, the GKI Yasmin still entrusted the legal process and security to the police. They had put their trust in AKBP Hilman who in

the early days of his leadership provided them safety and acted decisively towards the opponents, also by forming a barricade with his officers between the praying members of the GKI and their opponents.

In the eyes of the GKI Yasmin, the police tended to cooperate with the groups who opposed them in order to drive the congregation out from the location. One time the police informed them by telephone that there were groups from outside Bogor entering the city. "If they wanted to avoid escalation, why would the police even escort those groups?" asked Bona Sigalingging. He added that, "intelligence of sub-district, of district and of National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional, BIN) contacted us, spoke about Pancasila, but they still allowed masses to intimidate [GKI members] whenever they worshiped in the field" (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).

Some of the Forkami groups too expressed disappointment with the police. According to them the police did not act decisively against GKI Yasmin which was holding illegal religious activities. They stated "If the police is unable to do it, just let us disband them [the GKI]." They also often questioned the beliefs of the police, "If they are Muslims, why do they allow the GKI Yasmin to pray?" However, not all of them assessed the police negatively. According to one of them, the police was working properly, was always present at the location earlier than them, and with full force. According to him, the police surely wanted what was the best for Bogor (AS, interview, 25 April 2013).

## **Conclusions**

It can be concluded that the police in this case has been performing their duties in accordance with the existing legal framework. The decision to approach both parties and to deploy sufficient forces, discouraged both parties, especially the GKI opponents from taking up violent measures in their actions. In general, due to the absence of violence in this conflict, the performance of the Bogor Police was successful.

The police have run the pre-emptive measures by deploying intelligence and Babinkamtibmas to approach the core groups of both parties. The number of officers present in the field was enough in comparison to the size of the crowd. The police also succeeded in persuading both parties, particularly the GKI's opponents, not to carry, let alone use, any sharp weapons. But the police officers were prepared for repressive action if such was necessary. The police also followed up on the reports submitted by citizens. With regard to this case, we recorded that of several reports of alleged criminal offences, the police only processed one.

Nevertheless, the role of the police in this case went not without a note. In the eyes of the minority, the GKI Yasmin, the police tended to accommodate the demands of the masses, their opponents, rather than to protect the GKI Yasmin. On many occasions the police requested the congregation not to worship at the church location. In the context of existing law, both the constitution and the regulations on implementation of human rights, the police were supposed to protect the citizens who exercised their right to worship. The police indeed did not forbid worship activities, but was unable to protect the GKI Yasmin for more than 10 minutes. Besides this, the GKI Yasmin claimed they neither were able to perform worship at a house in the vicinity of the church location.

The policing in GKI Yasmin shows that policing of conflicts over places of worship is not as hard as of sectarian conflicts. The first reason is that the disputes over places of worship generally, as in the case of GKI Yasmin, remain in the realm of legal issues. Both parties were aware of their respective position before the law, which helped the police in making them aware of the legal sanctions in case anyone tried to commit acts of violence. Second, the opponents quite clearly distinguished between the issue of the place of worship and the religious beliefs. On several occasions the opponents stated that they did not hate Christianity. To them the conflict with GKI Yasmin was purely a matter of law. Although narrations with regard to Christianization did occur, they were trying to show in public that

they respected other religions. This made it easier for the police to convince both parties not to act in an unlawful way.

The police must continue to not underestimate the potential of conflicts triggered by the matter of places of worship. Through intelligence the police must improve the early warning system. When possible, the police should act as mediators to impede the conflicts at the very early stage of their emergence, and especially before they enter the legal path. Needed therefore, are skills to recognize a religious conflict and to mediate between the conflicted parties.

In accordance with the regulations, the role of the police in conflicts over places of worship is limited. Resolution of conflicts over places of worship is in the domain of the government, in this case the municipal government. Government's decisions which are wise and in line with the law, allow the police duties to run smoothly. Otherwise, the policing tasks become complicated, as it has been in the case of GKI Yasmin.\*\*\*

## THE CASE OF NUR MUSAFIR MOSQUE, KUPANG

### **Foreword**

The conflict over the mosque construction between the Muslim and Protestant residents of Batuplat was a long-term one. Interestingly, despite several incidents of unrest, the conflict did not lead to outbreaks of violence. Policing strategy which combined the tactics of showing force and applying persuasion, as well the decisiveness of the police officers, played a central role in preventing violence in Batuplat. The supporting factors of the policing success came from the willingness of both parties to the conflict to show restraint, and from other parties in who favored peaceful measures.

Presentation and analysis of the conflict in this chapter is divided into five parts. After the introduction in the first part, the second part presents the religio-social data of Batuplat. The third part describes the three phases of the conflict: the phase without turbulences (March 2003-September 2008), the phase with lower tensions (October 2008-June 2011), and the phase with higher tensions (July 2011-September 2012). The fourth section discusses the dynamics of policing the conflict seen from the policing activities, police knowl-

edge, legal-procedural framework of policing, institutional character of the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the interactions between the police and the actors of conflict. Finally, the fifth section describes the lessons learnt and presents recommendations for further improvement of policing activities.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Batuplat**

Of all 21 regencies and towns in the province of East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur, NTT), Kupang is the only one with the city status. Its population, as of 2012, was 339,197 inhabitants. Kupang covers 165.3 km<sup>2</sup> and is divided to six districts: Kelapa Lima, Kota Lama, Alak, Oebobo, Maulafa, and Kota Raja. Batuplat is located in Alak district.

The demographic data in terms of religion in Kupang, Alak district, and Batuplat village are as follows (BPS Kupang 2012). In Kupang: Protestants, 210,471; Catholics, 73,908; Muslims, 48,547; Hindus, 6,221; and Buddhists, 50 people. In Alak: Protestants, 36,960; Muslims, 9,661; Catholics, 4,474; Hindus, 719; Buddhists, 20 people. And in Batuplat: Protestants, 2,715; Catholics, 336; Muslims, 210; Hindus, 5 people; and no Buddhists.

As indicated by the data above, the number of Christian — Protestant and Catholic — residents of Batuplat is more than the number of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. This too is reflected by places of worship. There are three Pentecostal churches, one Catholic chapel, and a church of the Rehobot branch of the Evangelical Christian Church in Timor (Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor, GMIT). There are no places of worship of other religions.

Ethnicity-wise, the Batuplat community is mostly Timorese. There are some immigrants from outside NTT but not many, and most of them derive from Java. Pluralism up to the family level is a common thing. Inter-religious and inter-ethnic marriages are entrenched in the culture of Batuplat and of the whole NTT.

The inter-religious marriages have proven to create a strong civil bond through the so-called “family gatherings”. Residents of Batu-



plat, whatever their religion, share happiness with and a sense of responsibility for their neighbours who all take part in all important celebrations (weddings, school graduation, circumcision), and who donate some money during those celebrations. Those who receive the donations write down the names of donors and the amounts they donated. The notebook they keep will in future remind them to reward these persons upon the celebrations in their families. This practice has been present for years.

The Protestant residents of Batuplat usually choose to work in the formal sector, as civil servants in government offices, as police and army members, or as bank employees. This type of employment is also chosen by the native Muslim population, while the immigrant Muslim population would usually work in the informal sector, such as building or furniture businesses, or in limited partnership entities, as wholesalers (*pemborong*) and as contractors.

Each year native residents hope to get a job as civil servants because they consider it as a guarantee of a more certain future than other kinds of jobs. Consequently, the absorption of natives in the informal sector decreases. The civil servants in the municipal government offices are faced with ethnicity-based competition between the Rote and Timorese groups, while in the offices in the countryside they are faced with the competition between Protestants and Catholics.

### **Conflict over the Nur Musafir Mosque<sup>1</sup>**

The description of the conflict can be divided into three phases with regard to the intensity of the unrest between the two parties to the conflict: the phase without turbulences (March 2003-September 2008); the phase of lower tensions (October 2008-June 2011); and the phase of higher tensions (July 2011-September 2012).

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<sup>1</sup>Based on the chronology drafted by Uran (2013) and the official document titled “Kronologi Rencana Pembangunan Masjid di Kelurahan Batuplat” from the Batuplat village office.

*First Phase: No Turbulences (March 2003-September 2008)*

The first conflict phase, from March 2003 to September 2008, began with the desire of 30 Muslims of Batuplat to have a place of worship closer to their homes (Amir Pattiraja, chairman of the mosque construction committee, interview, 8 January 2013). Since the existing mosque was considered no longer adequate given the increase in the number of Muslim community and since its location was far away from their homes, the temporary place of worship was established on a land with a makeshift house of 48 m<sup>2</sup> which was used by the congregation for *taraweh* prayers (in the month of Ramadan) and then given as endowment by Haryono Susanto (commonly called "Mas Ono") for construction of the place of worship. The need to construct a place of worship in RT 08/RW 03, however, was met with a protest letter of Batuplat residents who, on 17 May 2003, addressed it to the Batuplat village chief. They rejected the construction because they felt its location was too close to the houses where pigs were kept, and they also stressed that the construction committee should meet all the requirements given in the procedures governing establishment of the places of worship.

Since then, the protest letter, the support for construction from other parties, as well as the response from the village office to the protest letter, all shaped the conflict. Besides the local residents, the Paskha Karang Taruna youth organization officially sent a letter, on 7 February 2005, to the village office demanding termination of the construction process and requesting information with regard to regulations of establishment of places of worship. The letter was answered on 2 March 2005, by the chairman of Golkar in Batuplat village who expressed his support for the construction of the mosque for the sake of inter-religious harmony and compliance with procedures.

Batuplat village chief, Regina Kobi, called the construction committee chairman for inquiry before finally deciding, on 27 August 2008, to suspend the construction of the mosque. The meeting between the village office and the construction committee took place after the former received oral and written reports from the residents

and the youth organization. Having suspended the construction, the village chief sought consultation with the city mayor. Not only the village residents appealed for the construction to be suspended, but also the Department of City Planning and Landscape Architecture of Kupang.

On 17 September 2008, the mayor along with the representatives of Muslims in Batuplat, head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Kupang, head of governance division, head of social affairs, head of Kesbang Linmas, assistant of the Alak district head, and Batuplat village chief agreed on the following: the new location of the mosque needs to be sought after the present location was considered inadequate as it was too close to residential houses; conflicts should be avoided and there should be mutual respect; the present location of the mosque would remain the property of the Muslim community and it could be converted into anything but a place of worship; Muslims and the government would work together to search for the new location of 800-1,000 m<sup>2</sup>.

#### *Second Phase: Lower Tensions (October 2008-June 2011)*

Following the September 2008 agreement, construction committee was looking for another location, which would be more comfortable for everyone, and eventually found it 600 meters away from the previous one, precisely in RT 17/RW 07. The land of 1,000 m<sup>2</sup> was a gift of the municipal government, who previously bought it from the owner of the Nur Musafir Foundation, a member of the mosque construction committee, Mas Ono. The construction, although approved by the mayor, and with the recommendation letter from the FKUB, as well as the construction permit, was met with protests due to alleged violation of the provisions contained in the joint decree (SKB) of two ministers issued in 2006.

Alleged violations of the provisions, according to the protesting residents, included the following: some people felt that the construction committee did not explain their intention when they asked for signatures of support; their signatures were given when

the committee was distributing offerings; the signature list was in support for the construction in the previous location; some persons who signed on the list were already dead at the time when their signatures were taken. All these accusations were denied by the construction committee (Mas Ono, interview, 9 January 2013).

In the midst of the protests, there were a number of residents or youth activists who welcomed the desire of Muslims to build their place of worship. One of them, Johannes Sembulu (interview, 9 January 2013), who happened to be the head of local police post (*kapolpos*), said: "At that time I gave my support as a citizen/neighbour, not as a *kapolpos*. We were asked for support and we were ready to give it. As citizens, as I said earlier, we are humans, [we need] mutual tolerance, and cooperation. It's better this way. [...] Moreover, we are neighbours, we can't be otherwise. We need to help each other, right?"

In this period, relations between the two groups were tense, though they did not turn into violence which would result in casualties or a large scale destruction of property. The disruptions made against the Muslim community included acts of vandalism against the mosque property such as erasing of the nameplate on the night of 12 May 2009, and its removal on the night of 13 May 2009 night, as well as pelting the house of one of the construction committee's member.

In response to the report of the mosque construction committee, a meeting was held with various parties to reduce the tensions. On 13 May 2009, Batuplat village chief met at the village office with the head of the Institute for Community Empowerment (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, LPM), heads of the RTs 16, 17, 18 and RWs 07 and 08, as well as the Babinkamtibmas of the police. As a result of the meeting, the community leaders were to constantly provide the residents with the insight on the importance of religious tolerance and to support the construction of the mosque in accordance with existing regulations.

On 16 May 2009, the Batuplat chief again held a meeting at the village office. The meeting was attended by the heads of RT and RW,

the head and secretary of the LPM, community leaders, religious leaders, Alak district head, Babinkamtibas of the police, youth representatives, and a representative of the Family Welfare Movement (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK). The meeting resulted in condemnation of persons who damaged the mosque property, advocacy on the importance of living in harmony, support for the construction in accordance with regulations, and urging that the non-Batuplat residents should not interfere in Batuplat affairs.<sup>2</sup>

Tensions between the Protestant and Muslim communities in Batuplat were unfortunate given the relatively harmonious relations between the two groups. When both were building their places of worship (Protestants of the Evangelical Christian Church in Timor were building their church and at the same time Muslims were working on their mosque in the new location, quite close to the church), they have formed a joint committee – Muslims helped to build the church and Christians helped to build the mosque. Finally, the church building was finished earlier than the mosque and the Muslims attended its inauguration. Everything was just fine, only that soon the mosque construction was questioned by a number of Batuplat residents and some persons from outside Batuplat. This damaged the relations between the two groups.

Protests against the construction of the mosque continued until the groundbreaking ceremony. Batuplat residents from the GMIT congregation, lead by pastor Judith Nunuhitu-Folabessy (pastor who serves in the village Manulai II, which is adjacent to Batuplat), shared their concerns with the preacher. Doubting whether the whole process was in line with procedures, the youth and the pastor met to inquire this from the then village chief, the late Adoe Edu. Adoe Edu in an unwelcome tone told the pastor that if she wanted to she could instead go and inspect all the documents at the mayor's office.

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<sup>2</sup>Information process, results, and a list of those who were present is available in the meeting minutes titled "Notulen Rapat untuk Mengantisipasi Gejolak Kamtibmas di Kelurahan Batuplat," dated 16 May 2009.

When the chairman of the Karang Taruna, Buce Rairutu, met the head of the LPM and Batuplat village chief on 2 June 2011, he refused to be involved in the security section of mosque construction committee. Twelve days later, the youth met with the district head to see the location of the mosque. This was followed by a meeting between the district head and the village chief. At that time, the youth also expressed their desire to meet the mayor. Accompanied by the Alak district head and Batuplat village chief, the youth met with the mayor. The meeting resulted in a decision that the timing of the mosque construction groundbreaking would remain as originally scheduled.

It should be noted that the mosque construction committee has acquired all the important papers needed. Letter of recommendation from the FKUB was issued on 4 June 2010, and the construction permit was finally processed and ready on 15 June 2011. The process of obtaining the construction permit was not quite easy because of the negative attitudes which emerged in the community, such as the feud between the chairman of the local parliament (mosque construction opponent) and the mayor of Kupang (who supported the construction), as well as the protests of local residents.

The construction process officially began on 25 June 2011 and was attended by the mayor, Muspida Kupang and the police. The ceremony was marred by quarrels between the protesters, mostly young men, some local residents, and the security forces. Since then, the atmosphere has been tense. One of the anticipatory measures taken by the Kupang police at that time was ordering the police officers to remain on guard at a police station not far from the construction site.

### *Third Phase: Higher Tensions (July 2011–September 2012)*

The tensions were increasing before the mayoral election of 1 May 2012. For those competing for the mayor's office, a conflict over a place of worship could be instrumental in gaining victory. In Kupang there was a fierce competition between the then mayor, Daniel Adoe (2005–2012), and the chairman of the local parliament, Viktor Lerik (2009–2011). Since the personal relationship between the two

was not good, the competition was not only for the office itself as it also involved personal sentiments.

The two politicians had opposing attitudes towards the construction of the Nur Musafir Mosque. According to the mayor and the local government officials under him, the construction of the mosque should proceed as all requirements were fulfilled. At the same time, the chairman of the local parliament called for the temporary suspension of the construction until all construction requirements were fulfilled. Throughout July 2011, Viktor Lरिक and Daniel Adoe exchanged letters on behalf of their institutions, in order to strengthen their respective positions.<sup>3</sup> When interviewed by the mass media, both showed enmity towards each other, and it was not a secret anymore that they were fighting. Feeling that these politicians were “diving in murky water,” which could aggravate the conflict, the chairman of the local MUI, Abdul Kadir Makarim, gave a signal, during discussion at *Timor Express* office on 27 August 2011, that the construction of the mosque should be postponed.<sup>4</sup> Election results were beyond belief, however: Daniel Adoe was not elected, while Viktor Lरिक’s candidacy was void after he was removed from Golkar party for violating the code of conduct.

The construction committee and the protesters were threatening each other. When earlier, in 2009, the minority groups felt threatened after their property and mosque were targeted, the citizens of the majority group experienced similar anxiety in 2011. In July, a youth activist of the Indonesian Protestant Students Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI) was abducted and received death threats from unidentified persons. Unidentified person also entered the house of pastor Judith (Pastor Judith, interview, 24 September 2009).

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<sup>3</sup>City DPRD’s Letter of Appeal No. DPRD.170/295/KK/2011, dated 25 July 2011, containing the answer to the mayor’s decision, dated 12 July 2011; Decision of the Mayor Daniel Adoe No. BKBPPM.451.2/213/2011, dated 12 July 2011, containing the answer to the appeal of the DPRD, dated 1 July 2011; and City DPRD’s Letter of Appeal No. DPRD.170/257/KK/2011, dated 1 July 2011, containing an appeal to the mayor to temporarily suspend the mosque construction.

<sup>4</sup>*Timor Express*, “MUI Minta Tunda Pembangunan Masjid Batuplat,” 29 August 2011.

Another situation that indicated that the conflict entered a new escalation phase could be seen from the tactics employed by the parties to the conflict. The Protestant Youth of Kupang in masses approached the mayor's office on 8 July 2011, to reject the construction of the mosque. Their presence was heavily guarded by policemen. During the mosque's groundbreaking ceremony the number of police troops was also quite significant.

Seeing the situation was turning volatile, the provincial FKUB did not remain silent. On 10 August 2011, they invited all parties concerned with the mosque construction: Kesbangpol and Linmas of the police, municipal government, and the representatives of the Regional Intelligence Community (Komunitas Intelijen Daerah, Kominda). The meeting was held at the Kesbangpol and Linmas office. A number of important points were agreed during the meeting, including temporary halt to the mosque construction process while discussions between the government and religious leaders would take place to find the best solution.

Tensions in Batuplat apparently attracted the attention of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Between 13-14 August 2011, a team from the Presidential Advisory Council (Wantimpres) came to Batupalat. It was lead by the inter-religious affairs secretary of the Wantimpres, Prof. Masykuri Abdillah, and was tasked to find out what was really happening. However, the NTT government or the administration below it never receive the report of investigations carried out during the two-days visit.

Tensions between Christians and Muslims in Batuplat also attracted the attention of the local mass media such as *Timor Express* and *Pos Kupang*, which were much more balanced in their reportings than other media like the online *Voice of Al Islam* (VoA), which tended to defend Muslims at the cost of discrediting Christians. The tone of VoA was quite provocative. For example, the word "sabotage" (*menjegal*) was used in reference to the Christians protesting against the mosque construction. In this way they worsened the problem more than they helped to resolve it.



In the end, the mosque construction was officially terminated by the decree of the new mayor, Jonas Salean, dated 12 September 2012.<sup>5</sup> Following the results of the meeting with the chairman of the GMIT Synod, Eben Nuban Timopada, on 8 August 2011, the previous mayor formed a fact-finding team on 19 August 2011.<sup>6</sup> After approximately a year of work, the team found some issues that were not in accordance with the existing regulations, including the fact that 10 of 65 people who supported the mosque construction withdrew their support, and that the letter of recommendation obtained from the chairman of FKUB, Hendrik Malelak, were not issued through the FKUB meeting. Thus, the mosque construction had to be suspended until the construction committee fulfilled all the requirements.

When the official letter on suspension of the construction was issued, Muslims did not give up. They managed to obtain new signatures to substitute those which were withdrawn, in order to allow the mosque construction to run, although at a slow pace and without publicity (Mas Ono and Ahmad, the construction committee, interview, 21 June 2013). The committee employed local residents who worked only on Sundays. On regular days they came to the site but were not working. Through this strategy the committee wanted the situation to remain safe. There were disturbances in the beginning but they were solved. The residents, including the protesters, occasionally exchanged greetings and chats at the construction site, on their way to and from the church.

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<sup>5</sup>Decision of the Mayor Jonas Salean No. BKBPPM. 645/038/2012, dated 12 September 2012, decision on the temporary suspension until the committee fulfils all applicable procedures, based on the Nur Musafir Mosque fact-finding team's report.

<sup>6</sup>From "Daftar Susunan Keanggotaan Tim Pencari Fakta Permasalahan Pembangunan Masjid Nur Musafir Batuplat Kota Kupang." The fact-finding team consisted of 40 people of different backgrounds with the Kupang police chief as its chairman, Kupang attorney as vice-chairman, and the head of Kesbangpol and Linmas Kupang as secretary. To find out more about the results of the fact-finding team's work, see the Report of the Nur Musafir Mosque Fact-Finding Team. The establishment of fact-finding team was based on the decree of mayor Daniel Adoe No. 109/KEP/HK/2011 dated 19 August 2011.

## **Dynamics of Policing the Conflict over Batuplat Mosque**

### *Policing Activities*

As already mentioned, the conflict over the construction of the Nur Musafir Mosque emerged in 2003. Since then, the police followed its development and the physical involvement of the police has been recorded since 2009. Of the four major policing actions (pre-emptive intelligence, prevention upon the occurrence of mass mobilization, response/counter measures at the time of the incident, legal process after clashes), pre-emptive and preventive action (although no mass mobilization really took place) were most relevant to the case of policing the conflict over the place of worship in Batuplat.

The intelligence officers knew of the Batuplat conflict long before the groundbreaking ceremony and performed closed security activities. They coordinated with Babinkamtibmas officers who were quite active in following the meetings of residents or the police officers who met with the FKUB. In one of the meetings with the FKUB, the police (as a part of the Kominda) was also present.<sup>7</sup> The meeting was held at the office of Kesbangpol and Linmas on 10 August 2011. From Kominda six people were present: one from NTT police, two from the district police, two from Korem, and one from the BIN. Besides Kominda, present were as well the representatives of the local FKUB, Kesbangpol and Linmas, as well as of the municipal government.

At the meeting, one of the NTT police representatives shared three insights. First, that the police was ready to safeguard the situation during the construction of the mosque, but once the construction is completed, would the members of the society who reject it take no action that could lead to an inter-religious conflict? Second, the police could conduct a campaign for diversity so that the community/grassroots would accept the national diversity as an advantage for unity and inter-religious harmony. And third, the police

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<sup>7</sup>See "Notulen Rapat FKUB Propinsi tertanggal 10 Agustus 2011."

asked, if the investigation team was formed, what would be done with the results of that team's work?<sup>8</sup>

It is important to note that in the intelligence unit of Kupang police, a few months before the beginning of 2013, there was a leadership change. The new unit head was Samuel Simanjuntak. As he said, protests of residents were peaceful, there was no indication of possibilities that would lead to criminal offenses. The calculations with regard to response to the threats and the impact of the response were based on various reports received by intelligence unit, including the reports of Pulbaket. He received and followed all information on the situation in Batuplat.

In the case of Batuplat, mass rallies at the time of groundbreaking ceremony did not take place although there were verbal arguments between the security officers and protesters, most of whom were youth. The police made a series of policing actions to prevent the situation from becoming worse. The Sabhara unit guarded the mosque which was the object of dispute and security activities were also carried out by the police station (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). In addition to coordinating with Dandim, the police chief prepared all that was necessary for pacification.

The police assigned were from the Sabhara unit, intelligence and Buser. District and sub-district police deployed the intelligence unit to the field for about one month after the groundbreaking ceremony, and until the situation was assessed as safe. The three units were on guard 24 hours at a post next to the mosque construction site. For three years the post has been serving as a police station, previously it housed the West Kupang sub-district police. Officers were deployed from the sub-district police (Johannes Mbulu, interview, 9 January 2013).

At the time of laying the first stone, the police were already at the location before the arguments broke out (Johannes Mbulu, interview, 9 January 2013). They listened to the protesters and reported to the leadership. Demonstrators were not taken away; the police only

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<sup>8</sup>See "Notulen Rapat FKUB Propinsi tertanggal 10 Agustus 2011."

asked them what had happened, how many people came to the site, who they were, where they came from, etc. After the police showed their understanding, the situation became calm. At that time the police suggested that the protesters should show their dissatisfaction to the local parliament or to the mayor, and not express it at the mosque construction site.

The police applied the anticipatory measures, which was seen, for example, during the groundbreaking ceremony when the police remained on standby and quickly responded to the calls from the minority group. The police were always present. To guard the mosque construction site about 60 officers were sent. There were also troops from the district military command (Ricky Suciadi, interview, 10 January 2013). All wore uniforms and were armed.

The presence of security forces gave an impression that the police was not neutral. When such views were circulating among the majority of residents, the Kupang police officers responded: "The police risks such suspicions when it carries out pacification. The police is protecting the minority group, in this case the Muslim community of Batuplat" (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013).

In conclusion, pre-emptive and preventive actions of Kupang police were well coordinated even though they received a negative response from the majority group. With the police alertness, the conflict over mosque construction did not escalate into violence.

### *Police Knowledge*

The knowledge of Kupang police with regard to the legal and procedural rules of policing conflicts over places of worship, like the one in Batuplat, was adequate both in terms of quantity and quality. However, the police knowledge related to the perception of the situation, by which they would determine the threats to security and order, was assessed negatively by the majority group and was seen as exaggerated.

In the context of conflicts over places of worship, the legal and procedural framework is set by PBM No. 8 and 9 of 2006 and Police

Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of the National Police, and the fixed procedures. The NTT and the Kupang police officers knew these frameworks, especially the procedural part which they followed in their duties.

The police officer briefly shared the problems they faced in Batuplat (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). The Batuplat case, he said, derived from the protests of Christians who did not approve the construction of a mosque because they thought it violated the existing procedures. Eventually, the construction process was temporarily suspended until the construction committee fulfilled the requirements stipulated in the PBM of 2006. From their answers regarding the conflict over the place of worship, it appeared that the police understood the problem. The police also knew that their duties and responsibilities must be in line with the principles of human rights since Indonesia committed itself to become more democratic.

In relation between the understanding of the conflict and the level of threat, the number of police personnel deployed to the location was well correlated with the estimated threat level. The more serious the conflict, the more personnel would be deployed. The Batuplat case, according to the local police, required a serious response. According to them, "All problems [must be handled] seriously, especially when they are SARA issues, so that they do not spread" (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). At that time Kupang was also in the phase of local election.

However, police efforts which were intended to anticipate clashes, were questioned by the majority. Pastor Judith (interview, 9 January 2013) said there were anomalies in the police approach:

With the problem in Batuplat there was something strange. That is, when we met the verification team, I have told the mayor and friends from the judiciary who were present, that what I know as a layman is that if military are deployed it is in case of clashes, when the police cannot handle [the situation]. There was no such problem in Batuplat. So, the impression remains that was deliberately exaggerated for unknown reasons. And, suddenly there appeared a group to guard the construction site of the mosque. This can't be accepted.

This peculiarity was felt by the protesters when the tensions increased. Based on the narration of Pastor Judith, the strange feeling was first experienced when after the groundbreaking ceremony, an the invitation to hold dialogue arrived. The invitation came from the municipal government to a limited number of people, five of whom were Pastor Judith's group (the pastor herself, GMKI, Paskha Karang Taruna, and some community leaders). The dialogue, as mentioned in the invitation letter, was to be held at the district military command's hall. This felt strange, Pastor Judith asked the military command why the dialogue was to be held there. Ultimately, the meeting was cancelled without any clear explanation.

In summary, the police knowledge of the legal and procedural framework of policing religious conflicts and the disputes over Nur Musafir Mosque was adequate. They understood the regulations, procedures, and the principles of human rights and democracy. The information they shared about the chronology of the conflict also showed they followed the conflict developments. Although the majority group questioned the police performance, the police were carrying out their duties in accordance with procedures and managed to prevent the open conflict and all possible violations.

#### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

In general, the police who were handling the dispute over the mosque in Batuplat knew the legal framework governing the construction of places of worship in Indonesia, which is based on the Joint Regulation (PBM) of 2006 on the guidelines for heads of the regions and their deputies on maintaining religious harmony, strengthening the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB), and construction of places of worship.<sup>9</sup>

The local police were working in line with the regulations and fixed procedures. There were two kinds of security actions in the

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<sup>9</sup>We could not obtain much information from the interviews with the police. They are not sufficiently open to provide the information which researchers needed.

Batuplat case based on them (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). The first one, covert security (*pengamanan tertutup*), was conducted by intelligence unit after the conflict issues surfaced. The second one, overt security (*pengamanan terbuka*), was conducted by Sabhara unit in order to protect the physical object (mosque). The Sabhara received help from the district police while the intelligence unit and Buser from the nearest sub-district police. Babinkamtibmas unit was also involved.

To sum up, the Kupang police knew the PBM of 2006, the Police Chief Regulation and the fixed procedures. They also carried out the main policing activities based on the persuasion and pacification approach.

### *Police Culture*

In general, the police culture or the police officers' perception of the issues of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance was conducive. In the current period of democratic transition, they knew these issues could not be disregarded and that the police needed to adapt to changes in the society which was becoming more democratic and open. This is proven by the police adopting the principles of democracy and human rights (including religious freedom and inter-religious tolerance) in the Police Chief Regulation and fixed procedures. The police was consistently adhering to these regulations while dealing with the case of conflict in Batuplat.

However, the support the National Police gives to all written rules or uttered ideas mentioned above, is not necessarily manifested in the way they perceive their own role in Indonesia's democratic society. When faced with "sensitive" problems — usually related to human rights and democracy, such as the issue of intolerance towards other religions — they are not as decisive and as they are towards criminal cases, including terrorism. The problem of intolerance, however, can lead to criminal offences as well by disrupting the lives of individuals and of communities, and by possibly being a threat to their lives as well.

In case of the conflict over construction of a mosque in Batuplat, it was the opposite. Police knew that the society of Kupang and of NTT in general was pluralistic, characterized by mixed marriages where family members followed different religions and were able to live together (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). Police also understood that racial issues were sensitive and could be fatal if not handled properly. "All problems [must be handled] seriously, especially when they are SARA issues, so that they do not spread" (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). With such understanding the police could act quickly to protect the minority and their mosque. The case of policing the conflict in Batuplat is a proof that the police response to sensitive issues is not always indecisive.

What was the police's perception of the actors involved in the conflict in Batuplat? The police view was dominated by the fact that Muslims in Batuplat were a minority, and a minority must be protected. "[...] The police protects the minority, in this case the Muslim community of Batuplat, because they are small number" (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013).

Was it due to the minority being weak and so vulnerable to the threats from the majority? Apparently not, both parties to the Batuplat conflict claimed they were threatened or abused. In the majority group, for example, the family of Pastor Judith was several times intruded by unknown persons and a GMKI activist was kidnapped and threatened with death. Of the minority group, on the other hand, the house of the mosque construction committee member was pelted by neighbors, and he was also insulted by those who opposed the construction. The mosque site too was damaged.<sup>11</sup> In this situation, the distinction based on strength with regard to

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<sup>10</sup>In the case of insults, the police (upon the call of the respondent) arrived and helped to confront the persons. In the case of vandalism, the respondent made a report to the village office. The village held a meeting with all people concerned about the construction of the mosque. Points agreed: participants did not reject the construction; the committee must meet the mosque construction procedures; those from Batuplat and Manulai II should provide insight to the public about the meaning of life and inter-religious harmony.



majority and minority was irrelevant. Anyone could threaten others with all the resources at their disposal, no matter whether they were from the majority or the minority group. Thus, when both groups become perpetrators of violence, both should be dealt with, and victims from both sides are entitled to police protection.

It can be concluded that the police culture or perception of matters pertaining to democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance was quite positive. They were serious in their approach to the religious/ethnic issues and diversity. That approach was based on the view that minorities are vulnerable groups whose safety might be threatened at any time.

### *Local Politics*

The first issue related to the dynamics of local politics in the development of the conflict was about the local policies governing the construction of places of worship and their adherence to the PBM of 2006. The PBM became the main reference for those who opposed the mosque construction, particularly its Article 14, paragraph 1, 2, and 3 which regulate the process of establishing a place of worship.<sup>12</sup>

Based on the information obtained, one of the requirements which according to the protesters was not fulfilled was that the collection of signatures of the local residents, was allegedly carried out in manipulative way. The allegations included the following: (1) some of the signatures were for the construction of the small

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<sup>12</sup>The construction of places of worship requirements are set out in Article 14 of the Joint Regulation, which reads: (1) Construction of a place of worship must meet the administrative and technical requirements. (2) In addition to meeting the requirements referred to in clause (1) the establishment of places of worship must meet the special requirements include: (a) a list of names and numbers National Identity Cards of at least 90 prospective users of the place of worship which is authorized by the local authorities in accordance with the borders of the regions as referred to in Article 13 clause (3); (b) the letter of support of at least 60 members of the local community, authorized by the head/village chief; (c) written recommendation from the head of the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and (d) a written recommendation of the local FKUB. (3) In case the requirements referred to in clause (2) point a) are met while in point (b) are not met, the local government is obliged to facilitate a construction site for the place of worship.

mosque in the previous location; (2) there were signatures of persons who died before administration process for the construction of the mosque in the new location even began; and (3) some claimed the committee requested support for the construction of a *musala*, not a mosque.<sup>12</sup> The construction committee stated that none of the allegations was true (Mas Ono, interview, 9 January 2013). After a fact-finding team's recommendations were out, the committee sought to fulfil them and was successful. They obtained replacement of signatures of persons who withdrew theirs (Mas Ono and Ahmad, interview, 21 June 2013).

From this case it appears that the PBM of 2006 made both parties powerless. They were equally confined by the rules so that they could not do much to resolve the existing problems. Not a few people believe that the PBM contradicts the constitution which guarantees and protects the right and freedom to worship of all religions. PBM actually restricts this right and freedom and, according to Pastor Judith, needs to be reviewed. According to her, while seeking the review of the PBM, the existing rules should be followed and the way for dialogue should be found to talk about the problem faced by the two groups (Pastor Judith, interview, 9 January 2013). When this research was concluded, such dialogue had not yet taken place.

Another issue was the attitude of the local political elites, in this case the municipal government and the parliament. To the mosque construction committee, the PBM of 2006 was a reference for the construction process, which was even reinforced by the mayor's decree, which was given in the mayor's (Daniel Adoe) formal written reply (BKBPPM.451.2/213/2011 dated 12 July 2011) to the chairman of the local parliament, Viktor Lरिक who requested temporary suspension of the mosque construction until the committee fulfilled all the requirements (DPRD.170/257/KK/2011 dated 1 July 2011). The Muslim community asked whether the chairman's request was

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<sup>12</sup>Based on interviews; see also "Tanda Tangan Warga Dipalsukan: Untuk Bangun Tempat ibadah," *Pos Kupang*, 28 July 2011.

right (Mas Ono and Ahmad, interview, 21 June 2013). The mayor reaffirmed that the construction process was in accordance with procedures and was supported by recommendation from the FKUB.<sup>13</sup> The community dispute over the process of mosque construction reflected the hostility between the two politicians.

Their attitudes were not only contending views of two officials who were competing for the Kupang mayor's office for the 2012-2017 period; it was no longer a secret that there was personal animosity between the two. After corruption allegations amounting to 13,5 billion IDR were reported against the city authorities with regard to mismanagement of the Acceleration of the Regional Infrastructure Development Fund of 2011 (Dana Percepatan Pembangunan Infrastruktur Daerah 2011), Viktor Lerik was removed from the Golkar party (while Daniel Adoe was the head of DPD II from the same party) for violating the party rules.<sup>14</sup> Without indicating the party rules, the deputy head of community development section of Golkar party in Kupang, Yohannes Foes said: "Viktor has violated the code of ethics and organization discipline of the Golkar party."<sup>15</sup> Viktor Lerik served as the chairman of the Kupang local parliament only until 2011.

In conclusion, tensions at the local political level were rooted in PBM of 2006. The mosque construction committee, and their opponents alike, used the PBM as a reference for their claims. The first group felt they had complied with the requirements set, while the second group claimed the requirements had not been fulfilled. In this case, the PBM of 2006 became the source of conflict between majority and minority, injuring the spirit of tolerance between them. The impact of local politics was worsened by the conflict between two politicians competing for the mayor's office. The then mayor

<sup>13</sup>"Pembangunan Masjid Sesuai Aturan," *Timor Express*, 4 July 2011.

<sup>14</sup>"Walikota Kupang: Pembangunan Masjid NurMusofir Telah Penuhi Persyaratan," *Republika*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/11/07/19/lokz2k-walikota-kupang-pembangunan-masjid-nur-musofir-telah-penuhi-persyaratan> (accessed 9 May 2013).

<sup>15</sup>"Walikota Kupang: Pembangunan Masjid Nur Musofir Telah Penuhi Persyaratan."

of Kupang endorsed the mosque construction as he felt the requirements were fulfilled — he sided with the construction committee. The chairman of the Kupang parliament, on the other hand, urged that the construction should be suspended until the requirements were fulfilled — he sided with the protesters.

### *Public Opinion*

The public opinion in the context of the religious conflict refers to the views of religious leaders, leaders of religious organizations, representatives of the FKUB, youth organizations, media, and so forth, on the conflict and on the policing of the conflict. Opinions on the construction of Nur Musafir Mosque within the community varied and were not rarely contradictory. Such views we could obtain from the statements of the parties in the mass media, interviews, or the written data which were gathered during the fieldwork conducted for this research.

Rejection of the mosque construction was predominantly from the Protestant group led by Pastor Judith and the head of Karang Taruna, Buce Rayrutu. The firmness of their stance to reject the mosque was inspired by the bitter experiences of Christians outside the NTT who were not able to build their churches. Pastor Judith (Human Rights Watch 2013) claimed: “Our Christian brothers and sisters in Java have to obey the rules of 2006. We want these rules to apply here as well. If we do not want to obey these rules, they also should not be applied in other areas of Indonesia.”

This kind of bargaining was present in many interviews (Abdul Kadir Makarim, interview, 10 January 2013; Mery Kolimon, interview, 9 January 2013; Pastor Judith, interview, 9 January 2013; Mas Ono, interview, 9 January 2013; Ricky Suciadi, interview, 10 January 2013; Andre Johanes, interview, 10 January 2013). A number of respondents confessed that Christians were no longer visiting Muslim neighbors even during Eid, similarly Muslims would not visit their Christian neighbors during Christmas. In this way the Batuplat community as a whole was on the loser’s position.

Meanwhile, the attitude of Buce Rayrutu did not change since the construction site of the mosque was moved to the new location. He would oppose it as long as the administration process deviated from the regulations. During the meeting on 16 May 2009, he asserted he would reject the mosque construction until the committee fulfilled all the requirements (Minutes of the Meeting to Anticipate Disturbances, Kamtibmas Batuplat, dated 16 May 2009). The youth who were not in Karang Taruna, most of whom were migrants from Ambon long domiciled in Batuplat or who moved recently from Batuplat neighborhood, also protested against the mosque on the grounds that procedures were violated. What surfaced was the anxiety over Islamization and, as mentioned earlier, the bargaining logic that the construction of the mosque in Batuplat should be rejected since the construction of churches was rejected on Java.

However, based on the latest developments (the research team returned to Batuplat in June 2013), the negative impact of the bargaining logic seemed to be fading little by little after the mosque construction committee managed to obtain the signatures to substitute those which were withdrawn. The construction work continued although slowly. Occasionally, the Christian residents who passed by, including those who protested earlier, took time to exchange greetings and chat with the workers or the construction committee members.

The view that the political disturbances on Java, or outside it, has created a chain of political disturbances in NTT was supported by the chairman of MUI NTT, Abdul Kadir Makarim. He mentioned that the tensions of Ketapang incident<sup>16</sup> spread to NTT in November 1998, places of worship and other buildings were destroyed, and so was the kinship between Christians and Muslims. The execution of Fabianus Tibo<sup>17</sup> also added to mutual mistrust. The most heated

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<sup>16</sup>This refers to a clash between Muslims and Christians that broke out in November 1998 in Ketapang, Jakarta. Thirteen people died during the incident, and several churches and Christian-affiliated schools were burned down.

<sup>17</sup>Fabianus Tibo was an Indonesian Catholic citizen executed on 22 September 2006 allegedly for leading riots in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 2000 that led to the murders of about 200 Muslims. Human Rights activists have expressed their doubts that Tibo, or the other men with him, were the masterminds of the riots.

case was that of the construction of the Nur Musafir Mosque: "There may be members of elites who do not want it. Some are saying that why on Java it is so hard to build a church. Let those on Java be crazy on Java! I once said like this. Why must we be as crazy as they are?! We are peaceful, why should we follow madmen?!" said Abdul Kadir Makarim (interview, 8 January 2013).

To avoid worsening of the conflict, he agreed for temporary suspension of the construction and stated that "There are indications of political interests. Religion and certain groups of people are utilized for private interests, especially as the election in Kupang is nearing".<sup>18</sup> This statement was also supported by the chairman of Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda or GP Ansor), Syukur Dapubeang: "I agree that [the construction] should be postponed. Do not let the harmony that we've been building for years be damaged by short-term political interests."<sup>19</sup>

On a different occasion, Pastor Ishak A. Hendrik of GMT also commented in a positive tone. He stressed that the followers of different religions can live in harmony in NTT due to the good cooperation between religious leaders. And also because in NTT many families have members of different religions. "So, as long as we are talking about harmony or peaceful living in Kupang, I think it [the situation] is very conducive here because the cooperation between religious leaders is strong and supported by kinship or family factors" (interview, 10 January 2013).

Pastor Ishak A. Hendrik, who is also active in the FKUB Kupang, added that steps for harmonious relations are still undertaken. He said: "In particular in the FKUB, of the province or district, we always say this from the church pulpits or through public discussions, also with the support from the government. [...] What we are saying is: first, maintain harmony. We should not be affected by all the issues/information that is used to provoke the public to act against

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<sup>18</sup>"MUI Minta Tunda Pembangunan Masjid Batuplat."

<sup>19</sup>"MUI Minta Tunda Pembangunan Masjid Batuplat."

the teachings of religions, especially Christianity. Here the majority are Christians" (Interview, 10 January 2013).

Inter-faith youth organizations should not be forgotten. In this case, the Peace Maker Community of Kupang (Komunitas Peace Maker Kupang, KOMPAK) believes that the community, Muslims and Christians of Batuplat included, needs to live in peace without looking at identities. Some of their activities include discussions and seminars with the themes such as diversity, peace, or non-violence. Inter-faith organizations such as this one are quite rare in Kupang and NTT.

An opinion which also appeared was that the policing action was seen by the Christian majority as excessive for dealing with the conflict. Like when a few dozen of GMIT Kupang youth activists, and the regional coordinator of Klasis Service, Yance Nayoan, arrived at the mayor's office, they were intercepted and escorted by security officers from Kupang police and eventually allowed to enter the building to be received by first the assistant of the Kupang City Secretariat, Jos Rera Beka — at that time the mayor was not at the office.<sup>20</sup> During the groundbreaking ceremony, not only the police but also soldiers from the local military command were present, and as is known by ordinary people, the soldiers are involved to handle riots when the police cannot manage it any longer (Pastor Judith, interview, 9 January 2013).

Because the police response was seen by opponents as exaggerated, the police itself was perceived as not neutral, and defending the party which was building the mosque. The presence of police personnel was seen as siding with the Muslim residents. These allegations were denied by one of the police officers who was handling the case: "The police risks such suspicions when it carries out pacification. The police is protecting the minority group, in this case the Muslim community of Batuplat" (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). If the police response was weak, it could actually trigger the

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<sup>20</sup>"Pemuda Kristen Datangi Kantor Walikota," *Timor Express*, 9 August 2011.

escalation. And, if the police were off guard, it would be impossible to achieve the peacefulness which until now has been enjoyed by the residents Batuplat.

The local and national mass media generally informed about the mosque construction in a balanced way. The news reports included not only the statements of the local government and political elites but also of religious leaders of each group, residents, and youth organizations. The exception to this was the news coverage of online media such as *Voice of Al-Islam* (VoA), which reported in favour of the Muslim group in Batuplat, and used provocative language against Christians.

Contradictory public opinion statements are normal. One cannot impose the unity in views. Different attitudes are common for democracy. It becomes unfair when the media or other parties start to intervene through provocations. Although there was a conflict, most of the people from the parties to the conflict and third parties, expected the mosque dispute to be resolved peacefully. Public opinion in the Batuplat case was not fuelling the conflict.

#### *Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

Police interaction with the parties to the conflict is illustrated by the police action and intervention before, during, and after the conflict incidents took place. This is important because the police cannot be separated from the way they look at society in which they serve. In the case of Batuplat, police understood that the Kupang was pluralistic in terms of religion and ethnicity, and that people were able to live in harmony (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). To maintain this harmony, the police reaction to the conflict was to prevent it and to protect those at risk, especially the minority group.

Police responded to all incidents related to the conflict, proving that they cared about the problems faced by the Batuplat community. Before the conflict escalation between June and August 2011, the police commissioned the Babinkamtibmas staff to socialize with the community and collect information about the occurring problems.



In the period of higher level of disturbances, for example during the groundbreaking ceremony, the police also deployed forces which were assisted by soldiers. After the disturbances subsided, a number of policemen remained on guard around the mosque construction site.

Members of the mosque construction committee generally felt safe, as one of them confessed: "I think both of them [the police and military] are very supportive. Any time I called, they arrived. At the time when [my house] was pelted at night, they came as well."

The discipline in police performance could be seen from their presence and division of duties among the police officers in every phase of the conflict, and the notes/records which were taken for future reference and use in the field. These notes were taken primarily from the police interaction with opponents of the mosque construction. For them the police involvement made the police seem not neutral. "The police are not neutral! And what for are the military deployed?! There was no incident of physical contact," said one of the respondents we interviewed.

From the reaction of the majority, as indicated above, it would need to be considered whether the action of the police (and military) indeed justified the allegations that the amount of security forces was excessive. These allegations were deemed untrue by the police in charge of the Batuplat case. It should be kept in mind that the police applied persuasive measures through involvement of Babinkamtibmas, and not repression. It might be so, in this case, that the allegations of the lack of neutrality indicate that the policing action went well.

It can be concluded that the police reaction to the conflict was positive. They were always present before, during, and after a disturbances occurred. Their presence helped to calm down the situation quickly and to prevent an open conflict. Their reaction to the minority group was also positively assessed, although the preventive measures strategy raised concerns among the members of majority group.

## Conclusions

Policing action in the conflict over construction of Nur Musafir Mosque, in which the Muslim minority and the Christian majority were involved, was relatively successful. The conflict began with the desire of the Muslim community to build a place of worship to accommodate the growing number of the community members. The attempts to build it at the first location failed, while at the second location they were blocked, but after conditions indicated by the fact-finding team were fulfilled, the mosque is now under construction. The conflict went through escalations, but the policing strategy successfully prevented it from breaking out into violence.

The key to the policing success was in the strategy of combining deployment of forces with the persuasive approach. This strategy became advantageous in the context of a conflict over a place of worship, SARA issues, and the preparations for the Kupang election. The police officers carried out their duties based on the constitution and the legal-procedural framework of policing.

The success of this policing strategy was not without taking important records/notes for strengthening the interventions. The mayoral election complicated the policing actions. The dispute between the then mayor and the chairman of the Kupang parliament heated up the situation and caused the local MUI to decide to suspend the mosque construction in order to isolate it from the conflicts around the election.

Another thing which added to complications was the bargaining mechanism used by the majority group: if a church cannot be built on Java and in other places, do not expect a mosque to be built in Batuplat. The factors which facilitated the policing action was the willingness of both parties to the conflict to refrain from violence.

Batuplat success story indicates positive prospects for policing of conflicts over places of worship. Such conflicts are a sensitive issue which the Indonesian police often fails to handle. As a recommendation, the policing in Batuplat would be strengthened by the skills and knowledge of conflict resolution. Knowledge of the aspects of

conflicts (contagious effect, phases, etc.) and conflict resolution (effective communication skills, negotiation, facilitation, problem solving, ethics, etc.) are very relevant, although not the most important, to the duties of the police as the law enforcers.

Another recommendation is that the police cannot and is not supposed to work alone, especially as religious conflicts easily arouse anger and mobilize huge crowds. The more extensive networking and cooperation, also with the conflicted parties, the easier the tasks of the police officers in dealing with the conflicts over places of worship.\*\*\*



## THE CASE OF ABDURRAHMAN MOSQUE, ENDE

### Foreword

The controversy between Muslims and Catholics over construction of mosque in Wolobheto hamlet of Wolokoli village, district Wolowaru in Ende regency, began in the early 2011.<sup>1</sup> The plans of Muslims to build a mosque were rejected by the Catholic residents on the grounds that they did not yet fulfill the requirements of establishing a place of worship set by the PBM (Joint Ministerial Regulation) No. 8 and 9 of 2006. Despite this opposition, the Muslim community continued the construction process, which several times led to tensions between the two parties.

These tensions peaked in August 2011, when the mosque began to be used. To prevent clashes, the government held a meeting between Muspida, Muspika, residents and the parties to the conflict. The meeting took place at the local *adat* house. During the meeting, the police were present and they prevented a confrontation which was about to happen. Up till now, despite mutual disappointment

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<sup>1</sup>Various documents and sources interviewed used the terms “mosque” and “*musala*” interchangeably. For consistency, here we used the term “mosque.”

and grievances, the two conflicted groups have been able to refrain from violence and vigilantism. This was because the society had enough power to quench the conflict. Also the police and the local government had intervened early enough.

This chapter describes and analyzes the role of the police and related agencies in handling the above conflict. After giving a general overview of Ende regency and Wolokoli village, the first part will present briefly the history of the conflict surrounding the mosque construction and the factors considered as conflict triggers. The second part will show how the police performed amid low level of trust bestowed upon them by the public, especially the parties to the conflict. The police intervention in this case was generally minimal. Violence could be avoided because both sides refrained from it.

### **A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Ende**

Ende regency is located in the middle of the island of Flores, East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur, NTT) province. It covers the area of 2046,59 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population of 260,428 (2010 census).<sup>2</sup> The regency is divided into 21 districts, 191 administrative villages and 23 villages. According to the 2010 data, 72% of the population is Catholic (189,445 people), 23% Muslim (71,769), 4% Protestant (5,678), and 1% Hindu (442), Buddhists and Confucianists were altogether 16 people.<sup>3</sup> The number of places of worship in Ende is as follows: 101 mosques, 18 *musalas*, 16 *langgars*, 254 Catholic churches, nine Protestant churches, and three temples.<sup>4</sup>

As the majority, Catholics occupy many of the political and administrative positions. Although there is no such written rule, in the government offices there is usually a mixed Catholic and Muslim representation. This shows in the example of regent and vice regent offices or the chairman and deputy chairman of the FKUB. Interest-

<sup>2</sup>Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Ende, *Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010: Data Agregat per Kecamatan* (Kabupaten Ende, 2010), p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>"Rencana Strategis Kementerian Agama Kantor Kabupaten Ende 2010-2014," p. 2 and 5.

<sup>4</sup>"Rencana Strategis Kementerian Agama Kantor Kabupaten Ende 2010-2014," p. 5.

ingly, the office of the police chief of Ende is held by a Muslim.

The controversy over mosque construction occurred in Wolokoli village of Wolowaru district which consists of 14 villages and one administrative village. Based on the 2010 census, the population of Wolowaru is 15,943 people<sup>5</sup> of whom 1,363 live in Wolokoli.<sup>6</sup> The distance from Wolokoli to Ende is around 60 km or about two hours drive. The road to the village of Wolokoli is full of turns going up and down on the side of Mountain Kelimutu, which is a tourist destination.

The first landmark to be found in the village of Wolokoli is the Wolowaru police office. Wolowaru police personnel consists of the police chief, deputy police chief and 11 officers, who must handle three sub-districts, and 64 villages with about 120 hamlets. Besides being responsible for security, they often have additional work in overseeing the National Examination (*Ujian Nasional*) and local elections in places that are difficult to reach. The distance from the police station to the location of the Wolobheto Mosque is about 15 to 30 minutes drive because the roads are not in a good condition.

When we visited the site, the disputed mosque was already erected but a few things such as windows and walls, seemed still under construction. The building was a simple cube of 10 meters side plus a patch of space for the preacher. What distinguishes it from other buildings are two small domes on the roof and a loud-speaker attached to one of the windows. Inside the mosque there is a space for woman and a hall for sermons, with a whiteboard and a small shelf to store *mukena* (women praying dress) and the Koran. To call for the prayer time, the loudspeakers would be used, but the sound is directed into the room.

The mosque is located near the local *adat* house compound, where the chairman of the mosque construction committee, Muhamad Nggori, serves as a *musalaki* (landlord or a traditional leader). Only a small part of the Muslim population lives around the mosque. The

<sup>5</sup>Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Ende (2010: 15).

<sup>6</sup>Penduduk Indonesia menurut Desa Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010.

majority of local residents are Catholics. Not far from the location of the mosque, in Jopu village adjacent to Wolokoli, stands the church of St. Virgin Mary, the centre of Jopu parish which is led by Father Felix Jawa.

### **Conflict Over the Abdurrahman Mosque**

Tensions related to the mosque construction in the village of Wolobheto were first visible in the late January of 2011. They peaked in August-September 2011, when the mosque was completed and set into use.

The Muslim residents who were then led by Muhamad Nggori (later referred to as Nggori) desired to establish a mosque because of the considerable distance from the nearest one. According to various sources, the distance to the nearest mosque, in the village of Mbuliloo, was between 500 meters to one kilometer, or about 15-30 minutes by foot. Nggori felt the distance was difficult for Muslims during Friday prayers. The local residents, Muslim and Catholic alike, worked together to transport stones and sand in preparation for the construction.

The construction committee was formed during a meeting on 24 January 2011. At the meeting, the Wolokoli village chief, Vincentius Gaga, reminded the committee that the construction should fulfil the requirements of the establishment of places of worship as stipulated in the PBM No. 8 and No. 9 of 2006. The initiative to familiarize the community with the 2006 PBM was made by the village chief after consultations with Father Felix Jawa, the leader of Jopu parish.

As a head of the construction committee, Nggori was surprised to hear about the regulations delivered by the village chief and said the construction would continue. In fact, it should not be difficult for the committee to fulfill the PBM 2006 requirements if Catholics were already helping them to build the mosque. It seems that as *musalaki* who traditionally ruled over the land, Nggori's pride would be hurt had he submitted to the village chief.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The village chief, Vincentius Gaga, is a family member of Muhamad Nggori, since he is married to Nggori's younger sister.



After the meeting rumors and prejudices were spread by both sides. Muslims suspected the village chief, a Catholic, of maneuvers to complicate the mosque construction. On the other hand, Catholics suspected that Nggori was influenced by Islamic hard-liners for daring to ignore the government rules. After this incident Catholics no longer participated in transporting stones and sand to the construction site. Instead of approaching the Catholics, Nggori appealed to Muslims from the nearby villages. The local residents stopped greeting each other and the tensions were felt by all.

The news about tensions reached the district level, precisely the office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ende and the FKUB. On 1 February 2011, the head of administration of the Ministry in Ende, Yosef Nganggo, and the chairman of the FKUB, Father Ambrosius Nanga, went to monitor the situation in Wolokoli. Both of them also met the village chief and his staff. In their report they concluded that “residents still live in harmony despite frictions.” Then the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ende and the FKUB suggested that the PBM should be introduced to the entire community and called on the village chief and local residents to maintain peace and order.

Based on the written request of the Wolokoli village chief, dated 5 February 2011, the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Ende, the chairman and the members of the FKUB, the chairman of the MUI Ende, and Muspika Wolowaru, provided explanation on how to introduce the PBM, during the meeting at the Wolokoli village office on 7 February 2011.<sup>8</sup> In the meeting, the chairman of the MUI Ende, H. Abdurrahman Aroeboesman, expressed the view that the construction of *musala* could not be implemented because the requirements of the PBM were not fulfilled.<sup>9</sup> The then Wolowaru police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar, was also present and seconded this view.

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<sup>8</sup>“Laporan Khusus” Kantor Kemenag Kab. Ende (Ministry of Religious Affairs office Ende) No. Kd. 20.08/1/OT 01.2/298/2011, dated 25 February 2011, to the head of Ministry of Religious Affairs office NTT.

<sup>9</sup>Letter of the Wolokoli village chief to Wolowaru district head No. Pem.140/97/VIII/DW/2011, dated 1 August 2011, on Kamtibmas.

After the meeting, two members of the Ende office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs staff, H. Pua Ibrahim and A. Wahab, as well as the head of the Ministry's office in Wolowaru, Abu Bakar Rasyid, reviewed the construction site. It was apparently interpreted by Nggori as a sign of support to continue the construction of the mosque. A few days later, a messenger from the Ministry went back to the site to clarify and persuade Nggori to delay construction. Their efforts did not succeed as Nggori did not obey.<sup>10</sup>

The members of Muspida took part in a meeting on 20 February 2011, in Wolobheto. At the meeting, the regional secretary of Ende, the first assistant to the regent, and the deputy police chief of Ende were present together with the chairman of the MUI Ende, the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ende, and the Muspika of Wolowaru. The meeting was chaired by the Ende secretary, Drs. Ansar Rera. The head of the Ministry's office was the first one to introduce the PBM. After him the chairman of the MUI and the Ende deputy police chief. The Wolokoli village chief provided an explanation and then Nggori and Father Felix were welcomed to convey their aspirations before the dialog session.

The meeting produced a number of agreements, but they were not written and not disseminated to the public. The agreements, as noted in the documentation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, were as follows:<sup>11</sup>

- Construction plans could go on but not for building a place of worship (mosque/*musala*) but a house.
- The building is to have a shape of an ordinary house. Features of a mosque or *musala* are not allowed. Wolowaru district head, Wolokoli village chief and the head of Ministry of Religious Af-

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<sup>10</sup>"Laporan Khusus" Kantor Kemenag Kab. Ende (Ministry of Religious Affairs office Ende) No. Kd. 20.08/1/OT01.2/298/2011, dated 25 February 2011, to the head of Ministry of Religious Affairs office NTT. See also the Letter of the Wolokoli village chief to Wolowaru district head No. Pem.140/97/VIII/DW/2011, dated 1 August 2011, on Kamtibmas.

<sup>11</sup>"Laporan Khusus" Kantor Kemenag Kab. Ende (Ministry of Religious Affairs office Ende) No. Kd.20.08/1/OT01.2/298/2011, dated 25th February 2011, to the head of Ministry of Religious Affairs office NTT.

fairs office in Wolowaru were to monitor the construction.

- When the construction is finished, the Muslim community should approach the owner of the house to rent it for use as a temporary place of worship.
- To obtain a temporary permit for the use of the house as a place of worship, the initiator must take care of all the requirements and apply to the head of the Ministry's office in Ende and to the chairman of the FKUB Ende.
- If the head of the Ministry's office in Ende and the chairman of the FKUB Ende decide that the building is appropriate for a place of worship, they would forward a recommendation to the Ende regent.
- Ende regent has a prerogative to give or not to give permission for the place to be used as a temporary place of worship.
- Only when the regent issues the permit, the place could be used as a temporary place of worship.

On the next day, 21 February 2011, Nggori began to build the foundations with assistance of Muslims from several villages including Mbuliwaralau, Bokasape, Mbuliloo, Rindiawawo and Nakambara. This by Catholics was perceived as a provocation, but they refrained from reacting after intervention from the government and the Jopu parish.

Since then, for several months of the ongoing construction, the atmosphere in Wolokoli was relatively peaceful. No meetings of Muspida or Muspika were held at that time.

Tensions again emerged at the end of July 2011 (ahead of Ramadan 1432) after the building was completed and set into use with a complete dome and loudspeakers. On 1 August 2011, Wolokoli village chief sent a letter to the Wolowaru district head and forwarded it also to various agencies, making reference to the disruption of social order in the village Wolokoli. In the letter he reported that the disputed mosque was standing complete with a variety of religious attributes and had been used since 21 July 2011. The village chief

also mentioned that on 31 July 2011, the loudspeakers were used in a noisy manner and that the residents of Wolokoli were “feeling restless, distracted and deceived.”<sup>12</sup>

The letter was fiery. Some parts of it were written in capital letters, bold and underlined. The village chief also mentioned that the presence of the mosque disturbed the customary ritual sacrifice of pigs and dogs during house construction, and that the residents worried their pigs and dogs would not be free to roam since there was a mosque. He suspected there were hardliners “backing” Nggori since he dared to ignore the PBM of 2006 and all protests. Finally, the village chief also underlined that the matter was “a time bomb ready to explode.”

On 7 August 2011, about 20 Catholic women complained on the use of loudspeakers to the Wolowaru district chief and the Wolowaru police chief. In the afternoon, the Wolowaru district chief with Kesbangpol Ende sent four officers to the scene to monitor the situation. They could not do much except for appealing for calm.<sup>13</sup>

In response to the reports of residents, the local government held a coordination meeting on 8 August 2011 in the office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ende, which was attended by the first assistant of Setkab Ende, Ende deputy police chief, head of the district Kesbangpolinmas Ende, FKUB, and Kasi/Gara of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Ende. It was approved to hold a meeting with the residents of Wolokoli. On the same day the group went to the location guarded by the mobile brigade and Dalmas of Ende police. The meeting was planned in the Wolowaru district office, but after the demands from the residents, it was shifted to Wolokoli village, to Wolobheto *adat* house.

The atmosphere in the meeting was tense. Government officials, along with leaders of the Catholic group sat on one side, while Ng-

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<sup>12</sup>Letter of the Wolokoli village chief to Wolowaru district head No. Pem.140/97/VIII/DW/2011, dated 1 August 2011, on Kamtibmas.

<sup>13</sup>Report of Kamtibmas Wolowaru to the regent No. BKPM.330/745/VIII/2011, dated 7 August 2011.

gori and his family on the other. Around them local residents were flocking, and a few armed members of mobile brigade were on guard. Both sides were quarrelling and almost clashed but the security forces and religious leaders managed to calm them down. After having taken into account legal, religious and cultural, approaches, the meeting yielded the following resolutions:

- Muslims who build the mosque (represented by H. Iramsyah Muh. Mberu) apologized for violating the rules of the construction of places of worship and stated that they were willing to lower the dome as well as to stop the use of loudspeakers.
- Those who needed the place of worship were ready to take the procedural path to obtain the permit for using the building as a temporary place of worship.

After the meeting, the dome was never lowered and the loudspeakers were off for a few days only. On 12 September 2011, a number of representatives of the Catholic community of Jopu parish, approached the Ende regent, leaders of the local parliament and the Ende police chief. They asked about the government's attitude towards the violations made by Nggori which could result in a conflict in the Wolokoli village.

This was followed by Ministry of Religious Affairs sending, on 17 September 2011, two separate teams to each of the parties to the conflict. The first team met the Muslims who were represented by Muhamad Nggori and H. Iramsyah M Mberu. Nggori stated he would stick to the already existing mosque building and was seeking to receive the permit from the government. He also claimed that on 22 August 2011, he had met with the village officials and members of Muspika (district head, police chief and Danramil). In that meeting it was agreed that the building would be used for worship, but the loudspeakers would not be switched on.

Meanwhile, the second team met the Catholic community representative, the priest of Jopu parish. The meeting took place in Jopu rectory. The Wolobheto Catholic community leader maintained that

the places of worship must follow the PBM and that during the 20 February 2011 meeting, there was an agreement made and it should be respected. He felt that they had already went through all the processes to submit their objections and sought the settlement from the regent and vice regent.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs suggested that the government should immediately follow up and hold a meeting outside Wolokoli. This was also reported in the Ministry's meeting with the vice regent on 20 September 2011. Since then the Ministry no longer held meetings with residents or issued reports on the situation as it did earlier.

The meeting was held again around August 2012. Muhamad Nggori and H. Iramsyah Mberu called to the regent's office to meet with regent and Muspida. In the meeting, were no one from the Catholic side was present, the regent said that the mosque could be used for worship as long as the loudspeakers were not used excessively.<sup>14</sup> Such message was also delivered by the local government officials who came with a visit during Ramadan 1433 H (July-August 2012).

When this report was completed both sides were still disappointed and holding resentments towards each other. Yet the situation seemed safe and under control. There were no clashes or attacks that claimed lives or material losses. But anxiety and hostility could not be hidden. When the call for prayer was heard, Catholics would play loud music. Catholic and Muslim neighbors no longer greeted each other as they used to. Rumors and gossips made them suspicious of one another.

Such conflict was something new in the history of Jopu. The efforts to judicialize a natural social process through the PBM, disturbed the harmony between Muslims and Catholics. Earlier, both communities would help each other to build a mosque or a church. This was stopped after the PBM was introduced to the residents and triggered hostility between the two groups.

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<sup>14</sup>See "Pokok-pokok Arahan Bupati Ende Pada Rapat Koordinasi Perumusan Kebijakan di Bidang Pemerintahan, Hukum dan Keamanan Ketertiban Masyarakat," Monday, 23 July 2012.

## **Dynamics of Policing the Conflict over the Mosque**

### *Policing Activities*

Information about tensions in Wolobheto reached the Wolowaru police chief in early February 2011. The police took part in the regency's efforts to introduce the matter of PBM on 7 February 2011, two weeks after the meeting of the village chief with the construction committee. But since the police himself did not yet know the contents of PBM, his appeals could only be general, regarding Kamtibmas or traffic order.

Upon the insistence from the local residents, the sub-district police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar (interview, 20 April 2013), was asked by the district head to ban the mosque construction by force. He refused. The building foundation was ready and the construction process was ongoing so it would be very disturbing if it was stopped forcibly. He also claimed to have consulted the matter with the district police chief and did not receive orders to stop the construction.

The police chief also believed that prohibiting construction of places of worship was in the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the FKUB. He only appealed to Nggori to follow the procedures and seek the acceptance of local residents. The deputy police chief, Yohanes Fono (interview, 22 April 2013), said that to anticipate potential security threats the police officers made daily patrols and reports on the situation.

Because the police was reluctant or unable to stop the construction of the mosque, the Catholic group suspected them of siding with the Muslims. Such complaint was made by Catholics to the district police chief. There is no official statement from the police regarding the truth of these allegations, but the leadership of the police Wolowaru had changed several times. Since the emergence of tensions in February 2011, and until this report was completed, the Wolowaru police chiefs changed four times and represented different religions, from Ali Hasan Mukhtar, (Muslim), Anom Triyatna (Hindu), Fidelis (Catholic), and Made Kadek (Hindu).

Although each of the police chiefs gave attention to the problem in Jopu, their handling of the situation was not as good as their predecessors. Each new police chief had to build a relationship with the parties to the conflict from zero, which required both the time and capabilities. Nggori, for example, claimed that the last police chief never visited him. Members of the police who followed this conflict since the beginning and who were still serving there included the deputy of the sub-district police chief and the head of intelligence unit.

Thus far, there has been no information from the police, Kesbangpol and Linmas, Ministry of Religious Affairs or the Jopu parish regarding any mass mobilization, except for during the meetings involving both parties to the conflict. In each meeting, the police was present to guard or to appease. Claims of the mass mobilization were made only by Nggori (interview, 23 April 2013) who said that he nearly clashed with the Catholic residents who wanted to tear down the mosque dome and that he had already prepared weapons such as machetes and spears.

Deployment of a considerable number of police personnel took place on 8 August 2011. John Philipus, head of Linmas Kesbangpol Ende (interview, 19 April 2013), reported that around 30 officers of Dalmas and mobile brigade were deployed to escort the officials on their way to the meeting in Jopu village. The order to deploy mobile brigade officers came directly from the district police chief. Wolowaru sub-district police chief (interview, 20 April 2013) confessed that he never requested additional assistance of the mobile brigade personnel. He felt confident that he could handle the situation with his own officers.

Besides guarding the meeting, the police were also monitoring the situation to anticipate rumors which could disrupt security. As narrated by the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office (interview, 19 April 2013), tensions emerged after rumors that a third party was involved in the conflict.<sup>15</sup> It is not clear who the third party

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<sup>15</sup>It is not clear who was meant the third party. But from the testimony of Jopu parish priest, there were people from outside Wolobheto who several times came to help in the mosque construction and the local residents suspected them to be Islamic hardliners.



was, but some of the local residents claimed that it was the outsiders who often arrived to assist in the mosque construction. The tensions were not followed by pelting or clashes; there were merely verbal attacks. In these situations, police and Koramil were busy monitoring.

Deputy district police chief, Yohanes Fono (interview, 22 April 2013), said that rumors were circulating via texts (SMS) and anonymous phone calls. The police arrived to investigate and to calm the residents. Then another rumor was spread that war between the two parties ("*baku potong*") would take place. This reached the regent who asked the police for clarification. After the investigation it appeared that the rumors were not true.

Nggori admitted (interview, 23 April 2013) that it was the police chief (Ali Hasan Mukhtar) who calmed him down when he nearly clashed with the Catholics who allegedly were going to lower the mosque's dome. Nggori also mentioned that the police and army who came in six trucks, were on guard at his home after people requested the dome to be removed.<sup>16</sup> Nggori told the opponents that he would not hesitate to remove the cross from their church if the mosque dome was lowered. He also opposed the police who were trying to persuade him to lower the dome.

The police were not taking repressive measures or seeking legal proceedings with regard to the conflict in Wolobheto. Since there were no clashes or criminal acts, the police considered repressive measures as potentially dangerous.

### *Police Knowledge*

From a number of Ende police members we interviewed, only the police chief, AKBP Musni Arifin, seemed to know, though not in detail, the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of the

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<sup>16</sup>Muhamad Nggori did not mention the exact date but referred to it as the biggest of the recent events, around Ramadan 2012. Meanwhile in the Dit Intelkam Polda NTT daily report No. R/LHI-22/VIII/2012/Dit Intelkam, on Sunday, 12 August there was "a polemic over Abdurrahman *musala* construction in Wolobheto, Wolokoli village, Wolowaru district, related to the construction permit."

National Police. He only complained that its application was not easy.

Wolowaru police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar (interview, 20 April 2013), claimed there was no regulation on human rights. Therefore, he only followed the general guidelines of Kamtimbas when dealing with the conflict over a place of worship in Jopu. Despite not knowing the regulation, the police chief agreed that everyone had a right to choose a religion and to worship in accordance with their religion.

According to John Philipus, the head of Linmas Kesbangpol of Ende (interview, 19 April 2013), the police should know about human rights, including the right to worship. According to him, even if not provided in regulations, the issues of human rights and religious tolerance are clearly stipulated in the constitution and are taught by one's own family.

With regard to the PBM of 2006, the sub-district police chief (interview, 20 April 2013) confessed he did not know it before the whole row and the introduction efforts made by the district officials. He learnt about the rule of 90-60 persons' support and provisions on the use of loudspeakers after the Ministry of Religious Affairs presented them in February 2011.

Vincentius Gaga, the village chief (interview, 22 April 2013), admitted he introduced PBM in 2007, but not many people were present and his own copy of the PBM was already lost. He obtained the new copy of the PBM of 2006 from Father Felix Jawa, and that copy he later used at the meeting on 24 January 2011. The village chief also confirmed that the police personnel did not know the rules of the PBM 2006 until the Ministry and FKUB presented them.

Some believed that the PBM became the trigger of the whole conflict. The deputy sub-district police chief, Yohanes Fono (interview, 22 April 2013), stated that "this is because of regulations. If there were no rules, there would be no problem. The village chief was also exaggerating. Frictions started, people stopped greeting each other."

The chairman of the parish council (interview, 22 April 2013) admitted that before knowing the rules, residents had good relationships: "At first, because we did not know the rules, everything was just normal. We helped bringing stones and so on to build it [the mosque]. Then came the government team to introduce [the regulations]. Priests and *ulama* came. And after that we were against [the construction]."

This too was recognized by the village chief (interview, 22 April 2013): "Earlier the community support here was incredible. They [Catholics] joined to bring the sandstone. But after I conveyed [the PBM rules], they withdrew."

Meanwhile, according to the Jopu parish priest, Father Felix (interview, 22 April 2013), what triggered the conflict was the mosque itself; before the plans to build it emerged, the relations between residents were very good, especially as Muhamad Nggori is a member of the family of traditional leaders. Father Felix admitted that he himself told the village chief to suggest that Nggori should build a small place of worship for family prayers, and without loudspeakers. Since Nggori still wanted to build a mosque, he asked the village chief to read the PBM 2006 and to introduce it to Nggori.

Father Felix regretted Nggori's change of attitude. He said: "In the past we would normally exchange greetings. I would give a ride to his family to the orchard. Muhamad's wife is a former Catholic who converted to Islam. Now we are enemies. I regret his attitude suddenly changed so completely."

For the district police chief, AKBP Musni Arifin (interview, 22 April 2013), PBM 2006 alone was not the only reason of tensions. According to him, the conflict also arose because of rumors and provocations: "Problems arose after provocation which made Catholics reject the construction. Then emerged the issue of the dome, loudspeakers, and it all spread. We suspect there was a provocation because, logically, why in the beginning there were no tensions [there was communal work, they together transported stones and sand]?"

Evidence of a provocation is hard to find because most likely it was a word of mouth behind closed doors.

Chairman of the mosque construction committee, Nggori (interview, 23 April 2013) also complained about unsettling issues which disturbed the harmony in his village: "Since the 1990s, we were helping in church construction, carrying stones and sand. We know tolerance. But lately there've been various issues [disrupting solidarity]. I also do not know [why]. Catholics do not want to come help us anymore [to build the mosque]."

One of the rumors which disturbed the residents was, as narrated by Nggori's family member (interview, 23 April 2013), that Muslims would "throw a bomb." Although there was no evidence, residents of the neighborhood were scared and slept in the orchards. When nights fell, the village was dark, no lights were switched on.

Whether or not the terms of establishment of a place of worship were fulfilled, is still confusing. Catholics claimed that Muslims have not and were unwilling to fulfill the terms of PBM 2006. Meanwhile, Muslims said that they already had the permit from the regent, although not in a written form.

Based on the records of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 19 April 2013), Muslims in Wolobheto were only about 60 people, including minors. Thus, the PBM 2006 provision which required 90 identity cards (of Muslims) and 60 of supporters (non-Muslims) could not be met. The village chief (interview, 22 April 2013) said that in 2013 in Wolobheto only 85 inhabitants were Muslim. In 2011, when the mosque was built, the number of Muslims, according to him, was even less. On the other hand, Nggori (interview, 23 April 2013) claimed that during a meeting in July 2012, the regent gave a permission to use the mosque.<sup>17</sup>

This confusion became one of the obstacles for the police in carrying out their duties. Police also had difficulties in approaching

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<sup>17</sup>See "Pokok-pokok Arahan Bupati Ende Pada Rapat Koordinasi Perumusan Kebijakan di Bidang Pemerintahan, Hukum dan Keamanan Ketertiban Masyarakat," Monday, 23 July 2012.

both sides because it was often considered as not neutral. When the Catholic residents denounced the police attitude, according to the village chief (interview, 22 April 2013), the district police chief held his badge and swore that it was not as they alleged.

But on the other hand, the police work was much facilitated by others who wanted to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. Parish priest was still able to control and appease his people. In addition, blood relationships (kinship) established many years ago, made the warring sides able to refrain. As told by Nggori himself (interview, 23 April 2013), “[It is possible] only because of kinship. If we made it [killed each other], we would lose our own relatives.”

#### *Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution*

The police did not specify the legal basis used for handling the conflict over the place of worship in Jopu. But they deployed the Dalmas and mobile brigade (Brimob) units on 8 August 2011.

Police AKBP Musni Arifin (interview, 22 April 2013), on various occasions often suggested that the government should use cultural approach and approach based on family relations in addition to the legal means: “The police repeatedly urged the government, in this case the Muspida, to quickly resolve this issue and recommended cultural approach. PBM and alike should be set aside for a while.”

Similarly, John Philipus, the head of Kesbangpol Ende who is also a member of Kominda (interview, 19 April 2013), said that “By application of a detached and formal way it would be very hard.” But in the conflict over Wolobheto Mosque, the cultural approach, according to him, would also be difficult, because the actors of the conflict, especially Muhamad Nggori, were the traditional leaders.

When asked why the police sometimes did not act neutrally, John Philipus (interview, 19 April 2013) stated that it depended on the decisiveness of the leadership and the fact that after all the police too were humans: “The police being neutral or not depends on the leadership. Indeed, when people join the police, there are rules and provisions. But the police are also human beings; there is dynamics

and there are differences [which affects neutrality]. And the police work is also very tiring.”

Cases involving the matters of religion were viewed by the police as very sensitive issues which had to be handled carefully. When he was asked by the district head to remove the loudspeakers, the police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar (interview, 20 April 2013) refused to “be slammed by fellow believers.” To address religious issues, the support for the police action should be really strong, he said. But he did not mention the need for special rules or procedures. He only said that the police action should be in line with that of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and other government agencies.

Police also did not seem to have much experience in dealing with disputes over places of worship. Religious issues that are often encountered by the Ende police included the matter of Hostia contamination or errors during receiving the holy communion bread at the end of the Catholic mass, which is considered desecration. In many cases it was done by Protestants or Catholics themselves because of lack of knowledge. Yet Hostia contamination could lead to huge sanctions: it can be considered as a criminal offence under the law on blasphemy and abuse of religion.

Other issues in Ende were inter-tribal conflicts, usually over the land. In tribal conflicts that involved criminal acts the police acted decisively. Land disputes between *musalaki* in Nduaria village, for example, lead to judicial trial because of knifing incident. Attackers from both sides were sentenced to four months in prison. John Philipus (interview, 19 April 2013) said that the police could be decisive if the problem was clearly identified. The important thing was to know the tribal rules and whether there were any outside influences or other causes of frictions. To establish that, he said, intelligence action was applied.

### *Police Culture*

Although the majority of the population is Catholic, not a few police officers in Ende are Muslims. Police chief, AKBP Musni Arifin

(interview, 22 April 2013), stated that the religion of a police chief was not an issue or a problem, neither internally in the police institution nor in the community. The proof was his being the police chief in the Catholic-majority Ende. To him, "religion is *hablun minallah* [relation between men and God]. While the task of policing is in accordance with regulations."

Generally, the members of Ende police were changing in their tasks of guarding the public worship. On Fridays non-Muslim police members were guarding the mosque, while on Sundays the Muslim or Hindu police officers were guarding the church. Besides their main tasks of maintaining security and order, the police officers were trained to respect diversity. Spiritual activities were regularly held at the police station, and speakers were often invited.

In dealing with the conflict over mosque construction in Wolobheto, the sub-district police chief (interview, 20 April 2013) repeatedly asserted that his actions were not influenced by religious sentiments. As a Muslim, he admitted, he was more likely to side with Muslims whose mosque was questioned. But he always reminded Nggori to follow procedures. He felt he had no personal interests in defending Muslims in Wolobheto. Nevertheless, the police chief admitted, some people alleged he had, just because he is a Muslim himself.

This became a dilemma for the police chief. On the one hand, he was accused of siding with Muslims if he approached the party represented by Nggori. On the other hand, if the police chief did not approach Nggori, persuasion efforts would become more difficult. The police chief admitted that while Nggori no longer wanted to hear from the government officials, he would still want to listen to him and his intelligence staff. The police chief also admitted he was never afraid to tell Nggori that he was wrong with regard to permissions. But this was not taken seriously by Catholics since Nggori kept on going with the construction and did not care about the rules.

Out of the four police chiefs who served in Wolowaru, neither Muslim, Catholic nor Hindu, dared to expressly prohibit the mosque construction or to pull it down. This shows that there were

other factors taken into consideration than the police chiefs' own religious sentiments. There were matters of overlapping regulations and authority, and the matter of the lack of incentive to act.

The relationships between the Catholic majority and the Muslim minority of Wolobheto have their own complexities which cannot be reduced to the relationship between the strong and the weak. The village chief (interview, 22 April 2013) told that once Nggori said to him "who rules Indonesia if not us, Muslims?" Although from a minority, Nggori was still a *musalaki* in the predominantly Catholic society.

The police chief himself (interview, 22 April 2013) admitted that Nggori was a temperamental person and was unwilling to discuss this issue. Nggori did not even bother to behave politely towards government officials. According to the police chief, for both sides it became a matter of honor, and no longer of seeking a solution. Towards the police chief Nggori was also stubborn, despite being approached many times, he still insisted to continue the building development.

However, amid these disturbances almost all of those who were interviewed, including the warring sides, believed that both Muslims and Catholics of Wolobheto could coexist. Relocation was not an issue here. Besides being impossible since the position of Nggori as *musalaki*, both sides also secretly longed for unity. In the previous section it was already mentioned that the Catholic and Muslim communities there were still a one extended family, and as it is said "blood [kinship] comes first, then religion."

Nggori himself (interview, 23 April 2013) confessed he knew about tolerance. According to him, since the 1990s, Muslims were helping in church construction. At the same time, the parish priest, Father Felix Jawa (interview, 22 April 2013), denied the allegations that he held and anti-Islamic sentiments:

I have visited the Wologawi community (Muslim majority). They said they were struggling to finish their mosque ceiling. I said I would call my friends, hopefully we could help, if we have resources. Then we gave some help. They are



good people. Catholics are a minority there in a Muslim majority village. But they [Muslims] and I are like siblings. We visit them during Eid. All in harmony.

Father Felix continued that where the majority are Catholics, they must act to protect minorities. At the meeting on 20 February 2011, which was mentioned earlier, he said directly to Nggori: "Who says that Catholics complicate things? We are living in a country where we have laws which govern all of us. When the requirements are fulfilled, we'll be the first ones to help you build [the mosque]."

### *Local Politics*

In the conflict over Wolobheto Mosque, the regent did not come to address the issue directly, but rather delegated the regional secretary and the first assistant who along Kesbangpol, Linmas, and deputy district police chief took part in the PBM introduction meeting on 20 February 2011. During the meeting, the secretary decided that Muslims could build a mosque but without the distinctive features of a place of worship.

The regent became directly involved in mid-2012, when he called Nggori's party for dialogue with the Muspida. The regent, Drs. Don Bosco M. Wangga, gave a directive that the place of worship which was already built in Wolobheto, could be used, although it had not yet received a permission from the local government as the PBM 2006 required, but it should be a family place of worship and the loudspeakers should not be turned on. During the meeting Nggori said he accepted the regent's directive, but despite that the loudspeakers were still used, although only for the call to prayer and in low volume.

According to Father Felix (interview, 22 April 2013), Nggori's persistence was slightly influenced by local politics. According to him, a politician from that constituency "played with fire to gain sympathy." The person he meant was a member of the local parliament from the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang) who provided assistance with loudspeakers to the Wolobheto Mosque. The head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office and the chair-

man of the MUI (interviews, 19 and 20 April 2013) confirmed that the person concerned indeed intended to provide assistance. Then the Catholics protested and the village chief requested the Ministry to hold another meeting.

However, given the small number of Muslims, it would be quite surprising if the politician sought to win the sympathy of prospective voters. If he indeed had political interests, he would approach the Catholic majority.

The Ministry itself (interview, 19 April 2013) admitted that they did not know the motives of the politician. Similarly, the chairman of the MUI did not know whether the assistance was requested or given because of the need of the heart. He added that the politician was surprised that his assistance caused such a fuss.

When asked about this issue, Nggori himself (interview, 23 April 2013) admitted indifference towards political parties. He said he would choose anyone who was from his family or came from his region. He also claimed to like Gerindra party for their support to farmers. Thus, he said, the benefits the politician could get for his assistance were insignificant. But intentionally or not, his help caused unrest among Catholics.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Ende is the government institution which from the beginning was actively involved in handling the issue of the mosque construction in Wolobheto. The head of the office, Yosef Nganggo (interview, 19 April 2013) said that the Ministry's efforts could be seen already at the early stage. The Ministry was been engaged in monitoring and reporting on the situation as early as on 1 February 2011. With the FKUB it also facilitated meetings in Wolokoli on 7 and 20 February 2011. There was a misunderstanding due to which the Ministry was seen as supporting the construction, but it was cleared. During each meeting, the Ministry urged the village residents to maintain harmony and order. The results of each meeting were discussed with the Ministry's provincial NTT office and agencies related.

When the construction was completed and tensions reoccurred, on 8 August 2011, the Ministry coordinated with the Muspida to meet the Wolokoli residents. At that meeting it no longer insisted on fulfillment of the PBM requirements, but rather that the residents should remember to value cultural harmony and their ancestral traditions, since they all were bonded by kinship.

The district police chief believed (interview, 22 April 2013) that the PBM in 2006 was released not to contain the worship rights. Only when it was applied in different places and for different people various issues emerged. Of similar opinion was the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Ende, Yosef Nganggo, (interview, 19 April 2013) according to whom the PBM could not be applied rigidly: “[PBM] cannot be effectively applied across the country because it could destroy the “local ethic” (local tradition). Local leaders should have the right to make additional rules.”

According to the FKUB chairman, Father Ambrosius Nanga (interview, 19 April 2013), the PBM could become a good regulation. But in practice it made establishment of places of worship difficult for minorities. Meanwhile, according to the chairman of the MUI, Djamal Humris (interview, 20 April 2013), the PBM in 2006 allowed people to negotiate: “PBM is actually good, but many people complain that in certain places, [we] can’t build a house of worship. It should provide a space for people to negotiate, to be flexible.”

Nggori’s family member (interview, 23 April 2013) admitted he questioned the PBM in one of the meetings. He asked for a letter, in black and white, if the mosque construction was indeed forbidden, but he never received one. He recounted:

They ordered us to have a permission first, to fulfill the requirement of 90 identity cards of Muslims and 60 of non-Muslims, only then it [the mosque] could be built. But we just continued. At that time I asked whether the law narrows or broadens people’s right to perform worship in accordance with their respective beliefs? I requested a letter in black and white that the place could not be built. But they never gave such letter. So we continued with the construction.

John Philipus, the head of Kesbangpol and Linmas in Ende (interview, 19 April 2013), explained the difficulties which the government was facing and asked for the understanding of all parties. He stated that government action had its limits, since it could not be authoritarian. An authoritarian solution would even cause a bigger commotion. According to him, a detached formal approach was unlikely to succeed.

In the midst of the limitations faced by the government, many people were disappointed by the relationship between the regent, Don Bosco Wangge, and the vice-regent, Achmad Mochdar, who did not get on well before the October 2013 local election in Ende. They were not running together in the election but with other candidates for vice-regent's office. In fact, many people expected the regent and vice-regent, who were representing the Catholic and Muslim communities, to come together to the conflict site to resolve the issue.

The Ende election was held in two rounds. Achmad Mochdar with his partner lost in the first round, while Don Bosco Wangge with his partner lost in the run-off.<sup>18</sup>

### *Public Opinion*

The attitude of the MUI Ende was in line with the government policy and it helped to deliver the government's appeals on various occasions. The MUI was always involved in the meetings. Father Felix recalled (interview, 22 April 2013) that during the meeting on 8 August 2011, "The chairman of the MUI, late Abdurrahman, cried when he was sitting next to me, said that God knows we do not have to use *Toa* [speaker] to pray, God hears the content of our hearts. Lower the dome. We will strive but step by step, [first] follow the rules."

The MUI was also present on the closed meeting at the regent's office between the Muspida and representatives of Jopu Muslims

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<sup>18</sup>"KPU Tetapkan Marsel-Djafar Sebagai Bupati dan Wakil Bupati Ende." <http://kupang.tribunnews.com/2013/12/07/kpu-tetapkan-marsel-djafar-sebagai-bupati-dan-wakil-bupati-ende> (accessed 10 December 2013).

ahead of Ramadan 2012. On that occasion, the new chairman of the MUI, Djamal Humris (interview, 20 April 2013), suggested that Nggori should thank the regent for allowing the use of the mosque building. He then asked Nggori to respect local residents and to limit the use of loudspeakers.

According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 19 April 2013) the MUI Ende has never issued a controversial fatwa like its counterparts in Java. This was admitted by the MUI chairman himself (interview, 20 April 2013), "For example the fatwa regarding Christmas, we respect it [Christmas], but do not participate in the rituals. I join at the greetings part of the event, not during the ritual. Participation does not weaken my faith. My relationship with the provincial and central MUIs is fine."

Nggori's views of the MUI did not seem too good. He admitted (interview, 23 April 2013) he was irritated by the MUI which was always persuading him to postpone the construction of the mosque and asked its dome to be lowered. He even considered the death of the previous MUI chairman a karmic result of his request that the mosque should not have the dome and pulpit.

When the conflict seemed to have reached a dead end and there was no middle way, the parish in his limited ways tried to reduce the conflict in order to avoid clashes and violence. The potential of violence in Wolobheto was quite high. Father Felix (interview, 22 April 2013) said: "The community members would tell me 'Father you don't have to participate, we will solve it on our own.' These were dangerous words. I refused. In church I urged people to use legal channels. If there is anything they were not satisfied with, that should be reported to me and to the village chief."

Father Felix also made an effort to appease his people in dialogue with the government or when rumors inciting tensions were circulated. After the incident when the statue of St. Mary's and a crucifix were broken, a rumor broke out that the perpetrators were Muslims. Father Felix urged his people to turn the matter over to the police. At the meeting on 8 August 2010, he admitted he was inten-

tionally wearing the priest robes in order to make his people see him present, as he knew there was a potential unrest.

Nggori's daughter said at that time, "Why a cross is allowed on the church but we cannot have a dome?" This caused a commotion. Women from the Catholic group stood up. Muhamad Nggori was also standing. But H. Irhamsyah embraced him. He said, "Apologies, she [Nggori's daughter] was carried away by emotions." Mobile brigade already held their weapons. I moved around to calm everyone. The woman made men point to each other ("baku tunjuk"). Father Ambrosius (FKUB) also stood up to appease others. After 10 minutes the meeting continued.

According to Father Felix, such manner was in accordance with his mandate from the episcopate. To him in the Catholic tradition there was no instance of priests blessing weapons for a fight. Although it was tiring, he chose the path of non-violence. He was aware of the potential for violence but fortunately his people were still listening to him.

With regard to the construction of churches on Java, which in many cases was problematic, Father Felix admitted people often complained in closed meetings. "Why on TV it looks like this? If we wanted to do like they do (on Java) we can. But I said that was impossible." The same issue, according to Father Ambrosius, was often raised in the meetings of the provincial FKUB.

FKUB in Ende has a fairly long history of maintaining harmony. A forum of this kind already existed in Ende in 1982. The interfaith activities of the forum increased significantly after anti-Chinese riots in 1998. Since then religious leaders have been devoted to maintaining harmony.

FKUB Ende was formed in 2006. Father Ambrosius Nanga became its chairman and the late Abdurrahman Aroeboesman (chairman of the MUI Ende) was his deputy. After the death of Aroeboesman, the MUI and FKUB vice-chairman positions were filled by H.A. Djamal Humris. FKUB Ende has 17 members, 10 representatives of the Catholic community, four Muslims, two Protestants, and one Hindu. The FKUB member of the Hindu community, Anom Triyatna, had once been the Wolowaru police chief, after Ali Hasan Mukhtar.

Constraints faced by the FKUB were the very insufficient funds and a difficult topography of the region. The budget was only enough for the meetings and visits to several districts per year, and not even all districts could be visited. The vice-regent, serving as the FKUB's advisor also did not give much attention to it.

Recommendations for establishment of places of worship that were issued by the FKUB thus far, was a recommendation for the use of the Hotel Dwipura building as a place of worship of the Protestant church Gereja Sidang Jemaat Allah (GSJA), and a recommendation for a mosque in Rukun Lima. The applications for recommendation for establishment of places of worship filed recently included the establishment of Protestant churches in the Catholic majority regions near Kelimutu and in Detusoko. According to the chairman of the FKUB, the number of mosques in Ende is actually quite big. The matter of license usually emerges in heterogeneous communities. In the homogeneous ones, places of worship are just built without the whole process of issuing recommendations.

Particularly for the conflict over a place of worship in Wolobheto, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in cooperation with the FKUB was monitoring the situation, introducing the PBM rules, and appeasing the public. The FKUB has been involved since 1 February 2011 and participated in meetings on 7 and 20 February 2011, and on 8 August 2011. In the last meeting, the chairman of the FKUB, Father Ambrosius, urged that there be an action in the district to minimize tensions. But it was ignored and the meeting which was held near the construction site almost lead to clashes. Father Ambrosius socialized with the community and was not sitting with either of the warring parties to ease the tensions. The last attempt of the FKUB was a written request to the regent to immediately approach the community (27 October 2011).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>FKUB letter to the regent No. 16/FKUB/E/X/2011, dated 27 October 2011, on resolution of the problem with establishment of the place of worship in Wolobheto, Wolokoli village, Wolowaru district.

Beside the FKUB, there were also interfaith groups initiated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs which were managed independently. They were formed within interfaith associations such as youth groups, women's groups, *ojeg* [motorbike taxi] or street vendors communities, who were expected to be agents of harmony who by being closer to the grassroots could immediately detect slightest threats.

The largest Islamic organization in Ende is Nahdlatul Ulama, with its Ansor and Fatayat groups. Most of the NU leaders also serve in the MUI and FKUB, and their views are almost in line with those of the local government. They seek to bridge Muslims with Catholics. Djamal Humris, the MUI chairman who is also the former chairman of the NU (interview, 20 April 2013) said, "as the chairman of the NU, I was often invited to attend the inter-religious dialogs or Christmas celebrations. Muslims have an obligation to respect others."

There is only one Islamic boarding school in Ende, namely the Walisongo school. Unlike in the neighboring province, NTB (Nusa Tenggara Barat, West Nusa Tenggara), the radical understanding of religion could not develop here because, according to Djamal Humris, every new understanding would be questioned. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Religious Affairs stated (interview, 19 April 2013) that during the last 10 years there have been more and more influences from outside. But with the local community they have been able to block and filter them.

Most of the mass media in Ende belong to Catholics. During desktop research we did not find any news in print and electronic media covering the tensions in Jopu. According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 19 April 2013), the news was avoided to prevent the spread of tensions. "These events did not get into newspapers. This is sensitive. I am close with the media, so I appealed to them not to disrupt the harmony. Let this be a problem only in one village alone."

In summary, the public opinion in Ende was helpful in easing the task of the police in preventing violence. The Catholic community



in Wolobheto and Jopu indeed continued to urge the police to take action and to stop the mosque construction, but the police refused and no one dared to stop the construction on their own. The potential for violence was quite high but the *ulama*, priests, and the FKUB, have been able to impede it.

*Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict*

As mentioned earlier, tensions occurred several times with a pause between February to August 2011. According to the police assessments the tensions were caused by several factors, among them existence of a third party (in this case it was the assistance of one local politician/legislator and *ulama* from outside the community), and the initial mishandling of the introduction of the PBM rules which should have been done much earlier.

Police efforts were limited to appeals, monitoring and guarding. Deployment of force was done in order to guard the course of the meetings. The conflict could be handled to prevent incidents of violence. The Muslim side could be appeased by the police and Catholics by the priest. Although today the situation is relatively under control, the potential for conflict still exists because of the dead-end in communications and because of rumors.

The meeting between the police and community leaders took place several times: on 7 February 2011, when Wolowaru police chief was present, and on 20 February 2011, when the deputy police chief along with his staff were trying to appeal to both sides of the conflict. At the meeting on 8 August 2011, the Dalmas and Brimob officers were deployed to guard the proceedings.

Meetings and coordination between the police and the local government with regard to conflict resolution took place almost every month. According to the district police chief (interview, 22 April 2013), the matter of the mosque in Wolobheto was always voiced by the FKUB, MUI, church and others in the monthly meetings of Muspida. For the police, the priority was security and minimization of the conflict potential.

The role of Kesbangpol and Linmas (Kominda) must be highlighted here, because aside engaging in almost all meetings of Muspida, the Kesbangpol also cooperated with the police in monitoring the situation. Kesbangpol also had more trust of the Wolokoli village chief than the police. The village chief himself helped Kesbangpol in monitoring the situation and recorded every person or vehicle coming from the outside to see Muhamad Nggori. In their recommendation to the regent, Kesbangpol asked Muslim leaders of Ende as well as the regent and vice-regent to request the mosque committee to halt the construction as well as to lower the dome and remove the loudspeakers.<sup>20</sup>

There were no signs that Nggori was influenced by radical teachings. His religious views were typical of Nahdlatul Ulama. His own children did not join the *`asr* (afternoon) prayer which Nggori and his brother held in the mosque. Nggori himself admitted (interview, 23 April 2013), “in matters of religion, we are only zero comma ... we know nothing. It is only that we take with us the *ulayat* heritage that we could build a *musala*.”

Nggori had heard the rumor that the local residents were going to remove the dome, but he did not report it to the police. Here the police was more active in approaching him. But he admitted that the sub-district police chief calmed him and made him ignore the rumors. “Had it not been for him, who knows what I’d become. He was great,” said Nggori.

Nggori also said that he was in a very good relationship with the police. He particularly praised the sub-district police chief, the head of Wolowaru intelligence, and the district police chief. Nevertheless, Nggori also felt annoyed by the police presence. He said:

Finally, the police and soldiers came in six trucks to guard. At that time people asked the dome to be removed. I said, please do it; and if necessary, [please] ask the priest to hang a pig’s head on the top [of the dome] ... [but] I will chuck out the cross. I am a human being ... the worst I will get is losing my head. Why

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<sup>20</sup>Letter (Telaah Staf) of Kesbangpol and Linmas Ende to the regent No. BKPPM.43/II/01/XI/2011, dated 7 November 2011.

should I think? It's a matter of faith. Police also asked me to lower the dome temporarily. I said, if a neighboring country lowers our flag, we would go mad. So would I. People have faith. If their cross is removed they too would get mad. I said to the police and the intelligence, "Enough, all of you go back. I'm not crazy yet. If I were, I'd have slashed you with a machete."

If in other cases the police was more in favor of the majority group, in this one the police was seen as siding with the minority. It was admitted by Nggori that Catholics suspected that the sub-district police chief was an "Islamic police" and so he was transferred, even though he was the best person. The police chief himself felt that Muhamad Nggori had no issue with police but with the government, including the village chief, because they were those who complicated things.

Protests of Catholics were reported by Father Felix Jawa and the village chief, Vincent Gaga. The FKUB chairman, Father Ambrosius (interview, 19 April 2013) considered the priest's involvement reasonable because of his position as the leader of the Catholic community. Meanwhile, Father Felix denied that the allegations that he was a provocateur (interview, 22 April 2013):

There is a statement in the internal circles of the police that the Jopu priest is a provocateur. It is said that Catholics actually have no problem, it is the priest who is always provoking. But [without being provoked] people are disturbed by the noise of *toa*. Here this sound was never present. Especially when we have a ceremony, we are praying, and there is this sound. There will be an immediate reaction. How should I control the people? I pretend not to hear it. I know their reaction but I do not comment. If I commented, later that would become a larger issue.

The protests were made in a peaceful and non-confrontational manner. As revealed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 19 April 2013), the objections of residents were reported to the village chief who later forwarded them to the district head and to the Ministry and FKUB. The leader of the Jopu parish (interview, 22 April 2013) said that he had already approached the

police, the regent's first assistant, and the Ende regional secretariat, but only received promises that the government would soon resolve it.

When the procedural path was unsuccessful, the leader of the parish admitted that the local residents thought to act on their own. But because there was a leak, their plans failed. His attitude was to remain calm. Thus, the acts of resistance from the local residents merely took the shape of turning on their music tapes to drown out the sound of *toa* [speaker], but they did not dare to make a direct reproach.

## Conclusions

Tensions related to the construction of the mosque in Wolobheto village, district Wolowaru, began in January 2011, when the mosque construction started. They were heightened in August 2011, when the mosque was almost completed and put into use.

Construction of the mosque in Wolobheto was met by resistance from the Catholic residents because it did not fulfill the requirements of the PBM No. 8 and No. 9 of 2006. The number of Muslim residents did not reach 90 and the construction was not yet approved by the non-Muslim neighborhood. Catholics also objected the presence of religious attributes such as the dome as well as the loudspeakers which were disturbing their peace.

Mediation efforts were early made by the local government but Muslims insisted on building the mosque with a complete dome and loudspeakers. The commotion was increasing but merely in a form of verbal threats which did not lead to clashes, attacks, or destruction. Both sides threatened each other that they would, for example, remove the dome of the mosque or the cross of the church. To protest against the sound of the mosque's loudspeakers, Catholics played loud music.

Tensions peaked in August 2011 when the mosque began to be used. To prevent clashes the government held a meeting with Muspdia, Muspika, residents and the parties to the conflict at the local

*adat* house. For security reasons the meeting was also attended by the mobile brigade. Confrontation was avoided.

Such disputes were a new thing in the history of Wolobheto. Introduction of the PBM rules made Muslims, whose leader happened to be the local *musalaki*, feel challenged. While the Catholics felt they had a valid reason to protest. Earlier Muslims and Catholics in solidarity transported stones and sand for construction of the house which was intended to become a place of worship. This stopped after the PBM was introduced. Hostilities arose when Muslims continued with the construction and violated the regulations and agreements reached at various meetings.

Until now both sides hold resentment towards each other. Catholics claimed that until now the Muslims have not and have not intended to fulfill the terms of the PBM. Meanwhile, Muslims claimed to have received the regent's permission to use the building. But despite mutual disappointment and aggravation, the two sides were still able to refrain from violence and vigilantism.

There are several factors that played a role in preventing the outbreak of violence. First, the Wolokoli community had the capacity to reduce the conflict. Kinship as well as the tradition of harmony were stronger than the urge to shed blood. In addition, religious leaders of each of the parties were sufficiently respected and they could still appease their followers.

Second, the police and the local government intervened since the very beginning. Police, for example, was already involved in the socialization of PBM, although it was not much involved in resolving the dispute. Meanwhile, the district police chief diligently asked for support and help of the local governments and officials. Since all parties carried out their duties from the beginning, the repressive police action – which is highly avoided in case of religious conflicts – could be minimized.

It is important to note here the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and of the FKUB, especially with regard to the PBM. Having learnt from the experience of introducing the PBM at the village lev-

el, which instead fuelled the tensions, the Ministry and the FKUB spoke less about the technical rules of the establishment of places of worship while they were approaching the community. They put more emphasis on other aspects of the PBM 2006, that is reminding the residents of the value of harmony in their culture and traditions, and that they had a common ancestry.

This is worth highlighting because governments elsewhere often focus only on the matter of regulations and requirements when they discuss the PBM, while the technical aspects of the establishment of places of worship are only a small part of the PBM 2006. The primary spirit of PBM 2006 which has often been overlooked, is the matter of how to build relationships and cooperation between religious communities on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual respect.

The government needs to review the PBM 2006. It is important that the PBM 2006, as well as various decisions and agreements made on its basis, should not be misused to hinder the establishment of places of worship, let alone undermine local mechanisms that previously were harmoniously working. Political interests such as competition in elections should not make the government officials neglect this issue or utilize it in order to gain votes.

Finally, the government, including the police, can no longer afford to disregard the disputes over places of worship. They should be addressed as early as possible so that their impact does not spread to other places. Not a few people were pushed against the construction of a mosque to take revenge after they saw disputes over construction of churches elsewhere. And vice versa. Such way of thinking should be reversed: for your relatives not to face difficulties from others somewhere else, do not make it difficult here for the relatives of those others.\*\*\*

## PART IV

## CONCLUSIONS





## LESSONS FROM THE EIGHT CASES: SOME CONCLUSION

This research sought to study the policing of religious conflicts in the post-New Order Indonesia by answering two questions. First, why the policing of religious conflicts was ineffective in some cases and why it was effective in some other? And second, what explains the variation of success and failure in policing of religious conflicts?

By “religious conflict” we understood here “the enmity with regard to values, claims, and identities involving religious issues or issues wrapped in religious slogans or religious expressions.” Religious conflicts are divided into two major categories: inter-religious conflicts and sectarian (intra-religious) conflicts. In this research, inter-religious conflicts were limited to conflicts over places of worship, while sectarian conflicts to conflicts between Muslim sects.

The “policing of religious conflicts” in this research is defined as “actions taken by the police to handle the incidents of religious conflicts.” In accordance with the duties and functions of the police in maintaining security and order (Act No. 02 of 2002 or Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on the implementation of human rights), policing is

assessed as “effective” if it succeeds to prevent the conflicts from spreading and becoming violent.

This research argued that variation in policing of religious conflicts is a function of three sets of variables: structural variables, knowledge variables, and interaction variables. The structural variable consists of legal and procedural frameworks which are the legal reference for the to police, the character of the local and national police organization, resources, police culture, local politics, and the pressure of the public opinion. Police knowledge variable is the understanding of the legal and procedural frameworks, understanding of the conflict issues, and perceptions of the conflict situation. Interaction variable means the relationships and interactions between the parties to the conflict themselves, and between the parties to the conflict and the police.

Eight cases were studied in this research: four cases of disputes over places of worship (HKBP Filadelfia, Bekasi; GKI Yasmin, Bogor; Abdurrahman Mosque in Wolobheto, Ende; and Nur Musafir Mosque in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara), and four cases related of sectarian conflicts (anti-Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, Pandeglang; anti-Ahmadiyya in Manis Lor, Kuningan; anti-Shi’a in Sampang, East Java; and anti-Shi’a in Bangil, Pasuruan). These cases were chosen to see variations in policing within each of the categories of religious conflicts.

The previous chapters showed the results of this research, case by case. This chapter will present the main findings in a comparative perspective. First, we will put forward some general conclusions about inter-religious conflicts over establishment of places of worship and policing thereof. This will be followed by conclusions with regard to sectarian conflicts and their policing. Next, we will present general conclusions on the matter of policing religious conflicts from the perspective of the three variables (structural, knowledge, and interaction). Finally, we will discuss several important findings beyond the aspects of policing.

### Variation of Success and Failure in Policing – Explanation

This research shows that policing of religious conflicts in Bekasi, Bogor, Kupang, Ende, Kuningan, and Pasuruan proved successful in preventing the tensions from escalating into open violence. Sometimes, in critical situations, provocations of the warring parties could trigger violence, but the policing measures prevented it and restored security and order. Sectarian conflicts in Sampang and Pandeglang were two cases where policing failed, giving rise to widespread violence, fatalities and great damage.

Many of the conflicts studied in this research did not end by the time this research was completed. Nevertheless, we have collected several important findings which explain the variation of success and failure in policing and its impact on the occurrence of violence.

Mobilization of the parties to the conflict needs to be taken into account as a factor that influences the emergence of violence. For example, in the case of Sampang and of Cikeusik, the militant and broad mobilization processes occurred among the warring parties, involving religious leaders and their followers, and making use of doctrines, idioms, and sectarian symbols. Shi'as in Sampang or Ahmadis in Pandeglang were much weaker than their Sunni opponents, but mobilization also took place within these two communities: they were not victims who did not resist, or who used a non-confrontational and non-violent approach when faced by differences in religious beliefs and practices.

Moreover, the above mobilization processes continued when the context of local politics allowed it and, to some extent sustained or even expanded it. The regent of Sampang as well as the village chief of Cikeusik participated in creation of the majority perception of the Shi'a and Ahmadiyya communities as enemies and as *the other*. Sectarian conflicts, thus, entered a new and more dangerous stage, i.e. when it was also defined who belonged to Sampang or Cikeusik and who did not. Such things did not happen in Bangil, where mobilization was weaker and the local government, together

with religious leaders, did not fuel but instead impeded the militant mobilization.

Of course, the mobilization of the warring parties does not necessarily lead to open violence. Here the policing, particularly the capacity of the police to deter, can impede the occurrence of open violence. In this research, the best example of the police capacity to deter was the case of policing the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis Lor, Cirebon. The policing capacity to deter is, thus, another variable explaining the presence or absence of violence in the escalation of tensions in sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship. In the cases of Sampang and Cikeusik, the geographic location which was relatively remote and difficult to access, weakened the possibility of deterrence.

In sectarian conflicts, the strategies of warring parties influence the role that can be played by the police. In Bangil, the conflicted parties gave an opportunity to the police to carry out their duty of maintaining security and order. In Sampang, the warring parties, their allies and supporters, opposed the involvement of the police, except for utilising it to support their own objectives.

Variations of success and failure of the police in managing religious conflicts also depends on policing strategies and strategies used by the parties to the conflict. Failure in deterring escalation and focus on religion (in inter-religious or sectarian terms) as the conflict frame and feature have complicated the policing as it triggered identity politics. The police in Bangil and in Sampang performed policing tasks that were relevant to disturbances of security and public order arising from the sectarian conflicts. In Bangil, the police could perform their tasks as a force maintaining security and order, because it was supported by the local government and religious leaders. In Sampang, the police could not perform their tasks as a force maintaining security and order, because it had no support, and in several incidents, its role was undermined by the government and religious leaders who became members of the warring sides.

### **Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship**

This research shows that conflicts over places of worship do not only happen in Muslim-majority communities (with regard to the construction of churches), but also where communities are predominantly Protestant or Catholic (with regard to the construction of mosques). This is visible from the cases of the HKBP Filadelfia Church in Bekasi, the GKI Yasmin Church in Bogor, and of mosques in Ende and in Kupang.

The issue of support for the plans of construction of places of worship, as set out in the regulations on the establishment of places of worship (both in the PBM 2006 and in the previous regulations), has often been used as a weapon of the warring parties to hamper the construction process. This concerned not only churches but also mosques. The PBM of 2006 also weakens the traditional mechanisms of cooperation in the interfaith communities. This was particularly visible in Ende and Kupang, where although people were accustomed to helping each other in construction of places of worship, they stopped it and even turned to disputes after the PBM 2006 was introduced.

The intensity of conflicts over construction of places of worship has generally been lower than of sectarian conflicts. So far, these conflicts have not resulted in fatalities, as has happened in sectarian conflicts. The warring sides still managed to restrain themselves, although in Bogor, Bekasi and Kupang, low-scale incidents of violence did take place. These included pelting, throwing rotten eggs and sewage.

Cases of disputes over places of worship studied in this research have not been resolved completely. Settlement in some of these cases has still been under negotiation, as in the case of the Nur Musafir Mosque in Batuplat, Kupang, and the Abdurrahman Mosque in Ende. Some other cases have already entered or passed the stage of settlement through legal channels but are still pending, especially when the government made decisions contrary to the rulings of the courts. With regard to the GKI Yasmin, for example, the Supreme

Court has decided that its church construction permit was valid. However, on the basis of security considerations, public order and the alleged forgery of signatures in the licensing process, the Bogor municipal government revoked the permit.

Although on different levels, all cases of conflicts over places of worship involved the issue of Christianization or Islamization. It was apparent from the interviews with leaders of both communities and the police. In Bekasi (HKBP Filadelfia) and Bogor (GKI Yasmin), the leaders who opposed construction of churches feared Christian proselytism. By contrast, the leaders who opposed the construction of mosques in Ende and Kupang were alarming of Islamization, and particularly the influence of radical Islam.

In specific cases, conflicts over places of worship overlapped with certain ethnic sentiments or the status within a particular ethnic group of persons involved in the conflict. In Bekasi, opposition towards the HKBP Church was associated with the Batak ethnic group which was a minority in the predominantly Betawi community. Meanwhile, in Ende the conflict was complicated by the fact that the mosque construction was initiated by a Muslim who at the same time was a *musalaki* (traditional chief) where the majority of residents were Catholics.

There are strong indications that the mass media coverage of the Muslim majority's rejection of church construction on Java (Bekasi and Bogor) contributed to the growing opposition of the Protestant and Catholic majorities towards the construction of mosques in Ende and Kupang. This shows that disputes related to places of worship have a contagious effect and that they spread from one place to another, as from Bogor and Bekasi to NTT.

In all cases of conflicts over places of worship, the police officers were fully engaged in maintaining security and order. The level of their involvement depended on the degree of the conflict addressed. In case of GKI Yasmin and HKBP Filadelfia, the level of involvement was very high, with their presence on every Sunday when the congregations carried out their worship practices at the

disputed sites. In case of the mosques in Ende and Kupang, the police was present in order to mediate between the warring parties, and occasionally a number of police officers were also deployed to guard important events.

### **Policing of Sectarian Conflicts**

This research shows that in two cases of sectarian conflicts involving Ahmadis, in Manis Lor, Kuningan, and in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, the contention was accompanied by differences in beliefs and religious practices of the warring parties. These differences became the basis for mobilization. However, the main strategy employed was aggression; so, the mobilization was also for the sake of attack and defence from attacks.

In such context policing became a determining factor. In Manis Lor, particularly in the conflict of 2010, the police successfully handled it and open sectarian violence – the violence against the Ahmadis and of the Ahmadis – could be minimized and avoided. In Cikeusik the mass anti-Ahmadiyya mobilization was not anticipated by the police and led to violence which engaged both parties to the conflict.

In the case of sectarian conflicts involving the groups of Sunnis and Shi'as, in Sampang and Bangil, the differences in religious beliefs and practices also existed before the emergence of the conflict. These differences were the grounds for mobilization of both parties. Yet in Sampang the Sunni opposition group was monolithic and also involved the local leadership such as the class of *kiais*, including those associated in the MUI and BASSRA, and the regent. On the other hand, the Shi'a group stood by its convictions and was ready to employ violent means, albeit in self-defence.

In a high-level conflict situation as described above, the police could not deter the aggression of warring parties and did not have a sufficient countervailing power when violence broke in Sampang in December 2011 and August 2012. On the contrary, in Bangil, not all Sunni Muslims were anti-Shi'a, and some of the anti-Shi'a

protests and violent incidents were carried out by a small group of people who had no majority support. Beside this, the Shi'a group who fought and defended itself was willing to follow softer ways of conflict resolution. The local government was neutral and the police could still carry out their duties properly.

Intra-Muslim sectarian conflicts are more severe than conflicts over places of worship. Three people died in the Cikeusik incident, and one in Sampang. This was an important precedent in the history of sectarian conflicts and violence in Indonesia. Casualties were from the Ahmadi and Shi'a groups, and resulted from a fight that was not equal. Destruction of property was visible from dozens of Shi'a houses burnt in Sampang, and vehicles belonging to Ahmadis in Cikeusik. Shi'as of Sampang were displaced from their homes, either because of security reasons or because their houses were burned down, or both. Displacement has also become one of the effects of sectarian conflicts, while it did not in conflicts over places of worship.

Intra-Muslim sectarian conflicts proceed relatively peacefully when both parties are able to exercise restraint while the police and local government play their role in the process of mitigation and counteraction. In Bangil, both Shi'as and Sunnis could refrain from casualties-yielding aggression and excessive property damage because religious leaders on both sides sought to control their followers. The police coordinated with the local government and actively prevented violence. In Manis Lor, the police learnt from the shortcomings and weaknesses of policing in previous conflicts, especially in 2007, and was able to show stronger determination in preventing excessive violence in 2010.

There are two types of violence in the sectarian conflicts, violence against the minority committed by the majority, and violence committed by the minority. The anti-Shi'a and anti-Ahmadiyya groups carried out violent attacks and their strength was much greater because they by far outnumbered the Shi'as or Ahmadis. On the other hand, the Shi'a and Ahmadi minorities also used



violence in order to defend themselves. This resulted in unequal confrontations. Behind these confrontations was the willingness of the warring parties, both the minority and majority, to exercise violence and aggression in the fights which also had unequal results.

### **Policing Activities**

In some of the cases of religious conflicts studied here, the police managed to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence, while in some other cases it failed. Generally, the police prevented violence when they dealt with conflicts over establishment of places of worship, as in case of HKBP Filadelfia in Bekasi, GKI Yasmin in Bogor, Nur Musafir Mosque in Kupang, and Abdurrahman Mosque in Ende. Also when dealing with sectarian conflicts (intra-Muslim), the police managed to prevent clashes or violence in case of the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis Lor, Kuningan, and of the anti-Shi'a conflict in Bangil. But it failed to prevent violence in case of the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, and of anti-Shi'a conflict in Sampang, East Java.

At the pre-emptive stage, the police have performed the intelligence functions adequately. Almost in all cases, intelligence officers worked every day and reported the situation to the district and sub-district leadership. The police also relied on its network of informants within the public. In some of the places, the police also made use of information technology to support the intelligence tasks, for example in Bekasi, where police intelligence officers reported on the case development via the BBM (Blackberry Messenger), even though later they were also required to submit their reports in print.

With regard to the performance of intelligence officers in the case of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, it is worth noting that they did not succeed in obtaining accurate information on the potential size of the anti-Ahmadiyya mass that planned to reach the house belonging to the Ahmadiyya community. The intelligence also failed to obtain information on the presence of Ahmadis in that

house. Inaccurate information contributed to delays in pacification, so that the clashes on 6 February 2011, between dozens of Ahmadis and thousands of their opponents, could not be avoided.

In addition to intelligence work, at the pre-emptive stage the police also performed the task of community guidance (*binmas*). By meeting with the warring parties they sought to decrease the tensions and prevent violent clashes. They also attended the meetings held for mediation purposes between the parties to the conflict.

Almost all of the cases of religious conflicts studied here have entered the stage of mass mobilization. Mobilization of hundreds or even thousands took place, except for the conflict over Nur Musafir Mosque in Kupang and Abdurrahman Mosque in Ende. Estimates of the masses size were taken into account by the police in deciding how many officers should be deployed for pacification. The location and accessibility of the sites was another important consideration.

In all cases studied, the police units deployed, both at the stage of prevention and pacification, came from the level of sub-district, district, up to the national police. In terms of units, they were inter-unit groups including the intelligence and security unit, *binmas*, criminal investigations unit, traffic control unit, and *sabhara*. During conflict escalation, the police also deployed *dalmas*, *rainmas* and the mobile brigade. In some of the cases, the army was also involved. Municipal police was also engaged in cases of conflicts over places of worship.

Except for conflicts in Ende and Kupang, where no mass mobilization occurred, the number of police officers deployed to handle the cases of conflict over places of worship ranged from 400 to 600. For dealing with sectarian conflicts, the number of police officers deployed would reach even thousands.

In all cases of sectarian conflicts, it is important to note the difference in the timing of deployment of police officers. In the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis Lor and anti-Shi'a community in Bangil, the large numbers of police were deployed during the prevention stage, before the mass mobilization. In the case of anti-

Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, Pandeglang and the anti-Shi'a conflict in Sampang, Madura, the mobilization of security forces in adequate numbers took place only after the violent clashes. In Cikeusik, the security forces did not manage to obtain accurate information on the potential size of the masses, while in Sampang the information about the existence of mass mobilization seems to have not been used at all.

In all cases, the police tried to position themselves as a neutral party, not favouring any of the warring sides. Nevertheless, the parties to the conflict generally did not perceived them as such.

In all cases, the police tried to put forward the persuasive measures of policing. In some cases, like in the case HKBP Filadelfia Church, the local police leadership adopted a policy of not arming their personnel, neither with weapons, nor with batons, shields and guns. If there were armed officers, such as those from the mobile brigade unit, they were usually placed in the rearmost position, or were deployed after the episodes of violence. The most common argument of the police to justify the avoidance of repressive actions was their unwillingness to exacerbate the tensions or encourage further escalation of the conflict. The persuasive measures taken by the police were actually seen by some parties as an indication of police indecision and weakness in the matter of law enforcement.

In some of the cases the policing actions have reached the stage of law enforcement. In the case of HKBP Filadelfia, Bekasi, the police processed reports of complaints from both parties to the conflict. In the sectarian anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, the police had to process cases of violence which later were brought to the court and led to convictions. In the case of the Shi'a community of Sampang, the police also conducted law enforcement measures but they did so discriminately. The Shi'a leader Tajul Muluk was processed by the police and brought to the court, and so was the killer of Hamamah, a Shi'a community member who was killed in the Sunni-Shi'a clashes on 26 August 2012.

### **Factors beyond Policing**

From the in-depth observations and interviews with community leaders and the police who were involved in the studied cases of religious conflicts, we have reached some important conclusions that are not directly related to the aspects of policing. First, particularly the local governments, but also the civil society in general, the legislature, the courts, and the mass media can mollify or exacerbate conflicts. In case of sectarian conflicts, the partisanship of local governments has exacerbated the conflicts and complicated policing. It was so in the cases of Cikeusik and Manis Lor, where the local governments sided with the majority group. The case of sectarian conflict in Bangil was an exception where the local government acted neutrally and policing became easier.

Second, in line with the conclusions in point (1), in conflicts over places of worship the local governments' siding with the Muslim majority (Bekasi and Bogor) or the Muslim minority (Kupang) also exacerbated the conflicts and complicated policing. The conflict in Ende was an exception, as the local government was neutral. The final settlement of the last conflict was not yet reached because of the lack of attention or decisiveness of the highest local leadership, the then regent (Catholic) and his deputy (Muslim) who were at that time competing in election for the regent's office.

Third, important events related to local politics, especially the elections, generally worsened the resolution of both kinds of religious conflicts. First, the candidates who participated in the elections, both the incumbents and their opponents, generally tended to side with the majority groups, which complicated the policing and handling of disputes. Second, the local government's attention to religious conflicts was not enough, which shows that religious conflicts were not a conclusive issue in the local politics.

Fourth, there are no specific conclusions with regard to gender in policing of religious conflicts. However, contrary to the common perceptions of women as passive, their role was quite prominent in almost all cases (except Cikeusik), where they represented both

of the warring parties. In Bekasi and Bogor, women participated in protests to show their opposition or support for the church construction. Similarly in Ende and Kupang. Highlighted should be the leadership of the former Kuningan police chief, AKBP Yoyoh Indayah, who effectively managed to prevent the anti-Ahmadiyya violence. Although in private she rejects the teachings of Ahmadiyya, as the police chief she remained nonpartisan.

And lastly, although most of the religious conflicts studied here did not lead to fatalities, except for the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik and the anti-Shi'a conflict in Sampang, their social and economic costs were high. For example, the police in Bekasi on average deployed 200 officers each week, while in Bogor on average 600 officers, also every week and for the last two years. These amounts were reduced or increased in certain periods.\*\*\*



## LEARNING FROM GOOD POLICING PRACTICES: RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the description and analysis presented in the previous chapters, here we seek to provide a number of recommendations. These will be addressed specifically to: (1) the parties to the conflict; (2) the police; (3) local governments; (4) civil society organizations and the FKUB; and (5) the mass media. Recommendations will be divided into two groups with regard to the conflicts type – sectarian ones and ones over places of worship. Some of the recommendations for handling the sectarian conflicts will be similar to the recommendations for handling conflicts over places of worship. However, most of them are different, and therefore grouped separately.

Recommendations based on the study of policing of religious conflicts are not only addressed to the police. As described in the introduction, in this research we have examined several factors or variables which influence policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship. Apart from describing the incidents of these conflicts in the communities where they occurred, this research also sought to examine the influence and the role of local politics, relationships between the police and the conflicted parties, as well as the role of public opinion in policing activities.

The recommendations are addressed to several parties who play an important role for policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship. Policing of these conflicts must involve not only the police alone but also the local governments, civil society, and, most importantly, the warring sides. This is in line with the approach of plural policing in which the police is a part of a wider group with which it also cooperates.

## **Recommendations for the Parties to the Conflict**

### *Addressing Sectarian Conflicts*

1. Improve the relationships and social interaction among people of different religions and between followers of different denominations and sects within one religion. Improvement of communication and interaction can be done in everyday life as well as through associations and institutions whose members come from diverse religious backgrounds or different denominations within one religion. Inter-faith and inter-sect relations can become the framework to discuss arising issues, including sectarian conflicts. Lack of interaction and poor communication among people of different religions and sects can make the conflicts escalate quickly and spread farther.
2. Do not only focus on exclusive dogmas and understandings but also on ethics of humanism and the sense of nationhood. Dogmas divide, humanism, also supported by religions, unites. Imagine Indonesian nation as a pluralistic society whose citizens live together and understand each other, and can handle problems and conflicts by peaceful and nonviolent means.
3. Avoid vigilantism when confronted by conflicts or problems of sectarian nature which derive from or are related to differences in understanding and religious practices. Vigilantism leads to violence, fatalities, injuries, or displacement, and also material destruction — of houses and other property. Vigilantism also causes the conflicts to spread, makes reconciliation difficult, and increases the perception that religious communities do not support peace and democracy.



4. Carry out internal policing by controlling the followers or organization and community members, so that they do not commit acts of violence and vigilantism. Both majority and minority religious leaders alike are responsible for educating and disciplining their followers to maintain peace and mutual understanding in a pluralistic society. Otherwise, allowing and inciting retaliation would trigger destruction of relationships within the society. Vigilantism of majority groups in one place can be answered by vigilantism elsewhere towards members of that majority group who there are in minority.
5. Coordinate with the police, either periodically or regularly, discuss the potential and signs of disharmony between religious groups which emerge in the society. Coordination should be intensified when the sectarian tensions increase. If parties to the conflict do not coordinate with the police, then the police cannot quickly prevent violence and calm them appropriately.
6. Coordinate with the local government, the regents and mayors, and related agencies such as Kesbanglinmas and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Local governments, along with the police, are representatives of the state at the local level and are in charge of protecting citizens regardless of their religion, sect, or tribe. If the warring parties do not coordinate with the local government, the local government cannot take preventive measures to immediately and appropriately handle the conflict.
7. Coordinate with FKUB and civil society organizations which can become a forum for dialogue and meetings in order to foster the mutual understanding. Organizations and institutions can provide nonpartisan assistance to reduce tensions and to find non-confrontational and non-violent solutions.

#### *Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship*

1. The warring parties need to develop empathy, sensitivity, and awareness that other religious communities also need places of worship. Religious communities have to improve the sense of

solidarity and unity towards one another because all of them want and need places of worship. Inter-faith cooperation in building places of worship is not uncommon in Indonesia, and religious leaders as well as organizations should support this noble practice, and not oppose and block it also by the means of the Joint Ministerial Decree (PBM) of 2006. Such support is increasingly needed in communities which are facing problems over places of worship.

2. Build places of worship after or simultaneously with building interfaith relations. Many places of worship were built without causing conflicts, even people of different religions built them together. Construction of places of worship reflects social cohesion in a pluralistic society. And in such societies it should not only be reduced to construction of a building but must be preceded by efforts to establish social relations.
3. Prevent and contain conflicts over places of worship in order that they do not escalate geographically. Conflicts over places of worship must be prevented as early as possible because they can spread to other places. The rejection of church construction in one place can result in or increase opposition to mosque construction elsewhere. Retaliation of this kind also makes the conflicts become increasingly conspicuous, and difficult to handle.
4. Cooperate and coordinate with the police. Coordination with the police should be done from the very beginning, not only for security reasons when the tensions increase. The police can provide assistance through counseling, community guidance, and socialization of the regulation on the establishment of places of worship in a pluralistic society. Police programs such as community policing and problem-oriented policing can become a framework which allows the cooperation and coordination between the police and the community.
5. Cooperate and coordinate with the local governments, officials and related agencies. Local governments have the authority to prevent and manage social conflicts, including conflicts over

places of worship. This coordination is carried out through the forums such as Musrembang, meetings of regional leaders (Mus-pida) of various levels, and other coordination forums.

6. Coordinate with the FKUB and similar civil society organizations because they can provide a forum for dialogue. The FKUB, as per Article 1 of the PBM 2006, is concerned with “building relations between religious communities, which are based on tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect, respect for equality in religious practice, and cooperation in social and national life of the Unitary State of Indonesia, in the light of Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945.”
7. Avoid vigilantism when confronted with problems or conflicts over places of worship. Vigilante actions lead to violence and destruction, and can trigger retaliation because the majority here is a minority elsewhere. A vicious circle of vigilantism tarnishes national solidarity, the good name of religions and of religious denominations which all claim to bring goodness and peace.

## **Recommendations for the Police**

### *Addressing Sectarian Conflicts*

1. Give more attention to sectarian conflicts which recently have been on the rise, and caused loss of life. In particular, the police needs to notice the symptoms and sources of tension between the sects, learn the ways to approach diverse religious groups, and to control the rumors and tensions which emerge in the society. Coordinate with conflicted denominations and sects irrespective of their religious practices.
2. Educate the police officers on how to behave and act when faced by differences between sects and religious practices in the society, and relationships between the majority and minority. The police must avoid prejudices against certain religious groups, even when these prejudices are derived from fatwas and regulations. Prejudices interfere with police professionalism.

3. Improve the professionalism of the police by decisively enforcing the law regardless of personal views on particular religious sects, and regardless of pressure from the masses of one of the parties to the sectarian conflict. Provide sanctions against police officers who do not enforce the law, because the threat of punishment and sanctions will encourage them to act in a decisive and professional way. Likewise, award professionalism of the police members and leadership.
4. Make the planning and decisions which enable the police to quickly mobilize the forces from various units and locations. Immediate deployment and presence of police forces in an adequate amount is much more required than the large number of officers coming to the scene after the riots. Incidents of sectarian conflicts in Indonesia showed that the police could not gain the control immediately because it was not accustomed to mobilizing themselves in order to prevent sectarian violence.
5. Avoid approach and persuasion when there are serious tensions which can lead to open sectarian violence. To prevent violence required is not flaccid persuasion but credible measures of prevention and deterrence, which show that the police as state apparatus is given the mandate and authority to punish offenders with violence and the threat of the use of force. If the police does not punish the perpetrators of vigilante actions, the police will lose the most important reason of its being needed in a country.
6. Coordinate with local governments in order to prevent and tackle sectarian conflicts. Coordination is an imperative because of the links between the governance and security in a society. Coordination should be carried out on a regular basis through meetings and discussions with leaders, meetings with the local intelligence communities, formal and informal forums. The alliance between the local government and the police will increase the credibility of deterrence. The split between them will open up the space for militancy, intolerance, vigilantism, and other social diseases.

7. Garner support for policing actions from various parties, both in order to provide protection to all citizens and in order to crack down on vigilantism and sectarian violence. The support should be raised as early as possible from the local government, FKUB, Komnas HAM, MUI, KWI, PGI, Parisada Hindu Dharma, Walubi, Matakini, and other relevant organizations, so that the public receives the message that there is an alliance against sectarian violence and vigilantism.

*Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship*

1. Understand the fact of religious pluralism in the society and carry out planning based on that understanding. Updates on the new settlements, relations between local communities and immigrants (especially when the receiving community's religion is different from the religion of the newcomers), should be taken into account in gathering information and in community guidance, especially in the communities affected by conflicts over places of worship.
2. Reinforce prevention in handling conflicts over places of worship by approaching the warring parties to subject them to existing laws, as well as to maintain security and order. Several police mechanisms such as negotiation, community guidance, community policing and problem-oriented policing can be used for prevention of conflicts over places of worship, not only during or after the conflict.
3. In dealing with conflicts over places of worship the police must garner as early as possible the support from the local government, FKUB, and civil society, so that they would assist the police in conflict prevention and in intervention if the conflict occurs.
4. The police should deter those who commit acts of vigilantism in conflicts over places of worship. This is done by presenting a credible threat that the perpetrators of violence and vigilantism would be arrested and punished immediately.

5. Support the lower police units at the level of sub-district police and police stations. Police is a hierarchical organization and clear directions and support from superiors would improve the morale of police officers below them. Otherwise, inaction and unconcerned attitude of the leaders will decrease their team spirit. Improve the inter-level communication within the police organization, so that evaluation of the leadership at lower levels or their replacement can be done in order to strengthen the police performance.

### **Recommendations for Local Governments**

#### *Addressing Sectarian Conflicts*

1. Understand the plurality of denominations and sects in the society, despite the fact that the majority of citizens adheres to one religion and one of its sects. The executives such as regents and mayors receive the support of some citizens, but they lead all of them. Local governments must protect all and foster religious harmony, as stipulated in laws and regulations such as the PBM (Article 5 and 6, clause 1).
2. Act neutrally and impartially in sectarian conflicts to avoid falling into them and complicating the conflict resolution. Avoid using sectarian conflicts for political purposes like seeking support in elections, as this undermines the autonomy of the state in handling conflicts and makes the state become a part of the problem, not a solution.
3. Support fair judicial process and provide due process of law to the parties or to one of the parties to the sectarian conflict. Respect the court decision and the Supreme Court, and do not to create the space for militant vigilantism because it will become the seed of future problems for the government.
4. Support the police in carrying out their duties of maintaining security and order, and law enforcement in sectarian conflicts. This support can include engagement and synergy in the joint operations (such as joint planning, appearing together in pub-

lic during interventions, providing funds for the operations to restore security and order, etc.). Without this synergy the capacity of the state in providing protection and deterring vigilantism will be flaccid.

5. Avoid making excuses and justifying inaction of the government in dealing with sectarian conflicts. Reasoning such as “religious and sectarian conflicts are a matter for the central government” or “local ethic does not desire the local government’s protection of the rights of citizens” is a lie and denial of responsibility of local governments to protect citizens regardless of their religious background and practices.
6. Do not succumb to the pressure and the *fait accompli* of the parties to the sectarian conflict in the hope this would appease them. Appeasement in sectarian conflicts often leads to escalation of violence and polarization in the society. Avoid creating regulatory actions that destroy diversity, tolerance, and national spirit.

#### *Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship*

1. Understand the fact of religious pluralism in the society and the need of religious communities to have their places of worship. The local governments should be neutral and impartial in conflicts over places of worship. Otherwise handling of such conflicts will be protracted.
2. Avoid issuing regulations and decrees (governor’s, regent’s, mayor’s) which specify and add provisions to the PBM, since this regulation can be, and has been, misused to hinder the establishment of places of worship.
3. Facilitate consensus-building meetings with regard to construction of places of worship. These meetings should be attended by the warring parties, but also by the police and representatives of the civil society. Perceive disputes over construction of places of worship in the wider context, since these conflicts are always related to other problems with social change, social cohesion, and governance.

4. Approach the broader public in order to improve the atmosphere of mutual trust in the community and between the community and the government. Conflicts over places of worship are related to feelings of fear and anxiety about the presence of different or new communities. Anxiety and fear are linked to efforts to protect oneself and one's group. The government must undertake serious actions to make these worries disappear and to restore the atmosphere of mutual trust, rather than to follow concerns of one of the parties to the conflict.
5. Support the police in maintaining security and order and enforcing law in conflicts over places of worship. Such support can be in form of engagement in a joint team (joint public appearances, joint consultations, providing financial assistance, etc.). Avoid the false notion that conflicts over places of worship are solely the matter for the police, because the sources of conflicts over places of worship are often located in the administration.
6. Do not succumb to the pressure and the *fait accompli* of the warring parties in the hope that it would calm them. Appeasement often leads to inconsistent policies/regulations and polarization in the society. Avoid submitting to the pressure and making regulatory actions that destroy diversity, tolerance, and national spirit, or by cancelling the permits (such as construction permits) that had been issued earlier.

### **Recommendations for Civil Society Organizations and the FKUB** *Addressing Sectarian Conflicts*

1. Handle the sectarian conflicts in the wider social context, do not just deal with the technical aspects of the construction of places of worship. FKUB should facilitate dialogue and cooperation among communities that follow different religions and sects. In this pluralistic society, the FKUB has to stand for all religious groups.
2. Support the police in maintaining security, order and law enforcement in conflicts over places of worship. Make the police



your major partner. Such support could be in form of involvement in joint operations (public appearances, engaging in joint consultations, negotiations, consensus building, etc.). Such support means a lot to the police for whose duties the public opinion is important.

3. Pay attention to peace-building within a society, do not focus on the incidents of religious conflicts alone. Civil society, along with the local government and the police has to support resolution of sectarian conflicts and to endorse interfaith institutions such as the FKUB. In cities and districts where the FKUB is weak or nonexistent, civil society needs to support its establishment or strengthening. Leaders of organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah must also seek the best ways to prevent sectarian conflicts from escalating into violence.
4. Support and pay attention to the local inter- and intra-religious youth organizations and networks. The FKUB and civil society organizations must begin to support the inter-faith networks of young people. Paying more attention to young actors of vigilantism and militancy and ignoring the “non-problematic” youth who support peace and social cooperation leaves an impression that there are only violent and intolerant young people in the public space.
5. Initiate a broader public debate on inter- and intra-religious relations, where fatwas, sectarian controversies, and truth claims are treated as opinions that are faced also by opinions but non-sectarian ones. Views which contain hatred, incitement to violence and discrimination, regardless of where they come from, should be debated openly in order to defend democratic measures.
6. Supervise the government and the police handling of sectarian conflicts in the community.

#### *Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship*

1. FKUB’s function, as stipulated by the PBM of 2006 (Article 1, clause 1-2, and Article 9, clause 1-5), is more important than

merely solving technical aspects with regard to establishment of places of worship. FKUB and civil society organizations should strengthen the sense of unity and equality within the pluralistic society of Indonesia.

2. FKUB needs to strengthen and maintain its internal consolidation and avoid being trapped in the conflicts over construction of places of worship.
3. Civil society organizations and institutions should monitor the government and the police handling of conflicts and disputes over places of worship. Civil society organizations should monitor politicians who exploit these conflicts for political purposes such as the local elections.
4. Support and pay attention to the local inter- and intra-religious youth organizations and networks, especially in places torn by conflicts over places of worship.
5. Support the police in maintaining security, order and law enforcement in conflicts over places of worship. This support can be in form of sharing information, facilitating dialogues, etc. Such support means a lot to the police as the public opinion is important for its performance.
6. Leaders of religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah should not be silent when faced by conflicts over places of worship. They must seek the best ways to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence.

## **Recommendations for the Mass Media**

### *Addressing Sectarian Conflicts*

1. Members of mass media should understand the diversity of religious beliefs and sects in the community and carry out their job in accordance with that understanding. The use of labels that reflect judgments and religious particularisms, such as “deviationist cults”, should be avoided.
2. Avoid sensationalism in the coverage of sectarian conflicts. In addition to relying on 5W (what, who, where, when, and why) and

1 H (how), the media should pay attention to S (solutions) and C (common grounds). Ideas and initiatives with regard to management and transformation of conflicts need to be promoted to the audience, irrespective of where they come from. Media needs to make the priority of reconciliation and conflict resolution in reporting sectarian conflicts. The audience is also interested in the coverage of conflict resolution.

3. Pay attention to peace and inter- and intra-religious tolerance, do not only cover the conflict incidents. Make coverage, in-depth reports, and human interest stories about religious groups which peacefully coexist in various cities and regions of Indonesia. Cases of peaceful coexistence of Sunnis and Shi'as or Sunnis and Ahmadis are more frequent than the cases of violence, but they are not broadcasted. Since one of the rules of the media reads "if it bleeds, it leads", the journalists are more interested in reporting acts of vigilantism which, in fact, are committed only by a small group of the society.
4. Cover the process of law enforcement and emphasize the due process of law. Report if the law enforcement process in the criminal justice system was manipulated and harmed one of the parties to the conflict or its victims.
5. Monitor performance of the police and local governments. Create investigative reports on the role of local governments, civil bureaucracy and the police in handling sectarian conflicts. Report if these institutions act in a partisan way, if they do not give sufficient attention to conflict resolution, or if they utilize sectarian conflicts in political competition such as, for example, the local elections.
6. Monitor performance of the media themselves, especially the media which ignore the independent reporting and plunge into sectarian conflicts to the extent that they become a part of these conflicts themselves. Also monitored need to be the media which tend to air judgmental statements and spread enmity among religious groups or which create a sensation out of sectarian conflicts.

*Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship*

1. Pay attention to cooperation and solidarity in construction of places of worship. Make coverage of cases where construction of places of worship went without problems, and people who worked on it came from different religious backgrounds. If social peace and non-violence are not covered, a general impression will be that construction of places of worship always leads to conflicts and violence.
2. Provide adequate coverage of the role of the police in policing of conflicts over places of worship, publish their perspective on the conflicts and the ways to resolve them. Also report the constraints and limitations faced by the police in handling these conflicts — why they avoid law enforcement actions, how they coordinate or not coordinate with the local governments, what steps and actions are taken by the police towards the warring sides, etc.
3. Monitor the performance of the police, local governments, and civil servants in handling conflicts over places of worship. Make investigative reports on the roles played by the local governments and civil servants in dealing with construction of places of worship, whether they act in a partisan way, or give insufficient attention to conflict resolution, or even utilize the conflicts in political competition such as the local elections.
4. Monitor performance of the media themselves, especially of the media which tend to spread hostility and represent exclusive views of one of the warring sides.\*\*\*

## Appendix

### DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT: “POLICING RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA”

#### **Description of Incident:**

1. Date:
2. Location:
3. Type of conflict: (places of worship/sectarian)
4. Issue of the conflict:
5. Form of the incident: (attack, destruction, etc.)
6. Trigger event:
7. Parties involved:
  - a. First party (attacker/protester):
  - b. Second party (target/victim):
8. Tools/weapons used:
9. Impact:
  - a. Fatalities
  - b. Injured
  - c. Disappeared
  - d. Refugees
  - e. Material loss (homes, places of worship, vehicles, livestock, public facilities, shop/kiosk etc.).
10. Is this a new conflict or recurrence of an old one:

#### **Policing Activities**

1. Pre-emptive (for police intelligence officers or others who have information about intelligence performance)
  - a. Did the police intelligence unit obtain information about the tensions before the conflict escalated into violence?
  - b. If yes, how long before the conflict escalated into violence the information was obtained?
  - c. What actions were undertaken after the police received information about tensions? Were there any police attempts to prevent tensions from escalating into violence? Did the police try to approach and calm the warring parties? Did it try to facilitate communication between the warring parties? What was done by the Bimmas and Humas units?
  - d. In the long duration of the conflict, were there any changes/transfers among the police officers? Were the new officers briefed about the potential of violent escalation?

2. Prevention (when mass mobilization has occurred)
  - a. Was the police aware of the mass mobilization before the incident?
  - b. If yes, did the police obtain the information about the possible escalation into violence from one of the parties to the conflict (particularly the party which became the target)?
  - c. What actions were undertaken after the police received information about mass mobilization, especially when it was already known that the masses carried objects which could be used for violent acts? (allowing; taking persuasive measures to prevent; dispelling the masses; repression)
  - d. Who has the authority to deploy the police officers to prevent mass mobilization, of which level (sub-district police, district police, provincial police), and under what conditions?
  - e. If the police takes preventive measures against mass mobilization, which units are deployed and of which level (sub-district police, district police, provincial police)?
3. Countermeasures (when the incident takes place)
  - a. Which unit was deployed? Why?
  - b. Police officers deployed were from sub-district police, district police, or provincial police? Why?
  - c. How many police officers were deployed? Was the amount adequate to deal with the masses (the attackers)?
  - d. If not, why the number of troops deployed was insufficient?
  - e. If the police troops deployed were in an adequate number, were they deployed at the right time? If not, why?
  - f. The types of policing activities: approach; documentation; persuasion; repressive actions.
  - g. What is the reason behind the police unwillingness to consider taking repressive measures against the masses who deliberately commit criminal acts (assault, vandalism, arson etc.)?
  - h. Why the police more often chooses to evacuate the victims instead of taking repressive measures against the attackers?
4. The legal process and the post-clashes/conflict phase: arrest, detention, investigation and inquiry (cooperation with the prosecutor: P21), trial, sentencing (see if mass demonstration takes place in the court) – in short: criminal justice system.

### **Police Knowledge**

1. Do the police officers know the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of the National Police?
2. Do the police officers know that the rights include the following inalienable rights?
  - ☐ right to embrace a religion and to worship in accordance with one's religion;
  - ☐ freedom of belief and the right to express one's opinions in accordance with one's conscience.
3. Do the police officers know that the following rights belong to the catalogue of citizens' rights which the police has to protect:
  - ☐ the right to personal freedom: everyone is free to choose and have political convictions, express their opinion in public, choose any religion, be free from enslavement, be not discriminated in their right to citizenship, have freedom of movement and the right to move and reside within the territory of the

- Republic of Indonesia (Regulation No. 8 of 2009, Article 6, clause b);
- ☐ the right to security: everyone is entitled to protection of their selves, their family, honour, dignity, property, and peace as well as protection against the fear (Regulation No. 8 of 2009, Article 6, clause c);
  - ☐ special rights of minorities such as ethnic, religious, sexual minorities and the disabled (Regulation No. 8 of 2009, Article 6, clause h).
4. [In case of conflicts over places of worship] did the police officers know the Joint Ministerial Regulation (PBM) of No. 8 and 9 of 2006 which regulates the construction of places of worship? Specifically, did the police officers know the requirements and mechanisms for establishment of places of worship?
  5. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] according to the police officers, why did the conflict occur? Who were the parties involved? Did the parties involved have a track record of conflicts at that location or in other locations?
  6. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] were the requirements for establishment of places of worship fulfilled? Was the construction process in accordance with the mechanisms and requirements?
  7. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship], if the requirements were fulfilled, the mechanisms were appropriate, and the conflict still took place, what, according to the police, has caused it?
  8. [In case of sectarian conflicts] do the police officers know the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy?
  9. [In case of sectarian conflicts] what is understood by the police officers as abuse of religion and blasphemy? Can sectarian conflicts be seen as cases of abuse of religion or blasphemy?
  10. [In case of sectarian conflicts] according to the police, why did the conflict take place? Who were the parties involved? Did the parties involved have a track record of conflicts at that location or in other locations?
  11. Are the actions undertaken by the police in dealing with sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship appropriate? Does the police comply with the formal and legal framework and the existing internal instruments of the police institution?
  12. What were the supporting factors and what were the obstacles faced by the police while dealing with sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?
  13. What needs to be done to improve the police performance in handling sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?

#### **Legal and Procedural Framework of Policing and Characteristics of the Police Institution**

1. Which laws are the main frame of reference for the police in handling sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship?
2. Which fixed procedures are used by the police when dealing with sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? The procedures on Pulbaket, Dumas, Dalmas, Ganunras, Gankuat, Ganki?
3. Although the police organization is centralized, why are there variations in policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? Are they related to the institutional structure and resources of the police at the level of sub-district, district, provincial, and national police?
4. Does the police apply alternative mechanisms in conflict resolution (such as traditional law)?

**Police Culture**

1. What are the police officers' views on democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance?
2. What are the perceptions of the police officers' on the role of the police in a democratic system, on protecting human rights, religious freedom and tolerance?
3. Do the members of the police perceive the conflicts involving religious issues as more sensitive than other kinds of conflicts? Does this make the police feel they need to be extra careful in handling religious conflicts? Does this make the police rarely employ repressive measures when dealing with violent conflicts over religious issues?
4. Do the police members have a religious affiliation with the majority group? Does this affiliation affect the policing activities?
5. What kind of prejudices and stereotypes do the police have about the minority religious groups which by the majority are seen as deviationist?
6. According to the police, can the minority religious groups (including groups considered as heretical/deviationist) coexist with the majority? Or should they remain in their own environment?
7. How does the police respond to the views of religious groups if they are contrary to the constitutional guarantees of protection of freedom of religion, belief, and worship? Can the police still put forward the principle of protection of religious freedom, although this attitude is contrary to the views of the majority?

**Local Politics**

1. Local governments and parliaments: do the statements of government officials and legislators in the local media aggravate or mitigate the conflict? Are the incidents of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship used for gaining support in the local political contests?
2. Ministry of Religious Affairs: what has been done, what public statements issued? Are there differences between the attitudes of the city/district, province offices of the Ministry and its main headquarters?
3. [In case of conflicts over places of worship] according to the police, do the existing regulations regarding the establishment of places of worship restrict the rights of religious worship as guaranteed by the constitution?
4. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] according to the police, do the local governments' (regents/mayors) policies and attitudes with regard to construction permits affect the police protection of citizens' right to religious practice?
5. [In case of sectarian conflicts] according to the police, are the existing regulations regarding the abuse of religion and/or blasphemy in line or contrary to the principle of the protection of religious freedom as guaranteed by the constitution?
6. [In case of sectarian conflicts] do the local governments' (regents/mayors) policies on religious groups labelled as deviationist affect the police protection of citizens' right to religious practice, and of the rights of minority groups?

**Public Opinion**

1. What are the roles and actions of the local MUI and of the main MUI headquarters? What is their general role? Is there a difference of attitudes between the local and the main MUI?
2. Synod and diocese: Does Synod/Diocese give directions which reduce or which exacerbate the conflict? Do the statements of Synod/Diocese leaders increase or reduce the polarization in society? Do they take part in bridging communities



when conflicts emerge or not? Are there any attempts to create links between the local conflict with the wider context (conflicts in the province, in Indonesia, or abroad)?

3. FKUB: was the FKUB present in districts/cities in the region where the conflict occurred? What was its role? Are there differences between the FKUB of districts/cities, provinces and main headquarters in addressing the conflict incidents? Are there any other interfaith organizations? What is their role and vision?
4. Leaders of Muhammadiyah, NU or similar: do their directions reduce or exacerbate conflicts? Do their statements add to polarization in society or reduce it? Do they play a bridging role when conflicts occur or they do not? Are there any attempts to create links between the local conflict with the wider context (conflicts in the province, in Indonesia, or abroad)?
5. Media: What is the role of the media in sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? Do the media side with one party to the conflict - for example, the majority party? Do they publish the views of the law enforcement agencies such as the police and the courts? Do they become a mouthpiece of one of the warring parties or do they provide reports that help in conflict resolution?
6. What is the role of NGOs in each location where the conflicts occurred?
7. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] according to the police, do the views and attitudes of religious leaders or local religious organizations about permits required for establishment of places of worship and their views on particular groups' right to worship, affect the police protection of citizens' right to religious practice, and of the minorities' rights?
8. [In case of sectarian conflicts] according to the police, do the views/fatwas of religious leaders/organizations on the groups labelled as deviationist/heretical, affect the police protection of citizens' right to religious practice, and of the minorities' rights?

#### **Interaction between the Police and the Actors of Conflict**

1. Have there been repeated incidents of sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship in your work environment in recent years? Was it a solitary incident?
2. If repeated, why in your opinion, it happened again?
3. How did the police handle each of the repetitions of this conflict?
4. [For conflicts that could be handled – did not lead to violence], why/how did the police manage to handle these particular sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship?
5. Were there meetings between the police and community leaders in order to handle the sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? What was the input from the community leaders in those meetings?
6. Were there meetings and coordination between the police and local authorities in order to handle sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?
7. What is the role of other parties aside those mentioned earlier, for decisions made by the police while dealing with sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?

#### **Parties Involved in the Conflict (Targets/Victims)**

1. Did the victims have information that the conflict would escalate into violence?
2. Did the victims report to the police the possibility of the conflict escalating into violence? What was the response of the police?
3. When did the victims know about the presence of the police: before, during, or

after the conflict escalated into violence?

4. In accordance with the timing of police presence, what actions were carried out by the police that were known to the victims (e.g. they were present but allowed the attacks, or they were trying to block the attackers but failed, etc.)?
5. According to the assessment by the victims, would the police forces present at the scene be able to prevent violence?
6. According to the victims' assessment, did the police tend to be biased (towards the attackers)?
7. According to the victims' assessment, if the police failed to prevent the outbreak of violence, what were the main reasons of failure? Was it connected to the policy or attitude of the local government towards the disputed issues? Was it connected to the views of the local social/religious leaders?

**Parties Involved in the Conflict (Attackers)**

1. Who are they in terms of social position? A small/big religious organization? The dominant group/minority? Are they related to thuggish circles?
2. Do the attackers have a track record of involvement in earlier conflict incidents?
3. The tactics they use: peaceful or violent? Confrontational or non-confrontational? A mix of both?
4. Do the attackers have individual or organizational links with the police?

## ACRONYMS

AKBP	: <i>Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi</i> (Police Adjunct Senior Commissioner); equivalent to Lieutenant Colonel
Babinkamtibmas	: <i>Bintara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat</i> (Development Board for Security and Order)
Babinmas	: <i>Badan Pembina Masyarakat</i> (Community Guidance Body)
Baintelkam	: <i>Bintara Intelijen dan Keamanan</i> (Security Intelligence Officer)
Bakesbangpolinmas	: <i>Badan Kesatuan Bangsa, Politik, dan Perlindungan Masyarakat</i> (Agency for National Unity, Politics, and Public Protection)
Bakorpakem	: <i>Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran dan Kepercayaan Masyarakat</i> (Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society)
BAP	: <i>Berita Acara Pemeriksaan</i> (Police Investigation Report)
BASSRA	: <i>Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren se-Madura</i> (Consultation Body of the Ulama of Madurese Boarding Schools)
Biddokkes	: <i>Bidang Kedokteran dan Kesehatan</i> (Medical and Health Section)
Bidropam	: <i>Bidang Pertanggungjawaban Profesi dan Pengamanan Internal</i> (Profession Accountability and Internal Security Section)
BIN	: <i>Badan Intelijen Negara</i> (State Intelligence Agency)
Binmas	: <i>Pembinaan Masyarakat</i> (Community Guidance)
Binamitra	: <i>Biro Pembinaan Kemitraan</i> (Guidance and Partnership Bureau)
BKO	: <i>Bawah Kendali Operasi</i> (Under Operational Control)
Brimob	: <i>Brigade Mobil</i> (Mobile Brigade)
Buser	: <i>Buru Sergap</i> (Mobile Detective Unit)
Dandim	: <i>Komandan Distrik Militer</i> (District Military Commander)
Dalmas	: <i>Pengendali Massa</i> (Crowd Control)
Danramil	: <i>Komandan Rayon Militer</i> (Sub-District Military Commander)
Ditintelkam	: <i>Direktorat Intelijen dan Keamanan</i> (Intelligence and Security Directorate)
Ditreskrimum	: <i>Direktorat Reserse Kriminal Umum</i> (General Criminal Investigations Directorate)
Ditsabharra	: <i>Direktorat Pengaturan Penjagaan Pengawasan Patroli</i> (Guarding Patrol Management Directorate)
DKM	: <i>Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid</i> (Council of Mosques)
DUHAM	: <i>Deklarasi Universal tentang HAM</i> (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
Dumas	: <i>Pengaduan Masyarakat</i> (Public Complaints)
FKUB	: <i>Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama</i> (Interfaith Harmony Forum) <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>FKUB was established through the joint ministerial regulation (*Peraturan Bersama Menteri, PBM*) of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home

FKUI	: <i>Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam</i> (Islamic Community Communication Forum)
Forkami	: <i>Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum)
Forpimda	: <i>Forum Pimpinan Daerah</i> (Regional [Provincial and District] Communication Forum)
Gakkum	: <i>Penegakan Hukum</i> (Law Enforcement)
Ganki	: <i>Penanganan Anarki</i> (Anarchy Countermeasures)
Ganunras	: <i>Penanganan Unjuk Rasa</i> (Handling Protests)
GAMAS	: <i>Gerakan Anti-Maksiat</i> (Anti-Vice Movement)
GARIS	: <i>Gerakan Reformis Islam</i> (Reformist Islam Movement)
GBHN	: <i>Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara</i> (Broad Outlines of National Policy)
GKI	: <i>Gereja Kristen Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Christian Church)
GO	: <i>Gelar Operasional</i> (Operation Display)
Harkamtibmas	: <i>Pemeliharaan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat</i> (Maintaining Security and Social Order)
HGB	: <i>Hak Guna Bangunan</i> (Certificate of Occupancy)
HKBP	: <i>Huria Kristen Batak Protestan</i> (Batak Protestant Church)
Humas	: <i>Hubungan Masyarakat</i> (Community Relations)
IMB	: <i>Izin Mendirikan Bangunan</i> (Construction Permit)
Intelkam	: <i>Intelijen dan Keamanan</i> (Intelligence and Security)
IPS	: <i>Ikatan Pencak Silat</i> (Pencak Silat Association) <sup>2</sup>
JAI	: <i>Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia</i> (Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia)
Kabag Ops	: <i>Kepala Bagian Operasional</i> (Head of Operations)
Kades	: <i>Kepala Desa</i> (Village Head)
Kamtibas	: <i>Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat</i> (Security and Social Order)
Kanit	: <i>Kepala Unit</i> (Head of Sub-District Level Police Unit)
Karoops	: <i>Kepala biro operasi</i> (Head of Operations Bureau)
Kasat	: <i>Kepala Satuan</i> (Head of District-Level Police Unit)
Kesbangpol	: <i>Kesatuan Kebangsaan dan Politik</i> (National Unity and Politics)
Kesbang	: <i>Kesatuan Kebangsaan</i> (National Unity)
Kejari	: <i>Kejaksaan Negeri</i> (Prosecutor Office)
Kodim	: <i>Komando Distrik Militer</i> (District Military Command)
Kominda	: <i>Komunitas Intelijen Daerah</i> (Regional [provincial and district] Intelligence Community)
KUA	: <i>Kantor Urusan Agama</i> (Office of Religious Affairs)
KUHAP	: <i>Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana</i> (Penal Law)
Lantas	: <i>Lalu-Lintas</i> (Traffic)
Linmas	: <i>Perlindungan Masyarakat</i> (Community Protection)
MA	: <i>Mahkamah Agung</i> (Supreme Court)
Matakin	: <i>Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia</i> (Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia)
MMI	: <i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)
MUI	: <i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Ulama Council), with national, provincial, and local bodies

Affairs No. 9 of 2006 / No. 8 of 2006 on the guidelines for the duties of the heads of regions/deputy heads in maintaining religious harmony, empowerment of the Forum for Religious Harmony, and the construction of places of worship.

<sup>2</sup>Pencak Silat is one of Indonesian traditional martial arts.

Muspida	: <i>Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah</i> (Regional [Provincial and District] Leaders Consultation)
Muspika	: <i>Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan</i> (Sub-District Leaders Consultation)
Musrembang	: <i>Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan</i> (Development Planning Consultation)
NU	: <i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> (Ulama Awakening); the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia
Pakem	: <i>Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat</i> (Team to Monitor the Mystical Beliefs in the Society)
PBM	: <i>Peraturan Bersama Menteri</i> (Joint Ministerial Regulation) <sup>3</sup>
PC	: <i>Pengurus Cabang</i> (Officials at Branch-Level)
PDI-P	: <i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)
Pemda	: <i>Pemerintahan Daerah</i> (Local Government)
Pemkot	: <i>Pemerintahan Kota</i> (Municipal Government)
Perkap	: <i>Peraturan Kapolri</i> (Police Regulation)
Persis	: <i>Persatuan Islam</i> (Islamic Unity); one of Indonesian puritan Islamic organizations
PGI	: <i>Persatuan Guru Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Association of Teachers)
Pilkada	: <i>Pemilihan Kepala Daerah</i> (Local Election)
PKS	: <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party)
Polda	: <i>Kepolisian Daerah</i> (Provincial Police)
Polresta	: <i>Kepolisian Resor Kota</i> (Municipal Police)
Polwan	: <i>Polisi Wanita</i> (Policewomen)
Polmas	: <i>Pemolisian Masyarakat</i> (Community Policing)
Polres	: <i>Kepolisian Resor</i> (District-Level Police)
Polri	: <i>Kepolisian Republik Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Police)
Polsek	: <i>Kepolisian Sektor</i> (Sub-District Police)
Protap	: <i>Prosedur Tetap</i> (Fixed Operating Procedures)
PUI	: <i>Persatuan Umat Islam</i> (The Unity of Muslims); one of Indonesian Islamic organizations
Pulbaket	: <i>Pengumpulan Bahan dan Keterangan</i> (Collecting Information)
Raimas	: <i>Pengurai Massa</i> (Mass Decomposer)
Renpam	: <i>Rencana Pengamanan</i> (Security Plan)
Reskrim	: <i>Reserse Kriminal</i> (Criminal Investigation)
RT	: <i>Rukun Tetangga</i> (Neighborhood Group). <sup>4</sup>
RW	: <i>Rukun Warga</i> (Community Group)
Sabhara	: <i>Pengaturan Penjagaan Pengawalan Patroli</i> (Guarding Patrol)
Samapta	: <i>Siap siaga</i> (readiness); field officer
SARA	: <i>Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan</i> (Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and

<sup>3</sup>Refers to the joint ministerial regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 of 2006 / No. 8 of 2006 on the guidelines for the duties of the heads of regions/deputy heads in maintaining religious harmony, empowerment of the Forum for Religious Harmony, and the construction of houses of worship.

<sup>4</sup>In Indonesia, RT and RW are units below village (*desa*) or even hamlet (*dusun*). RW is short for *rukun warga* (community group) and below it is RT or *rukun tetangga* (neighbourhood group).

	Inter-Group [Relations]] <sup>5</sup>
Satpol PP	: <i>Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja</i> (Public Order Agency)
Sekdes	: <i>Sekretaris Desa</i> (Village Secretary)
SK	: <i>Surat Keputusan</i> (Decree)
SKB	: <i>Surat Keputusan Bersama</i> (Joint Decree) <sup>6</sup>
SOP	: Standard Operating Procedure
SPKT	: <i>Sentra Pelayanan Kepolisian Terpadu</i> (Center for Police Integrated Service)
Sprint	: <i>Surat Perintah</i> (Letter of Instruction)
SSK	: <i>Satuan Setingkat Kompi</i> (Company-Level Unit)
SST	: <i>Satuan Setingkat Pleton</i> (Platoon-Level Unit)
THR	: <i>Tunjangan Hari Raya</i> (Annual Bonus, in connection to Eid al-Fitr/ Idul Fitri festival)
Tupoksi	: <i>Tugas Pokok dan Fungsi</i> (Main Duties and Functions)
Turjawali	: <i>Pengaturan, Penjagaan, Pegawalan dan Patroli</i> (Management, Protection, Guarding, and Patrol); a police unit
Walubi	: <i>Perwakilan Umat Budha Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Buddhists Representative)

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<sup>5</sup>The acronym originated in the New Order government, who prohibited discussion on these four topics for being sensitive issues.

<sup>6</sup>SKB generally refers to the joint decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia No. 3.2008, KEP-033/A/JA/6/2008, 199 of 2008 on the warning and commands to the followers, members, and/or leaders of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community of Indonesia (JAI) and the public. SKB also refers to the joint decree issued by a number of local governments.

## GLOSSARY

<i>Adat</i>	From Arabic: tradition, custom
<i>Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah</i>	From Arabic; lit.: "the people of the traditional way and of the congregation of believers"; widely understood as Sunnis, in contrast to Shi'as
<i>Amar ma'aruf nahi munkar</i>	From Arabic: to encourage the good and discourage the evil
<i>Carok</i>	A Madurese tradition of duelling in which [commonly male] combatants use sickles and often fight to the death; the fight could expand beyond two combatants to include also their family members or groups
<i>Dakwah</i>	From Arabic; lit.: "the call"; the term denotes to the efforts to convert non-Muslims to the Islamic faith and/or to persuade Muslims to become more observant
<i>Fatwa</i>	From Arabic: Islamic religious edict
<i>Halal bihalal</i>	From Arabic: Muslim gathering, especially after Ramadan and the celebration of Eid al-Fitr ( <i>Idul Fitri</i> )
<i>Haba'ib</i>	See: <i>habib</i>
<i>Habib</i>	From Arabic; lit.: "beloved [of God]"; a cognate for Indonesians of Arab descent; plural: <i>haba'ib</i>
<i>Haul</i>	Annual religious gathering to commemorate and celebrate a deceased religious leader
<i>Imam</i>	From Arabic: a person who leads a prayer
<i>Istigasah</i>	From Arabic: mass prayer to ask God's help
<i>Jawara</i>	Local strongmen
<i>Karang Taruna</i>	Neighbourhood youth organization
<i>Khatib</i>	From Arabic: someone who gives a sermon
<i>Kiai (or Kiyai)</i>	Headmaster and head teacher of an Islamic school, particularly Islamic boarding school
<i>Langgar</i>	See: <i>musala</i> .
<i>Madrasah</i>	Islamic day schools.
<i>Madhab</i>	From Arabic; Islamic schools of law such as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali; the word sometimes is also used to denote schools of theology, such as Sunni or Shi'a
<i>Majlis taklim</i>	From Arabic; Islamic study group
<i>Mubalig</i>	From Arabic: preacher

<i>Musala</i>	From Arabic: Islamic prayer room found in shopping malls, airports, offices and other sites, as well as standalone buildings; <i>musala</i> are smaller than mosques; as a standalone building, sometimes <i>musala</i> is also called <i>langgar</i> .
<i>Mut'ah</i>	From Arabic: temporary marriage
<i>Pengajian</i>	Islamic teaching sessions
<i>Pesantren</i>	Indonesian Islamic boarding schools
<i>Preman</i>	Thug, gangs
<i>Ruko</i>	<i>Rumah-toko</i> ; shop-house
<i>Salafi</i>	From Arabic; lit.: "past"; Salafis seek to return to Islam in its traditional, purified forms (roots)
<i>Santri</i>	students of a <i>pesantren</i>
<i>Tablig</i>	preaching
<i>Tablig akbar</i>	From Arabic; lit.: "grand sermon"; religious gathering where some preachers make sermons in front of a huge crowd
<i>Tazkirah</i>	A book written by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of Ahmadiyya; many mainstream Muslims and organizations like the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) believe the <i>Tazkirah</i> is the holy scripture of Ahmadiyya
<i>Tengkah</i>	The high value the Madurese ascribe to matters of self worth and pride
<i>Ulama</i>	Muslim scholars
<i>Ustad (or Ustaz)</i>	From Arabic: teacher
<i>Zina</i>	From Arabic: adultery



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“In these eight meticulously researched case studies, Rizal Panggabean, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and their colleagues illuminate two critical issues in post-Soeharto Indonesia: the prevalence of religious conflict and the institutional weaknesses of the police. ... The institutes involved in this study have developed a formidable reputation for work on religious conflict, combining rigorous research with practical advocacy, looking for lessons that might be learned to manage such conflicts more effectively and prevent violence in the future.”

— SIDNEY JONES

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)

Some of the developments in the management of religious life in the post-New Order Indonesia have been encouraging, some not at all. Although often discussed, very rarely this problem has been reviewed in terms of policing. This is quite unfortunate because since the separation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) in 1999, the police has been gradually taking over the major role of maintaining security and public order.

This is what prompted the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, to carry out a research on the subject of religious conflicts policing. The present book, which is based on it, asked two main questions: why the policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship has been effective in some cases but has not been so in others? What explains the variation of policing success and failure in these conflicts?

This research was driven by an assumption that performance of the police in dealing with religious conflicts, as well as with all other matters, cannot be treated solely as the police problem. The failure or success of policing must be seen in the context of existing political structures of opportunities and constraints which influence the policing.