



Disputed Churches in Jakarta

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Translated by Rebecca Lunnon

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Abstract

Healthy pluralism requires space for all religious adherents to worship and construct places of worship in accordance with their convictions. The state should protect this right as an essential matter. Despite this normative ideal, there is still much controversy surrounding the construction of places of worship in Indonesia. In the last few years, the planned construction of a number of places of worship has been disputed, although others have been able to overcome these problems by relying on different strategies.

This research seeks to examine the factors that play a role in initiating and resolving conflict over places of worship. Places of worship are specifically limited in this study to Catholic churches and Protestant churches that are members of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, PGI). The methods used were participant observation and in-depth interviews of churches representing one of four categories: (1) undisputed churches; (2) disputed churches that have since resolved the dispute; (3) originally undisputed churches that have since become disputed; and (4) churches that have never been able to resolve the dispute.

Based on thirteen case studies, the research on which this report is based confirms the influential role of state regulation and social factors. The cases show that the obstacles some churches experience are generally related to weak government agencies due to political, social or ideological reasons. In terms of social factors, demographic factors were not found to have an influence. Resistance to churches was more often caused by a lack of communication, or provocation or intimidation by specific groups. After describing and analysing the thirteen cases selected, this monograph closes with conclusions and recommendations.***

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Reprint Edition, published by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi [PUSAD]), Paramadina Foundation, February 2014

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Originally published in Indonesia as *Kontroversi Gereja di Jakarta* by the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Postgraduate School, Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta) in 2011. The first English edition of this book is published in cooperation with the Asian Law Centre and the Centre for Islamic Law and Society at the University of Melbourne, The Paramadina Foundation (Jakarta) and CRCS, Gadjah Mada University.

Cover design & Layout by Irsyad Rafsadi

ISBN: 978-602-96257-3-8.

Translation was funded by Professor Tim Lindsey's ARC Federation Fellowship "Islam and Modernity: Syari'ah, Terrorism and Governance in South-East Asia". Professor Lindsey was appointed as an ARC Federation Fellow in 2006, a 5-year appointment funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC). Extremism in Southeast Asia responds to challenges that western-derived modernity poses for Islam, including market economies, democracy and nation states. Professor Lindsey examined the different responses to these challenges through research on regional Muslim communities, institution building, mentoring young scholars and community engagement in the Southeast Asian region. The Fellowship also aimed to help strengthen the Melbourne Law School as a hub for research and public engagement on issues related to Islam and law in our region.

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Preface

Introduction to the Monograph Series on the Practice of Pluralism

There is always some ambiguity when how diversity is to be managed is discussed in Indonesia. During the New Order, there appeared to be harmony between groups that differed in terms of their customs (*adat*), culture, religion, languages or their status as migrants or natives, among other things. The government intentionally managed this diversity to ensure the law and order and harmony that would allow for economic development. In reality, there were many issues inherent in this strict control of harmony, particularly the popular SARA issue. An acronym for *Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antargolongan* (Ethnicity, Religion, Race and Inter-group relations), SARA referred to the dictum that ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations – the most prominent sources of difference – were sensitive issues and had to be treated carefully. They could not be dealt with in a way that angered any particular group, and as such any discourse on these issues was limited.

Channels through which citizens could participate in discussion of these issues were restricted to officially provided. For

religious issues, the channel was religious councils, believed to represent religious communities. There were also official associations to represent cultural or customary issues and, even within schools (as discussed in one monograph in this series) there were facilities for student participation, including the OSIS (Intra-School Student Organisation). This had two functions: to provide a space for student activities and to limit those activities and the involvement of particular groups. Under New Order corporatism, participation was no different to mobilisation.

Another icon of the New Order was the Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*) in Jakarta. It recognises the immense diversity of Indonesia but at the same time limits that recognition. It displays different traditional houses and places of worship but the number of different traditional houses or places of worship is set, finite. As this display has it, culture, customs (*adat*) and religion seem to be unchanging, singular, like museums. There are at least two problems with this representation. First, diversity is not limited to the number of displays on show, or to any set number. Second, it leaves no room for the incredible diversity that occurs within each of these depictions, or the fact that each culture, custom, or religion is not an inanimate object, but continues to move, change and struggle for recognition of its aspirations. It is not enough to just “preserve” these cultures, customs or religions. Their vitality also needs to be recognised. The *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* model also denies inter-linkages between tribes, races, cultures, customs and even religions. It is as if each diverse form is separate, stands alone, and has no convergence beyond the fact that each is on display in the Indonesian “park”.

Interestingly, after the collapse of the New Order, triggered by the popular calls for *Reformasi*, or ‘reformation’, there was little change to this paradigm. There was greater space for diversity but clear boundaries remained. The number of “officially recog-

nised religions" increased by one, and the number of provinces also increased as old provinces were divided differently under the decentralisation policy, but all this occurred within certain boundaries.

Under the New Order, the harmony paradigm was questioned but Indonesians also took pride in Indonesia as a unitary state that was home to diverse regions, islands, customs, cultures, religions and languages. This image was threatened after the Reformation, when diversity seemed to try to break free from the confines of the old regime in a disorganised and, at times, anarchic manner, coloured by violence on both small and large scale. Indonesians became anxious, thinking that the harmony of the past of which we had been so proud was fading, along with the image of Indonesia as a modern, moderate and democratic state. We asked with increasing intensity: 'what is wrong?'

While the New Order was marked by authoritarianism and corporatism, the democratic movement that grew out of the Reformation had two key characteristics. First, there was far greater room for freedom of expression; and second, it ushered in decentralisation, which decreased the power of the central government and gave greater recognition to regional authorities. Most contemporary issues concerning diversity originate from these two main characteristics. Greater room for expression allowed new groups, including those repressed during the New Order, to emerge unimpeded, and we saw the strengthening of religious and cultural identity. Combined with the weakening of law enforcement, these groups' strong aspirations often led to violence that was not dealt with appropriately. Greater regional authority as a result of decentralisation did, in some regions, increase welfare and social justice. But along with decentralisation and extensive corruption, however, there were also cases where the discriminatory aspirations of certain groups found their way into local governance.

In other words, many of the issues we face today in relation to the management of diversity are part and parcel of democratisation and these two characteristics. As a result, whatever we might think about resolving current issues of diversity, it will be no good to return to a situation similar to that which prevailed before the Reformation. We must accept the consequences of democratisation, positive or negative, and then work on fixing the issues that arise.

It is this issue that has prompted us to undertake research and publish the results in this series of monographs and an additional book on *pluralisme kewargaan* (civic pluralism). While the book contains a more theoretical discussion and views the issue on a wider scale, the monograph series focuses on local cases, limited to certain regions.

The book and the monograph series examine civic pluralism, emphasising issues that relate to religious diversity, although often it is difficult to clearly distinguish between the religious sector and other social sectors. The term “pluralism” generally refers to the effort to respond to issues of diversity in society. The adjective “civic” further defines our discussion. First, the adjective “civic” is used to differentiate this discourse from that on pluralism which in Indonesia is often understood to be a theological or philosophical claim to truth or salvation within the different religions. These monographs and the book do seek to enter this discourse. In addition, the qualification “civic” refers to issues of diversity that identify individuals and their communities as Indonesian citizens.

This discussion is strongly rooted in the political, not theological realm, although theology is discussed at certain points, as religious discussion also plays a role within social groups. As a political issue, one of the primary issues in the management of diversity is how to maintain the public realm as a facility for social participation in a democratic state. As strict separation

between the private and public realms is increasingly difficult to justify and does not accord with the socio-political realities in almost all democratic states today, recognition of religious diversity and all its aspirations is increasingly important and must be managed appropriately.

Management of diversity is not the same as religious regulation. Regulation is necessary for several reasons, and is a duty shared by the government, the legislature and wider society. Outside the law, however, there must be an ethos within society - a good neighbourly ethos between citizens - that is not restricted simply to tolerance for the sake of maintaining order but extends also to the desire to help one another resolve issues, or even learn from one another. If not, management of diversity will remain merely a legal matter.

In terms of individual religious communities, an open political realm that allows participation in order to discover ideas of common good and collective resolution of problems also demands that religion shows a constructive and civilised face. In doing so, religious groups become part of civil society, which holds a central position in democratic countries. The primary duty of the state is to maintain the public realm and, even when neutrality is absent or is not desirable, the state still needs to provide facilities, particularly to marginalised groups, to participate in the public realm.

Although such an idea is not problematic normatively, several potential issues could emerge in relation to the recognition and diverse representation of civil groups in the political arena. Separate from the debate over the ways to manage diversity (such as liberalism, multiculturalism and so on) another important matter is the opening up, and maintenance of, spaces for inter- and intra-community dialogue, rather than establishing explicit standards (some of which may be considered “universal”) to determine which citizens may participate. In this context,

Indonesia's normative foundations, such as *Pancasila* or the idea of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity), would be more productive if used as a framework for participation of citizens that is always open to reinterpretation, rather than as an exclusive ideological formulation.

The final point of "civic pluralism" is the connection that recognition and representation has with redistribution, namely efforts to provide social welfare that is inclusive and targets all social groups, no matter what their geographical background, culture, *adat* or religion. Here, recognition and representation, or efforts to manage diversity more generally, are instruments through which to achieve social justice and equality for all citizens. This issue is discussed further in the book, *Civic Pluralism*.

In the monograph series – particularly in the first seven monographs – our research colleagues have selected several topics through which to view the practice of pluralism in various regions in Indonesia. These topics are varied, and range from middle school institutes to churches, the attempt to introduce local regulations inspired by religious values and the interaction between religion and local cultures, or even "unofficial religions". Each research project is focused on a specific and limited geographical area, so we can understand pluralism, or the practice of living together in a diverse environment, from a close-up and focused perspective, and not just as a large abstract idea about the management of diversity. Our ambition is not to find a single general pattern behind the practice of pluralism in Indonesia but to rather examine each particular topic in greater depth, in order to further illuminate and help explore the issue of "civic pluralism".

It is important to note that we started discussing the idea of "civic pluralism" at the end of 2008 but in a much less specific, more general form. Ideally, we would have had a clear picture from the beginning, which would have guided all the research

undertaken. In reality, however, our initial idea, which was perhaps premature in some aspects, was explored collectively and concurrently by the directing team who edited this series and our partners undertaking field research in several regions throughout Indonesia.

About this Monograph: Dissection of Issues Concerning the Construction of Churches

Issues over the construction of churches have long disturbed harmonious relations between religious communities in Indonesia. Various government regimes have come to power, yet problems with the construction of churches have always existed, and at times have led to social tension and even violent conflict. Available data shows that more than 1000 cases have occurred from the middle of 1969 to 2006, with the majority occurring under the New Order regime, which – ironically – placed great emphasis on harmony.

After the regime collapsed and there was greater space for the expression of freedom and diversity, the construction of churches continued to be a crucial issue of religious freedom. This is evident from the annual reports on religious freedom produced by the Wahid Institute, Setara Institute, Paramadina Foundation and MPRK UGM, the Moderate Muslim Society and CRCS UGM. These reports show that the tension surrounding the construction of churches is still high, particularly over the last five years.

The government has indeed made several efforts to address the issue. In 2006, the government issued the Joint Regulations of the Minister for Religious Affairs and the Minister for Internal Affairs (PBM) Nos. 9 and 8 to replace Joint Decree (SKB) No. 1/Ber/MDN-MAG/1969, which had been deemed discriminatory. Legally, the Joint Regulations give greater legal certainty than the

Joint Decree. In addition, the government established the Inter-Religious Harmony Forum (*Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama*, FKUB) through the Joint Regulations, which the government expected to play a constructive role in maintaining harmony. These efforts were, however, unable to resolve the issues surrounding the construction of places of worship.

A research team from Paramadina Foundation, the Masters of Peace and Conflict Resolution program of Gadjah Mada University (MPRK UGM) and the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP), set out to study the issue by conducting research into the controversies behind the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. Although this study is only a preliminary analysis and the sample of churches studied was limited (only 13 churches, seven Catholic and six Protestant), several of the conclusions provide valuable lessons about the need to enforce “civic pluralism”.

“Civic pluralism” requires an initiative by citizens to build a network of friendships and mutually negotiate differences so they can develop a rulebook that collectively benefits all groups. Cases involving the construction of churches rarely pay much attention to this aspect. People often focus attention on formal rules or state regulations. Our research in Jakarta and the surrounding areas shows that informal friendship networks are, in fact, an effective tool through which to resolve issues that arise during the construction of churches.

The case of St Mikael’s Church in Kranji, for example, provides an important lesson on the value of informal relations. Until 2005, when Father Yosef was sent to St Mikael, the relationship between this church’s congregants and the local community was coloured by suspicion. This was evident from the fact that barely any local residents were willing to enter, or walk within, the vast Strada complex. The complex was separated from the local community by a small door that had never been opened,

and locals had been cautioned against opening it. The area near the door became a rubbish dump and the door became a symbol of the separation between the two communities. Working with the heads of the local neighbourhood and community association units and religious leaders, the door was eventually opened. Father Yosef prayed that the opening of the door would signify the start of improved communications between the church community and local residents.

This story may also be a symbol of the need for attention to “civic pluralism”, especially in relation to the construction of churches. Often in public discourse issues over the construction of churches are viewed and discussed solely as human rights issues, which should not be contested and should be upheld by the government. This research in Jakarta and the surrounding areas provides a portrait, however, that is much more complex and nuanced. In many aspects, problems with the construction of churches reflect deeply-rooted suspicions between religious communities. It requires people like Father Yosef and other advocates of pluralism – whose stories can be found in this report – to have the courage to “cross boundaries” and build friendships in order to remove suspicions and open bridges of dialogue so that debate can be negotiated and, eventually, a better and more civilised way of life can be built together.

Of course, this does not reduce the government’s responsibility. Citizens will not make efforts to build mutual understanding if the government does not provide room for negotiations, crucial to the development of “civic pluralism”. The government can play an important role here by ensuring that room for negotiations remains open to all parties, that they are not monopolised by any one party, and that they proceed without threats or violence.***

Preface to the English Edition

From the Director of the Paramadina Foundation

This small book is based on research by the Paramadina Foundation's Research Team into controversies concerning the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. This is not a new theme in the advocacy of religious freedom in Indonesia. Several institutes, such as the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS, UGM) and the Wahid Institute, have recorded instances of church closures in Indonesia in their annual reports on religious freedom in Indonesia. Unlike these reports, however, this research seeks to further examine the dynamics of this issue and to discover what can be learnt from the cases where disputes over the construction of churches have been resolved.

The Indonesian edition of this book has already been released and commented on by Sidney Jones (International Crisis Group, Indonesia), Jeirry Sumampow (Communion of Churches in Indonesia, PGI), Rudy Pratikno (Archdiocese of Jakarta), and Syafi'i Mufid (Inter-Religious Harmony Forum, Jakarta). We have also

received similar comments from Firliana Purwanti (Hivos, Indonesia) and Zainal Abidin Bagir (CRCS, UGM). The English edition of the book contains a few alterations based on these comments.

We express our deepest thanks to all those mentioned above for their suggestions. We would especially like to thank CRCS, UGM and the Pluralism Knowledge Program (PKP) Team, who initiated this research and then published the Indonesian language version.

Finally, we give our many thanks to Professor Tim Lindsey, Dr Melissa Crouch and Rebecca Lunnon from the Asian Law Centre, the University of Melbourne, for their willingness to support the translation and publication of this book in English.***

Jakarta, May 2011

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi

From the Asian Law Centre

In 2011, three major incidents at churches raised fears that large-scale communal violence between Muslims and Christians may break out again in Indonesia. The first occurred in February 2011 after a crowd of hardline (*garis keras*) Muslims, dissatisfied with the perceived light sentence of a Christian convicted for blaspheming Islam, burnt down several churches in Temanggung, Central Java (Arnaz, 2011). The second occurred in September 2011 when communal violence broke out between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, Maluku, leaving 7,000 people displaced (ICG, 2011). Shortly after this, a third incident occurred when a Muslim suicide bomber severely injured several Christians when he detonated a bomb inside a church in Solo, Central Java. This level of violence between Muslims and Christians has not been seen in Indonesia since early 2000s.

Despite these incidents and the intensity of the violence they involved, protracted disputes over permits are an equally pressing and daily concern for many churches. One example is the Yasmin Protestant church in Bogor, which had its permit formally recognised by the Administrative Court in 2010 but is still not built, due to the refusal of the local mayor to enforce the court decision.¹ Such disputes continue to raise ongoing questions about the permit application process, and the role that law and enforcement agencies play in facilitating or exacerbating these disputes.

While many Indonesian non-government organisations now report these incidents as statistics in bulletins or annual reports on religious freedom, there is a lack of in-depth, qualitative research that explores these tensions in their context. This report seeks to fill this gap by analysing in detail how and why tensions and disputes over churches occur, based on a large number of interviews at 14 different locations in and around Jakarta. I wish to congratulate the Paramadina Foundation research team, led by Pak Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, for a very detailed and thorough piece of research. Crucially, this research on Muslim-Christian relations was conducted by Indonesian Muslims, which means that the perspective they bring to this report gives the reader an insight into the daily, lived realities of inter-religious relations in Indonesia.

The report makes several key findings, of which I will highlight just a few. First, it finds that disputes over applications for church permits often arise because of fears (real or perceived) that Christians will attempt to proselytise or convert Muslims, activities referred to in Indonesia as 'Kristenisasi' or Christianisation (p 80).² It also demonstrates that there are a significant number of 'non-religious' factors at play in these disputes. One is the socio-

¹ For discussion of cases in the Administrative Courts involving church permits, see Crouch, 2010.

² This is similar to the findings in my own research, see Crouch, 2011.

economic context. The report finds that churches can negotiate solutions to such disputes if they are able to find a tangible way of contributing to, or empowering, the local community without that being perceived as 'Christianisation'. For example, if a church offered to employ local residents as parking attendants, then it was more likely that the local community would feel the construction of a church could offer positive benefits to the community, and might therefore consent to the construction (p 37).

Another important issue is the role of the bureaucracy, including the local government and the police. The report highlights the way in which local governments have bowed to the pressure created by campaigns led by hardline Islamic religious leaders and groups. It suggests that the positions taken by local government leaders regarding church disputes directly affect the response of the police, often contributing to tensions rather than helping to resolve them. If an agreement is eventually made between the parties, it often comes at a high price to the church involved. For example, one church paid Rp 50 million for 'coordination fees' to the police. There is clearly an urgent need for reform of the police force to ensure that it is truly a public service rather than a rent-seeking institution.

On a more positive note, the report finds that there are encouraging efforts being made by some local leaders at the grassroots level to promote inter-religious relations in Indonesia. The report suggests that it is local community leaders, often the head of the local neighbourhood unit (RW or RT), who are the most powerful determinants in the outcome of a dispute over a church. It also highlights the importance of personal relationships between the church members and the wider local community (p 89). It demonstrates the many ways church leaders actively try to connect with local community leaders at a personal level, taking the time to engage in dialogue and find creative ways to allay fears or to provide benefits to leaders and the local community.

This research also reflects on the implementation of the new Joint Ministerial Regulations in 2006 and the establishment of the Inter-religious Harmony Forum, a council of religious leaders with the official role of facilitating the process for issuing permits for places of worship. Despite its promising name, this report finds that the Forum has at times hindered, rather than facilitated, applications for church permits and has yet to play a significant role in mediating church disputes (p 80). This clearly requires government attention if the concept of *kerukunan umat beragama* (inter-religious harmony) is to be more than empty rhetoric.

Finally, the findings of this report are relevant not only for Indonesian institutions and organisations, but also for other governments and international organisations that seek to understand inter-religious relations in Indonesia. The report also has broader application to the incidents of violent conflict mentioned above, particularly as regards the need to address the complicity of local governments and enforcement agencies in exacerbating violence, and the need to support respected community leaders at the grassroots level who can play a significant role in mediating tensions. ***

Melbourne, September 2011
Melissa Crouch

Glossary

AD :	<i>Angkatan Darat, Army</i>
Amdal :	<i>Analisis Dampak Lingkungan, Environmental Impact Analysis</i>
Dandim :	<i>Komandan Dinas Militer, District Military Commander</i>
Danramil :	<i>Komandan Rayon Militer, Sub-district Military Commander</i>
Depkau :	<i>Departemen Keuangan, Department of Finance</i>
DGI :	<i>Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Churches</i>
DPP :	<i>Dewan Pastorial Paroki, Parish Pastoral Council</i>
FBR :	<i>Forum Betawi Rempug, Betawi Brotherhood Forum</i>
FKUI :	<i>Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam, The Muslim Communication Forum</i>
Forkami :	<i>Forum Komunitas Muslim Indonesia, The Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum</i>
FPI :	<i>Front Pembela Islam, The Islamic Defenders Front</i>
FUI :	<i>Forum Umat Islam, The Muslim Forum</i>
GKI :	<i>Gereja Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Church</i>
GPI :	<i>Gereja Protestan Indonesia, Indonesian Protestant Church</i>
GSG :	<i>Gedung Serba Guna, Multi-purpose building</i>

HKBP :	<i>Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, Huria Christian Batak Protestant Church</i>
IMB :	<i>Izin Mendirikan Bangunan, Building Permit</i>
Inpres :	<i>Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction</i>
IPPT :	<i>Izin Peruntukan Penggunaan Tanah, Land Usage and Management Permit</i>
KAJ :	<i>Keuskupan Agung Jakarta, The Jakarta Archdiocese</i>
Kapolres :	<i>Kepala Kepolisian Resort, District Police Chief</i>
Kapolsek :	<i>Kepala Kepolisian Sektor, Sub-district Police Chief</i>
Kesbang :	<i>Kesatuan Bangsa, National Unity</i>
Kepag :	<i>Kementerian Agama, Ministry of Religious Affairs</i>
Komnas HAM :	<i>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, National Commission on Human Rights</i>
KWI :	<i>Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, Bishop's Conference of Indonesia</i>
Laksusda :	<i>Pelaksana Khusus Daerah, Special Territorial Administrator</i>
LMS :	<i>London Missionary Society</i>
LSI :	<i>Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Indonesian Survey Institute</i>
MAWI :	<i>Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia, The Indonesian Council of Bishops</i>
MUI :	<i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulama Council</i>
NZG :	<i>Nederlands Zendeling Genootschap, The Dutch Missionary Society</i>
Ormas :	<i>Organisasi Massa, mass or social organisation</i>
Pemda :	<i>Pemerintah Daerah, regional government</i>
Pemkot :	<i>Pemerintah Kota, municipal government</i>
PGI :	<i>Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, Communion of Churches in Indonesia</i>

PHDI :	<i>Parisadhe Hindu Dharma Indonesia, Hindu Dharma Council of Indonesia</i>
Pilkada :	<i>Pemilihan Langsung Kepala Daerah, direct elections of regional heads</i>
PMB :	<i>Peraturan Mendirikan Bangunan, Construction Regulations</i>
Polmas :	<i>Polisi Masyarakat, Community Police</i>
PPG :	<i>Panitia Pembangunan Gereja, Church Construction Committee</i>
PTUN :	<i>Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara, State Administrative Court</i>
RT :	<i>Rukun Tetangga, Neighbourhood Association Unit</i>
RW :	<i>Rukun Warga, Community Association Unit</i>
SD :	<i>Sekolah Dasar, Primary School</i>
Sesdalopbang :	<i>Sekretaris Pengendalian dan Operasional Pembangunan, Secretary of Construction Control and Operations</i>
SK :	<i>Surat Keputusan, Decree</i>
SKB :	<i>Surat Keputusan Bersama, Joint Decree</i>
SMA :	<i>Sekolah Menengah Atas, Senior High School</i>
SMP :	<i>Sekolah Menengah Pertama, Junior High or Middle School</i>
TK :	<i>Taman Kanak-Kanak, Kindergarten</i>
TNI :	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army</i>
UUD :	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar, the Constitution</i>
Walubi:	<i>Perwalian Umat Buddha Indonesia, The Buddhist Council of Indonesia</i>

I

Introduction: The Genealogy of Disputes over Sacred Places

Research Scope:

Controversy over the Construction of Churches

The right to worship and construct places of worship is an integral part of the religious freedoms guaranteed by the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. As a result, the state is obliged to guarantee the implementation of this right. In practice, however, there are many obstacles that make it difficult for religious minorities to construct their own places of worship.

This research examines the polemic surrounding the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. Christian churches were chosen in particular, because in a number of reports on religious freedom the most controversial cases concerning places of worship in Jakarta and the surrounding areas often involved churches. In addition, as Mujiburrahman (2006) and Ropi (1998) note, there is an interesting dynamic between Christians and Muslims (the majority) in Indonesia. This dynamic sometimes takes the form of cooperation but is more often marked by competition and conflict. The construction of churches is subject to all these dynamics.

For example, according to the Paramadina Foundation and the Gadjah Mada University Masters of Peace and Conflict Resolution (MPRK) Team (2009a), in 2008 there were 15 violations involving places of worship. The Moderate Muslim Society [MMS] (2009) recorded 12 violations relating to places of worship in 2009, ranging from extortion to intimidation and vandalism. In addition these reports noted government mismanagement, in the form the cancellation of church permits due to social pressure. Similar cases have been reported by both the CRCs (2009) and the Wahid Institute (2009). The number of reports has also increased, with 50 such cases in 2005 and more than 1000 cases from 1969-2006 (Crouch 2007). Although these reports provide a valuable picture of the issues involved, one thing is clear: there is a lack of understanding of how to interpret the polemic. The majority of these reports only present data of vandalism or violations without explaining why the incidences occurred. In addition, they focus narrowly on damage caused to churches, neglecting the fact that there are also churches that have never experienced any problems.

This research therefore seeks to build on prior research to examine the factors that play a role in disputes over the construction of places of worship. This study by no means negates the importance of the reports on religious freedom that have been released. On the contrary, the research undertaken here would be impossible without these data on vandalism and violations of places of worship. Rather, this study probes the factors behind the figures presented in these reports.

More specifically, this research elaborates the factors that give rise to particularly complex cases involving the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas, including the negotiation process between churches and the various parties that dispute their construction. There are indeed churches that have never been disputed. There are some that were initially un-

disputed but are now being challenged. There are also churches that were once disputed but which have since resolved their issues, and some others that remain unresolved.

Disputes over the construction of churches are always interrelated with social issues in the local region. Here we examine the roles of the government and social elements, such as the Inter-Religious Harmony Forum (*Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama*, FKUB), which mediates between the government, society and the church. We also examine the dynamics between the church and the socio-economic life of the local community, including inappropriate actions and solution-based dialogue for conflicts over the construction of churches. Equally important is the politicisation of conflicts, often involving an “uninvited guest” taking advantage of the situation for the sake of ideological or pragmatic aims.

In order to provide a more complete picture, the Research Team devised four categories for disputes over the construction of churches. As suggested above, the first group consists of churches that have not faced any significant issues. The second group consists of churches that were initially disputed but have since been resolved. The third group incorporates churches that were initially undisputed but are now disputed. Finally, the fourth group consists of churches that have always been disputed.

For each of these four groups we took three cases from Jakarta and the surrounding areas, so in total we had twelve cases. The data from each case was analysed and compared. Data was collected using several methods. First, through observation, we made field trips in order to develop a real understanding of the areas that were experiencing issues with the construction of churches. During these observations, further data was gathered from secondary sources such as the media and research reports from other organisations. Second, we held in-depth interviews

with related parties in order to obtain a firsthand perspective from the actors involved in each case. This method was chosen in order to obtain information on the unique factors that differentiate each case from the others.

This research defines ‘church’ fairly specifically. The definition used includes Catholic churches that are members of the Indonesian Bishops Council (Kantor Waligierja Indonesia, KWI) and Protestant churches that are members of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, PGI). Our decision to limit the definition to these churches, and not include several important cases that involved non-KWI or PGI churches, no doubt has consequences. On the other hand, this definition allowed the Research Team to focus in greater detail on individual cases. In terms of public policy, the limited definition we have used strengthens the capacity of the research results to be used for advocacy purposes, because KWI and PGI are the two national organisations that represent the Catholic and Protestant communities respectively in Indonesia. It is logical to assume that if the “official representatives” of the government-recognised religions experience conflict, then other religions must also experience conflict.

In addition to membership with either KWI or PGI, the criteria for inclusion of churches in this research also involved social perceptions. For churches that had not yet been built, the criteria applied required that land had been bought specifically for the construction of a church, and/or that an application for a permit to build the church had been submitted. The aim here was to ensure that the community had known of, and understood, the planned construction of a church in their area.

For churches that had already been constructed, the Research Team concentrated on how the local community knew about the church, not just through its religious activities, but from its property and promotion campaigns, such as use of signage, a

website, a board displaying sermon times, the sign of the cross, or through publications. This was intended to ensure that the congregants of the church and the general public held the same perception of the building as the church—even though the building itself might be used for other activities or might not have permission to be used as a place of worship.

This rather specific criterion inevitably eliminated the phenomena of “churches in malls” or the use of private homes as places of worship. Without denying the importance of these two phenomena, this research views them as products of the difficulties surrounding the construction of places of worship. Considering that the focus of this research is the controversy over the construction of churches, the researchers have tried not to confuse causes with effects.

The definition of ‘disputed churches’ was broad, and included places of worship that faced obstacles stemming from national regulations and social factors. Problems with state regulations arose when churches were unable to fulfil the requirements of a place of worship or other bureaucratic obstacles. Social obstacles included rejection by certain parties or groups. This definition did not specifically require disputes to stem only from these two sources, leaving open the possibility of other sources of dispute should they have arisen.

Why Controversial?

State Regulations and Social Factors

One important aspect of researching religious freedom (including the right to construct a place of worship) is the need for clear definitions and standards by which to measure it. In this report, religious freedom is examined using the standard applied by the Center for Religious Freedom (CRF) in *Religious Freedom in the World* (2008). The CRF’s original standard uses three measures, namely: (1) the presence/absence of government regulations that

restrict religious freedom; (2) whether the government favours a particular religion; and (3) where there are social dynamics or conventions that restrict religious freedom.

This study uses the CRF's standard to review the problems with the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. Disputes stemming from state regulations fall into the first two of the CRF measures, which are used to determine how far the state has gone to resolve, cause or permit problems concerning church permits.

State regulations encompass formal regulations such as the Joint Ministerial Regulations (PBM) No. 8 and No. 9 of 2006 in replacement of SKB 1/Ber/MDN-MAG/1969, and government institutions and agencies.¹ Institutions such as the police force, the government-established FKUB,² and local agencies such as the subdistrict and district governments are also included. On the other hand, social factors include issues located outside state institutions. Discrimination or vandalism by community organisations, local residents, religious leaders and other community leaders are all included. Although legally they do not possess legitimacy and authority on the same scale as the state, social

¹ Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 8 and No. 9 were issued by the Indonesian Ministers of Religious Affairs and Home Affairs to address "Implementation of the Duty of Local Government Heads in Maintaining Interreligious Harmony" and "Empowerment of the Interreligious Harmony Forum and Construction of Places of Worship". They were a revision to the Joint Decree issued in 1969 to control the construction of places of worship and religious practices after an increase in violence against churches. The revised regulations require that places of worship obtain and provide authorities with a list of the names of 90 members of the congregation; signatures from 60 local community members of a different faith; a written recommendation from the regional or municipal Office of Religious Affairs; a written recommendation from the local Forum of Religious Harmony (FKUB); and approval from the subdistrict head.

² The FKUB consists of leaders from the six officially recognised religious organisations and has the responsibility to facilitate the permit application process for places of worship.

influences are an important element, for example, because the state often bows to social pressure in times of conflict, as was seen during the Poso conflict (see Karnavian 2008).

Besides state regulations and social factors, another important issue is the relationship between religious majority and minorities, which is clearly connected with state regulations. As is well-known, an important concept that underlies democracy is “majority rules, minority rights”. The majority does indeed possess greater capacity to influence legislation. Behind the primacy of the majority, however, is the precondition that minority rights must always be preserved and protected. It is only on this condition that a healthy majority-minority relationship can be maintained.

In reality, this ideal is not achieved easily. Majority-minority relations, and even relations between different groups in general, are always coloured by suspicion. The majority feels threatened by the existence of minorities, especially those that have different values, while minorities feel pressured and unjustly treated. This kind of inter-group tension is common. It is not appropriate, however, when it leads to intolerant attitudes and behaviour. Democracy does not require each member group to love all other groups, but it does require that they be tolerant of one another.

Intolerance can be viewed as a restriction on an individual, or of the collective rights of a group (see Marcus et. al. 1982). Intolerance is caused by many things, including individual predisposition, the level of individual support for democratic values, or the complexity of understanding of an issue. What is interesting is that intolerance is also influenced by contemporary information. For example, information that one particular group may be threatening another can push the latter group to act in an intolerant manner.

In the context of the construction of churches, the relationship between Islam and Christianity is also influenced by these

issues: the majority-minority context and dynamics, suspicion, misunderstanding and a lack of information. All these relations and dynamics fall under the category of social factors and are theoretically very influential in disputes over the construction of churches. As a result, social factors are an important aspect of this research

It is also necessary to examine the role of the state. The state has an important part to play in protecting religious freedom, including guaranteeing the right to build places of worship. The state has the authority to create regulations and enforce them firmly through legal processes. There are three important aspects of the role of the state. The first concerns the capacity of the state to perform its duties. According to Chernov-Hwang (2009), state capacity can be measured by its ability to enforce law and order on society and guarantee security. A state with strong security is able to ensure social movements remain peaceful. By contrast, a state with a weak capacity to maintain order increases incentives for anarchism. A state with the ability to enforce civil order is also able to prevent social groups from taking unilateral action. In the context of church disputes in Jakarta, the inability of the government to protect the rights of Christians, a minority group, to worship could spark discontent in areas with Christian majorities. This is undesirable and only complicates matters. The state's willingness and ability to act as a fair intermediary plays a significant role in preventing such occurrences.

The second matter, according to Chernov-Hwang (2009), is the provision of democratic institutions. A state with healthy democratic institutions allows its citizens to voice their discontent peacefully. This is also closely related to the capability of the state to enforce law and order. A strong democracy and government is able to "manage" social tension to ensure it does not result in conflict. By contrast, a weak democracy and government only encourages violence in society.

The third aspect is related to this issue of democratic systems and effective governance, and to the fact that religious conflict and violence in Indonesia occurred more frequently during the transition period (1998-2004) than during the New Order (1966-1998) or the new democracy (2004-2008) (Ali-Fauzi, Alam & Panggabean 2009b). This can be explained by the assumption that during the transition period state control was at its weakest. In addition, the democratic system was not yet established, although politics were dynamic. Given these perspectives, it is only fitting that state regulations are a focus of this research.

Research Context: A History of Churches in Jakarta

In the previous section, we have explained the scope of this research and how, or through which lenses, we wish to examine church disputes in Jakarta. We will now provide a short background to the growth of churches in Jakarta and surrounding areas in the past, as well as a description of the current situation. At the end, we also explain several state regulations relevant to the construction of churches in Indonesia today. This is a necessary foundation to understanding the research results presented in the following chapters.

The history of church construction in Indonesia is closely related to the development of Christianity, which went hand-in-hand with colonialism. Christianity first arrived with the Catholic Portuguese in Maluku at the beginning of the 16th century (Aritonang 2004; Kruger 1959). The first Catholic church in Maluku was established in 1522, with Fransiskus Xaverius (1506-1552) being one of the first missionaries. By the 1590s, there were 50,000 to 60,000 Catholics in Maluku (Ricklefs 2008).

The arrival of the Dutch East-India Company or the VOC (+1600-1799) in 1602 brought new developments. In addition to pursuing economic gain, the VOC had a mandate from the Dutch

Protestant Church to spread Christianity (Aritonang 2004). In 1605, the De Protestantsche Kerk in Nederlandsch-Indie was established (now the Communion of Churches in Indonesia, PGI). When the Governor General moved to Jakarta (then Batavia) in 1619, the PGI headquarters also moved to Jakarta (PGI 2010). Under the VOC, Christianity was dominated by the Reformed Church, which took over the Portuguese Catholic churches (Shihab 1998).

For 200 years, the VOC forbade Catholics to practice their religion. From 1600-1800, VOC religious regulations were found mostly in colonial trade contracts with local powers, including, for example, bans against Catholic churches, eviction of Catholics, or authorisation for Protestant weddings only. During this period there was a strong connection between religion and politics. The death sentence was handed down to “apostates” (Christians who converted to Islam) or those involved in forbidden sexual relationships (Steenbrink 1995).

Although there were only a few, the VOC government issued a number of religious regulations, particularly in relation to the Muslim community. For instance, in 1661, the VOC banned the *hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca (Suminto 1985). In 1754, the VOC issued a regulation on the application of Islamic law to Muslims and civil law to Europeans, in addition to rules on inheritance, marriage and divorce. In 1776, the colonial government issued the New Statutes of Batavia, which forbade marriage across nationalities (Steenbrink 1995). The VOC also maintained a strict distinction between Christians and non-Christians to ensure they did not mix.

Over these 200 years, conflict concerning religious identity was largely political. In 1634, for instance, Muslim *Hitus* established fortresses in the hinterland and looted Christian villages. During the political conflict in Java in the 17th century, Panembahan Giri refused a request by the Mataram kingdom to help

the VOC because the Christian VOC was perceived as an infidel power (Ricklefs 2008).

At the end of the 18th century, according to Kruger (1959), Christians primarily resided in the eastern parts of Indonesia (Makassar, Ambon, Banda, Ternate and Kupang), Java (Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya) and Sumatera (Padang). Nevertheless, Christianity during the VOC era did not undergo any meaningful growth by comparison how it fared under Portuguese rule. In 1727, there were only about 55,000 Christians in the Dutch East Indies (Kruger 1959). This was a result of the VOC policy that prevented Christianisation efforts to convert the indigenous people in order to maintain law and order (*rust en orde*) and guarantee continued commercial trade (Shihab 1998: 33).

After the fall of the VOC in 1799, Christianity gradually began to spread in Jakarta, as a result of two factors: (1) liberal thinking developing in the West brought new nuances to the policies of the Governor Generals after the VOC era; and (2) private missionary institutes established in England (the London Missionary Society or LMS, 1795) and the Netherlands (the Nederlands Zendeling Genootschap or NZG, 1797) were granted permission to work in Indonesia.

The new government under Governor General Daendels (1808-1811) maintained a neutral attitude towards religion. This position allowed Christianity to develop freely. When the Dutch surrendered to the English, English Lieutenant Governor Raffles (1811-1815) continued the pro-Christian policy (Heuken SJ 2007). During Raffles' rule in 1813, LMS initiated missionary activities in Java aimed at converting the indigenous people and established the first English Baptist Church in Jakarta (Shihab 1998).

Christianity was part of a Dutch government policy to counteract a series of rebellions during the 19th century. These rebellions were usually led by the Muslim elite (Suminto 1985). The establishment of Muhammadiyah in 1912 was seen as an

attempt to stem the spread of 'Christianisation' (Shihab 1998). Despite this, there is no record of social conflict between Muslims and Christians arising as a result of Christianisation. Snouck Hurgronje, who arrived in the Dutch East Indies in 1889 as an advisor at the *Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* (Office of Indigenous Affairs), criticised the Christianisation policy. He chose to counter Islam through education (Suminto 1985).

In the 19th century, Christianisation began to develop rapidly. In Java, Christianisation efforts began to produce results where they had previously failed. In East Java, an indigenous Christian community developed where Christianity was merged with Javanese mysticism. The movement was initiated by C.L. Coolen (c. 1773-1873). Its most famous leader was Kiai Sadrach Surapranata (c. 1835-1924) (Guillot 1985). By 1900, there were about 20,000 Christians in Central and East Java, increased only around 5,000 at the end of the 18th century.

During the 19th century, churches in Jakarta started to grow in number. Their history can be described in three periods (Kruger 1959). The first was one with almost no evangelists (+1800-1850). Before 1808, Catholicism in Jakarta experienced a period of darkness but in 1808 a defining event occurred. Two priests sent by the Pope, Nelissen and Prinsen, arrived in Jakarta and celebrated Mass openly for the first time in the house of the surgeon, F.C.H. Assmuss. This became the precursor for the construction of the Jakarta Cathedral (officially, the Church of Our Lady of Assumption),³ which, after moving locations several times, was eventually built in 1900-01 where it still stands today (Heuken SJ 2007).

When the Dutch returned to power (1815), the development of Christianity was still restricted, particularly because of the

³ In Indonesia it is known as *Gereja Santa Maria Pelindung Diangkat Ke Surga*, which is taken from the Dutch, *De Kerk van Onze Lieve Vrouwe ten Hemelopneming*.

Dutch East Indies Regulations of 1818 and 1854, which required Christian teachers, priests and missionaries to obtain special authorisation before they could operate (Aritonang 2004; Shihab 1998). Although the NZG sent its first missionaries in 1848, by 1850 there were still no significant developments in Jakarta.

The second period is marked by a variety of Christianisation activities (+1850-1900). It was during this period that planned evangelical activities emerged in Jakarta. A group of Christians who felt there was a lack of evangelicalism in Jakarta established the Association for Spreading the Message of the Gospel Within and Outside of the Church in 1851. Two well-known leaders of the Association were Anthing and Gan Kwee.

Until about 1870, the Dutch East Indies issued formal permits for evangelical activities in Jakarta and the surrounding areas – Tanah Pasundan and Banten. F.L. Anthing (+1820-1883), who worked in Jakarta as Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was the first to begin intensive and planned evangelicalism in Jakarta.

In 1873, Anthing successfully obtained permission to run evangelical activities in Jakarta and the surrounding area. He educated and trained a number of children to be evangelists in his home. Anthing and his students then established a number of congregations around Jakarta, including Gunung Puteri, Pondok Melati, Kampung Sawah, Cigelam, Pasirkaliki (Karawang), Tanah Tinggi (Tangerang), Ciater (Serpong), Cikuya (Banten) and Cakung (Aritonang 2004).

The third period was one of consolidation and development (+1900-1950). During this period churches slowly continued to grow in Jakarta. At the beginning of the 20th century, Jakarta was developing and expanding. One church, the Jakarta Cathedral, could no longer accommodate its congregants. In 1908, a second church was thus established in Matraman. From what were initially only three groups – Dutch, Portuguese (which has since

almost disappeared) and Malay (in Depok and Tugu) – Christianity expanded across ethnicities. In fact, as increasing numbers of Christians came to Jakarta, there were also many congregations established by Christian migrants outside Jakarta, for example, the Toba Batak, Java, Timor, Sangir, Dayak and Toraja congregations. Chinese and Sundanese congregations were also developing (Kruger 1959).

After the proclamation of independence in 1945, the church distanced itself from the Dutch and asked the Ministry of Religious Affairs to guarantee that missionaries would not be treated like the Dutch. When the colonial era was brought to an end by the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Catholic community in 'Jakarta', the now-renamed capital, developed rapidly - largely due to tolerant government attitudes towards religion. It is worth noting that the values of tolerance in the Pancasila were considered important in influencing government policies (Heuken SJ 2007). During the Revolution (1945-1949), social unrest had, however, led to a number of incidents where Christians became a target of violence. In Jakarta this kind of conflict occurred in Kampung Sawah and Bekasi. A similar incident occurred in Tapanuli (North Sumatera), where around 300 people were killed in a conflict between the Christian Toba Batak and the Muslim Karo Batak that was compounded by their different religious identities (Ricklefs 2008).

By 1941, 22,072 Catholics were recorded in Jakarta, and this number increased to 29,833 in 1961, including 16 parishes (church administrative regions under the diocese) (Heuken SJ 2007). In 1950, Protestant leaders formed the Indonesian Council of Churches (*Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia*, DGI), which in 1984 became the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (*Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia*, PGI). Meanwhile, in 1955, Catholic leaders formed the High Council of Indonesian Bishops (*Majelis Agung Wali Gereja di Indonesia*, MAWI) (Mujiburrahman 2006). In

1961, the Archdiocese was officially established.

Towards the end of the Old Order (1945-1965), a book attacking Christianity was published, largely written by Muhammadiyah leaders including Bisron A. Wardy, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Hasbullah Bakry (Boland 1985). It was written in response to a brochure supposedly detailing a plan to Christianise Java (Aritonang 2004: 361).

In countering the Communist Party (prior to 1965), the Catholic bishop proclaimed the *Front Katholik Tanpa Lubang*⁴ to signify that his community was united against Communism (Heuken SJ 2007). After the 1965 coup attempt and the mass killings that followed there was a wave of conversion to Christianity, especially in East and Central Java. People chose to adhere to a religion because they were afraid of being labelled atheist and thus Communist. This was confirmed by the 1971 consensus, which showed that the total Christian population in Indonesia had climbed to 7.5% (nearly 9 million people) from 2.8% (under 2 million people) in 1933 (Ricklefs 2008).

Fear over the spread of Christianity triggered tension between Islam and Christianity at the beginning of the New Order (1966-1998). In 1967, for instance, churches were vandalised in Makassar and Aceh. In 1967, a number of Muslims damaged a Christian school in Jakarta. In 1969, a similar incident occurred on the outskirts of Jakarta, where a Protestant church was vandalised by Muslims. The trend spread to West Jakarta and even to some cities in Central Java (Shihab 1998).

After the New Order came to power, the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia changed. The number of Muslim-Christian conflicts rose sharply, especially in the form of the closure, vandalism or arson of churches. During the New Order, records state that at least 456 churches were damaged,

⁴ The literal translation is 'The Un-Holey Catholic Front', although the intended meaning is 'The Perfect Catholic Front'.

closed or had their permits revoked (Santoso 2000 in Mulia 2010: 46). Of this, about 21 cases took place in Jakarta.

During the 1980s, the Christian community in Jakarta grew rapidly. In 1980, there were 159,040 Catholics and 406,280 Protestants in Jakarta. By 2000, these figures increased to 282,869 Catholics and 501,168 Protestants in Jakarta (Heuken SJ 2007). Data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs notes that there were 41 Catholic churches and 913 Protestant churches in Jakarta in 2008.

During the Reformation era that began in 1998, and the democratic transition that it triggered, incidents of church vandalism increased. Under Habibie's government (1998-1999) 156 churches were affected; during Abdurrahman Wahid's government (1999-2001) 232 churches were affected; and during Megawati's government (2001-2004) 68 churches were vandalised (Crouch 2007). PGI and KWI reports indicate that, there were 108 instances of closure, vandalism or attacks against churches from 2004-2007 (Mulia 2009: 353). This includes 30 cases in 2004, 39 cases in 2005, 17 cases in 2006 and 22 cases in 2007. Conflict over churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas – Bekasi, Tangerang and Bogor – amounted to 23 of these cases. The majority were caused by issues over authorisation, such as the need to obtain a construction permit (IMB).

Regulations for Places of Worship: Then and Now

State regulations on the construction of places of worship in Indonesia can be found in two regulations. First, Joint Decree of the Minister for Religious Affairs and the Minister for Internal Affairs No. 01/BER/mdn-mag/1969 on Implementation of the Task of Government Officials to Ensure the Order and Undisturbed Implementation of Religious Development and Practices by Adherents. Second, Joint Regulations of the Minister for Re-

ligious Affairs and the Minister for Internal Affairs Nos. 8 and 9 of 2006 on Guidance for Implementation of the Duty of Local Government Heads in Maintaining Interreligious Harmony and Empowerment of the Interreligious Harmony Forum and Construction of Places of Worship.

The 1969 Joint Decree was enacted on 13 September of that year. At the time the Minister for Internal Affairs was Amir Machmud and the Minister for Religious Affairs was K.H.⁵ Muhammad Dahlan. The regulation was created in response to the new challenges concerning interreligious relations that arose during the New Order. At the start of the new regime there was a high level of conflict between Muslims and Christians. Incidents usually took the form of vandalism, or the closure or burning of churches.

The 1969 Joint Decree did not specifically focus on regulation of construction of places of worship. Rather, it regulated the development and propagation of religion generally, and this, in principle, also covered the existence of places of worship. In the only article that did address the construction of places of worship, the 1969 Joint Decree stated that they must have permission from the local government head. Permission was to be granted by the local head if the applicant had obtained a recommendation from the chief representative of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and town planning officials, and providing there were no issues with the local community. Furthermore, the regulation stated that the local government head may, if necessary, seek advice from local religious organisations, such as *ulama* (Islamic religious scholars) or priests.

The provisions that followed stated that if there was a dispute, including over the construction of a place of worship, then its resolution is the responsibility of the local government head.

⁵ K.H. is short for Kyai Haji, a title indicating that the person referred to is an Islamic scholar (*kyai*) and has completed the haj (*haji*).

If the dispute remained unresolved and resulted in a criminal offense, legal authorities were required to address it according to the applicable law.

According to Rudy Pratikno,⁶ in practice local government heads only issued a permit if they already had a recommendation from the Special Territorial Administrator (Laksusda).⁷ Applications for permits to build places of worship were sent to Laksusda. The organisation held a monthly meeting to discuss several permits at a time. The usual approach taken emphasised social stability and law and order. After Laksusda granted permission, the Governor, represented by the Deputy Governor for Human Welfare, could grant a permit for the construction of the place of worship.

Although Laksusda was an extension of Soeharto's security regime, a significant number of churches were nonetheless vandalised during the New Order. During the transitional era (after 1998), perpetrators of vandalism often used the 1969 Joint Decree as justification to destroy and close down places of worship, particularly churches, that lacked the required permit.

As a result, several elements within society called for the 1969 Joint Decree be revoked. They argued that it was detrimental to minority groups. Instead of guaranteeing religious freedom as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution, the Joint Decree actually restricted religious freedom. Supporters of the 1969 Joint Decree responded by arguing for it to be upgraded in status to become a

⁶ Interview with Rudy Pratikno, Tuesday, 8 June 2010, in the Pastoral Karya Building of the Jakarta Archdiocese. He is the Secretary of the Commission for Interfaith Relations of the Jakarta Archdiocese and head of the Jakarta FKUB Recommendations Department.

⁷ Laksusda (*Pelaksana Khusus Daerah*) was a security institute during the New Order under the Operational Command for Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB). While the scope of Kopkamtib was national, Laksusda was Kopkamtib's organ on the local scale and the position generally filled by members of the military.

statute (*undang-undang*). In their eyes, the Joint Decree regulated inter-religious relations and prevented anarchy from breaking out due to conflict over places of worship. So long as places of worship were required to obtain permits, they argued, there would be no anarchy.

In the midst of this debate, the Ministry of Religious Affairs held a meeting with the Minister for Internal Affairs, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, the Attorney General and other relevant officials. They discussed revising the 1969 Joint Decree, particularly in relation to the construction of places of worship, and produced an initial draft for a new Bill on Interreligious Harmony which addressed the construction of places of worship, among other issues.

Initially this draft received the same response as had the 1969 Joint Decree. Those in support (such as MUI,⁸ PKS,⁹ FPI,¹⁰ KOMPAK¹¹) argued that the new regulation was appropriate because it set out how to maintain interreligious harmony, especially in relation to the construction of places of worship. On the other hand, those in opposition (including the Prosperous Peace Party,¹² the Community Alliance for Freedom of Worship¹³ of East Nusa Tenggara, and several Muslim communities in Bali and West Nusa Tenggara) argued that the new regulation would only worsen the situation. Not only would long-standing churches that did not have permits face difficulties but new churches would also find it difficult to meet conditions that required a minimum amount of support in the area (see below).

⁸ *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, Indonesian Ulama Council.

⁹ *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, Prosperous Justice Party.

¹⁰ *Front Pembela Islam*, The Islamic Defenders Front.

¹¹ *Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis* The Crisis Management/Prevention Committee.

¹² *Partai Damai Sejahtera*, PDS.

¹³ *Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Kebebasan Beribadah*.

Nevertheless, this revised draft with all its limitations was considered the best middle path by representatives of the “official” religions in Indonesia. These included KWI, PGI, MUI, PHDI,¹⁴ and Walubi.¹⁵ As a result, on 21 March 2006, the Minister for Religious Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, and the Minister for Internal Affairs, Mohamad Ma’ruf, signed the Joint Regulations of 2006 on Guidance for Implementation of the Task of Local Government Heads in Maintaining Interreligious Harmony, Empowerment of the Interreligious Harmony Forum and Construction of Places of Worship (Colbran in Lindholm 2009).

While the 1969 Joint Decree regulated inter-religious harmony in a general manner, the new Joint Regulations specifically addressed which organisations should have the authority to maintain inter-religious harmony; mechanisms behind the granting of permits for the construction of places of worship in Jakarta; and means for resolution of conflict should it occur. They consist of 30 articles divided into 10 chapters, namely (1) General provisions; (2) Duties of local government heads; (3) Duties and role of the Interreligious Harmony Forum (FKUB); (4) Construction of places of worship; (5) Temporary places of worship; (6) Temporary permits for use of a building; (7) Dispute resolution; (8) Monitoring and reporting; (9) FKUB’s source of funding; and (10) Transition and closure mechanisms.

In the Joint Regulations, maintaining interreligious harmony is seen as the collective responsibility of the government and religious communities. The government is represented by the governor or regent/mayor at the regency/city level. On the other hand, the aspirations of religious communities are represented by religious leaders in the FKUB. There are 21 members of the FKUB at the provincial level and 17 at the regency or city level.

¹⁴ *Parisadhe Hindu Dharma Indonesia*, The Hindu Dharma Council of Indonesia.

¹⁵ *Perwalian Umat Buddha Indonesia*, The Buddhist Council of Indonesia.

The representation for each religion is based on the percentages of the number of adherents of each religion in each area, with a minimum of one person representing each religion.

In addition to addressing the technical requirements for construction, the Joint Regulations also state that to construct a place of worship the following is required: (1) A list of names and National Identity Cards (KTP) of 90 people who will use the place of worship, confirmed by local government officials; (2) The National Identity Cards of 60 members of the local community, confirmed by the village or subdistrict head; (3) A written recommendation from the regional officer of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and (4) A recommendation from the regional FKUB. Recommendations must be based on consensus and not majority vote.

The Joint Regulations also state that if support from the local community is not obtained, the government is obliged to find a new location for the place of worship. In the interim, other buildings can be used as temporary places of worship but a permit must be obtained from the regional or city government. A permit is granted if the office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the FKUB issue a letter of recommendation. A permit for a temporary place of worship lasts two years. Disputes over the construction of places of worship are first resolved through consensus with the local community. If consensus is not achieved, then the regency or city government is required to facilitate a fair and unbiased discussion. If government mediation is unsuccessful, a resolution is sought through the courts.

Broadly, the Joint Regulations are based on the government's desire to guarantee the right of religious adherents to perform their religious activities. Over the four years the regulation has been in effect, it has, however, been shown to be full of loopholes for discrimination, especially in relation to the construction of places of worship. Opportunities for discrimination are evident

in the following areas, among others.

First, politicisation of local government authority in issuing construction permits, for instance, authority to issue a permit may be exchanged for votes from certain groups in local elections. In several regions - Bogor, for example - there are indications that candidates for the position of local head have promised during their campaigns not to issue construction permits for certain religions. Other forms of politicisation occur when local executives come from Islamist parties. They use their position to implement Islamist agendas in their region and this includes preventing the growth of non-Muslim places of worship. The authority of the local government to provide recommendations, without tight monitoring by the legislature and civil society, makes local governments likely to issue discriminatory policies.

The second issue is the membership of FKUB as a representative of the different religions in each region. Although it is stated in the Joint Regulations that decisions of the FKUB must be made on the basis of mutual consensus, in reality decisions are often made by voting. Making decisions based on a vote is naturally detrimental to religious minorities. Religious representation is also problematic because this does not provide any room for religious "denominations" within particular religions. MUI, for instance, does not accommodate Ahmadiyah (an Islamic sect), and within Christianity there are many churches that are not members of PGI or KWI and as such are not represented in the FKUB. The same concerns apply to religions or sects that are not recognised as "official" religions.

It is important to note, however, that although they are not represented officially, non-PGI Protestant churches have been able to communicate and participate in the Jakarta FKUB when resolving issues they face. This has been noted by Rudy Pratikno, although he has also pointed out that no unofficial religion has ever brought issues to the FKUB. This suggests that although

formal regulations limit its role, membership of the FKUB is important. If the FKUB is made up of relatively open-minded people then can go about its role without being restricted by formalities, as indicated by the assistance given to non-PGI Protestant churches despite the fact that they have no official representation.

Third, the requirement to obtain the support of the local community in the form of copies of 60 national ID cards creates opportunities for discrimination. According to findings by the Indonesian Survey Institute (*Lembaga Survei Indonesia*, LSI), Indonesian society in general is not tolerant of the construction of places of worship. As many as 64.9% of Muslims object to the construction of non-Muslim places of worship.¹⁶ In certain areas where the wider community is tolerant, this is not an issue but in less tolerant areas it can obstruct the construction of places of worship.

Both PGI and the Catholic Church understand that churches have to be accepted by local communities. An indication of a community's acceptance is the provision of signatures in accordance with the requirements of the Joint Regulations. According to Gomar Gultom and Rudy Pratikno (of PGI), if there are hundreds of congregation members around a church but the church fails to obtain 60 signatures showing local support, then

¹⁶ Survey by LSI and Lazuardi Birru, March 2010, prepared for the National Symposium on "Breaking the Chain of Radicalism and Terrorism," Jakarta, 27-28 July 2010. Similar results were found in a survey of Muslim religious teachers in Java by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (*Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat*, PPIM), Jakarta State Islamic University in 2008 and a survey of Muslim religious teachers and students in Jakarta and the surrounding areas by the Institute for Peace and Islamic Studies (*Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian*, LAKIP) in 2010. See "Most Islamic Studies Teachers Oppose Pluralism, Survey Finds," *The Jakarta Post*, 26 November 2008; and "Separuh Pelajar Setuju Aksi Radikal Berlabel Agama," *Tempointeraktif.com*, 26 April 2010, <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/fokus/2011/04/26/fks,20110426-1855,id.html> (accessed 16 May 2011).

the church should not be established and must work harder in approaching the community.

The problem then is that in several instances the requirement for community support becomes a means for particular groups to make money. That is, certain groups promise to obtain the support of the communities on behalf of churches if the construction committees are willing to pay. If the money is not paid, construction is delayed and sometimes the support that has been obtained is withdrawn. For construction committees of places of worship that have surplus funds, the situation can be easily resolved. Not all construction committees for places of worship have significant financial resources, however. These are all potential loopholes for misuse of the Joint Regulations. The manner in which these affect real cases is shown in the description of individual church cases below.

In other words, state regulations may be rendered ineffective by social factors. According to Marshal (2007), social issues are one of the key factors that can obstruct religious freedom. By examining social issues we discover how far certain groups restrict the religious freedom of other groups. As the case of Indonesia suggests, social factors in fact often restrict religious freedom more rigorously than official government regulations.

Social issues often arise from suspicion or lack of trust between religions. This is evident, among other things, by the perception that the existence of a place of worship for one particular religion is an attempt to influence the local community to convert. On the basis of this kind of suspicion, groups of people may obstruct the construction of places of worship of other religions in their region. The issue of religious conversion (especially Christianisation) has become an effective mantra for groups of people who wish to stop the construction of, or to destroy, a place of worship.

An important note concerning 'Christianisation' is that PGI

and KWI, the organisations regarded as representative of Protestantism and Catholicism, deny that the practice occurs. Churches under these two organisations are forbidden to undertake conversion activities by giving either material or non-material incentives. If there are churches or Christian communities that engage in such activities, they are likely to be outside PGI and KWI. The leadership of both KWI and PGI were, for example, shocked and concerned to read the International Crisis Group report (2010) on Christianisation regarding the practises of several foundations and evangelical churches in Bekasi that were not members of either organisation.

Social issues are not necessarily sporadic, spontaneous or unstructured. In Jakarta and the surrounding areas it is suspected that there are Islamic organisations that specifically monitor the development of churches. In fact, these organisations do not just monitor the development of churches but also seek to obstruct them. Although confirmation and further research is needed to uncover the exact roles of these kinds of organisations, their involvement in church disputes clearly complicates matters.

Other social organisations that have the potential to obstruct the construction of places of worship include paramilitary organisations. Although these kind claim to act in the interests of is the public good, they really take over the role of the police. The Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) is one such paramilitary organisation. It is often behind violent attacks and intolerance towards churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas.

Paramilitary organisations often act out of material motives. The fee to obtain a building permit for a place of worship according to the regulations is not expensive. The cost to obtain a permit becomes expensive, however, if it must be obtained through 'other avenues'. Often those acting in the name of paramilitary organisations offer their services to organise permits for places

of worship for a fee.

Controversy over construction of places of worship is also sometimes related to commercial interests. This is often found to be behind disputes over places of worship that are to be constructed in strategic locations. Disputes over these places of worship allow businesspersons the opportunity to acquire the land and use it for their own business interests.

Generally, these social forces are more influential when the state and law enforcement agencies are weak. During periods of transition, the police tend to be powerless in the face of brutality by the masses. This is a challenge to be overcome by the police, now and in the future. Together with religious leaders and other stakeholders they must act decisively.

In summary, this chapter has explained the context and importance of this research and how we view and understand controversies over churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. We have also discussed several aspects of state regulations and social factors that perpetuate disputes over the construction of churches. In the following chapter we present our research findings.***

II

Contests over Church Buildings

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research into the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas categorises church experiences in four groups: (1) churches which have faced no significant impediments; (2) churches which once experienced problems but no longer do so (resolved); (3) churches that were initially undisputed but have since become problematic (disputed); and (4) churches that have always been disputed. We use this classification to observe the variations in individual church experiences.

This chapter discusses the experiences of churches belonging to the four categories above. We discuss them sequentially, beginning with the first category.

Undisputed Churches

For this category, we obtained information about four churches that could potentially be examined, namely the St. Albertus Catholic Church in Harapan Indah; the Jakarta Cathedral; Ne-

hemia Javanese Protestant Church (GKJ) in Lebak Bulus; and a church in Serpong. The church in Serpong was interesting, because information suggested that it had never been disputed as initial arrangements to obtain a permit had been entrusted to the [Muslim] paramilitary organisation *Forum Betawi Rem-pug* (FBR). Further research into the church was not possible, however, because our informant was unable to provide another source who could confirm the information.

As to the other three churches, we discovered after interviewing the relevant parties that each had their own problems, and would be better placed in the second category. This is interesting because it indicates that even churches that are viewed positively by the community may well have been hindered by either state regulations or social factors. Although it is difficult to find churches that have experienced no problems, the Research Team did succeed in finding one church that fits the criteria, namely the St. Aloysius Gonzaga Catholic Church in Cijantung, which was established under the initiative of the Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of the Indonesian Army.

Although we only examine one undisputed church, it should not be assumed that it is the only undisputed church in Jakarta and surrounding areas. Rather, time restrictions were the determining factor in examining only this one undisputed church. Our discussion should be viewed in the context of exploring the factors that play a role in maintaining a favourable environment for places of worship. In the future, the Research Team suggests that to obtain maximal results a survey of the overall church population should be conducted to discover how many churches do, in fact, fit this category.

St. Aloysius Catholic Church and St. Valentino Chapel

The Catholic community in Cijantung was established along with the development in the 1960s of an Indonesian Army set-

tlement. The relocation of army officers increased the number of Catholic soldiers in Cijantung. As a result, there was a greater demand for places of worship.

The Catholic soldiers and local residents who lived in Cijantung contacted the Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of the Indonesian Army in Gunung Sahari for assistance locating a facility. They were given permission to hold services in the Cijantung complex. In 1962, Pastor Widjajasuparto held the first Mass in the house of a local resident. From then on, the Catholic community no longer needed to attend Mass in Cililitan or other parishes nearby.

By 1964, the community had grown so large that it was no longer possible to hold sermons in the houses of local residents. Services were then held in a number of places, moving from the Persit KWK Cijantung II Primary School to the waiting room of the Kesdam V/Jaya Cijantung II Military Polyclinic, and then to the Special Forces canteen in Cijantung.

At the same time, several Catholic leaders established the Gatot Subroto Junior High School with the support of the Special Forces Commandant at the time, Col. Sarwo Edhi Wibowo. At the time there was no junior high school in Cijantung and children had to travel to Matraman for an education. One room in the new school was used for religious worship. Due to space restrictions, sermons were eventually moved again to a building owned by the Special Forces, the Chandraca Hall. Fortunately for the community, the Special Forces Commandant built places of worship in the Special Forces complex for soldiers of all religions. For the Catholic community, the Special Forces built the St. Yakobus Chapel (which recently changed its name to the St. Valentino Chapel).

The desire for their own church building led the Cijantung Catholic community to establish the Ignatius Slamet Riyadi Foundation, which recently established the Ignatius Slamet Ri-

yadi Kindergarten, Primary School, Junior High School and Senior High School. The community used the school hall to hold sermons, due to its greater seating capacity. There were at least 300 congregants at the time. Sermons were led by alternating pastors, the majority of whom were military pastors.

In 1974, Cijantung was overseen by the Robertus Bellarminus Parish of Cililitan. In the same year, the Cililitan Parish appointed Pastor Wiyana Haryadi, SJ., to oversee Cijantung. With a permanent pastor, the Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of the Indonesian Army decreased the role it played. On 21 June 1979, the Cijantung Parish officially became the 32nd parish of the Jakarta Archdiocese. One year later, on 17 February 1980, construction of the church started, and it was completed by 23 November 1980.

Today the Cijantung Parish has approximately 8,500 members and two pastors. The church building can accommodate between 1,000–1,500 people. In terms of social status, the Cijantung Catholic community tends to be middle-class and similar to other local residents in most respects. They work in various jobs, ranging from the military to the private sectors. The church uses the Slamet Riyadi school carpark for parking, which is managed by the church congregants themselves.

The church has not faced too many difficulties from state regulations, though that is not to say that there have been none. The construction permit, according to Hieronimus Kasman, took a long time to obtain (more than a year) but that was caused more by Indonesia's disorderly bureaucracy than any intentional effort to delay the process. There are more stories about how state agencies helped with the church construction than to the contrary.

The key factor was the care and concern shown by the Special Forces Commandant, who allowed the Cijantung community to use the chapel facilities for services. In addition, even

today the church occupies land owned by the Army and not by the church or the diocese. When the committee sought funds for the construction of the church, the Armed Forces played a significant role. According to Hieronimus Kasman, the Jakarta Garrison helped provide money and materials. Some of the church pews, which are still in use today, were donated by the Jakarta Governor, others by the Bina Graha presidential building via the Secretary for Construction Management, Solihin GP, and the rest were provided by the church itself.

To raise funds, the church also held a charity event in the Flores Room of Hotel Borobudur that was well-attended, including by officials, entrepreneurs, dancers—from the Bagong Kusudiarjo art school—and several artists, including Kris Biantoro. This financial support enabled the church building to be completed in nine months.

There were also few obstacles arising from social factors. First, when the church was established, the local community population was small. The land in front of the church was empty and there were few houses in the area, all built at some distance from one another. This decreased the potential for resistance.

Second, the church was planned right from the beginning and soldiers who worked at the Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of the Indonesian Army lived on land that borders the church. In addition to protecting the church, this also helped with obtaining a permit. Because of the small population at the time, when the church sought signatures in order to meet the requirements for a construction permit they necessarily asked Catholic soldiers and their families for their support. These families happily provided their signatures.

Even today, the relationship between the church and the local community is well-maintained. The church contributes financially to the community by promoting local stalls and cafes, and engaging in other types of social service. This rapport is

also evident during large celebrations (Christmas and Easter), when the road becomes one-way and local residents obligingly take alternative routes.

Based on interviews with the managers of the neighbourhood and community association units (RT and RW units), one factor that helps maintain good relationships is that Catholic residents are also active in community activities. During Lebaran (the time of celebration after the Ramadan month of fasting), Protestants and Catholics visit Muslims to greet them, and vice versa. This mutual visiting on holy days is an initiative of local residents themselves and the Army rarely intervenes.

Although the Cijantung Parish claims to be an “undisputed” church, it continues to be supported by the army culture present in the community. This clearly reveals the function of state accommodation and protection. Technically speaking, the Cijantung Parish has two churches: the mother church and the church that was originally named the St Yakobus Chapel and is located inside the Special Forces complex. Both these churches continue to be used today.

After the fall of Soeharto’s regime, there were no acts of vandalism or disruption relating to this church – at least not openly. This is likely due to its close relationship with the community, in addition to the fact that it is surrounded by military bases (the Denzipur base is 50 metres from the church and the Kopasus (Special Forces) Group V is one kilometre from the church).

Disputed Churches Resolved

Six churches are examined under this second category: the St. Mikael Catholic Church in Kranji; the Pasundan Seroja Protestant Church in Seroja; the Terang Hidup Indonesian Protestant Church in Ketapang; the St. Albertus Catholic Church in Harapan Indah; the Jakarta Cathedral; and the Jawa Nehemia Protestant Church in Pondok Indah. The first three churches were

originally from this second category, while the latter three were complicated cases that were moved from our first category (undisputed churches).

First, it is necessary to explain the inclusion of the Jakarta Cathedral. As mentioned, the Jakarta Cathedral was initially thought to be part of the first category (never disputed). After the interviews, it became evident, however, that the Jakarta Cathedral had experienced issues during Dutch colonialism. Instead of not using the church as an example because of the period in which the problems occurred (more than a century ago), the Research Team considered it to be a good example of the important role of the government or regime in power. We suggest that readers view the Cathedral case in the context of state regulations and social factors and not focus on the different time period.

St. Mikael Catholic Church

The St. Mikael Parish in Kranji was born out of the development of the St. Arnoldus Parish in Bekasi. Increasing numbers led the parish to split into two stations, the St. Bartolomeus Station in Taman Galaxi and the St. Mikael Station in Kranji. In 1991, the St. Mikael Station was officially declared a parish by the Jakarta Archdiocese. Sermons were held at the time in the multi-purpose hall of the Strada school complex in Bekasi. Prior to 1991, before the hall was built, sermons were held in the school yard on the school terrace. The Strada school itself had been around well before Kranji and was built on more than a hectare of land owned by the Jakarta Archdiocese.

In 2004, the church obtained its construction permit. It is currently approaching 10,000 members, with a building that can seat 1,500 people. In addition to the church, the Graha Mikael hall is often used for meetings or rented to the public. From about 2006 until the church building was completed, sermons

were held in the Graha Mikael hall. On 16 November 2008, the church was completed and inaugurated by Bekasi Mayor, Mochtar Mohamad.

The St. Mikael congregation tends to be middle-class and from a variety of ethnic groups, including Javanese, Batak and others from Flores. The local residents in the area, however, are largely Betawi and Javanese, and are slightly below middle-class. To include the local community in the running of the church, the church's security force consists largely of members of the Karang Taruna youth organisation and local residents. Parking is also managed by local residents. In fact, the church renovated one local resident's house so it could be used to park motorbikes, with the income going to the local community.

Today, the Kranji Parish has its own "child", namely the St. Albertus Station in Harapan Indah. There are about 6,000 members in Harapan Indah alone. Both St. Albertus and St. Mikael are led by the same three pastors (because as a station, St. Albertus does not have its own pastor).

Disputes over the church can be separated into two periods. The first covers the years before 2004 when the church obtained its construction permit. The second covers the years after 2004. Because the disputes were spread over a protracted period, the Research Team was unable to find any formal records of the incidents that occurred and had to rely on the memory of those interviewed.

In the first period, problems were related to difficulties in obtaining a permit from the government. This was a result of high resistance among the community, compounded by internal differences within the church and its construction committee. According to Mulyadi, the head of the neighbourhood association unit (RT) 07, one of the mistakes of the church at the time was to place too much trust in brokers in seeking a permit, rather than approaching the local community directly. As a re-

sult, the community felt undervalued.

The lack of understanding with local residents is apparent in a story told by Father Yosef, the parish pastor. He was first stationed at St. Mikael in 2005. At the time, he recalls, almost no nearby local residents wanted to walk in the vast Strada complex. "It was forbidden, *haram*," Father Yosef explained. He added that between the complex and residential area there was a small door only large enough for pedestrians. From the beginning it had remained closed and local residents had even been warned against opening it.

Another issue from the first period in the church's construction was internal solidarity. After years of trying to obtain a construction permit but failing, the congregation, the church construction committee and the parish pastor began to despair. The construction committee had been replaced time and time again but continued to face the same problem: despair and distrust. This effected many things, from fundraising to leadership and building relationships with the local residents.

During the second period, 2004-2008, St. Mikael had obtained a permit but construction was impeded. Here, it was local resistance that played the most important role. Some local residents who opposed the construction cited a variety of reasons: noisy trucks that interfered with sleep, traffic jams caused by people attending sermons and the 'exclusive nature' of the Catholic community.

During an interview with Basyuni, head of RT 03, one factor that was apparent in motivating local resistance was a sermon given by Ustadz Abdullah (not his real name) in a nearby mosque. He encouraged local residents to oppose the church and to hate Christians. More recently, however, RT officials addressed this provocation and Ustadz Abdullah began to lose support. He then invited participation by outside parties, such as FPI and FBR.

A number of incidents increased tension between the church and those opposing it, such as when two truckloads of FPI members visited the construction site; when a Nuzulul Qur'an event¹ was used to provoke local residents; and when local residents objected to construction trucks arriving at night.² The focus of this case is on the resolution of these issues, and as such the analysis of national regulations and social factors centres on this second, post-2004, period. The most influential state actor in the St. Mikael case was the government (represented by the deputy Mayor of Bekasi at the time, H. Mochtar Mohamad) and the police force (represented by the Chief of Bekasi Police). After obtaining a permit the church continued to be questioned by several groups, and so the Bekasi Police Chief mediated a meeting between the government, the church and the opposing groups. According to Father Yosef, at the meeting the Deputy Mayor said clearly, "I don't want to say a lot, I just want to say that I'll arrest anyone who becomes violent." When it was the Police Chief's turn to talk, he also said, "It is my duty to protect the government. The government has already spoken. I'll arrest anyone who becomes violent." The firm and decisive nature with which these two men spoke during the meeting sufficiently intimidated the opposing groups and they retorted, "We think this is just a miscommunication. There isn't any problem really. But this is what happens when we aren't consulted."

The influence of the police was apparent when FPI members approached the construction site in trucks. The police on guard asked FPI to leave, even though they were clearly outnumbered. There was also an instance where local residents opposed the presence of construction trucks but the local police were able to

¹ Nuzulul Qur'an is a day commemorating the revelation of the Qur'an. In Indonesia, special Nuzulul Qur'an sermons are often held on the 17th day of the month of Ramadhan.

² The construction could only take place at night because if it was done during the day it would cause traffic congestion.

resolve the issue. For all their work, the church claims to have paid no extra money to police other than “cigarette money”.

FKUB, which was only established in 2006, played a strange role. FKUB approached the church and inquired about various permits. The forum also invited local residents and asked them if they had any complaints. During the meeting, the head of the community association unit (RW) emphasised that the church was fine and was not seen as detrimental by local residents. No one had any problems, especially those who knew nothing about the issue. The behaviour of the FKUB indicates that there is confusion and misunderstanding within FKUB about its responsibilities. There is no requirement that FKUB must check permits that have already been obtained by places of worship.

Despite this unusual behaviour, FKUB was not completely useless in resolving the dispute. According to Krissantono, the role FKUB can play was evident in the effort by Bapak Imam, the Catholic representative of the Bekasi FKUB, to communicate with Muslim youth. The communication between elite groups through the FKUB was quite effective in the case of the St. Albertus Station in Harapan Indah, and in calming tensions between St. Mikael and its opponents. Social factors were most prominent in the St. Mikael case, however. Local opposition was primarily based on fears of Christianisation and the perception that the Catholic community was exclusive. One figure who was opposed to the church was Ustadz Abu (not his real name) from the West Bekasi Ustadz Forum, as well as Ustadz Abdullah who often gave sermons at the local mosque. The church’s strategy to overcome this was to build good relations with the community, beginning with the neighbourhood and community association units, and then similar organisations at the subdistrict and district levels.

One of the defining moments in efforts to create good relations with local residents was the decision to open the door,

mentioned earlier. The idea began with the RW head's desire to create a clean and beautiful environment. Because the door had never been opened, local residents used the space as a rubbish dump. The area was generally dark and unsafe. The head of the RW wanted to improve the situation and spoke to Father Yosef. Several local residents objected because opening the door would allow easier access to the church.

To overcome this resistance, the head of the RW set out to convince local residents, with support from Father Yosef who sat diligently at the door talking with people. Eventually, despite resistance, the door was opened in an event that was attended by religious leaders and officials from the RT and RW units. Father Yosef himself blessed the door and prayed candidly that the opening of the door would initiate a better dialogue between the church and the local community.

The church's approach to improving relations with the local community was also influenced by the inclusion of the local community in the church construction. Mulyadi made a direct request that the church involve local residents, arguing that if there were any issues with the church, it would be local residents who would first asked for help. The church accommodated this request and hired several local residents as security officers. It was these officers who were, among other things, later to disperse a PKS crowd that sought to speak out against the church. It is necessary to note that Mulyadi now feels slightly distanced from the church because the new parish council does not relate as intimately with local residents as did the previous one.

Another important insight that emerged from interviews with Father Yosef and Krissantono was that in cases where churches face problems, the church too often reduces the issues in dispute to the idea that those in opposition only want money. According to them, it is important that the church not only

gives money to these parties but also builds a relationship with the local community so they are not hesitant to speak frankly.

In a meeting with the diocese, Krissantono suggested that if churches were aware that people were opposing the churches because they needed money, the church should not give out money but instead talk frankly with their opponents. Openness, he argued, was important because people are only open with those who are not 'foreign'. If local residents could be open with the church about their needs, then it meant that the church was no longer a foreign entity for them.

In relation to money, Ustadz Abu's case is an interesting example. Initially, Ustadz Abu was one of the most vocal opponents. His position as one of the leaders of the West Bekasi Ustadz Forum gave him respect and a strong base of mass support. The church attempted to visit him in his home. This proved to be an effective approach but what the church had not suspected was that a more effective approach would come through his grandchild.

Ustadz Abu's grandchild liked chicken nuggets, and Krissantono happened to work in a nugget company. When they eventually visited the Ustadz' house, the church committee took nuggets to give to his grandchild. In addition to other personal approaches, this 'nugget approach' improved their relationship. The church committee often dropped by the mosque managed by Ustadz Abu. They visited so often that Ustadz Abu said, "Father, don't come so often, or people will think I'm taking money from you."

There are four other stories in this case that highlight the importance of managing social issues by forming good relationships. The first relates to a meeting between the church, local residents and the opponents of the church. The meeting was heated. The head of one RT, Mulyadi, a Muslim, stood up and shouted at the church's opponents, "Pull down the Garuda

(Pancasila) then, if churches can't be constructed in this country!"

The second story concerns the arrival of the two FPI trucks at the church complex. The FPI crowd had been shouting from some distance away, "Burn it ... burn it!" They did so until they reached the complex, when the men on guard (led directly by the chief of the local police) firmly told the crowd to leave. The FPI crowd, possibly daunted by the uncompromising attitude of the security agencies, left after saying, "Sorry, we took a wrong turn." Recently, Father Yosef was told by local youth leaders that the Karang Taruna youth organisation was prepared to step in if FPI began vandalising the church.

The third story relates to Ustadz Abu, and was told by Father Yosef. It was the beginning of Ramadhan and the church was not being constructed although the permit had been obtained. Out of respect for local residents, the church erected the banner, "Have a happy fasting month-- St. Mikael Catholic Church." FPI and several other groups disliked the use of the word "church", because the church building had not been constructed. They planned a mass protest. The church was not initially aware of this attitude, and it was Ustadz Abu who told the church about the discontented groups. On the basis of his information, the church replaced the banner before it became a significant issue.

The fourth story started with monitoring by the RT and RW officials of mosques and small Islamic places of worship called *mushollas*. In order to maintain healthy relations with the church and maintain social harmony, the RT and RW officials selectively elected mosque preachers. Ustadz Abdullah was black-listed because he was considered to be spreading hatred. He taught his students to hate Christians, which the RT and RW officials thought was wrong. After being fired, Ustadz Abdullah struggled financially and eventually divorced his wife.

Although approaching the local community has proven effective, there are still some who are unhappy with the existence of the church. Dissent has come largely from the head of RT 01, a member of FPI. The church is surrounded by several RT units but only RT 01 has expressed dissatisfaction. The church itself has not worried about RT 01 as it believes that individuals have a right to oppose the church. From interviews with RT and RW officials, it is clear that on a personal level the head of RT 01 does not actually have many complaints but his membership of FPI means he has been influenced by many parties who oppose the church and this has placed him in a difficult position.

One important aspect of the firm stance of the police over St. Mikael is the close relationship between Father Yosef and the police chief. The two became close immediately after their first meeting, to the extent that the police chief asked Father Yosef to pray for his wife during labour and to suggest a name for his second child. Their relationship was also apparent when the police chief stood at the altar during Mass after FPI had visited the church. He took the opportunity to say that he would guarantee the church's security and spoke about his personal life as a way of increasing the community's trust in him.

Another note about St. Mikael's is more political. It concerns Mochtar Mohammad, successfully elected as Bekasi Mayor in 2008, primarily as a result of solid support from the Protestant and Catholic communities. Initial information also suggested that before the local election he signed an agreement with representatives from the Protestant-Catholic community that made two main points. First, if elected he would enforce religious freedom. Second, if elected he would speed up the processing of permits for the construction of churches in accordance with the law.

Many parties dislike Mochtar Mohammad's relationship with the Protestant-Catholic community. There are at least three

different explanations for why disputes over churches in Bekasi have not been resolved. The first is that government indifference to churches that are closed down is proof that Mochtar Mohammad only used the Protestant-Catholic community as a political commodity. The second, on the other hand, suggests that the Mayor's close relationship with the churches places political pressure on him and, like it or not, he has to maintain some distance. Finally, the third explanation perceives the closure of churches as an effort by certain parties to delegitimise Mochtar Mohammad in the eyes of the Protestant-Catholic community and reduce the possibility of him securing a second term. This research has not been able to determine which among these explanations are accurate.

The political and ideological elements of the situation are also apparent from Basyuni's defence of the church. He is a PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) sympathiser who has a large photograph of Bung Karno (Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia) in his guest room. He is also head of an RT unit and supports the church for reasons of religious freedom and the Constitution. The church must be supported, he says, because Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Basyuni even debated with Ustadz Abdullah in a sermon at the mosque. This kind of ideology is important as an effort to counter opposition by ideologically (not economically or pragmatically) motivated opponents.

The analysis above shows that in the case of St Mikael's in Kranji effective state involvement was the most important factor in resolving objections to the church's construction. The St Mikael's case also emphasises the role of good relationships with local residents. In fact, at least every fortnight the church reminds its congregation to wind down their car windows (which are usually tinted) when passing local houses before entering the church complex to greet local residents. Their in-

timacy with the local community was apparent when the local Karang Taruna was willing to stand up against FPI in defence of the church. The role the RT and RW played was also very positive, not only in mediating between the church, local residents and the government but also in controlling the content of sermons in mosques and preventing radical teachings from being disseminated to the local community.

Seroja Pasundan Protestant Church

Seroja Pasundan Protestant Church or Seroja GKP is situated in the Seroja Soldiers' complex. The complex is managed by the Dharmais Foundation and was established as a sign of President Soeharto's appreciation for soldiers and volunteers involved in Indonesian operations in East Timor. The East Timor invasion in 1975 was known as 'Operation Seroja', and those involved thus came to be known as the Seroja Soldiers. The Seroja complex, dedicated to these men and their families, was built from 1981 to 1982. At almost the same time, the Protestant and Catholic communities began to hold religious activities in the houses of local residents living in the complex.

In 1985, during a presidential visit, Soeharto saw that the Protestant and Catholic communities had no special place to worship. He ordered Dharmais to provide them with a special building. Dharmais authorised a building on Pisang Street to be used alternately for Protestant and Catholic religious activities. For the Protestants, the building was used by the Pasundan Protestant Church, while for the Catholic community it was used by the Johannes Pemandi Chapel.

The two churches continue to share a single building even today. Their current building, now on Tomat Street, has been partitioned into two equal parts, one for the Protestants, the other for the Catholics. The Protestants can accommodate about 200-300 people. Their community is about 1600 members

strong, some of whom live in the complex.

The church is led by Pastor Eric Egne, who has been at Seroja GKP since 1987. In 1992, the church purchased 850 m² of land outside the Seroja Complex in order to build a new church to accommodate their increasing numbers. Construction was delayed by a number of issues. As a result, after some objected to the proposed Seroja church were raised in 2006, it was unable to move to its own land and has had to continue using the Dharmais building.

In 2006, two retired Seroja soldiers disputed the existence of the church. Acting in the name of the Seroja Islamic Forum (*Forum Umat Islam Seroja*, FUIS), they argued that the church disturbed the local community. At the time, conditions were less than favourable for the church as the large number of congregants attending sermons caused traffic congestion that annoyed local residents living near the church. Fear of 'Christianisation' was not a reason for opposition in this case.

The opponents did not protest or attack the church. They chose instead to intimidate its congregants, causing them discomfort. Although there was no physical attack, the church felt uneasy and took the issue to the community association unit and the Dharmais Foundation.

The intimidation campaign began in May 2006 and the church immediately informed Dharmais of the development. Those opposing the church were former Seroja soldiers, and so the church focused its negotiations on this group. The Dharmais Foundation was very helpful and within a month it had already offered a new location for the church on Tomat Street. The new building had previously been used for training workshops for East Timorese youth. After the 27th Indonesian province (East Timor) separated from Indonesia, the building had been abandoned, so it was now offered to Seroja GKP and the Johannes Pemandi Chapel.

In October 2006, Seroja GKP moved to the new location. Dharmais owned the building and rented it out to the church under the condition that the structure remains unaltered. In addition, the church must annually renew its letter of agreement and rent arrangements with Dharmais.

The Joint Regulations on places of worship did not play a major role in the resolution of the issues in 2006. The dominant actor was the Dharmais Foundation as owner and manager of the Seroja Complex. The state - more specifically President Soeharto - played a larger role in the early days of Seroja GKP by ordering that it be given a building for worship. There were other aspects of the resolution of the Seroja GKP dispute that involved other elements of the state.

The first aspect related to the position of the church as a facility for worship for retired Seroja army soldiers. This meant the church was brought to the attention of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), particularly the Department for Spiritual Guidance and the Centre for Physical Rehabilitation of the TNI. This office indirectly "monitored" the relocation of the church. Another aspect related to the role of the local government. While the dispute was underway, the Deputy Mayor at the time, Mochtar Mohammad, visited the church and gathered subdistrict and district heads to discuss the dispute. The leader of the church, Pastor Eric Egne, explained that Mochtar Mohammad instructed the subdistrict and district heads to find a way for the community to continue worshipping, either in the old location or a new one.

Social issues in this case primarily related to the Dharmais Foundation and the RW unit head. The Dharmais Foundation was an appropriate mediator between the church and its opponents. The RW head, on the other hand, was committed to keeping the Seroja issue an internal matter between local residents living in the complex. He cautioned those opposing the church

not to involve outside parties as that would create further conflict amongst local residents. Even meetings of local residents involved in the relocation of the church did not involve Pastor Eric because he did not live in the complex.

Another interesting aspect, according to Martin, a Seroja veteran and member of Seroja GKP, was that the Seroja local residents and Dharmais controlled the content of sermons in nearby mosques. This helped prevent the church dispute from being blown out of proportion.

The church has maintained good relationships with local residents, particularly as regards parking. Church parking is managed by local residents, and is charged at a relatively high rate. Cars pay IDR 5,000 (AUD 0.52) and motorbikes pay IDR 3,000 (AUD 0.31). The parking lot is on empty land owned by Dharmais near the church and is therefore not in the way of local residents.

There are two issues with the Seroja GKP dispute that are important to examine. The first is the fact that while Seroja GKP had almost no problems relocating within the Seroja Complex, it faced difficulties trying to construct a church outside the complex on the land it had already purchased. According to Pastor Eric, the church had already obtained signatures from local residents in accordance with the regulations (as the area is different from the Seroja area, new signatures had to be collected).

The dispute concerned the reluctance of the local RT and RW heads to confirm the signatures. They were ambivalent, saying that if the Protestant community wanted to build a church they did not oppose the idea but they also would not express support for it. Further, when asked, Pastor Eric confirmed that the RT and RW heads were PKS sympathisers.

The second aspect relates to Mochtar Mohammad. Pastor Eric confirmed that Mochtar Mohammad was close to the Protestant and Catholic communities. In fact, his visit when

the church was experiencing problems was most surprising because, as far as Pastor Eric could remember, no one from the church had complained to the deputy Mayor. In addition, Pastor Eric believes that several cases involving churches in Bekasi are attempts by Mochtar Mohammad's political opponents to damage his image among local Protestants and Catholics. The Christian community was considered important in securing victory for Mochtar Mohammad and Rahmat Effendi, who defeated PKS candidates Akhmad Syaikhul and Kamaludin Djaini, by a margin of 9 per cent. This was also mentioned by Father Yosef (see the section on the St. Mikael Catholic Church in Kranji).

The dispute over the Seroja GKP church and its subsequent relocation was only minor. There were no demonstrations, violence or physical destruction. Yet there are many things that can be learned from this case. First, the role of the RW head in localising the issue and not allowing outside organisations to participate was significant. Second, the decisiveness of those managing the complex played an important role. In this case it was Dharmais, supported by the Army, which was asked by the local government to find the best solution for both parties. State regulations were thus indirectly enforced by Dharmais, while social factors were represented by the community association unit or RW.

Terang Hidup Indonesian Protestant Church

In 1978, the Terang Hidup (Light of Life) congregation of the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) was established by Pastor Amos Tan and his wife. The first sermon was held on 9 July 1978 in the hall of the Pemberita Injil (Evangelist) Church on Mangga Alley, Kemurnian Street, West Jakarta. At the time the church was called the Tio Ciu Protestant Church. In July 1984, it became the Terang Hidup Protestant Church.

The church building today is situated at No.19A Ketapang

Utara I Street, and was purchased in February 1987. The building was initially a residential house but was later renovated so it could be used by the church.

The church was first established under the auspices of the Hongkong Swatow Protestant Church, which provided financial support. On 20 March 1994, however, the Terang Hidup Church council decided that it wanted to become a member of the official synod in Indonesia. The church currently has 200 registered members, with 150 actively participating in services every Sunday. The congregation is led by two priests. The building is permanent and does not differ greatly from the buildings around it. There is a large cross on the church wall. Within the church fence, there is a car park that accommodates several cars, and parking is managed by local residents.

The majority of the church community are ethnic Chinese. This contrasts with local residents who are mostly Javanese, Betawi or Makassarese. Pastor Mellisa claims the congregation is not upper-class, although they are generally better off than local residents. Pastor Mellisa made the interesting observation that sometimes it is not the actual economic disparity that upsets local residents. Although the socio-economic status of the church congregation and local residents are not so different, local residents tend to view the congregation as better off, simply because, "You have the money to build a church".

Beginning in 2003, the church approached the community about plans for the renovation of the old building and the construction of a new church. The church argued that the old building was not large enough and often flooded. The church obtained more than 40 signatures from local residents³ and the Krukut subdistrict head verified them on 30 October 2003.

In March 2004, during a session held by the subdistrict head

³ At the time Joint Ministerial Regulation 8/9 of 2006 had not been issued and there was no minimum requirement for signatures.

to announce the church renovation, a local figure and leader of a mosque, Ustadz Hasan (not his real name), expressed his opposition to the construction of the church. He reasoned that his house, which was located behind the church, would become hot and stuffy if the church was built higher as it would block the airflow around his house. The subdistrict head was able to resolve Hasan's concerns.

On 16 April 2004, the church applied for a permit for construction of the church. In December 2004, the West Jakarta Mayor granted approval to change the current permit for a residential property into one for a place of worship, and forwarded the case to the Jakarta Governor. In August 2006, the deputy Governor of Jakarta, acting on behalf of the Governor, granted a permit for the development and renovation of the church.

After obtaining the permit, the church began construction and erected a banner asking for the blessings of the local residents. According to Pastor Mellisa, erecting the banner was effectively like waking a sleeping tiger. Ustad Hasan voiced his opposition again. During a meeting in September 2007 in the RW 07 office, he accused the church of lying to his father, the deceased H. Ihsan (not his real name), by claiming they would only fill the land to reduce flooding when they actually intended to renovate and extend the church.

From that day on, the head and the deputy head of RW 07 acted as facilitators between local residents and the church. They suggested that the church be only one storey high. On 10 October 2007, during a meeting between the facilitators and local residents, local residents could not agree on this issue and accused the facilitators of accepting money from the church.

On 6 December 2007, a group of local residents, acting in the name of the Krukut Muslim Community (*Masyarakat Umat Islam Krukut*) submitted a written letter in opposition to the church. The reasons they cited were (1) the church was originally a resi-

dential property that never obtained a permit for a change of status (to a place of worship); (2) there was already a church on Ketapang Utara 1 Street; (3) the local residents around the church were Muslim; and (4) the church congregation did not come from Ketapang Utara 1.

In January 2008, Taman Sari District invited the church and local residents to meet. According to information from Pastor Melissa, the Taman Sari district head was not present and the meeting was eventually moved to the Taman Sari police station. From then on, the police chief became the chief mediator.

Parallel to these processes, the church sent a letter to the regional police chief regarding security and sent carbon copies to the National Police Chief, the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and the chairperson of PGI. In January 2008, Komnas HAM wrote a letter to the West Jakarta police chief in response to the request for security. In May 2008, the church construction began. Local protests took place but as time passed they became increasingly infrequent.

In the Terang Hidup case, state regulations were applied by the police. The police - in this instance the Taman Sari police station - acted as a facilitator between the church and its opponents. The police also provided security and helped approach local residents.

Interviews revealed that during this mediation process the church spent IDR 50 million in police coordination fees. This was paid upfront in return for the achievement of certain objectives. Further money was paid in instalments, depending on need. More recently, information has surfaced that the amount paid was much smaller than was originally reported, because the dispute was resolved earlier than expected.

The active and courageous role the police played was apparent in meetings between the church and its opponents. At one meeting, the police chief quite firmly stated that the police

would always refer to the church's legal status in any dispute. In this case, because the church had already obtained a permit, local residents who opposed its existence were effectively opposing the government and the police. On the same occasion, the police chief also told local residents that the church had already forwarded the case to Komnas HAM and the regional police chief. "Does the regional police chief really have to become involved?" the Taman Sari police chief asked rhetorically, as retold by Pastor Mellisa.

There are several aspects to note regarding police involvement in this case. First, the church tried to contact the Metro Jaya police office through Komnas HAM. Second, the church coordinated with PGI, which has connections with elements of the Metro Jaya police office. One member of the GKI synod was a policeman and assisted in taking these steps.

The church's success in obtaining police attention was apparent in a statement by the local police chief which Pastor Mellisa quoted in an interview: "Be patient yeah, we're handling it. Senior management has also asked us to resolve it." Third, according to Pastor Mellisa, the Taman Sari police chief told the church that he had often handled church issues of a similar kind. He assured the church that he understood fully what had to be done.

The church felt that other institutions, such as FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, did not play an important or useful role. FKUB did become involved in the mediation process, but the problems had largely subsided by that stage. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, on the other hand, was passive, and only wrote letters in response without becoming actively involved in the field.

The most prominent party from the bureaucracy was the Kurkut subdistrict head. He was involved in mediation between the church and its opponents. Several meetings were

held on his initiative, although his involvement was not purely motivated by a desire to implement his duties. There were indications that opportunism and pragmatism motivated him, as was evident for instance in the request that the church help with community work but do so by providing financial assistance.

The church feared its permit would be cancelled, although this did not occur. A temporary permit requires that construction be started within six months. Resistance from local residents, however, delayed the construction and the church had to apply for an extension. The church felt that the Jakarta local government did not raise questions about the extension even though the church was being disputed. This was perhaps because the police had already guaranteed the church's security.

Social issues were the most important aspect in the Terang Hidup case. Resistance to the church came not from government agencies but from local residents. As Pastor Mellisa said, the problem was initially quite trivial, with a mosque manager feeling that his house would become airless because a higher church would block ventilation. Pastor Mellisa admitted that the church had not been sensitive enough in responding to this.

The issue then developed into accusations of 'Christianisation', church manipulation and claims that the ethnic Chinese congregation were not local residents. At its climax, Ustadz Hasan, who managed a local mosque, used the mosque's loud-speaker to express opposition to the church construction. This scared the congregation from worshiping without a police escort. Those opposing the church also stirred up the issue of Christianisation, particularly by pointing out that a church of a different denomination was located not far from Terang Hidup GKI. Local residents argued that the presence of many churches was an indication of Christianisation.

The church's opponents were largely local residents, and not groups from outside the region. Their opposition usually

took the form of threats and intimidation as opposed to violent action. The groups suspected of being behind the closure of churches, such as FPI and FUL, were, according to Pastor Melissa's observations, not present in this case. There were some local residents who were also FPI members, but their opposition was more in their capacity as citizens of Ketapang Utara, rather than as FPI members.

One important aspect often found in controversial church disputes arose here: the presence of "brokers". Pastor Mellisa recalled that there were people who claimed to be FPI members and offered their services. The church declined these offers because, among other reasons, they had been warned by the local police chief that such people are often two-faced: they appear friendly to the church but speak out against them to local residents.

Another aspect that deserves mention in the *Terang Hidup* case is the inseparability of state regulations and social factors. The Taman Sari police station dealt with the local disagreement and approached local residents in several ways, including by inviting an ustadz from another region who was respected by local residents and inviting him to deliver a sermon. The police station also employed the intelligence unit to help map out and talk with those who opposed the church.

The police did not, however, ignore all demands of local residents. The police chief took the middle path in response to the demand that the church collect signatures again. The signatures were taken again but the process was implemented through the neighbourhood association unit or RT. The relationship between the church and local residents (represented by the community association unit or RW) was good, apart from one strange aspect. During an interview with one RW official, the impression was that the RW was trying to maintain a distance from the church. Time and time again the RW declined

offers of help from the church. In fact, when the church invited the RW to celebrate Ramadhan, the RW also declined. Clearly, the RW wanted to establish a boundary between the two. This is substantially different from the attitudes of the RT and RW in the case of St. Mikael's Catholic Church in Kranji (discussed above).

Despite maintaining its distance, however, the RW became instrumental in calming individuals opposed to the church. RW members pointed out that the church had existed for a long time, which meant that the parents of those now opposed to it had, in fact, agreed to its construction.

Ultimately, however, the most influential party in mediating with, and on behalf of, Terang Hidup GKI was the police. FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs did very little. The RW helped calm the situation before the role was taken over by the police. The subdistrict head was considered an opportunist. The representative of higher levels of government administration, in this case the Taman Sari district head, failed to attend the meeting he had arranged. Assistance from the synod and PGI was also helpful in strengthening the congregation and obtaining access to state security agencies.

The Cathedral

The Cathedral is located directly in front of the Istiqlal Mosque, the construction of which began in the 1960s, with inauguration taking place in 1976. The Cathedral was first established in 1808 but was, in fact, built twice, with the current building dating from 1891. The 'mother church' of all Catholic churches in Indonesia, the Cathedral has been protected by its inclusion in the 1931 *Staatsblad* (Statute) No. 238 on *Monumenten Ordonantie* (Ordinance on Monuments) and, later, Instruction by the Minister for Internal Affairs No. 65/1/17 of 5 February 1960 (Majalah Hidup 2001: 22).

The congregation of the Catholic Cathedral has increased over the years. In 1862, 2,359 people were recorded as members. By 1892, its membership had increased to 4,144 people. In 1911, this became 5,610; in 1922, 7,743; and in 1932 as many as 7,966 people were worshipping there (Heuken 2007: 274). The construction of parishes also influenced the number of members. In 1941, there were 5,491 congregants; in 1960, there were 3,865 members; in 1970, this increased to 4,020; by 1990, there were 6,010 people and data from 2004 records a total of 9,995 members (Heuken 2007: 274).

The history of the Cathedral in Jakarta begins on 5 April 1808, with the arrival of Priest Nelissen and Priest Prinsen in Jakarta. On 10 April 1808, the first Mass was celebrated openly in the house of Surgeon F.C.H Assmuss. This was the embryo of both the Cathedral and the Catholic Church in Indonesia (Heuken 2007: 52). According to the head of the Cathedral Museum, Gina Sutono, the first mission in fact arrived in 1808 but the Catholic Church existed officially from 1807, the year the two pastors began their journey to the Dutch East Indies. This was why 200 years of the Catholic Church was celebrated in 2007, although the Cathedral parish was only established in 1808, after the two pastors had arrived.

On 15 May 1808, the Dutch government borrowed a bamboo house for use as an emergency church. It was located on the land where the Ministry of Religious Affairs now stands (Cathedral Museum 2008: 6). Deemed improper, the government gave a plot of land in Pintu Air Pasar Baru to the Catholic community on which to build a church. The funds raised for the church construction, however, were insufficient and it was delayed (Heuken 2007: 52 – 53). Eventually, in 1811 Pastor Nelissen traded the land for an unused Protestant chapel on Kenanga Alley on the outskirts of Pasar Senen, where Atrium Senen now stands. The 8 x 32 metre church was able to hold about 200 people and

was called Santo Ludovicus (Heuken 2007: 54). At the time the Dutch East Indies was under the rule of Governor General Daendels, who supported religious freedom.

On 27 June 1826, the first Catholic church was burnt down, along with dozens of Chinese traders' houses. The heir, J. Cransen, a high Dutch official who held authority over Pasar Senen was not prepared to sell the land and chapel (Heuken 2007: 58). In 1830, the dispute over ownership rights to the land led to the demolition of the chapel on Kenanga Alley (Majalah Hidup, 22 April 2001: 21). One of the reasons was that the Catholic Church did not have a letter of ownership, or a construction permit, as it does today. The situation changed when the Commissioner General of the Dutch East Indies, Du Bus (1825 – 1830), a Catholic, heard about the difficulties the Catholic community faced in trying to practice their religion. He gave the Jakarta Catholic community the opportunity to purchase the land and the building that had once been the residence of General de Kock, in Lapangan Banteng (now No. 7 Katedral Street) (Cathedral Museum, 2008: 9 – 11). Gina Sutono, the head of the Jakarta Cathedral Museum, talked about the assistance Du Bus gave, but said, "Although he helped, the land was still sold, not given away. Du Bus intervened a little, but why wasn't the building just given to the Catholic Church seeing that it wasn't being used anymore? So we bought it. We have all the documents from the sale. We have a construction permit. So the church land belongs to the Jakarta diocese."

Tromph, the engineer, was asked to draw up plans for a new church, although it was never built due to financial difficulties. Eventually, the building that existed was renovated so that it could be used as a church. On 6 November 1829, the 35 x 17 metre church was inaugurated with the name The Ascension of St Mary (St. Maria Diangkat ke Surga). By the beginning of the 1870s, the old church building was deteriorating and had

to be restored. Lacking sufficient funds, the 80-year-old church building was renovated as best as possible but lasted only 10 more years. On 9 April 1890, the church was totally destroyed, largely by an earthquake. As a temporary measure, the priest's horse stables were used as an emergency church for community activities for the next ten years (Majalah Hidup 2001: 21 – 22, 34).

In 1891, Monsignor A.C. Claessen Sr began construction on the second Cathedral, architectural plans having been prepared by P.A. Dijkmans. One year after the first stone was placed, construction was stopped due to lack of funds (Cathedral Museum 2008: 21–22). The financial situation saw the new Bishop, Monsignor E. Luypen SJ (1889–1923), seek funding in the Netherlands. The second stage of the construction was continued by engineer M.J. Hulswit in 1898, with Pater Carolus Wanneker placing the first stone (Heuken 2007: 99).

In 1988, the Cathedral underwent large-scale renovations, which even included the ornaments inside. At the same time, the Cathedral Museum was created in a balcony room within the Cathedral. The Museum was inaugurated on 28 April 1991. The Cathedral has three pastors, Father Broto Kartono as the head pastor, Father Budi and Father Suherman. The congregation has about 7,000 members, who are largely middle to lower-class and 60% are ethnic Chinese.

The Cathedral is 60 metres long and 20 metres wide. It can accommodate 800 people seated, or about 1000 standing. The architecture is neo-gothic, and the floorplan is in the shape of a cross. The construction is made of stone, while the ceiling is made of wood in anticipation of earthquakes. It is 17 metres high, and was installed by labourers from China.

Gina, the head of the Jakarta Cathedral Museum, sees the construction of the Cathedral as something unique. "This church represents a combination of three nations. The build-

ing is stone, but the interior is wood. So it's called Neo-Gothic. To be Gothic the ceiling should be stone. The architect was from the Netherlands. Then the Chinese were famous for the wooden parts, so labourers were brought over from China. The general construction was completed by local labourers. So the Cathedral is the work of three nations."

The Cathedral has three towers, the Benteng Daud Tower and the Gading Tower at 60 metres high, and the Angelus Dei Tower (the Tower of God's Angel) between the two and 45 metres high. In anticipation of earthquakes, the three towers are made of iron, although iron is not appropriate for a Neo-Gothic building (Heuken 2007: 100 – 101). These towers made the Cathedral the tallest building in Jakarta at the beginning of the 20th century (Majalah Hidup 2001: 22).

In 1901, construction was completed. On 21 April 1901, the Ascension of St Mary's Church was inaugurated in a grand ceremony by Monsignor E.S. Luypen SJ. From that moment, as the main church in Jakarta it was called "The Cathedral" because it contains the bishop's throne (Majalah Hidup 2001: 22).

The Cathedral's position directly opposite the Istiqlal Mosque raises questions. The tendency is to think their positions reflect conflict and tension between the two religions. According to Gina, however, the relationship between the two is strong. "Since Istiqlal was established we have often worked together. For instance, when we celebrate holy days like Christmas, because the size of our congregation keeps growing we use the Istiqlal car park. It isn't a problem."

Nevertheless, the sound of the *azan* (prayer call) from the Istiqlal mosque does disturb the Catholic community during Sunday sermons. The Catholic church tries to be understanding and not see it as a problem. "Because it's always been like that we tolerate it," Gina said. When the Indonesian government planned the construction of the largest mosque in Indone-

sia directly across from the Cathedral, no one from the Catholic community protested. According to Gina, this is representative of the Catholic attitude in general - to accept all change and attempt to live in peaceful coexistence, without making a 'big deal' of negative things.

It must be noted that the Cathedral has experienced a number of threats. In November 1998, there was a riot near Ketapang Street. Crowds of people damaged the Ketapang Church of Christ and burnt the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia, as well as several others. During the riot, a number of people also attempted to attack the Cathedral church, but were detained by a special unit of the Air Force (Aritonang 2004: 534). At the time, the Cathedral was guarded by the government security forces. Two years later, the Cathedral was faced with a more serious threat. On 24 December 2000, as Christmas Eve Mass was underway at the Cathedral, the congregation was startled by an explosion in front of the Cathedral fence. Similar explosions occurred in several cities in Indonesia including Bandung, Sukabumi, Mojokerto, Batam, Mataram, Medan and Pekanbaru (Majalah Hidup 2001: 35). According to media sources, a member of [the militant Islamist Group] Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible for the bomb attack on the Cathedral (Heuken 2007: 2).

In the case of this church, the state played an important role during the Dutch colonial period. The construction of churches at the time was influenced by the levels of tolerance shown by the Governor General and other Jakarta officials. The Cathedral, which has always seemed peaceful, has at times experienced the same issues that other churches are experiencing today. In Gina's eyes, "From the colonial era to the present there has been no difference in religious freedom. Establishing a church has always been difficult." Intervention by the Dutch colonial government made it difficult for Catholics, as evident in policies restricting the number of priests, religious freedom, and pro-

viding no support to the construction of Catholic churches.

The Protestant colonial government was known to be anti-Catholic. Some within the government, however, were supportive of the right to religious freedom, including the development of Catholicism. When the Dutch East Indies was ruled by tolerant Governor Generals, congregations trying to construct churches found they had strong government support. The opposite was the case when the Republic of Indonesia was established. The government, however, was aware of the importance of the Cathedral for the Catholic community in Indonesia. To some extent the government was obliged to protect the church. Gina expressed the dynamic in this way, "Attacking the Cathedral, because it is the centre, is like attacking Catholicism in Indonesia. So it's like attacking an embassy." Even after the Istiqlal Mosque was built tolerance was maintained, however. The government now uses the Cathedral-Istiqlal Mosque relationship as a symbol of religious harmony in Indonesia.

Social factors were not so important in the Cathedral dispute, at least not since the Republic of Indonesia gained independence. There are several reasons for this. First, there were originally hardly any settlements near the Cathedral. Second, the Cathedral holds a unique position because it is not just an ordinary church but is also a political icon of religious harmony in Indonesia. This symbolism means that the Cathedral is affected more by state regulations than social factors.

Since Indonesian independence, the Cathedral church has not experienced many significant problems. Opposition occurred in the colonial era and was a result of the nature of the ruling officers at the time. This has important implications. First, it suggests that the level of tolerance of those in power is important in determining state regulations. Second, the restriction of religious freedom is not just a product of an exclusivist Islamic Indonesian government but has historical roots that

date back to the colonial period. The Cathedral case teaches that problems with places of worship are often not simply ideological issues but also political ones.

St. Albertus Catholic Church

The first stakes to mark out the construction of the St. Albertus Catholic Church were planted in May 2006. This church's design has changed several times. It was initially intended to accommodate about 1250 people, but plans underwent two changes before its current design was decided upon. On 24 December 2009, just before Christmas, the first service was held in the St. Albertus Church.

The building is about 2100 m² with a capacity of 2000 people, and is located on land about 7000 m² in size. The church is only 500 metres from the Medan Satria police station in Bekasi. Geographically, it stands in the middle of vacant land waiting to be built upon. The closest village is Tanah Apit, which is inhabited largely by ethnic Betawis.

The church design is minimalist, and in January 2011 the main structure was 90% complete, with the interior 65% complete. IDR 8-9 billion has been spent so far on the construction, and was collected from the congregation and the diocese.

The size of the congregation at St. Albertus Church continues to increase, in line with rapid increases in the number of people living in the Harapan Indah housing complex. In 2006, the congregation was only 5000 strong. There are now about 6000 people. This number will only continue to increase with the development of the Harapan Indah residential area. Of its total area of about 1800 m², only 30% has been developed, which leaves room for further development.

The majority of the congregation of St. Albertus lives in Harapan Indah and surrounding areas, including Naga-Pondok Ungu, Taman Harapan Baru and Rorotan. The St. Alber-

tus Church, however, is still a station of the St. Mikael Parish in Kranji. The socio-economic situation of the congregation is largely middle to upper-class, with many working as businesspersons. Others are government officials or employees. Some are ethnic Javanese, a small portion are Batak, from Flores or are Chinese. The social conditions in the housing complex differ noticeably from the local residents, the majority of whom are middle to lower-class. These generally work as security guards, rubbish collectors, maids and office boys, and are largely ethnic Betawis.

The St. Albertus Church was first initiated in 1995. It started off as a shop that doubled as a residential property in Taman Harapan Baru. When the property was burnt down by local residents, the place of worship was moved to a house in the Permata Harapan Baru complex. Opposition arose again. Local residents threatened the house until the church was eventually closed down, and moved to another house. It was again threatened, and moved, splitting into four smaller churches. One house was rented in Hijau Boulevard, together with two separate houses in Harapan Indah and one in Harapan Baru. This situation continued until October 2009.

Construction of a church for the Catholic community was a necessity. Not only was the community growing but houses used to hold services continually received threats from local residents. On 31 December 2009, the use of these houses as places of worship was finally brought to a halt. The Catholic community was told that even if they refused to move, they would no longer be able to hold services in those houses.

From 1995, according to Christina Rantena, the head of the St. Albertus Church Construction Committee, a previous church committee had applied for a construction permit but never received one. At the time the reason was that the local community did not agree to the construction, and the Mayor

wrote a letter of rejection to that effect. In 2006, the Church Construction Committee applied for a permit in accordance with the Joint Ministerial Regulations requiring 60 signatures from non-Catholics and 90 from Catholics. To obtain the 60 Muslim signatures the Committee approached the community. The Committee also talked with the heads of the RT and RW units, the subdistrict head and local community leaders. The church was successful in obtaining a permit this time and began construction.

From the start of the construction until 2009, there was no intimidation, protests, violence or opposition. The only violent incident occurred on 17 December 2009, one week before the church was to be used for the first time on 24 December 2009. Even this incident was not preceded by threats or any warning.

The incident began when hundreds – *Kompas* mentioned thousands in an article on 18 December 2009 – gathered at the Statue of the Three Ancestors (*Patung Tiga Mojang*) roundabout, not far from the main entrance to Harapan Indah, just before midnight on 17 December 2009. There were children and adults, including mothers. They did not display any uniform to identify them with a particular Islamic organisation, and carried no banners.

At about 11:00pm, the crowd began to push towards the St. Albertus Church. When they arrived, they began throwing stones at the church, smashing the windows and outdoor lights. "In addition to throwing stones, they burnt the security post, one security guard's motorbike, and a container that functioned as the building contractor's office."⁴ Upon hearing word of the incident, Christina, who was on the way to the church that night, immediately turned around to report the incident to the

⁴ "Gereja Dihujani Lemparan Batu dan Nyaris Dibumihanguskan," *Kompas.com*, 18 December 2009, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2009/12/18/12204719> (accessed 26 August 2010).

police station 500 metres from the church. One hour later, the police from the Harapan Indah police precinct and the Bekasi regional police station finally dispersed the crowd.

According to Christina, the crowd had arrived prepared to burn the church down. They carried gasoline. When the police chief arrived at 2:00am in the morning (18 December 2009) he acknowledged that there was the smell of petrol in the air, "That was what caused thousands of boxes of ceramic tiles to burn through to the morning, as well as the contractor's office." The police sealed off the church on the Thursday night but took the police line down on Friday morning. According to Haryono, the secretary for the St. Albertus Church Construction Committee, "The crowd was not organised. Although it is possible they were being directed by a social organisation." It was known, however, that the crowd came from Taruma Jaya district.

The police station took over the case, "There were a lot of perpetrators arrested but they did not claim to be from any particular organisation." The case was resolved without being taken to court. Initially a number of perpetrators were arrested for vandalism but only one was charged with theft, having been caught stealing an electric drill. Commenting on the charge, which changed from vandalism to theft, Christina responded, "Frankly, I don't want to interfere with legal matters. I'll leave that all up to the police." Christina herself agrees there is no need to exacerbate the situation. It was possible the police intentionally made the case about a lesser criminal offence in order to calm the situation and avoid tension if the perpetrators were charged with arson against a place of worship.

Prior to 2006, national regulations made it difficult to construct a church. This is related to the fact that there was not a healthy relationship between the St. Albertus Church and the community. According to Christina, at the time the church only communicated with one figure, Haji Toha (not his real name)

who might not have properly represented the local community. In addition, the church did not establish effective cooperation with the developer, which also delayed the process of obtaining a permit from the government.

When the church was attacked on 17 December 2009, state agencies, particularly the police, showed some ambivalence. On the one hand, they followed through relatively quickly, with the police chiefs from the regional and local police stations and several other officials from the Armed Forces and the Police visiting the location the morning after the attack to monitor the situation and ensure it was secure. On the other hand, security agencies appeared reluctant to pursue the incident further.

As to state regulations, the church committee was committed to not holding activities on the land they owned until they received a permit. To obtain the permit, however, the church had to do more than was required by the Joint Ministerial Regulations. The church obtained an Environmental Impact Analysis, traffic permits, safety permits and several other permits not explicitly required in the regulation. Christina herself acknowledged that the church did not want any trouble and thought it better to be prepared.

In addition, St. Albertus also learnt from the experience of St. Clara, which is still unable to construct a church building. The first stone of the St. Clara church was laid by the deputy Mayor Mochtar Mohammad before a permit was officially obtained. This enraged the church's opponents. As a result, they protested against St. Clara and stopped the construction. Learning from this, the St. Albertus construction committee refrained from taking any action at all before their permit was issued.

Although in the initial stages of its construction there was some resistance from the developer and the local community towards the church, the committee under Christina was able to establish good relationships with both parties. A turning point

in the relationship with the developer was the church's willingness to move locations. Previously, the committee had bought land on Block O of the Harapan Indah Housing Complex. Discussions with the developer revealed that it was not possible to build a church there. According to the developer's master plan, the area was not for social facilities. This caused internal tension over whether to find a new location or defend the land they had already bought. Christina decided that the church must move because staying there would make it difficult to develop a good relationship with the developer.

In addition to moving, Christina also determined that she, as head of the committee, was the only one allowed to establish a relationship with the developer. She did so to minimise the confusion that comes out of communication without any centralised coordination. This had plagued the previous committee. This approach was successful. In fact, the construction committee acknowledged, and Wahono, the head of RW 09, further confirmed, that it was the developer who approached the community.

The church committee claimed that they refrained from giving out money. Communication was established not through money but by holding collective activities. The committee often held events in sports centres or restaurants with government officials, police and community leaders. According to Christina, a *kiai* (a Muslim teacher or scholar) and elder in the community said, "I'm grateful. All my life I've never eaten in this cafe, even though this land belonged to our ancestors."

The provision of financial support is another important aspect. As mentioned above, the church said they avoided using money as a form of persuasion. An interview with the head of RW 09, however, suggested that when the church was collecting signatures of support from the RT, the developer paid those who gave their support. Wahono admitted that the developer

gave money, built footpaths and installed streetlights on the road to Kampung Tanah Apit. The Research Team did not confirm with the developer whether the money originated from his own pockets or from the church.

In addition to approaching local residents at the beginning of the construction, the church committee also came up with the policy of entrusting management of parking to local residents, many of whom are FBR members. The labourers who worked on the church construction and the security force were also local residents. These arrangements were seen as a fitting contribution to the local community.

Although she denies being the most instrumental figure in the construction process, Christina Rantena has a unique position. She is a First Admiral in the Indonesian Navy and a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) in the TNI-Police faction from 1997 to 2004. During that time she lived in Kalibata, in the DPR complex. In 2001, Christina bought a house in Permata Harapan Baru. In January 2005, she moved into the house. Upon hearing of her relocation, the Catholic community visited her and offered her the position as head of the Church Construction Committee. The offer was reinforced by a request from Father Gaby. Christina is now a senior advisor to the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs in the Department of Ideology and the Constitution.

The significance of Christina's rank was apparent when the church was attacked. State agencies responded relatively quickly and with care. Several officers from the police headquarters contacted her personally. Although Christina acknowledges that her senior title helped both her and the church committee to establish good contacts with government officials, she continues to emphasise the primacy of maintaining good relations with the community.

The experience of the St. Albertus Church reveals a num-

ber of important elements in establishing a church: (1) establish good communication and relationships with the local community, especially with key leaders both before and after the church is constructed; (2) establish a good working relationship with the developer if the church is in a housing complex, in order to facilitate communication with local residents; (3) resolve and obtain all permits and conditions before beginning any construction activities; (4) approach and establish good relations with the government and local leaders; and (5) charisma and leadership by the church committee is crucial.

Nehemia Javanese Protestant Church

The Javanese Protestant Church (GKJ) of Nehemia, Pondok Indah, is located on Pasar Jumat Road, Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta. It is close to the Lebak Bulus Fire Station in South Jakarta, and is opposite the Lebak Bulus Stadium, beside the Lebak Bulus Bus Terminal.

The church bought the land, and then obtained a permit on 12 December 1983. Construction of the was completed on 6 November 1985, with the church community and its supporters working together to build a modern church. It can hold 1120 people, was built on 4567 m² of land and cost IDR 350 million.

Nehemia GKJ began as a group from the Jakarta GKJ congregation (previously known as Rawamangun GKJ) who lived in Kebayoran, South Jakarta. They called themselves the "Kebayoran Group". In light of the fact that the church was built in Pondok Indah, which is far from Kebayoran, they changed their name from Kebayoran GKJ to the Pondok Indah Nehemia GKJ.

Nehemia GKJ has three pastors: Pastor Lucindo is the head, supported by Senior Pastors Agus Hendratmo and Samuel Bambang Haryanto. The Nehemia GKJ congregation is currently 3,500 strong, with members coming from seven areas, primarily Tebet, Pasar Minggu, Ciputat, Permata Hijau and Ke-

bayoran Baru. The majority, about 75%, are Javanese. The rest represent a variety of ethnicities, including Batak, Ambonese and Manadonese. Most are civil servants, and many of the others are private employees or are self-employed. This suggests that they are middle to upper-class.

Since 1 January 1999, Nehemia GKJ has owned a multi-purpose building next to the church. The building is about 1055 m² (ground floor and second story) and stands on 4980 m² of land.

As mentioned, Kebayoran or Nehemia GKJ was initially part of the Jakarta GKJ. On 6 November 1966, it established a church on Persahabatan Street, Rawamangun, East Jakarta. The Kebayoran group had been around since 1953. At the time, the Kebayoran congregation consisted of only about 20 people. For services they used a classroom at the State Senior High School (SMAN) 6 in Kebayoran (Soediono 1985).

In 1955, services were moved to the Graphics School on Melawai Street (now Melawai Plaza) with the congregation increasing in size to about 100 people. In 1961, the Kebayoran congregation moved its services again to the Kebayoran GKI Church at 1/51 Panglima Polim Street. By 1966, 400 people were attending services (Soediono 1985).

Its establishment coinciding with the development of Kebayoran, the Jakarta GKJ congregation in Kebayoran continued to grow. By 1970, it was estimated to have 850 people. Eventually, in 1971, the Kebayoran group officially became the Javanese Protestant Church in Kebayoran, under Pastor Roesman Moel-jodwiatmoko. As it developed, Kebayoran GKJ was divided into 13 regions, spread across South Jakarta, later increasing to 16 regions, including Depok and Tangerang. At the beginning of its development Kebayoran GKJ had 992 members (Soediono 1985).

On 1 June 1972, Kebayoran GKJ established the Nehemia Church Construction Foundation, which was responsible for

establishing a Javanese Protestant Church in Kebayoran. In 1973, an application for land for the church was submitted to the Jakarta government, asking the government release land to the church (Soediono 1985). In 1974, the Nehemia Foundation submitted a request to the Pondok Indah project for a piece of land. PT Metropolitan Kencana, the real-estate developer for Pondok Indah, said it might be possible to incorporate the church into land allocated for education and cultural facilities.

In October 1976, the Nehemia Foundation asked the Jakarta Advisory Body for Places of Worship to facilitate the administrative process concerning the land on which the church would be built. The Jakarta Department of City Planning had already given the church alternative locations in Pasar Minggu, Cilandak and near Pakubuwono Street. The Department of City Planning later withdrew these options, however.

At the end of 1976, a location near the IKPN Bintaro complex in Pondok Pinang was found. The government quickly cancelled that option, because the land was to be used for another building. In 1977, the Governor of Jakarta instructed the Mayor of South Jakarta and the South Jakarta Sub Department of City Planning to find a replacement location. In February 1978, the government eventually found a place opposite the Lebak Bulus Stadium and next to the Fire Station (where the church currently stands).

This location was ideal because it had once been a rubber plantation and was far from residential areas. After two years, however, the mayor had still not issued a letter to allow the church to begin construction. On 22 December 1980, a meeting between Nehemia GKJ and the Mayor of South Jakarta was held in which the mayor emphasised that in principle he agreed with the plan to construct a church at that location, but asked that the construction be delayed until after the 1982 general election (Soediono 1985).

On 10 November 1982, the managers of the Nehemia Foundation met with the Mayor of South Jakarta and asked for an official statement allocating the land in Lebak Bulus for use by Kebayoran GKJ. The mayor asked the managers to submit an official request to the Governor of Jakarta, the chairperson of the Jakarta Advisory Team for the Construction of Places of Worship and Places for Religious Activities and the head of the Mental and Spiritual Bureau of Jakarta. On 7 March 1983, the Governor of Jakarta finally issued a decree that asked PT Metropolitan Kencana to prepare the location near the Lebak Bulus Fire Station in South Jakarta for the construction of Kebayoran GKJ. The decree took into consideration the fact that it was a public building and that the surrounding area was not crowded.

The land spans about 4200 m². As mentioned, it was previously a rubber plantation and was now uninhabited. On 6 June 1983, the documents for sale of the land were signed and the Nehemia Foundation paid the deposit to PT. Metropolitan Kencana. After nearly 12 years, the Nehemia Foundation had finally obtained land on which to build a church. Construction did not begin until the end of 1984, and was later completed on 6 November 1985. From then on, Sunday sermons were moved to the new Kebayoran GKJ building. On 29 November 1985, the Deputy Governor of Jakarta for Social Welfare inaugurated it.

Nehemia GKJ is one church in Jakarta that experienced difficulty establishing a church during the New Order. The Nehemia GKJ management tried many different ways to obtain permission to build a church, including meeting officials such as the Governor of Jakarta but for a decade these efforts produced no results.

As an “offshoot” of Rawamangun GKJ, Nehemia GKJ had to move the location of its services several times until it was finally able to use the Kebayoran GKI building on Panglima Po-

lim Street in 1961. Pastor Samuel explained, "Because it was difficult to obtain a permit, we used the Kebayoran GKI building on Panglima Polim Street. The one building was used by two different churches, GKI and GKJ."

According to the official records of Nehemia GKJ, the permit from the Department of City Planning and the Mayor took a long time to procure because the church itself had trouble determining a location for construction. Pastor Samuel acknowledged that difficulty in obtaining a permit from the government was generally related to allotment of a site, "The Regional Government has a particular plan for any one region with specific allotments. We can understand these kinds of reasons."

When they obtained the land in Lebak Bulus, the church continued to struggle for a permit. According to Pastor Samuel, the church believed the location in Lebak Bulus to be empty land, which had once been a rubber plantation. There were naturally no complaints because there were no houses nearby, and thus there was no reason for the government to deny a permit. Despite this, the permit was only issued after a long and bureaucratic process.

Pastor Samuel acknowledged the role of certain political leaders in facilitating the issue of the construction permit. He said, "Honestly, there was Pak Radius Prawiro, he's a Javanese, his parents are GKJ like us, though he himself is a GKI member. He helped us out and backed us up behind the scenes." According to Pastor Samuel, one reason the government was reluctant to issue a permit was because the church had not obtained support from the local residents as required in the Joint Ministerial Regulations.

In reality, the requirement to obtain support from local residents did not apply to the Lebak Bulus location because the land had been a plantation and was far from any residential area. Local opposition could not be used as a reason for not grant-

ing the Nehemia GKJ a permit. The only village nearby was a housing complex for employees of the Department of Public Works and the church has had no problems with the residents of that compound. Their relationship has remained cordial, as acknowledged by Bangun Waspodo, the head of RW 10.

When the church was ready to begin construction there were some protests. No one knew where the perpetrators had come from and, according to Pastor Samuel they were not from the Public Works housing complex. The Regional Military Command quickly dispersed them: during the New Order era the military was indeed efficient at mitigating conflict, especially in relation to the construction of places of worship.

From 1985 onwards, Nehemia GKJ faced no opposition, protests or demonstrations from local residents or social organisations. This, according to Pastor Samuel, is because it was able to establish good relations with the local community. For instance, Nehemia GKJ established the Community Health Centre, which has benefited Muslims and the less fortunate. Nehemia GKJ also provides free cataract operations. Pastor Samuel explains, "We're open, we do not discriminate based on ethnicity or religion. The only condition is that patients are poor. And we do not evangelise." In addition, to address the socio-economic sector, every Christmas and Lebaran the church runs a cheap market that sells basic ingredients at reduced prices.

This case study suggests several general patterns relevant to this second category. The first reveals the need for the state to urgently resolve issues faced by churches. In each case, the problems these churches faced were resolved because of, or after, the state showed its support. This support may have been in the form of a decisive security agencies, as in the St Mikael and Terang Hidup GKI cases, or it may have been support from the government bureaucracy, as in the Cathedral and Nehemia GKJ cases.

State support clearly influences social factors, the second pattern discernable in this category. These churches established good relationships with their local communities, although that does not mean that local residents supported the church 100%. It is possible that some continued to have issues with the church but were not brave enough to speak up because of the church's close relationship with the majority of local residents and the firm stance of the government. In some cases, as in the Terang Hidup GKI case, a close relationship between the two parties is not necessarily always visible, because there was, in this instance, resistance from the community association unit or RW. This slightly distant relationship did not cause problems for the church because the police were supportive. State support, however, does not automatically result in support from local residents (or vice versa). The resolution of issues in this category was possible because the churches obtained support from both the government and local residents, and did not rely solely on one or the other.

Another matter worth noting is that there was no demographic pattern common to the cases studied in this category. Examining the demographics of the church congregations and the local communities in each case shows that it is difficult to find evidence that they influenced the church disputes. For example, the demographic profile of Seroja GKP was different to that of Terang Hidup GKI (the former is surrounded by Seroja veterans and the latter is a case of ethnic Chinese living in the midst of Betawi, Javanese and Makassarese local residents), yet both were disputed by local residents and both were later resolved.

In terms of politics, these cases also suggest a connection between church disputes and political issues. Generally speaking, the resolution of disputes over church construction was a result of supportive state officials and good relations with local resi-

dents. There was little sign that politicisation compounded the disputes in this second category.

Undisputed Churches, Now Disputed

Our third category, which consists of churches that were initially undisputed but have since become problematic, includes case studies of three churches: St. Bernadet Catholic Church in Ciledug; Taman Yasmin GKI in Bogor; and Cinere HKBP in Depok. The first church's dispute overlaps with the Sang Timur case. For 12 years, this church was not disputed and was allowed by the subdistrict to hold sermons in the Sang Timur School complex. This ended in 2004, following protests. Yasmin GKI and Cinere HKBP, however, faced another issue: both obtained permits but were then banned from conducting religious activities by their respective regional heads. Among the reasons why we selected these churches for study was the common fact that in each case their dispute with locals received wide media coverage and attracted public attention.

St. Bernadet Catholic Church

St. Bernadet is a parish in Tangerang city. Its roots can be traced back to 1987. At the time, Pastor S. Bintaro, SJ, who was the pastor of the Santa Maria Parish in Tangerang, suggested that a new parish be established. It was proposed that the new St. Bernadet Parish cover congregants in Karawaci, Serpong, Tanjung Kait and Ciledug. The parish activities were initially held at No. 29 Barata Raya Street, the pastor's home.

In December 1989, the Archdiocese of Jakarta bought 5129 m² of land between the Treasury Complex and the Barata Complex. They planned to build the Sang Timur School and a church on the land. The Archdiocese of Jakarta entrusted PT Tripatono Sri to design the architectural drawings and plans. As the parish congregation continued to increase in size, the need to con-

struct a new church became a pressing issue. When it was first established, there were about 2,000 members at St Bernadet. This increased to 5,400 in 1995, 8,000 in 2001, and 9,000 in 2005. By 2009, numbers had reached 12,000 in 2009. The increase was not only due to an increase in reproduction among members of the congregation but also a greater capacity to travel longer distances. There were very few new members from conversions, although there were some. The reason for this low rate of conversion to Catholicism is that to become Catholic requires time and certain conditions must be met that are not always easy to fulfil.

The congregants are middle-class with occupations ranging from teaching to private sector employment, civil service and trading. The congregation is also ethnically diverse. The majority are migrants. In this respect the parish congregation cannot be described as original inhabitants of the area, as they are not ethnic Betawi. Most have nonetheless lived in Ciledug for quite some time.

When it was first established, St. Bernadet rented three places to hold sermons: (1) the Archives Building of the Ciledug Finance Housing Complex (owned by the Ministry of Finance); (2) the Loka Genta Bakti Hall of the Ciledug Indah housing complex (an ecumenical facility); and (3) the Tinggi Building of the Ciledug Police Dormitory (owned by the Indonesian National Police). After purchasing land in December 1989, the Archbishop of Jakarta, Leo Soekoto SJ, suggested that the parish immediately build a centre for religious activities for the Catholic community, in the form of a temporary church.

In April 1990, the Church Construction Committee was formed and the church applied for a permit. The regional government rejected the application. The church applied for another permit, this time for a multi-purpose building. The permit was rejected again, with the reason given that the building

would be used as a church. As a solution, the church applied for a permit to build a temporary school building in the name of the Sang Timur Foundation. Application for the permit was based on the consideration that the same building could be used as a church and a school until the school building could be constructed in accordance with the master plan. The regional government granted the permit with the Decree of the Regent of Tangerang No. 642.2/ 409-PERK/1990. Traffic for the construction would use the road through the Finance Department Complex, so the committee also obtained the approval of local residents and agreed that the church would be responsible if the construction trucks damaged the road.

Despite having obtained the approval of local residents, the construction was stopped. Acting on behalf of local residents, the managers of the Finance Department Complex closed the road. The Department for Public Works in Tangerang also ordered construction to stop by a letter dated 19 September 1990. The reason stated was that the building resembled a church. The church and the diocese then approached the relevant parties, including JB. Sumarlin, then Minister for Finance. In April 1991, the construction of the temporary school building resumed and continued until the building was complete.

At the beginning of 1992, the committee submitted an application to the subdistrict head of Karang Tengah to use the building as a place of worship on Sundays and religious holidays. The committee then submitted a similar application to the Regent [Bupati] of Tangerang. On July 1992, the subdistrict head of Karang Tengah issued recommendation number 192/Pem/VII/1992 on the use of the Sang Timur Temporary School Building for religious activities. On the basis of this recommendation the committee used the building as the centre for worship by members of the St. Bernadet Parish.

On 14 November 2003, the committee finally obtained a per-

mit for a multi-purpose building to be built at the Sang Timur School location. Like the construction process for the temporary school, the committee first sought permission from the residents of the Finance Department Complex for use of their road. The construction was halted when some local residents protested. To resolve the issue the church bought additional land so that the church and the Sang Timur School had their own access road, reducing the effect on the local community.

While the church was finalising the purchase of the extra land and continuing mediation, the Tangerang Ministry of Religious Affairs issued Letter Number Kd.258.5/BA.00/248/2004 dated 29 July 2004. The letter was addressed to the Sang Timur School Principal and declared that the school building should not be used as a place of worship. In addition, the subdistrict head of Karang Tengah also revoked the permit issued in 1992 for the use of the temporary school building as a place of worship. On the basis of the letter from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a number of people protested against the construction of the multi-purpose building. The protest reached its peak when the road to the Sang Timur School was sealed off. In previous protests, opponents of the church had also interrupted sermons and forced congregants to leave.

St. Bernadet had to recommence the construction process from scratch. After the protests and the road closure, the congregation was forced to worship at home. For religious holidays, the church had no option but to rent out a building because of the large number of congregants attending. The church changed the construction location to land that they bought in Sudimara Pinang subdistrict in 2001. The church is currently in the process of obtaining a permit for this new location.

In the case of St. Bernadet in Ciledug the state was initially supportive of the use of the multi-purpose Sang Timur School building for religious activities. This is clear from the recom-

mendation issued by the Karang Tengah subdistrict. In 2004, however, a different subdistrict head revoked the permit. In addition to revoking the permit, the Tangerang Ministry of Religious Affairs banned the use of the Sang Timur building for Catholic religious activities. The church construction permits that had initially been applied for in the 1990s had also been rejected several times.

After 1992, the church construction committee had tried to obtain a permit but their applications never received a response from the government until the road to the Sang Timur complex was closed off. Even when the committee tried to obtain a new permit for a church elsewhere, they received no response from the regional government. The police who were present when the gate to the Sang Timur Complex was walled up could do very little and were unable to act as mediators. The government paid very little attention to this incident, which occurred one year into the new Tangerang Mayor's term.

In 2009, the committee changed the location for construction. At the time, Wahidin Halim had been re-elected as Mayor. He won in a landslide victory with 80% of the vote. Several sources said that when the parish asked for help, Wahidin Halim ignored their request, saying that his re-election was not due to Catholic support. It did not matter to him whether the Catholic community voted for him or not. This suggests that responses to applications for the construction of places of worship can often be influenced by the extent to which a regional head needs the support of non-Muslim communities.

State and government ambivalence was also apparent when in 2004 the Tangerang government mediated the purchase of land by the church from local residents to be used as a road. As soon as the church had purchased the land, the government withdrew its assistance and left the church to face its problems alone.

The construction of St. Bernadet Church also ran into difficulties when it confronted by the community. The primary trigger was access to the Sang Timur Foundation, which required the use of the Finance Department Complex's road. According to *Tempo*,⁵ the Sang Timur location and the use of the road passing through the Finance Department Complex had been suggested by the former Minister for Finance, JB. Sumarlin, before school construction had been approved. Every Sunday, dozens of Catholics drive their cars to attend Mass using this road. It was this issue that triggered several other incidents, including accusations of 'Christianisation' and apostasy (by Muslims converting to Christianity) because it was suspected that St. Bernadet would be the largest church in Asia. Opposition continued even after the church chose to buy land for its own road, at the cost of IDR 1 billion.

In fact, St. Bernadet's activities have been of benefit to the surrounding community. As well as trading, the Finance Department Complex provides a special transport service within the complex. When the road was still open, Catholics congregants and students were the main passengers using the service. Closure of the Sang Timur road caused a financial loss to local residents. They have not spoken of their financial loss, for fear of sounding supportive of the church and contradicting those who wish to see it closed.

The opponents of St. Bernadet came from the Karang Tengah Islamic Youth Front. They erected a number of banners and demonstrated on 15 and 28 August 2004 in opposition to the existence of Sang Timur and the plan to build the St. Bernadet multi-purpose building. On 3 October 2004, the Islamic Youth Front interrupted 7:00am Mass led by Pastor Derikson, forcing

⁵ "Bara di atas Nama Tuhan," *Tempo.com*, <<http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2004/11/15/AG/mbm.20041115.AG92983.id.html>> (accessed 22 December 2010).

it to end early. According to one church manager, church representatives were forced to write a declaration that they would stop holding religious activities in the building. They signed the declaration under pressure from the Islamic Youth Front. Their opponents then used the letter as a basis to close the Sang Timur road, which they claimed belonged to local residents who had not agreed that the church could use it.

This was the peak of the demonstrations against the church. The committee had tried as hard as it could to discuss the issues and clarify the accusations of Christianisation. They never received a response from those objecting to the church, however. According to one member of the church construction committee, very few of their opponents were local residents. Most were from outside the region, and some were FPI members. The residents of the Finance Department complex preferred just to observe, although undeniably some also objected to the church's presence.

The St. Bernadet Parish, which had held sermons for 12 years in the Sang Timur School's multi-purpose building, had to find, and move to, a new location. The church committee chose this option because of the obstacles they faced from state regulations and social factors. The difficulties concerning state regulations included the refusal to grant a construction permit; revocation of the Karang Tengah subdistrict head's permit; the letter from the Ministry of Religious Affairs which banned religious activities; and security officials failing to deal firmly with the anarchy that took place in 2004.

There were also social obstacles raised by opposing parties, many of whom were from outside Karang Tengah. They mobilised people based on the discontent of local residents from the Finance Department complex regarding the access road to the Sang Timur School. Although the church had tried to resolve the problem by purchasing land, opposition continued until a

barrier was erected, closing off the road.

Yasmin Indonesian Protestant Church

The Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) of Taman Yasmin in Bogor was established as part of the expansion of Bogor GKI. Planning for construction of Yasmin GKI began in 2001. The idea grew out of the inability of the Bogor GKI building to accommodate all members, as well as insufficient parking that caused traffic congestion. This interrupted transportation for local residents, including public transport services. In light of this, the Bogor GKI management formed a new Church Construction Committee in the Taman Yasmin Housing complex in Curug Mekar, Bogor, West Java.

The Taman Yasmin GKI priests were still based at Bogor GKI. The land where the Taman Yasmin GKI was proposed to be built was 1720 m² and was held in the name of Sumantoro, Chair of the Bogor GKI Congregation Council. For Bogor GKI, the Taman Yasmin complex was a strategic location. The Taman Yasmin GKI has about 300 members from 100 families, from Curug Mekar and surrounding areas.

Taman Yasmin is a new and developing housing complex. The residents are generally middle to upper-class and come from various regions throughout Indonesia. One side of the Taman Yasmin complex borders a local village. The village is populated by original inhabitants of the area, although some migrants live there as well.

Initially, PT Inti Inovaco, the developer of the Taman Yasmin complex, said that the social and public facilities for the construction of a church in the Taman Yasmin complex were not available. The church was not built in the first location, in Sector 3, because of debate over which Christian denomination had the right to build the church. A small mosque, or *musholla*, was built there instead. Similarly with the second location, Sec-

tor 5, what was initially to be a church was later changed into a mosque. GKI was offered two plots of land in the complex but the committee chose only to buy a single 1720 m² plot, due to financial considerations. The money for the purchase of the land came from contributions from the church congregation and from Central GKI. PT. Inti Inovaco gave the church a year to pay for the land.

After purchase of the land, the construction committee began informing local residents of their plans in 2002, in order to fulfil the conditions for a permit to construct the church. Committee members went from house to house approaching, explaining and seeking signatures from local residents as an indication that they had “no objection to the church construction”. In 2003, the committee held an initial event to inform the Curug Mekar youth. 100 people attended the meeting, and the youths present said that they had no objections. This was on the condition that when the GKI church was completed, it would also be available for use by local residents of other denominations who had previously held informal services in their houses.

The process of informing and asking the permission of local residents was stopped for a number of reasons. In 2006, several regional officials were approached and the ‘socialisation’ process started again. Two events were held. The first, held on 12 January 2006, was especially for local residents who lived outside the Taman Yasmin Complex. The second, on 15 January 2006, was specifically for local residents who lived in the complex near the land on which the church was to be built. The committee took the minutes of these two meetings to the Department for National Unity. This Department then invited the district head, the subdistrict head, the regional military commander, the regional police chief, the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Church Construction Committee. The meeting was intended to ensure that there were no problems

with the planned construction. At the time, the Department of National Unity acknowledged that the application for the permit to construct the place of worship had been made according to the procedures. Not long afterwards, the Mayor issued his recommendation.

To obtain a permit, the committee had to fulfil a range of other conditions, including obtaining recommendations from the Department of Environmental Management, the Department of Land Management, the Department of Traffic, the Department of City Planning and Landscaping and the Department of Highways. After obtaining recommendations from the relevant parties, on 13 July 2006, Taman Yasmin GKI received its permit. On 19 August 2006, the committee invited the relevant authorities to lay the first stone. The event was attended by the subdistrict head, the district head, the regional military commander, the regional police chief, the head of the Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, an officer from the Christian Community Guidance division of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Provincial Assistant and various community leaders.

For a number of reasons that remain unclear, Taman Yasmin GKI's permit was suspended by the Bogor government on 14 February 2008. This meant that the church was not allowed to continue construction and the congregation was not allowed to use the church for religious activities. The suspension is still in place, even though the church has since successfully appealed to the Bandung Administrative Court (Crouch, 2010).

In reality, suspension of the permit was initiated by the Cugur Mekar subdistrict head. At the end of 2006, he requested that the church construction be halted for a number of reasons. First, the church was being built prior to the arrival of George W. Bush and it was feared that it would become a target for those parties who disliked Bush. Second, at the time Aa' Gym⁶

⁶ Yan Gymnastiar, more commonly known as Aa' Gym, is a Muslim preacher,

was holding a public prayer gathering for Muslims (*tabligh akbar*) and it was feared that the church would be targeted by the crowds. Taking these matters into consideration, the committee obeyed the request and delayed construction of their church.

After these two events had passed, the committee resumed construction. It was then that opposing groups began to emerge. They not only protested but also pressured the Bogor government to revoke the church's construction permit. Bowing to this pressure, the Bogor government suspended the church permit on 14 February 2008. The committee then approached the mayor and questioned the decision. According to one Yasmin GKI committee member, the government representative argued that the suspension was put in place in order to appease the masses. They argued that the suspension was only temporary and would eventually be removed.

Taman Yasmin GKI took legal action through the Bandung Administrative Court, suing the Bogor government. The court decision No. 41/G/2008/PTUN-BDG, September 2008, stated "On the Exception: Rejects the exception of the Accused (the government). On the Principles of Dispute: (1) Rules in favour of the Plaintiff (GKI) in all matters; (2) Revokes the Suspension on the Construction Permit; (3) Orders the Accused (the government) to revoke the Suspension on the Construction Permit; and (4) Requires the Accused to pay the court fees".

The Bogor government then appealed to the Jakarta High Administrative Court but that court ruled as follows: "Verdict: upholds the decision of the Bandung Administrative Court Number 41/G/2008/PTUN.BDG." As a result the Bogor gov-

singer and author who rose to fame primarily for a style of preaching that combines theatrics with practical Islamic teachings generally applicable to everyday life, ranging from issues of self control to one's conscience, tolerance and sincerity. This is in contrast to conventional preaching, which centres on the virtues of prayer, fasting and the splendour of heaven.

ernment was required to withdraw its suspension of the construction permit. The government continued to uphold the suspension, however, and tried to appeal again in September 2008. In response, the Bandung Administrative Court issued a letter dated 11 June 2009 No. W2.TUN2/696/HK.06/VI/2009, which stated that because the object of the lawsuit (the suspension of the permit) was only valid in a restricted administrative region the “case does not fulfil the formal requirements to be filed as an appeal ... as such it will not be accepted.” The ruling on the case was “final and binding”. The government, however, has chosen to simply ignore the court’s ruling and has kept the church sealed.

The police have not supported the court decision either. Under the pretext of protecting the church from members of Forkami, a forum formed to oppose the church, the police tightened security during religious activities. In addition to assigning more personnel, police also intentionally parked their vehicles on the side of the road where sermons were held. As a result the congregation had to listen to sermons amidst the police cars. On one occasion, the Bogor police chief also approached the podium and asked the congregation to stop the sermon.

Another disappointment came when police allowed the church to be vandalised and the legal advisor to the church, H. Ujang Sujai of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU),⁷ to be assaulted. Ironically, the police charged one of the church members who had been actively struggling to defend the church. As a result of these two incidents, the National Commission for Human Rights wrote to the Bogor Police Station and Police Headquarters on 9 February 2010. The first letter to the Bogor Police Chief was

⁷ Nadhlatul Ulama is the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. It was established in 1926 with a traditionalist Sunni orientation in response to the modernist Muhammadiyah organisation. Membership is estimated at 40 million.

titled "Complaint against Human Rights Violations". The letter to the National Police Chief was titled "Request for Professional Police Behaviour".

The indifference of the police was also apparent when they did not follow up on the letter, written by the police themselves, dated 30 May 2010. The letter (number SPH2HP/522/V/2009/Sat Reskrim re: Notification of Investigation Results (SPH2HP)) addressed the church's report of 22 April 2010 on an incident in which the GKI church gate was padlocked. The police letter stated "investigations revealed sufficient evidence that a crime had been committed." This was despite the fact that the criminal act at issue is, in fact, stipulated in Article 175 of the Criminal Code.⁸ The Bogor municipal police were the suspected perpetrator. On 12 April 2010, Yasmin GKI intended to hold a church service on the church land. An announcement was made to all GKI members around Taman Yasmin. Without warning, on 11 April 2010, the day before the service, Satpol PP padlocked the gate. The service had to be held on the side of the street in front of the church. Instead of pursuing the investigation, the police sided with the local government and took no further action.

On another occasion the Taman Yasmin GKI committee had a confrontation with Satpol PP. At the time, Satpol PP members were caught stealing iron owned by the church in the middle of the night. They argued that they did so because the construction was not allowed to continue due to the suspended permit. The next day the committee visited the Bogor Satpol PP office to seek an explanation for the theft of the iron.

Political factors further complicated the issue. On 11 March

⁸ Article 175 of the Criminal Code guarantees the right to freedom to worship according to one's religious convictions. It states that anyone found guilty of impeding by force an authorised public religious gathering, or burial ceremony, faces a maximum sentence of one year and four months imprisonment.

2010, Satpol PP locked the GKI fence under orders from the deputy Mayor, Ahmad Ruhiyat, who is also a cadre of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKS involvement was also evident from the very beginning of the mobilisation of the masses. PKS cadres distributed anti-church pamphlets in mosques and *mushollahs* in Curug Mekar. The opposition movement then adopted the name Forkami, with the approval of the deputy Mayor of Bogor.

The Taman Yasmin GKI dispute is also complex at the social level. During the process of community consultation, Iwan (not his real name), who lives in Sector 3 of the Taman Yasmin Complex, was opposed to the planned church construction. In 2004, Iwan became head of the neighbourhood association unit or RT. When the church committee asked Iwan to confirm more than 200 signatures of support, he refused to do so. This made it impossible to continue with the application for a permit. In 2006, during the second community consultation process, Iwan declared that according to his faith, he was able to express neither acceptance of the church nor objection to it. He said he had no problems if there was a church in his region, so long as it had government permission.

In addition to Iwan, during the second consultation one of the 70 people in attendance spoke openly of his opposition. Rahman (not his real name) was a PKS cadre. He argued that the church was opposite the mosque that he ran in Curug Mekar. In reality, the church and mosque are not opposite one another. In fact they are quite some distance apart.

In 2008, when the construction committee was ready to begin laying the church foundations, the community began to protest. Bonar (not his real name), a migrant from Medan who claims to be an Afghanistan veteran and lives in Taman Yasmin, mobilised the protestors. The protestors demanded a stop to the construction. They threatened to burn the cement trucks and

equipment used to lay the foundations. The construction was eventually stopped.

The committee intended to recommence construction because they already had all the materials. This time, the committee met with representatives from the district and subdistrict to discuss how to prevent local residents from taking violent action. During the meeting, the church's opponents suddenly arrived and forced those from the subdistrict government agencies and H. Ujang to leave. They even hit H. Ujang several times.

In January 2010, the construction recommenced, with the church employed a Madurese contractor. Four days after construction had begun a pamphlet signed by Bonar was distributed, urging local residents to oppose the church. Eventually the committee stopped work again, in order to prevent further conflict. Although the police said they would guarantee the security of the church, the crowd destroyed the church fence without warning and the police did not respond.

After this incident the crowd mobilised by Bonar adopted the name Forkami (*Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia*, Forum for the Indonesian Muslim Community). Its agenda was to urge the mayor to revoke the Taman Yasmin GKI permit. Although Forkami is run by local residents of Curug Mekar subdistrict, it was initiated by elements from outside of the region. In fact, according to the local RW, people from Jasinga, South Bogor, were involved in protests.

According to an official from RW 08, Forkami was also of concern to the community, particularly when it pressured local residents to oppose to the church. One local resident complained to the RW that he was unable to refuse when five Forkami members came and demanded his signature. In addition, Forkami tried to force a mother to support Forkami and provide a copy of her National ID card. At the time, her oldest son came to her defence and refused to agree to their request. Fork-

ami kept insisting and they argued. The next day, the woman's husband, an Army officer, visited Forkami headquarters and pulled out his pistol. Fortunately the situation was finally resolved without violence.

According to one RW officer in Curug Mekar, several commercial buildings on Ring Road were also pressured by local residents, including Bonar. For instance, Hermina Hospital for Women and Children and Giant Supermarket were both sites of protest. The issue was resolved when relatives of the protestors were given jobs at Hermina and Giant [major retail outlets]. Opposition aside, however, there were many local residents who supported Yasmin GKI. In addition to their signatures and copies of their National ID cards, support came in other forms. Aki Pohman, a Muslim retiree, approached the subdistrict head to attest to the need for the church to be constructed. Aki Pohman also assisted when the committee decided to build a fence around the Yasmin GKI property.

The discussion above shows there were a number of aspects concerning state regulations that impeded the church construction. The first was the Mayor's suspension of the Taman Yasmin place of worship permit. This was followed by the decision of the deputy Mayor to allow the Satpol PP to lock the church gate. Police indecision was the third obstacle, as it allowed the church opponents to act as they pleased.

The primary obstacle in terms of social factors came from the Forkami organisation and leaders like Bonar and Rahman, who mobilised local residents against the church. The church itself was able to obtain support from a number of local groups. The indecisiveness of the security agencies meant, however, that the church's opponents were able to speak louder than its supporters.

Pangkalan Jati HKBP

Pangkalan Jati Batak Christian Protestant Church (HKBP) in Cinere was an extension of South Jakarta HKBP. The idea to establish a branch in Cinere was proposed in 1980. At the time, the HKBP congregation consisted of 12 families. They temporarily held sermons in the house of one of their members, Bella Shafira. After eight months, sermons were moved to the Ecumenical Church in the Navy complex in Pangkalan Jati.

With the move to Cinere came an inevitable increase in the number of Bataks living in Cinere. This development saw the Cinere HKBP congregation expand. By the 1990s, it had 100 families and about 400 members. During this time the Java-Kalimantan district of the Batak Christian Protestant Church bought 5000 m² of land in Cinere. From the date of purchase, the land was always intended for use as the site of a church.

Today, the Cinere HKBP consists of 300 families or 1,100 people. Thirty years after its establishment the congregation continues to worship in the Navy Ecumenical Church. Cinere HKBP has one priest and several board members. The board members are replaced every two years. HKBP members are Batak migrants, residing in Cinere, and are generally middle-class.

By the authority of the Java-Kalimantan district of HKBP, Cinere HKBP formed a church construction committee and a district office. In 1988, Bukit Cinere Indah took over development of the area on which the church stood from the previous developer, Sumarecon. This caused a change in the layout of the area, including changes in land allocated to social facilities and public facilities. The change also divided HKBP's land, allocating 700 m² to be used as a residential area, with the remaining 4200 m² tagged to become a road, Bandung Street.

In 1991, Cinere HKBP started to form its church construction committee. The increasing size of the congregation demanded

that Cinere HKBP have its own church building. Although there was no written regulation at the time, the committee asked local residents for their signatures of support to meet the request of the Bogor Ministry of Religious Affairs. Two people chose not to sign the declaration of “no objection” but the committee was able to gather a large number of signatures. On 13 June 1998, after waiting seven years, the construction committee was granted a permit. On the basis of the permit, which required that the construction begin within six months from the issuance of the permit, the committee immediately began laying the foundations and the stakes. Construction was brought to a halt in 1999, however, due to lack of funds.

After six months, a number of local residents started protesting in the name of the Muslim community. They protested through collective prayers or *istighosah*. At the time there was no clash because the HKBP congregation was worshipping in the Navy church. In 2000, the local protests led the deputy Mayor of Bogor to ask HKBP to stop construction. He argued that suspension of the construction would prevent any undesirable incidents and would continue until the situation became ‘conducive’ again. Although there was no clear time frame for the suspension, the committee complied with the deputy Mayor’s request.

The committee stopped the construction until 2006 and concentrated on collecting funds. In 2006, the committee was replaced. In addition to acquiring further funding, the new committee began to prepare to recommence building. The first step was taken on 4 August 2008 when the committee sent a letter to the Mayor of Depok. They received no response, so in the same month the committee decided to continue constructing the first floor. After two weeks, about 100 members of the Cinere Islamic Forum protested and forced the builders to stop. Before their protest, they had erected banners opposing the construction.

According to Betty J. Sitorus, HKBP identified the protestors as people from outside the region. The local residents who objected to the church were not present during the protest. Police were present but did nothing to stop the protestors.

Three days later, there was an incident at night. The perpetrators tore the church gate off its hinges with a chain pulled by motorbikes. A number of items were vandalised. The workers who lived in the building escaped to the river behind the site. The only person left was the cook, who could not run, and she was the only witness who could identify the perpetrators. The incident was reported to police but after two weeks they closed the case due to lack of evidence.

Two weeks later, representatives of the opposing party asked for a meeting. During the meeting two local residents spoke for the opponents. They said that the church was not allowed to be built, that builders were not allowed to work on the church and that no fence was to be erected until the deputy Mayor issued a statement to the effect that suspension of construction was revoked. The committee agreed not to continue the construction, so long as the fence was left intact because it contained all their equipment and materials.

On 28 October 2008, the opponents held collective prayers, or *istighosah*, again to oppose the church. 800 people attended from several areas. Claiming to act on behalf of the local residents, they reported to the Mayor of Depok that local residents were opposed to the church. In February 2009, the Mayor of Depok revoked the church permit. That night, the council decided to appeal to the court. In March 2009, hearing of the appeal began at the Bandung Administrative Court. In August 2009, the court ruled in favour of Cinere HKBP. Their opponents appealed. Cinere HKBP won again in the Administrative High Court. Their opponents appealed again and, on 14 July 2010, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal.

On Wednesday 15 September 2010, new committee members were elected. A week before recommencing construction, the committee sent a letter to the President, the Governor of West Java, the Mayor of Depok, the district head, the subdistrict head, Jakarta police, regional police and the local FKUB. The letter stated that the church would begin construction and asked for blessings and a guarantee of security from the authorities. As it turned out, that was the week prior to the local elections and so the construction continued unimpeded.

The Mayor then invited the church to a meeting. Present were the district head, the subdistrict head and regional and local police heads. The Mayor asked that the construction be delayed so as not to 'startle' local residents, which could lead to 'anarchy'. Cinere HKBP expressed their objection to the fact that they had been asked to suspend the construction but had no clear idea of when they could start it again. Construction has been underway from that meeting until today. At the beginning of October, banners protesting against the church were erected again. The committee ignored them because they had a legal basis for construction. In addition, the police began to be work more effectively [to protect the church site] out of fear that the Ciketing HKBP incident⁹ would be repeated in Cinere. Construction continues today.

This discussion reveals a number of obstacles from the state. The first came from the deputy Mayor of Bogor who halted the construction of the church. In 2009, when the regional administration was transferred to Depok, the Mayor of Depok, Nurmahmudi Ismail, who was influenced by PKS, revoked the permit. Although he had asked for the construction to be suspended, the Mayor of Depok did not prevent the continued con-

⁹ In August 2010, FPI attacked members of a HKBP church in Ciketing, Bekasi, injuring several people. See *The Jakarta Post*, 'FPI members attack HKBP church members in Bekasi', 8 August 2010, www.thejakartaglobe.com.

struction of the church after the court ruled in favour of Cinere HKBP. The police, on the other hand, failed to behave professionally. They did not stop the demonstrators who threatened the builders. They also failed to investigate vandalism of the church. They did, however, eventually increase security at the site. In addition to the court ruling in favour of Cinere HKBP, the Ciketing HKBP incident also forced the Depok police to pay more attention. The police continue to maintain a presence at the construction site today.

The Depok FKUB sided with the opponents of the church. They supported the Mayor of Depok when he revoked the church permit. The Protestant representative of the FKUB could not prevent this because he was a minority of one. After the court ruled in favour of Cinere HKBP, the FKUB agreed that the construction could continue.

In relation to social factors, those who opposed Cinere HKBP were not local residents. During the vandalism, the local residents who disagreed with the church construction were not present. They were only present during meetings, along with representatives from outside Cinere. As such, very few local residents were directly involved in the opposition movement. They invited outside parties to stop the construction instead. One of their strategies was to hold collective prayers or *istighosah*.

The majority of the HKBP congregants are Batak migrants who work in Jakarta and live in Depok. Their opponents were also migrants from various regions, and not local Betawi residents. In fact the local residents seemed to have no problems with the church. Cinere HKBP even asked several local residents to help secure the construction site. One of them appointed the head of the neighbourhood association unit as a security guard for the church.

Although opponents claimed to be from the Cinere FUI,

Betty identified a number of people wearing FPI clothing. It was unclear whether they were from FPI Central or the Cinere branch. Sobri Lubis, an FPI Central official, gave speeches at several *istighosah* held at the church construction site. Since the police increased security and the court ruled in favour of Cinere HKBP, there have been no visible protests. Only banners in opposition to the church have been erected, and this was done in secrecy.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the Cinere HKBP experience. First, the legal process was important as it enabled the church to retain its permit, even when the case was heard by the Administrative High Court. Government agencies, from the city government, police and FKUB to the district and subdistrict heads, accepted the court ruling. Although they did not support construction, they no longer prevented it. The police also eventually responded appropriately as a result of fears that the Ciketing HKBP incident could be repeated in Cinere.

Second, the Mayor of Depok, who was clearly influenced by PKS, actively opposed the church construction by revoking the permit. Third, suggestions that opposition to the church construction was related to urban migration and tension between local residents and the newcomers were unfounded. The opponents were not local residents but migrants from outside of Jakarta. By contrast, the head of the RT, a Betawi local, was even willing to become a church security guard. Fourth, although opponents of the church did not explicitly act in the name of FPI, there were indications that FPI was, in fact, the organisation actively opposing the church construction. Fifth, there were indications of bribery concerning the construction.

There are several similarities between our case studies of churches that were originally undisputed but which have since become contested. The first relates to the inconsistent at-

titudes of, and lack of support from, local governments. The cases studied show that the process of establishing a place of worship is not confirmed simply because the government has issued a permit. In the St. Bernadet case, the new subdistrict head revoked the permit for worship that the previous head had issued. Meanwhile, Taman Yasmin GKI and Cinere HKBP both obtained permits to construct churches, but these were then revoked after pressure from their opponents. In both these cases, the Administrative Court ruled in favour of the churches, deciding that there was no basis for cancellation of the permits.

The second factor is the involvement of groups actively opposing the church. Opponents are present in almost all disputes over the construction of churches. The difference for cases in this category is that their opponents' demands were strengthened by the indecisiveness of local government. In Bogor and Depok these opponents were one of the main reasons for the suspension of the Yasmin GKI and Cinere HKBP church permits. In Ciledug, the opponents continued to call for people to oppose the church, and in one incident were able to force congregants to leave a service and block the road without any intervention by the police.

The third similarity is timing. Protests occurred when the construction was being planned or underway. The church opponents protested against Taman Yasmin just as construction had begun. Cinere HKBP was also opposed as it was about to restart the suspended construction. In the Sang Timur case, opposition emerged when the church began building the newly-authorised multi-purpose building.

This shows that simply obtaining a permit does not guarantee there will not be problems during construction. The government, security agencies and the church committee appear to pay more attention to the initial construction processes. The Research Team believes that more research is needed to examine

this crucial point in the construction of churches, and ascertain whether problems that commonly arise at this time are a coincidence or not.

Disputed Churches, Unresolved

This final category discusses churches that have faced obstacles from the beginning that are yet to be resolved. The three churches examined here are Filadelfia HKBP, St. Johannes Baptista and St. Yohanes Maria Vianney. We also received a suggestion to analyse Getsemane HKBP and Ciketing HKBP, which at the time received national media attention. Due to time restrictions, however, and our operational definitions, we researched only the three churches first mentioned. The operational definition the Research Team used thus sidelined several interesting cases. The Ciketing HKBP case, for instance, could not be included because it did not fulfil the condition requiring a sign indicating that the building in question was a church. It is important to realise that in using this operational definition the Research Team does not intend to define which buildings are churches and which are not. The definition was only used so that the Research Team could focus on clear cases in greater depth.

Filadelfia HKBP

In April 2000, the Batak community established Filadelfia Batak Christian Protestant Church (HKBP). The community primarily lives in Jejalan Jaya, Mangun Jaya, Satria Jaya and Sumber Jaya villages in Bekasi. From 2000 to 2002, they held Sunday sermons in different houses, alternating between them. In 2003, Filadelfia HKBP bought a plot of land and built two multi-purpose buildings that functioned as both shops and houses in Villa Bekasi Indah 2 Housing Complex, in Sumber Jaya village, with Building Utilisation Right (HGB) certificates No. 10095 and No. 10096. The two buildings were also intended to be used

as places of worship but local opposition soon arose.

Filadelfia HKBP consists of 131 families or 521 individuals and Pastor Palti Panjaitan. Pastor Palti is the church's most recent pastor, after Pastor Josua Butarbutar and Teacher (*Guru*) Elmun Rumahorbo. Pastor Palti has been assigned to the church since July 2007, after previously being assigned to West Pademangan, in North Jakarta. In terms of socio-economic status, the completely Batak Filadelfia HKBP congregation is middle-class, with 60% earning IDR 2-3 million a month, and the rest earning more than that. Most are factory workers, the remainder civil servants and entrepreneurs. They are spread throughout several housing complexes in Jejalan Jaya, Mangun Jaya, Satria Jaya and Sumber Jaya villages.

After local residents opposed the use of the two residential/retail buildings as a place of worship, the church returned to holding services in congregants' houses from 2003 to 2006. In April 2006, local residents banned sermons conducted in the housing complexes, particularly in Block C of the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 Complex. On 2 April 2006, the Filadelfia HKBP leadership was forced to sign a declaration that had been prepared in advance, stating that they would find new land for the construction of a church because sermons were disturbing neighbours. On 15 July 2007, Filadelfia HKBP decided to buy Ibu Sumiati's land. Not only was it clear that the land the church purchased was to be used for a church, the owner of the land stated that she had no objections to the use of the land as a church in a statutory declaration witnessed by several local residents and the local village head. The land was purchased with the Title Certificate No. 149, dated 26 September 2007, and issued by the Bekasi State Land Agency. The plan was to build a church to accommodate 300-400 members on the 1088 m² block of land.

Following this purchase, Filadelfia HKBP started to consult the local community in 2007 seeking for support in accordance

with the Joint Ministerial Regulations. The conditions were satisfied and the church obtained more signatures than required, with 300 National ID cards and 259 signatures of agreement from the local community. As a result, Sukardi, head of Jejalen Jaya village, had no objections to the construction of the church and issued a recommendation for the construction of Filadelfia HKBP church by Letter No. 451.2/09/X/2007 of 11 October 2007. In fact, according to reports by KBR 68H journalists,¹⁰ Sukardi noted that the majority of the 13,000 residents in the village were in support of the church.

These documents and the recommendation later came to be at the heart of the disputes over the church. Some local residents who objected to the construction of the church accused the church of bribery and deception in obtaining local support. They believed that community support had been engineered. The majority of local residents, particularly those close to the construction site, confirmed that they had willingly given their support, claiming that it was FKUI that had threatened and pressured them to withdraw their support. On 2 April 2008, Filadelfia HKBP applied for permission to construct the church to the Regent [Bupati] of Bekasi, the head of the Bekasi Office of Religious Affairs, the Bekasi Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB) and the Tambun Utara district head.

The head of Tambun Utara district wrote a letter rejecting the construction of the church on the basis that there were some local residents who objected to the construction. The letter, No. 452.2/76/II-/Eksmasy/2008 Re: Report to the Regent of Bekasi, was copied to Filadelfia HKBP. After that, the Bekasi Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued letter No. Kd.10.16.11/1473/2009 of 18 August 2009, re Application

¹⁰ "Gereja HKBP Filadelfia Dilarang di Bekasi," Forumkami.com, <http://www.forumkami.com/forum/Kristen/34137-gerejahkbp-filadelfia-dilarang-di-bekasi.html>, accessed 28 July 2010.

for Recommendation, which stated that it was not yet possible to grant a recommendation for the construction of the HKBP church because there was local opposition according to a report by the district head of Tambun Utara. The letter also advised the committee to approach the local community and continue to spread information about the church to local residents and their religious leaders.

In December 2009, facing an uncertain future, and needing to find a way to perform their religious activities and obligations, Filadelfia HKBP built a temporary place of worship from plywood and red clay. This emergency church could hold 200 congregants. For security, a two metre high gate was erected. As soon as the temporary church was established in 2009, it was attacked several times, including two days before Christmas and two days after the 2010 New Year. The congregation was then forced to worship in the Village Hall.

On 31 December 2009, the Regent of Bekasi issued Decree No.300/675/KesbangPollinmas/09 on Halting Construction and Religious Activities. After the decree was issued, the church was sealed by the Bekasi government. The official documentation in relation to the closure of the church was signed by several representatives of the Bekasi government, including the district head of Tambun Utara, A. Junaedi Rakhman, BCom and the head of the Bekasi Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Drs H. Jaja Jaelani, MM. They justified this Decree by reference to a Local Regulation of Bekasi No. 7/1996 on Construction Permits (IMB). Since the church was sealed on 17 January, the congregation held sermons in front of the gate to their church. They even set the gate back four metres from the edge of their land in anticipation of possible road widening.

Until 20 July 2010, the services they held outside the church gate were constantly disturbed, and the land was strewn with animal faeces, carrion and rotten eggs. This stopped after 20

July 2010, when church leaders appeared as witnesses in court. Filadelfia HKBP challenged the Regent's decree in the Bandung Administrative Court. The church argued that the decree overstepped the Regent's authority. On 2 September 2010, the church won the case and the judge cancelled the Regent's Decree.

The Bekasi FKUB consists of 17 people, with 12 representing Islam and the remaining five members representing Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Sulaiman Zakhorus is the chairperson of the FKUB. According to HKBP, 9 of the 17 FKUB members supported the church construction including several among the Muslim members. Zakhorus, however, was very persuasive and forced these members to consent to his decision to not issue a recommendation.

Generally speaking, according to Filadelfia HKBP it is almost impossible for churches in Bekasi to obtain a recommendation for a permit from the FKUB because, although there is no voting system within FKUB, the non-Muslim members have little power. The deputy head of FKUB, Sudarno, acknowledged that, although an application for a recommendation had been received in the Filadelfia case in 2008, there had been no specific meeting to discuss the church.¹¹ On 29 July 2010, Sudarno lied when he gave testimony during a hearing at the Bandung Administrative Court. He stated that in order to obtain a recommendation from the FKUB, a recommendation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs must be obtained first.¹² According to the 2006 Joint Ministerial Regulations, however, there is no such requirement.

The government was also pressured by opponents of the church, represented by FKUI, a local organisation formed specifically in response to the construction of the Filadelfia HKBP

¹¹ Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.

¹² Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.

church. This was apparent in the attitudes of the head of RW 09 and the head of Jejalen Jaya village, who were forced to withdraw their support. FKUI also influenced the district head, who did not want to issue a recommendation for a permit, and the Regent, who due to social pressure eventually issued the decree stopping services and sealing the church. The Bekasi government itself has not introduced a local regulation that specifically regulates the construction of places of worship. The Regent has, however, issued a Decree on Halting Construction and Religious Activities with reference to the Local Regulation of Bekasi No. 07/1996 on Construction Permits (IMB) and the 2006 Joint Ministerial Regulations.

In addition to support from the heads of several RT units, sub-village heads, and the head of the RW unit in Jejalen Jaya, the majority of local residents and several religious leaders believe that there is no problem with the construction of a church in the selected location. H. Heri, a religious leader who has lived about 1 km from the church since 1992, supports the church construction. He is a member of NU, the largest traditionalist Islamic organisation in Indonesia, and former head of the Tambun Utara MUI, a branch of the Indonesian Ulama Council. He runs a religious study group in the area, called the *Majelis Zikir Ikhwan*. Throughout the debate over the construction, his support did not waver. In fact, when one local spread faeces around the Filadelfia church site, Heri ordered his religious study group to clean it up.¹³ Heri often argued in favour of the church from an Islamic perspective, opposing *ustadz* or religious teachers who objected to the church.

Another man who gave his support is Bongkon, the head of RW 09, which includes the church location. He gave his support to the construction, but recently admitted he withdrew it after being threatened by Ustadz Naimun, Ustadz Amil Amung

¹³ Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 22 July 2010.

Mariadi and Ustadz Acep. They threatened that if he did not withdraw his letter of support then when he died the village would not pray for him. Sadih, a local who lives next-door to the church, is not bothered by the presence of the church and has no objections to its construction. He was one Muslim supporter of the church who was brave enough to appear as a witness in the trial at the Bandung Administrative Court.

People who opposed the church included Junaedi Rachman, district head of Tambun Utara. He eventually decided not to issue a recommendation supporting the church construction because he believed that the church was not transparent in the way it sought local support.¹⁴ Nesan, head of FKUI in Jejalen Jaya village was another opponent. He was a former candidate for village head who was eventually defeated by H. Sukardi. During one FKUI demonstration he tore up the Regent's letter banning religious activities, because he believed that the Filadelfia HKBP members did not respect it.¹⁵

The primary opponents of the church's construction, however, were Ustadz Naimun, Ustadz Amil Mariadi and Ustadz Acep. These three ustadz approached local residents who supported the church construction and asked them to withdraw their support. Several witnesses who supported the church said that the ustadz threatened them, although they denied this.¹⁶

Ustadz Naimun, FKUI advisor and ustadz for RT 01/04, claimed that the community had been deceived by the letter of support for the Filadelfia HKBP church, which stated that it was for the legally mandated salary bonus given to employees during religious festivals such as Christmas or Ramadhan (*Tun-*

¹⁴ Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.

¹⁵ "Gereja HKBP Filadelfia Dilarang di Bekasi," Forumkami.com, <http://www.forumkami.com/forum/Kristen/34137-gerejahkbp-filadelfia-dilarang-di-bekasi.html>, accessed 28 July 2010.

¹⁶ Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.

jangen Hari Raya, THR). Meanwhile, Ustadz Amil, who admitted that he lived in a different village to the one in which the church is to be built and claimed to be a member of the Village Consultative Body, said that the church had lured people with money when asking for their support. He did acknowledge, however, that the church had obtained the signatures of 259 local residents.

These opponents identified themselves as being from the Jajalen Jaya FKUI, which was established on 22 February 2008. According to its letterhead, the FKUI secretariat is located at the village office, although when asked the village head claimed not to know about it. Nesan claimed that the forum was formed in order to establish hospitality amongst the Muslim community, not just because of the construction of the Filadelfia Church. According to Ustadz Acep, however, FKUI was established with the specific mission of cancelling the letter of agreement to the construction of Filadelfia HKBP.¹⁷ They believed that support for the church was obtained by deception and trickery. The three *ustadz* above, who are known as the Team for the Annulment of Filadelfia HKBP's Letter of Support, claimed to be from the FKUI when approaching local residents. According to Ustadz Acep, they visited local residents in order to check whether their support was genuine or whether they had been deceived.

Although not directly linked to other organisations, in the middle of January, the FKUI held a public prayer meeting for Muslims that was attended by over 700 people from Tanjung Priok and Petamburan (FPI). The Bekasi police, aware of the vulnerability of the church and of a planned attack, sent 400 officers to protect the premises in anticipation of the attack. Police Chief Herry Wibowo had asked Filadelfia HKBP not to hold

¹⁷ Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.

services but HKBP chose to do so anyway.¹⁸ Pastor Palti claimed that the attackers were not all local residents but included people from outside Jejalan Jaya.¹⁹

According to the church, the dispute was not directly caused by political affiliations and local elections. Information received suggests, however, that the Regent once said at a public forum that as long as he was in power, the church would not obtain a permit. Since 2007, Regent H. Sa'duddin and deputy Regent Darip Mulyana have run Bekasi after being nominated by the PKS Faction. The Regent is also more frequently called Pak Ustadz (Mr Religious Teacher) than Pak Bupati (Mr Regent). Pastor Palti himself said that he had never found a case where the Bekasi FKUB had issued a recommendation for the construction of a church. The Research Team has not examined FKUB further.

There are several conclusions to draw from this case. Filadelfia HKBP is an example of a church that successfully obtained signatures of support well above the required minimum and yet was obstructed by masses mobilised from outside the area. The government and the FKUB further complicated the process of obtaining a permit. There are at least two interesting aspects of this case, also often found in other cases of disputed churches: first, the accusation that the signatures of support were falsified; and, second, the government's refusal to give a recommendation on the basis that some parties objected to the church. It is important to note that this second reason makes no sense because the Joint Ministerial Regulations emphasise that the important thing is the signatures of 90 people who will use the church, together with those of 60 other residents. There is no provision stating that there must be no objections at all.

¹⁸ <http://www.forumkami.com/forum/kristen/34137-gerejahkbp-filadelfia-dilarang-di-bekasi.html>, accessed 28 July 2010.

¹⁹ Interview with Pastor Palti Panjaitan, 6 September 2010.

St. Johannes Baptista Catholic Church

The St. Johannes Baptista Parish in Parung was formed after a long and difficult journey, beginning with an influx of migrants during the development of Jakarta and West Java. In the 1970s, the most significant development occurred through a program in which teachers were recruited and appointed by reference to a Presidential Instruction, particularly in 1977. Many appointed teachers from outside the area were settled in districts around Parung. In 1978, the Catholic community was divided into five stations: namely the Gunung Sindur Station, Bojong Gede Station, Parung Station, Duren Seribu Station and Lebak Wangi Station.

Initially the Parung community was a part of the Santo Paulus Parish in Depok Lama. Since 1982, a pastor alternated between the five stations. This kind of ministry began with the presence of Pastor Guido Brod, OFM, at the Santo Paulus Parish in Depok. Mass was held twice a month at the Duren Seribu Station and only once a month simultaneously in the other four stations. This arrangement was considered to negatively affect the development of the community's faith.

On 19 November 1989, a meeting and regional Mass incorporating all the stations was held at a residential house. Through the initiative of Father Hugo Brod, OFM, the Pastor of the Santo Paulus Parish at the time, it was agreed that all stations should be combined into one station of the Santo Paulus Parish in Depok and be given a new name: the Santo Johannes Baptista Station, which would be led by Richard Haryanto. Mass services for the newly-merged station were held every Sunday in Wimpie Sukendar's house. There were only 85 families (about 300 individuals) involved.

In anticipation of increasing numbers and the need for pastoral guidance, the station proposed owning its own church building. At the same time, several non-Christian residents

near Bapak Wimpie's house raised objections to the use of a residential house as a place of worship. Through Decree No. 036/DP/II/1990, and with the agreement of Monsignor Ignatius Harsono, Pr., a Church Construction Committee was formed, and tasked with preparing land and other requirements for the construction of a church. From 1992, the weekly Eucharist celebrations were moved to the Lebak Wangi Garden Restaurant, owned by the family of Felix Djohari, a member of the church.

The congregation expanded further and pastoral care had to be taken more seriously. There was no other choice but for the Parung Station to have its status increased to that of a parish. In accordance with the provisions stipulated in the Church Constitution, through Letter No. 010/IX/JB/2000, the Parung Station congregation asked the Bishop of Bogor to raise their status. Then with Decree No. 47/SKB/IX/00 of 24 September 2000, the Bishop of Bogor increased the status of the station and inaugurated it as the Parish of Santo Johannes Baptista in Parung. From then onwards Mass and religious activities were held on the church's land in Tulang Kuning, although no building had been constructed.

As a parish, the church covered several districts, including Parung, Gunung Sindur, Sawangan, Sawangan Baru, Tajur Halang and Sasak Panjang. Meanwhile, according to the central Catholic Church the region was divided into three regions (Region I, II and III) and 15 Zones (Petrus, Paulus, Philipus, Ignatius Loyola, Fransiskus Xaverius, Sisilia, Stephanus, Markus, Lukas, Benediktus, Anna, Maria Fatima, Antonius Maria de Claret and Theresia). For the first period of 2000-2003, the Parish Pastoral Council consisted of Pastor Vitalis Nonggur, OFM (Head), Patrick Suwartho (deputy Head), Thomas Suhardjono (Secretary I), Ny. Budi Kentarti Tampatty (Secretary II), Ny. Rosilawati Dewi S (Treasurer I) and Ny. Rosalia Wempie Sukendar (Treasurer II). The Pastoral Council included the following sec-

tions: Preaching, Liturgy, Family Apostleship, Socio-Economic Development, Youth, Interfaith Relations, Women, Social Communication and Management of Facilities.

The Bishop of Bogor then issued Decree No. 48/D/SKB/IX/00, declaring the establishment of the Church Board and Poverty Fund (PGDP) of the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish, with the following members: P. Vitalis Nonggur, OFM (Head), Patrick Suwartho (deputy Head), Thomas Suhardjono (Secretary), Rosilawati Dewi S (Treasurer), FX Sidi Harsoyo (member), Roy Edward Tampatty (member), YPC Yodopratomo (member) and Bonaventura Huwa (member). At the same time the Parish Pastor issued Decree No. 001/DP/IX/2000 to renew the Church Construction Committee.

The St. Johannes Baptista Parish now has more than 2,500 congregants. The majority are young families and migrants from Java, Flores and Sumatera or of Chinese descent. To date, weekly Mass has been held in a semi-permanent tent in Tulang Kuning village, next to the Villa Citra Lestari complex. The location is adjacent to the Kwan Im Bio Confucian statue and the Tulang Kuning office of the Indonesian Confucian Community.

From 1990-1993, the community felt they needed a church building so that they could worship properly. Led by the Church Construction Committee, the community collected money to buy land on which the church and its supporting facilities could be built. Eventually the congregation bought a 7000 m² piece of land in Tulang Kuning, Waru, Parung. The title was transferred to the Roman Catholic Church board of directors. At the same time the parish board started a process of engaging with the local community. As with other churches, they did this through involvement in community events, such as sporting and social events. In fact, the parish also became the location for one of the two Integrated Health Clinics or *Posyandu*²⁰ in Waru village.

²⁰ Short for *Pos Pelayan Terpadu*, these centres provide pre- and post-natal

From its upgrade from a station to a parish in 2000 until the introduction of the Joint Ministerial Regulations in 2006, the church continued to consult the community before the construction began. During this process the parish was opposed twice. The first occurred in 2001, when the church was planning on building a multi-purpose building, for which it had already obtained a construction permit. Protests by the Parung Mosque Youth Group (Irmah), however, interfered with these plans. The second incident occurred in 2005. At the time the parish was believed to have financed a candidate for village head of Waru, who won the election and still holds the position today. About 10 local residents (the other candidates who ran in the local election) approached the church and angrily accused the church of paying IDR 80 million to ensure that their opponent won. The Parish denied that they had backed the successful candidate and claimed not to have paid money to any candidate.

The introduction of the Joint Ministerial Regulations on places of worship gave the parish new enthusiasm to construct a church. They believed that the regulation gave certainty to the rule of the law, making the process more reliable. As a result, at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, the Parish organised the necessary administrative documents, including signatures of support from both congregants and non-Catholic local residents. The Parish easily obtained 225 signatures.

On 1 February, the church officially applied for a construction permit from the Regent of Bogor. On 1 September, after 90 days and no response (in breach of article 16 (2) of the Joint Ministerial Regulations), the church sent a follow up letter to the Regent. On 22 March 2008, the afternoon before Easter,

care for women and children. They are run by the local community and usually offer services on a monthly basis, providing children under 5 years old with a meal, immunisations and vitamin A, and measuring their height and weight.

hundreds of people from the Jamiul Fataa Muslim Youth Communication Forum, held a demonstration and demanded that the church halt all activities. There were about 10 adults at the demonstration and the remainder were junior and senior high school children. Although they called the demonstration a peaceful protest, they forced their way into the parish yard and made the church take down the hired tent that had been set up for the Easter celebration that night. They even threatened that they would become violent and were prepared to die if their demands were not met.

Representatives of the demonstrators (H. Umar, Asep and Surip - not their real names) then asked to talk and entered the church. They presented a declaration that they had prepared beforehand. The church was forced to sign a letter stating that the Church agreed to the dismantling of the tent, to cessation of all forms of worship in Tulang Kuning, and the halting of all efforts to obtain a construction permit for the church. In the end the church gave in, took the tent down and called off the Easter event that night. It was not willing to sign the declaration, however. H. Umar, dissatisfied with the church's refusal to sign, reverted back to the mob, inviting them to turn to violence. The Parung Satpol PP was able to control the crowd, however, and said that the declaration would be handed to the Bogor FKUB. The church then suggested that its members celebrate Easter in other nearby Catholic churches.

On 19 July 2010, the church continued the process to obtain a permit by applying for a Land Usage and Management Permit (IPPT) in accordance with the regional government's request. According to some sources, they did not receive a response from the government. The Research Team, however, found two letters in relation to St. Yohanes Baptista's request for a permit in the archives of the Bogor Ministry of Religious Affairs.

In general the relationship between the church and the gov-

ernment is quite good. There are no problems with the personal relationships with the heads of RT 01 and RW 06, the police chief, the regional military commander and the village head. The only slightly problematic relationship is with the current Parung district head, who is less supportive than his two predecessors. For instance, in December 2008 when the church sent a letter informing the current district head of its planned Christmas celebrations, the district head replied that he had no authority to issue a recommendation for the Christmas event because the church had not obtained a construction permit in accordance with applicable laws. These personal relationships aside, it was the state bureaucracy that delayed the administration of the construction permit. The heads of the local RT and RW units did not want to sign off on the local signatures of support. As a result, the village head was not prepared to sign a recommendation before the heads of the RT and RW had signed. In 2007, the subdistrict head of Parung who was very supportive, felt that matters of law were beyond his authority, being the direct responsibility of the regent.

Consequently, on 1 February 2007, the church submitted the application for a permit without the signatures of the RT head, the RW head and the village head as the relevant authorities. The church informed the Bogor Government (Office of National Unity and Community Protection and the Department of Spatial Planning and the Environment) of its reasons for doing so. On 22 February, these two government institutes sent officers to verify the signatures of support and form a conclusion as to their appropriateness and veracity. The Office of National Unity and Community Protection verified the signatures with the head of the local neighbourhood association unit. As mentioned previously, however, the church received no response from the government within the required 90-day period.

On 13 September, the Department of Housing, Planning and

Urban Development of Bogor wrote a letter replying to the Parish's letter. The letter asked the church to complete further administrative requirements for the permit. It also mentioned that MUI in Parung had sent two letters objecting to the construction of the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish in Parung. One of the requirements was a recommendation from the Bogor FKUB, which was only formed in August 2007, several months after the church first applied for the permit.

On 14 October 2008, the Bogor Department of Spatial Planning and the Environment also responded to the church, asking it to complete its application with a recommendation from the FKUB. Almost two years later, on 5 May 2010, the FKUB finally wrote a letter in response to the church's application for a permit. The letter made three points. First, it did not recommend the construction of the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish in Parung. Second, it asked the church to stop all the activities in Tulang Kuning. Third, it asked the regent to follow up on the issue. In response to the FKUB's letter, the parish wrote to the Regent stating it letter was legally flawed for two reasons. First, the FKUB had exceeded its authority. Second, there were issues with the means by which decisions were made within FKUB, because the Catholic representative within FKUB had objected to the FKUB letter. In addition, the parish asked for legal and physical protection.

The church acknowledged that they had spoken twice with FKUB. The first meeting was facilitated by the Office of National Unity and Community Protection and took the form of a 'sharing session' between the two parties. The second meeting was held on 8 May 2010, three days after FKUB sent out its letter. For the church, the two meetings were ineffectual because FKUB did not regard dialogue as an appropriate way to resolve the issues at stake.

In response to the church's letter, the government ordered

the Satpol PP to check on the parish. Satpol PP concluded that there were no problems between the church and the local residents, and suggested that the church continue the application for a permit. These government institutes aside, the parish did not perceive itself to have any problems with the police precinct, the regional military command or the district military command. The three agencies performed their duties as required and took a neutral stance to the issues the parish faced.

According to the parish, the one community leader who was very influential in provoking opposition to the church was one of the board members of Parung MUI, H. Umar. In addition to issuing MUI's formal rejection in 2007, he was allegedly behind the mass action that stopped the church's Easter celebrations in 2008. The demonstration itself was largely attended by children from schools affiliated with H. Umar's foundation. This education foundation is located in Waru Jaya village, the neighbouring village to that in which the church is located. H. Umar himself was also involved in leading the action, although he did so in the name of 'Muslim Youth'.

The official reason for MUI's rejection was that there were already lots of churches in Parung. The church explained to the Office of National Unity and Community Protection that the churches MUI was talking about were Protestant churches. There was not one Catholic church in the seven districts covered by the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish. According to the church, it is possible that the rejection by the heads of the RT, RW and Waru Village was influenced by MUI's attitude, whether directly or indirectly.

As mentioned, the church's efforts to consult and its manner of approaching the local residents was quite successful. The church provided job opportunities for local residents because the parking was managed by local youth who lived near the church. In addition, the church had a very good relationship

with local *ojek* (motorcycle taxi) drivers. Several local residents that the Research Team met testified to the good relationship between the church and local residents. Gito and Ling, two adherents of Confucianism who lived close to the church, said that the church was not an issue. In fact, the church had provided a means of living for the residents of RT 01 who worked as traders or parking attendants.

Tony, a member of a Pentecostal church who lived about 100 metres from the church, and Amir, a senior *santri* or student at the Islamic Orphanage who lived about 300 metres from the church, also confirmed that there were no problems with the church. Although the orphanage had not been directly involved in either supporting or opposing the church, Amir said that so long as it did not disturb anyone it was only fair that the Catholics could build a church.

Within the village administration, Joko, the head of RW 06 who lives 200 metres from the church, was supportive. When Yayang, the head of RT 01, consulted him on whether she had to confirm the signatures from local residents who supported the church, Joko asked her to support the church. For Joko, heads of RTs and RWs had no reason not to confirm the signatures if local residents had already expressed their support. Joko himself suggested that the church could gather further support because their opponents were arguing that the Catholic community in Waru Village was small in comparison to other religious communities.

The church has come to view the Joint Ministerial Regulations of 2006 critically. While they believe the regulations give greater legal certainty to places of worship, the lack of state monitoring of their implementation means that they often impedes the construction of churches on the ground. This is especially the case with FKUB, and its unequal representation that meant that, in this case, of 17 members, 12 were Muslim and the

remaining members represented the other 5 state-sanctioned religions. This results in FKUB playing a very different role from that suggested by its name. Instead of harmonising religious communities, it sometimes impedes religious harmony.

At the time of writing, the parish was waiting for a response to its request for a Land Usage and Management Permit and was considering taking the issue to court. The parish has already formed an Advocacy Team to take further action, because the prolonged process of obtaining a permit has meant the congregation has had to hold sermons in a tent for a long time now.

The St. Johannes Baptista dispute is primarily a result of government inconsistency in enforcing the law. This is apparent in the refusal to grant a construction permit despite verification of local residents' signatures. Further, FKUB was an influential opponent. Religious representation within FKUB was suspected to have played a role in FKUB's letter of objection. Parung MUI was also involved as its leader, H. Umar, claimed to act on behalf of local residents. Of these issues, the primary factor in the dispute over the church construction was resistance from religious organisations, including the government-formed FKUB. In addition, the government failed to fulfil its duty to protect its citizens.

Santo Yohanes Maria Vianney Parish

The Santo Yohanes Maria Vianney Parish in Cilangkap was an offshoot of the Santo Robertus Bellarminus Parish in Cililitan and the Santo Aloysius Gonzaga Parish in Cijantung. The Cililitan Parish community was spread throughout Ceger, Bambu Apus, Cipayung and Cilangkap, while the St. Aloysius Gonzaga Parish community of Cijantung lived in Cipayung, Ciracas, Kelapa Dua Wetan, Munjul, Pekayon, Pondok Ranggon, Cibubur and Setu.

The two parishes grew so large that it was proposed to split

the two and form a third parish. In a joint meeting between the Cililitan and Cijangung Parish Councils on 3 March 1998, the parishes agreed to form a new parish from several areas in Cilangkap. This became the 53rd parish under the Archdiocese of Jakarta, with the name St. Yohanes Maria Vianney, as stipulated in a Decree of the Archbishop of Jakarta issued in August 1998. The first pastor was V. Sudarmo, O.Carm. In 2000, the management of the parish was handed over to the priests of the diocese.

Until 1996, the parish held sermons in the *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* tourist church. From 1996 until 1998 it moved to the Mekar Wangi Kindergarten Church and the Nusa Melati Primary School Church (mass was held in a classroom or sheltered outdoor assembly areas). In April 1998, when protests broke out and stones were thrown at services held in the St. Anna School and Kindergarten, services were moved to the Melati-Cipayung Catholic School and the Economic Vocational School owned by the Budi Murni Christian Foundation. Then, in 1998, due to the kindness of KRMT²¹ Sinambela, services were moved to the Budi Murni Primary School. Services were held in tents that were erected every Saturday and taken down every Sunday after the service was over. In 2002, the Budi Murni Hall was constructed.

Until today, Eucharist and other religious activities are held every Sunday in the Budi Murni School Hall. The parish congregation are migrants. Initially there were 3,000 members but this number has since increased to 5,600. None of the local Betawi residents in the area are congregants, because during the 12 years that the parish has existed no new members have been baptised.

The local residents are aware that the hall is used as a place of worship, yet they know it is not a church. They have no

²¹ KMRT is a traditional Javanese noble title that stands for Kanjeng Raden Mas Tumenggung.

objections to the existence of the church. In fact, they are concerned that the church might move, because many depend on the church congregants to earn a living, especially those who work as parking attendants and snack vendors. The Cilangkap Parish congregation is largely middle to lower-class, as are the local residents. There is no inequality between the parish community and local residents, as most congregants live in villages, not in housing complexes. The parish is currently led by Pastor Yohanes Hadi Suryono, Pr.

In 1997, before the Cilangkap parish was officially formed, the community bought a piece of land on Malaka Street in Cilangkap, in the name of the Cijantung Parish. The 4,500 m² block has remained empty due to strong opposition from local residents. The Church then bought land on Kramat Street in Cilangkap. The church invited local residents to be involved in the process of purchasing the land.

During this community consultation process and the early stages of construction, fears arose that the church might actually prove to be "Doulos 2". The local residents in Cipayang and Cilangkap were reminded of an incident on 15 December 1999, in which the Doulos Christian Foundation (a Protestant organisation) was attacked, one person was killed and several others injured. The arson and attack of the Doulos complex was triggered by fears of 'Christianisation'.

The St. Maria Vianney Parish was on the receiving end of the community's collective memory of the incident. Generally, local residents cannot distinguish between Protestants and Catholics (the Doulos Christian Foundation being Protestant, not Catholic). Stirring up fears of a Doulos 2 incident was effective in triggering local opposition to the planned church construction. Eventually the parish sold the land and looked for an alternative location.

The parish next bought 8000 m² of land on Bambu Wulung

Street, Bambu Apus, after having already bought a house in the area to function as the pastor's temporary place of residence. As they had done previously, the parish involved local residents in the purchase of the land and erection of a fence. Several local residents who opposed the church later claimed that they had always objected to the church being built at this location.

The land on Bambu Wulung Street turned out to be problematic because it lay on a greenbelt established by the East Jakarta Government. After negotiations, the parish eventually traded land with the government. The Parish gave the land on Malaka Street to the Mayor of East Jakarta to be used as part of a greenbelt, while retaining its land on Bambu Wulung Street.

In 2005, the Cilangkap Parish began the process of obtaining a permit, based on the Jakarta Governor's Decree No. 137/2002 on the construction of places of worship. The Governor's Decree stipulated that the general prerequisite for the construction of churches is that they be "based on the actual needs of the congregation". The regulation also stipulated that the church "must obtain support from the community/community leaders", indicating that there must be statistics on religious adherents in the community. Although no required number was stated, the parish obtained nearly 300 signatures from local residents who supported the church construction.

A successful approach and consultation process by the church meant that village officials, including the local RT and RW units and the subdistrict head, gave their support. Only one RT head objected. The parish had a close relationship with the district head of Cipayung, H. Iwansyah Ali, who was also the head of East Jakarta Forkabi.²² The application process went relatively smoothly, and in 2007 the parish obtained a recom-

²² *Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi*, the Betawi Communication Forum. This forum acts to preserve Betawi culture and works with the government in building and developing Jakarta to this effect.

mentation from the East Jakarta Mayor. Based on the Mayor's recommendation, the parish also obtained a recommendation from the East Jakarta FKUB in the following year.

The main problem in processing the permit was conflicting legal regulations. The first regulation was the Governor's Decree No. 137/2002, and the second the Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006. According to the Joint Ministerial Regulations, once a recommendation is issued by the FKUB the parish is entitled to a construction permit. The Governor's Decree from 2002 remained in place, however, after the introduction of the new Regulations in 2006. The result was conflicting legal requirements, as follows.

- According to the Governor's Decree, a construction permit is issued by the Office of Planning and Building Control (P2B) on the Governor's recommendation. The Governor's recommendation in turn requires a recommendation from the Bureau for Mental and Spiritual Education or the Advisory Board formed by the Governor.
- Although the Joint Ministerial Regulations do not require support from community leaders, the Governor's Decree does. The practice on the ground is therefore that five of the 60 local signatures of support required in the Joint Ministerial Regulations should come from community leaders.
- In practice, the process of obtaining a permit involves several stages, that include the Legal Bureau, the Assistant for Public Welfare, the Public Bureau, the Bureau for Mental and Spiritual Education, the Regional Secretary, the Deputy Governor and finally the Governor.

The existence of these two different regulations is compounded by the absence of clear guidelines in the 2006 Joint Ministerial Regulations, which means that the verification of local signatures was repeated five times. Each agency felt they had the authority to verify the signatures, including the sub-

district government, the municipal FKUB, the provincial FKUB, the Bureau for Mental and Spiritual Education and the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The verification process is lengthy, and often the National ID cards of the signatories were no longer valid by the time they were verified. The cards would therefore be questioned by whichever agency was undertaking the verification process.

On the other hand, the village bureaucracy was also pressured by community leaders who objected to the church's construction. Over time, several RT and RW officials came to agree with the opinions of the more influential community leaders. Local residents who signed their names in support of the church were approached by the heads of the RT and RW, Babinsa officers²³ or community leaders and asked to withdraw their support.

Although all these processes were eventually completed, it took a long time. The church is now hopeful that the permit will be issued. To date, the (spoken) response of the deputy Governor of Jakarta who visited the church is that the situation is 'currently uncondusive'. In the opinion of the parish, this is just an easy excuse that effectively suspends the process, because it implies that there is no time limit for when the permit will be issued.

Another issue in the context of state regulations concerns spatial planning and regional governance. The Governor of Jakarta from 1992 to 1994, Suryadi Sudirja, had determined which areas would be set aside for catchments, settlement and so on. East Jakarta was given the largest portion of catchment areas. Of the 13.8% of land set aside for catchments, almost 4% was in East Jakarta. The spatial planning and regional governance allocations only set out a greenbelt and business area. social facili-

²³ Babsina stands for *Bintara Pembina Desa*, non-commissioned military intelligence officers stationed in villages.

ties and public facilities were not established at this time. The Parish did not initially take spatial planning into consideration and as a result ran into difficulties. This became an excuse used by several government agencies to justify their refusal to grant a permit.

Aside from the tiring and discouraging formal process described above, the parish also informally lobbied the Governor, and even the President, as several parish members had connections to the political elite. These efforts were not successful, however.

Although the formal process for obtaining a permit reached the provincial stage, local social factors were the dominant influence throughout the process. According to Father Anto, there are about 60 small social organisations around the Cilangkap-Cipayung area but no single dominant organisation. As a result, any consultation conducted by the church had to include all these various groups. The Parish considered the situation and undertook an intensive process to approach the various organisations, especially the larger and more influential ones. It received help from H. Deni (not his real name), a community leader and member of the Jakarta regional legislature. H. Deni approached the various social organisations in the region, and was also able to pacify H. Hari (not his real name), a Laskar Hizbullah²⁴ elder who objected to the church's construction. The close relationship between the parish and the district head of Cipayung, who was also the head of Forkabi, also meant that Forkabi supported the church. The Association of Betawi Residents (*Paguyuban Warga Betawi*) led by Bang Adi (not his real name), initially objected to the church but discussions with Adi proved successful.

There was no clear reason for the opposition to the church.

²⁴ Laskar Hizbullah was an Indonesian local militia active during the Japanese occupation in the fight for Indonesian independence.

Those objecting to the church were aware that Catholicism is one of the recognised official religions of Indonesia. Several times they raised the issue of 'Christianisation', but when they heard that the parish had never baptised a local resident during its 12 years they started citing issues with the church permit. More recently, FPI has been the driving force behind the opposition. Initially FPI did not have a presence in the area but H. Deni's attempt to reach out to social organisations in the community disappointed some parties, who then invited FPI to the region.

The trigger that caused the problem was simple. After successfully buying land on Bambu Wulung Street, the parish was committed to including local residents in the construction through H. Deni. When it was time to build the church fence, one community leader had been promised that he could be involved but restrictions meant H. Deni did not end up including him. H. Soleh (not his real name), the community leader who initially supported the church and signed his name to that effect, changed his mind and invited FPI to the region. H. Soleh held several religious study sessions in his home and invited FPI members. It was during these sessions that FPI called for the rejection of, and hatred towards, the church. There are still several FPI and NU flags erected near the construction site and the pastor's house. Banners of objection in the name of "FPI, PERSIS, NU, ETC" were also erected in front of Bambu Apus branch of the Majelis Ta'lim Dzikir Mudzakarah Ar-Rahman religious group, which stands directly opposite the church construction site.

H. Soleh also influenced several other leaders, leading to the social isolation of some members of the Islamic community who supported the church. One victim, Syaifudin (not his real name), an indigenous Betawi *ustadz*, was banned from giving sermons and talks in mosques or teaching at educational in-

stitutes because he consistently supported the church. He was even forced to temporarily flee the area because of rumours that his house was going to be attacked.

When the Research Team met several community leaders objecting to the church (who wished to remain anonymous), the team found out why they objected. The primary reason was that the church was in the middle of a Muslim community. According to them, 99.9% of local residents near the church were Muslim. In addition, they also felt that the location was not suitable because the road in front of the church was narrow. They claimed to have objected to the church from the very first time it was announced, both formally and through informal forums facilitated by the local government.

This opposing group believed that it was illogical to construct a church in a community that was nearly 100% Muslim. As regards the conditions stipulated in the Joint Ministerial Regulations, one leader said that they were illogical and unfair, because how could 60 + 90 people defeat thousands of people who objected to the church? They were also disappointed with the local government, which eventually agreed to exchange the land that was planned to be part of the greenbelt with the church's land. They argued that there were indications of manipulation and corruption in the way the signatures of local support were obtained in order to meet the requirements for the construction permit. They also deplored the way the church approached the local residents. For instance, they said that priests from the rectory often did not greet local residents as they passed them, although they acknowledged that maybe the church or priests were scared due to the local opposition. They felt that the church construction had only triggered interfaith tension. Prior to the planned construction religious harmony had been maintained in the region, they claimed.

Although several demonstrations had been held, they were

said to have all been peaceful, with no acts of violence. The church opponents acknowledged, however, that they could not guarantee that this would continue in the future if the church construction continued. What they did not understand was why the church persisted with building when it had been well received in its old location (Cipayung). They questioned why the church did not just look for land in Cipayung or try to use the Budi Murni building as their official church.

In addition to these leaders, the Research Team also interviewed two local residents who lived near the construction site: Ibu Ayu (not her real name), a resident of Bambu Apus and a Muslim, who lived about 1 km from the site; and Pak Sukidi (not his real name), also a Muslim but from Solo, who lived behind the church construction site. Although both were reluctant to take a stance on the issue, both said that they had not been disturbed and, in principle, had no objections to a church being built on the site.

In this case, the two regulations on the construction of places of worship were questioned not only by the church as the victim, but also by the Jakarta FKUB. The latter has requested that the Governor annul the Decree No. 137/2002 to eliminate the inconsistencies between the two laws. Ahmad Syafii Mufid, head of the Jakarta FKUB, said that the Governor should immediately grant a recommendation for a permit once a church obtained a recommendation from the FKUB.

Another note concerns the greenbelt and spatial planning and regional governance. Strangely, when the land was owned by local residents the government did not dispute it. When the land was purchased by the church, however, the government did question it. The final point to make concerns the high fees the church had to pay in order to complete the permit application process. For every step during the authorisation and construction process, the church said it had to increase its budget

by double what it should have been, in light of the number of fees and charges sought and the need to “take care of” local support.

In terms of state regulations, the Cilangkap church dispute should not have been protracted if the government had adhered to the regulations and had not resorted to outdated laws. Once the church obtained a recommendation from the FKUB, the rest of the process should not have been protracted, but in reality the government bureaucracy created many obstacles, compounded further by the need to obtain from the consent of the Advisory Council formed on the basis of Governor’s Decree No. 137/2002.

In terms of social factors, it was apparent that government indecisiveness also influenced local residents who used the permit as an excuse to oppose the church construction. The presence of radical organisations also contributed to the St. Yohanes Maria Vianney dispute by further complicating the dispute.

Although each of the three cases described above have their own unique issues there are some generalisations that can be made about this category. First, in terms of government agencies, the churches in this category faced less than supportive government bureaucracy and more convoluted bureaucratic processes. St. Yohanes Maria Vianney in Cilangkap, for instance, had to undergo several verification processes. These delayed the application for a permit, even though the church had already obtained local support and a recommendation from the FKUB. On the other hand, churches like St. Johannes Baptista in Parung and Filadelfia HKBP were unable to obtain a recommendation from the FKUB, despite obtaining the support of local residents. Filadelfia HKBP was even sealed by the local government and, despite winning its case in the Administrative Court, the Bekasi government has been unable to make significant progress on the issue.

Second, in terms of regulations, there was non-compliance and lack of uniformity in the application of the Joint Ministerial Regulations to cases from this category. In Cilangkap, there were contradictions between the Joint Ministerial Regulations and Governor's Decree No. 137/2002. In the Filadelfia HKBP case, the deputy head of the Bekasi FKUB stated that the FKUB could issue a recommendation only after the Ministry of Religious Affairs first issued a recommendation. Meanwhile in Parung, there were delays over the reluctance of heads of the RT and RW units to confirm the signatures of support from local residents that the church had obtained.

This refusal to confirm signatures of support by the heads of RT and RW units is found in many of the cases examined in this research. One interesting thing is that the three churches experienced issues because of inconsistent application of the Joint Ministerial Regulations, among other things. All interviewees agreed that in principle the regulation was far better than its predecessor. If the government had the courage and consistency to uphold its own regulations, church disputes would not be as protracted as they have been recently.

Third, deeper examination of the cases in this category reveals patterns in the way churches are opposed. Almost all the groups who disputed the churches did so in the name of Islam or made reference to Islam. The Research Team suggests, however, that this attitude is not representative of the wider Muslim community because in many cases there were also Islamic groups who had no objections to, or even openly supported, the construction of these churches.

The opponents of the construction of the churches in this category used a variety of methods, from mass protests, letters of objection sent to government and intimidation, to the more frequent accusations of falsification of local support. For the cases in this category, the church had difficulty in approaching local

residents for several reasons. First, the church had no support or back-up from the government. Such support is important because the government acts as both a mediator and protector. The absence of a government that plays these two roles leaves the church "alone" to face its opponents. Second, the church's opponents were often from outside the area. Although the majority of churches secured support from local residents, in several cases the residents who objected to the churches called in groups from outside the region. In the end, the churches had to approach these outside groups too. The more outside groups that were involved, whether intentionally invited or arriving on their own initiative, the more difficult it was for the churches to consult with them all.

The fourth conclusion for churches in this category is an accumulation of the three points just described. Government indecisiveness and the opposition of various groups in the community (each with their own motives) always increases the cost of the church construction. This could be prevented if the government reformed the bureaucracy and refused to bow to pressure from the opposing groups.***

III

Dynamics Of Church Permits

In this chapter we analyse the findings discussed in the previous chapters in order to further clarify the relationships between the various actors and the dynamics at play in church disputes in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. We begin with a discussion of the role of the FKUB.

FKUB's Authority and Representation

According to Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006, the FKUB has several duties, including consultation with religious and community leaders; accommodating and channeling the various aspirations of religious organisations and the community; disseminating legislation related to interreligious harmony; and, specifically for the city/regency FKUB branches, issuing recommendations in relation to applications to construct places of worship.

In several cases where churches have been disputed, the

FKUB has become part of the problem, by refusing to issue a recommendation. This occurred with Filadelfia HKBP in Bekasi and St. Yohanes Baptista Catholic Church in Parung. The FKUB refused to give a recommendation, even though the churches involved had obtained the number of signatures required. Without a recommendation from the FKUB, it is impossible to continue to apply for a permit. FKUB thus holds a critical position when it comes to impeding the construction of places of worship.

On the other hand, churches like St. Yohanes Maria Vianney in Cilangkap obtained a recommendation from the FKUB but could not build a church due to local opposition and an ambivalent government. The Jakarta Government still implements Governor's Decree No. 137/2002, which creates extra conditions for the construction of places of worship. This old regulation duplicates the verification requirements and delays the application process. In these kinds of cases, the FKUB, which is supposed to facilitate, does not hold so decisive a position because there are many other institutes that can negate its recommendations. According to the head of FKUB in Jakarta, Syafii Mufid, and the head of its Recommendation's Department, Rudy Pratikno, the regional government should immediately grant a permit once FKUB issues a recommendation. In doing so, legal certainty is guaranteed.

Besides the formal legal aspects, the FKUB is also required to facilitate communication between religious organisations and adherents. In this regard, FKUB should be involved in church disputes by seeking to bridge gaps and establish dialogue between opposing and supporting groups. Unfortunately, this role was not undertaken in any of the cases examined here. There are at least two reasons for this. First, efforts to establish dialogue often progress slowly and 'behind the scenes'. The effects of this dialogue are also not necessarily visible, although

that is not to say they do not exist. This was evident in the St. Albertus case in Harapan Indah. The Catholic representative in the Bekasi FKUB provided information to the church about which important leaders to approach, and the church then met with these leaders. This is different to the role of the police, for example, which is immediately detectable and has a direct impact on church services, congregants and their protection.

Second, this research was based on information provided by those involved in building the churches (the church committees) and then developed to include significant actors mentioned by the church committees. FKUB was mentioned in several cases as having been a significant actor but it was never seen as important as other actors, who were usually from the local community. As such there are not many sources that can shed light on the role of the FKUB. This is an aspect that should be examined in further research.

Triggers and Fuel for the Conflict

From the 13 cases examined in this research, we identified nine different factors that caused or exacerbated disputes over churches. The **first factor** is the issue of 'Christianisation'. Parts of Indonesian society still identify churches with religious conversion (from Islam to Protestantism or Catholicism). This is also related to misunderstandings within society about the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism. A lack of understanding of the different church denominations makes it difficult for the community to understand why another church needs to be built when there is already a Christian church in any particular area.

The **second factor** is that the local residents who object to the church often do so because they believe they receive no benefit from its presence. This is largely a socio-economic, rather than ideological, objection. It was apparent, for instance, in the

Terang Hidup GKI case in Ketapang, where one *ustadz* objected to church construction because it would obstruct the ventilation of his house, making it hot and stuffy. In the St Mikael case in Kranji, the church initially selected the wrong partner to work with, which complicated relations with other leaders and impeded the church's construction.

The **third factor** is ideological resistance. This is an important factor but, at least in this research, is not as significant as many people assume would be the case. One example of ideological resistance is in the St. Mikael case in Kranji, where one *ustadz* who opposed the church was eventually banned from giving sermons by the neighbourhood association unit. The possibility of ideological resistance in church disputes must be taken into account even if it is not a primary cause. In the cases examined here, the more dominant factors were religious leaders' lack of knowledge and fears of Christianisation (factor 1) or local residents feeling disadvantaged because they did not receive benefits (factor 2).

The **fourth factor** relates to radical Islamic organisations. These organisations were often involved in protracted disputes, such as the St. Bernadet case in Ciledug and the St. Yohanes Maria Vianney case in Cilangkap. The most notorious among these organisations was FPI, which at times possibly operated under other names to try to claim a local identity, such as the Karang Tengah Islamic Youth Front in Ciledug and the Cinere Islamic Forum, which opposed Cinere HKBP. These radical organisations tended to complicate the situation because of the way they manipulated local politics. In addition, the presence of radical organisations meant that there were more leaders and actors that needed to be approached.

The **fifth factor** is the possibility that changes in church councils or boards may affect relationships between churches and local residents. This was apparent in this study from the words

of Bapak Mulyadi (head of RT 07) in respect of the St. Mikael Church in Kranji. He said that the relationship with the church became distanced after a change in membership of the parish council. This could explain why several churches that initially had good standing in their communities were later disputed. In addition to external factors (provocation from outside), it is also necessary to recognise that a church may lose a close relationship with the local community if the new committee members are unable to maintain the same spirit as those who struggled for the church to be constructed in the first place.

While these first five factors are related to social aspects, the next pertains to the government. The **sixth factor** that can hinder the construction of churches is an unsupportive bureaucracy. This ranges from the reluctance of RT/RW unit heads to confirm the support of local residents; to FKUB failing to issue recommendations; and permits not being granted despite all conditions having been met. In Jakarta, this is also related to the inconsistencies between Joint Ministerial Regulation No. 9 and 8 of 2006 and Governor's Decree No. 137 of 2002.

The **seventh factor** is unwillingness on the part of the government to uphold its own decisions, as indicated by the cancellation of permits due to pressure from certain groups. This occurred in the Cinere HKBP case and the Yasmin GKI case, and clearly complicates the construction of churches, as it demonstrates a lack of legal certainty. After the committee of a place of worship has approached local residents and gained their support, met the conditions, and obtained a permit, its efforts cannot stop there because there is always a significant possibility that the church will be disputed by groups that are able to rally large crowds of people.

The **eighth factor**, similar to factor 6, concerns the role of the police force. Disputes over churches can be protracted if the police are not firm and decisive in performing their duties.

Unfortunately, in the cases examined here, negligence by security agencies was not due simply to poor performance. Rather, the attitude of security forces was largely determined by the attitude of the regional government. In cases like the St. Mikael Church in Kranji and Terang Hidup GKI, security agencies helped the church because the government was also cooperative. By contrast, in the Filadelfia HKBP and GKI Yasmin cases, the security forces did little, because the local government was ambivalent towards the church.

The **ninth factor** relates to the level of intolerance in society more broadly, which, according to several studies, is quite high. This intolerance can come from ideological aspects (see factor 3) or non-ideological aspects such as fear of Christianisation and misunderstanding of the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism (factor 1) or government negligence (factors 6, 7 and 8). With such a level of intolerance in addition to minimal government support, it is no surprise that in several cases the democratic principle of “majority rules, minority rights” was not fulfilled, and minority groups were forced to fight harder for their rights.

Mediators and Conflict Resolution

One surprising result that differed from our initial expectations was that the most important factor in resolving church disputes was neither state regulations nor social issues. In fact, the **main factor** was the internal solidarity of the church itself. This issue deserves to be highlighted because it influences the dynamics of state regulations and social factors. In several cases, such as with St. Mikael in Kranji and St. Albertus in Harapan Indah, the church had difficulties in obtaining a permit because it was internally divided. Lack of internal solidarity contributed to poor coordination and planning in these cases. In addition, different factions within the church committee approached different

community leaders, as if they were competing with one another.

The **second factor** is correct identification of which leaders should be approached from the local community around the church. The heads of the RT and RW units and *ustadz* from local mosques and *mushollas* are often on this list. The heads of the local RT and RW units hold strategic positions within society, and are responsible for confirming the list of local supporters required for a permit. Churches that resolved their disputes, such as St. Mikael in Kranji, Terang Hidup GKI in Ketapang and Seroja GKP in Bekasi, did so after the RT and RW units assisted in reducing the conflict. By contrast, in cases such as St. Bernadet in Ciledug, the RT and RW units were part of the problem.

The **third factor**, following on from identification of local leaders, is the ability to successfully approach these leaders. The common assumption is that the best approach is to hand out cash but our research shows that the reality is more complex. In the St. Mikael case in Kranji, an effective way of approaching the *ustadz* turned out to be through giving chicken nuggets to one of his grandchildren. The head of an RT also became close to the church after the church employed several unemployed local residents. In the St. Albertus case in Harapan Indah, one *ustadz* was emotionally moved when for he was invited to eat the first time in a café that stood on the land of his ancestors. These cases show that there is no uniform approach that works for everyone. The church committee must identify the particular characteristics of each leader in order to discover the best way to approach him or her.

The **fourth factor** is the presence of community leaders committed to religious freedom (pluralism). These leaders are important because they are willing to defend and show concern for churches when the majority of the community chooses to remain silent. The head of RT 03 at the St. Mikael church and H.

Heri at Filadelfia HKBP are examples of such leaders.

The **fifth factor** is the ability to contain disputes. This includes the church's ability to refrain from escalating the issue where it is not absolutely necessary to do so. If the dispute can be resolved at the RT, RW or subdistrict levels it is counterproductive for the church to take it further, for instance, by involving the media. This complicates the issue by involving more parties. The best example of this is Seroja GKP, which resolved its dispute within the complex, by mediating through the Dharmais Foundation. When the dispute continued, the head of the RW unit urged both the church's opponents and the church not to invite parties from outside the area to become involved.

The **sixth factor** is the need for an impartial and competent state agencies, including both the bureaucracy and the police force. The importance of this factor is evident in the St. Mikael case in Kranji, the Terang Hidup GKI case in Ketapang and the St. Albertus case in Harapan Indah. All of these churches were protected by government agencies. Psychologically, a police force that protects citizens and performs its duty will make not just the church congregation, but also local residents who have no objections to the church, feel safe. Opposing groups will then find it difficult to intimidate local residents into withdrawing their support.

There was one inconsistency apparent in the role of the state. In some churches like Terang Hidup GKI and St. Albertus, members in the congregation with connections to officials or the government were able to achieve positive results. On the other hand, some churches that had difficulties, such as St. Yohanes Maria Vianney in Cilangkap, also had connections with officials but were unable to obtain the desired result. It thus seems that the presence of powerful people can help, but it does not guarantee that a church will be free from, or be able to resolve, disputes. The reason for this may be that in the current democratic era power

and influence tend to be dispersed to many people and groups, as opposed to during the New Order when power was centralised and the influence of connections was more pronounced.

Actors behind the Conflict

There are several actors in the cases examined here who often play an influential role, which might mean helping with the construction of the church but could also mean opposing it. The **first actors** here are the heads of the neighbourhood (RT) and community (RW) association units. They played supportive roles when they did not impede the construction process or when they firmly opposed the involvement of outside organisations. More infrequently, they played a supportive role by monitoring religious sermons in mosques in their regions, as did the head of RT 03 in the St. Mikael case in Kranji. At times, the RT and RW heads played unsupportive roles by refusing to confirm signatures of local support. Their confirmation is crucial, because the subdistrict and district heads are usually reluctant to sign off if there is no confirmation from the RT and RW heads. This is somewhat ironic, given the Joint Ministerial Regulations do not, in fact, require the RT and RW heads to confirm signatures at all.

The **second actors** are the religious leaders or *ustadz* based in the mosques in the RT or RW units near the church. These individuals hold important positions because they are a reference point for local residents in relation to religious matters. Religious leaders who resist the construction of a church can easily use religious pretexts to influence local residents. In reality, this research showed that religious arguments were rarely used to oppose a church, at least not publicly.

The **third actor** is the FKUB. It is an important institution due to its authority to issue recommendations. Without an FKUB recommendation an application cannot be approved. On the

other hand, obtaining a recommendation is not a simple process. Not only is it complicated by objections from opponents of a church, there is sometimes disagreement within FKUB itself as to whether a church should be constructed or not. Factors internal to FKUB can influence a recommendation, such as the religious understandings of the FKUB head and members. In addition, representation can also be problematic in Muslim-majority areas, because the majority of FKUB members are Muslim and this can potentially impede church construction, although it is difficult to generalise in this regard. For more information on matters related to FKUB and its complexities see the *Report on Religious Life* published by CRCS (2009).¹

The **fourth set of actors** includes the Mayor, Regent or head of the regional government. In the cases examined here, there were at least three different roles that regional heads played. Some actively opposed the church, like the Mayor of Bogor in the Yasmin GKI case, or the Mayor of Depok, who annulled the permit given to Cinere HKBP. Others, including heads of government, firmly stated their support for a church. The Mayor of Bekasi in the St. Mikael in Kranji case falls into this category, because in a meeting with the church and its opponents he stated he would take action against those who disrupted law and order, or disputed the church, which had already obtained a permit. Other regional heads were passive and reluctant to take a clear stance. These kinds of heads did not actively oppose the church but did refuse to help it resolve its disputes. The dispute over St. Yohanes Maria Vianney is a good example. The Governor of Jakarta did not interfere in the application process for a permit but neither did he attempt to reduce the complex chain of bureaucratic process created by Governor's Decree No. 137/2002.

It is necessary to note that churches experience difficulties

¹ The Report can be accessed at: <http://crs.ugm.ac.id/>.

due to lack of government support when the regional heads are resistant or passive. Of course, even when regional heads are supportive a church might not be able to resolve its problems immediately. Supportive regional heads are thus capital for the church but not an automatic cure for all ills.

The **fifth actor** is the police force, primarily the regional and local police chiefs. The police are responsible for guaranteeing law and order, and acting as mediators between the church and its opponents. The Bekasi police chief in the St. Mikael case in Kranji and the Sawah Besar police chief in the Terang Hidup GKI case provide an example of policing that helps mediate the dispute. On the other hand, in the Yasmin GKI case the police sided with the regional government and its wish to cancel the church's permit.

Another issue is the role of the police in relation to the position of the local government. If the local government does not interfere, the police are usually supportive of a church. If the local government objects to a church, however, the police may also obstruct attempts by the church to hold services, as occurred in the Yasmin GKI case. In general, the most influential state actors in disputes over places of worship are regional heads and the FKUB.

The sixth actor is **social organisations** that become involved in church disputes. The most notorious organisation here is FPI. At the very least, the organisation was involved in the opposition to St. Bernadet in Ciledug and St. Yohanes Maria Vianney in Cilangkap. In addition to established organisations like FPI, there are often similar organisations acting on behalf of local Muslim residents involved in the opposition to churches. These organisations usually identify with the name of the area in which the church stands in order to emphasise their locality. Further research is needed in order to examine the relationship between these local organisations and more well-established radical or-

ganisations, such as FPI.

There are several issues surrounding the relationship between social organisations and church disputes. First, this research revealed that organisations often become involved after being invited by local residents living near a church who object to the church but feel they lack support. This was evident in the case of St. Mikael in Kranji and Yasmin GKI in Bogor. As a result it is difficult to determine whether the dispute comes from “local residents” or “outsiders”. The Research Team believes that this dichotomy between “local residents” and “outsiders” is not helpful because there are almost always local residents involved. Rather than distinguishing between the two, it is more important to work out how to approach the local RT and RW units so that they can become a “security network” for churches against any problems that may emerge.

Second, a clearer definition is needed of the term “involvement”. A definition of this term is important because in several cases, such as the Terang Hidup GKI case, organisational involvement (FPI) turned out to be nothing more than claims made by individuals associated with FPI. On the other hand, churches like St. Bernadet experienced mass action by FPI first hand. Defining the boundaries of involvement is necessary, because individual disputes and actual mass protests require different responses.

The third issue concerning social organisations relates to Chernov-Hwang’s study (2009). She stated that peaceful mobilisation requires a strong state. A state that lacks the capacity or is hesitant in performing its duties is one of the factors behind anarchy. This research arrived at a similar finding. In the church cases examined, it was clear that the lack of a strong state encouraged radical groups to impose their will. Churches that were able to resolve their disputes are examples of how state protection and guarantees can force radical groups to soften their stance.

Socio-Economic Demographics

It is important to note that this research does not use evidence such as statistics from the Bureau of Statistics or from the sub-district government. The relationship between church disputes and demographic and economic factors was examined through interviews and, if possible, through examination of the documents stating the demands of the opposing groups. The Research Team did not directly ask interviewees, "Is the church dispute related to ethnic or economic factors?" Rather, the Research Team inquired about the demographic characteristics of church congregants and local residents. These characteristics were then compared to the demographics of the other churches examined here. From these data, the Research Team found no relationship between the demographic composition or economic level of local residents and church members. If there was any correlation between economic factors and church disputes it was in relation to local residents' expectations about employment or economic benefits as a result of the church construction.

Ethnicity also had little impact. Although local residents living near the church in dispute in Bekasi were largely Betawi, other groups such as the Javanese were also well-represented. In the St. Bernadet church case, the residents of the Finance Department complex who objected to the church had no particular ethnic character. Generally speaking the Research Team concluded that there were too many inconsistencies to identify demographic and economic factors as causes of church disputes.

One interesting case is Terang Hidup GKI. If demographic and economic reasons cause church construction disputes, then this one should have been almost impossible to resolve. First, local residents near the church tended to be middle to lower-class, while congregants were not. Second, and even more complex, the church congregation was almost 100% ethnic Chinese

and lived far from the church, while local residents were Betawi, Javanese, Bugis or members of ethnic groups other than the Chinese. In reality, however, letters of demand from the opposing groups and interviews with the church and RW unit gave no indication that the opposition was about either ethnic or economic factors.

There is therefore very little likelihood that demographic and economic factors play a significant role in church disputes. If demographic factors are considered, they refer more to the mobility of local residents who then bring their “need” for the construction of a church to the area in which they settle. Fulfilling this need can potentially lead to disputes for the variety of reasons described earlier.

The Local Politics of Conflict

The cases examined in this research reveal three interesting aspects of political dynamics and their influence on church disputes. Political dynamics do, however, require further research.

First, the cases of St. Mikael in Kranji and Seroja GKP provide several possible reasons for the position of the Mayor of Bekasi, Mochtar Mohammad, and explain why many churches experience difficulties in Bekasi. Sources from the two churches agreed that Mochtar Mohammad was close to both churches. This opens up the possibility that some parties intentionally objected to the construction of several churches in Bekasi in order to decrease his popularity among the Christian community. Another explanation is that Mochtar Mohammad was only exploiting the support of the Protestant and Catholic communities as a political commodity in order to win the Bekasi local election, or that he was not actually as strong as expected in defending religious freedom.

Second, it is possible that regional heads who require support from Christian communities in order to win local elections

give greater attention to churches by comparison with regional heads who already have well-established political legitimacy. This finding is based on a comparison between Mochtar Mohammad in Bekasi and Wahidin Halim in Tangerang. Mochtar Mohammad won with a margin of only 9% and thus the non-Muslim votes were a significant factor in his election. By contrast, Wahidin Halim won the Tangerang local election with more than 80% of the votes. This is further supported by a discussion the Research Team had with one observer of the St. Bernadet case in Ciledug, who stated that Wahidin Halim had been asked to look into the issue because during the election the Christians had voted for him. According to this source, however, Wahidin Halim paid little attention because he did not believe that the Christian community's support had, in fact, been important for his victory.

The **third** aspect relates to political parties and church disputes. The deputy Mayor of Bogor in the Yasmin GKI case, the Mayor of Depok in the Cinere HKBP case and the Regent of Bekasi in the Filadelfia HKBP case were all from PKS. On the other hand, in areas such as Bekasi and Tangerang the regional heads were not members of PKS but the churches were still disputed. Nevertheless, there are differences between the two situations. In Bogor and Depok the regional heads actively made things difficult for the churches by annulling their permits. The Mayor of Tangerang did not do so, but he did not help the church either. The Mayor of Bekasi (at the time the Deputy Mayor) was actually generally supportive of the church. Apart from the difficulty this Research Team faced in finding supportive actors from PKS, further research is required to see what positions Islamic parties take towards the construction of churches.***

IV

Conclusion

Having discussed and analysed the results of the research described the previous chapters, this chapter will draw a number of conclusions and recommendations. In the final section we will also discuss the limitations of this research and the extent to which the results reflect disputes over places of worship in other regions in Indonesia.

Conclusion

In accordance with the initial design of this research, we have grouped our conclusions into those related to state regulations and social factors.

State Regulations

- The Indonesian government can, and must, do more to guarantee the right to construct a place of worship and religious freedom in general. In this research, every church dispute

that was resolved involved firm and decisive government agencies, especially the police force (the institution responsible for security) and the regional head (the bureaucratic authority). Weak government is one of the main causes of the significant number of church disputes today.

- Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006 give greater legal certainty and clarity than previous regulations. There are, however, also many weaknesses in these regulations, such as the requirement for a minimum number of signatures, which can be difficult to obtain in some cases, as well as the government's inconsistency in providing legal certainty.
- There is inefficiency and the potential for delay in the construction of places of worship in the way this regulation is implemented, in the sense that meeting the requirements at one stage in the process does not guarantee that a church can move on to the next stage. This is clear from the experience of churches that fulfilled the requirement for signatures of support and recommendation, but were still unable to obtain a permit.
- Regional heads are influential in determining bureaucratic policies for disputed churches. Of the cases covered in this research, almost all churches that resolved their issues were assisted by supportive regional heads or professional security forces. By contrast, regional heads who are resistant can complicate the church construction process, and may even revoke permits that have been issued previously.
- The opposing groups in this research almost all used symbols relating to Islam or acted in the name of the Muslim community. Although this might seem like a trivial matter, it deserves serious attention, for at least two reasons. First, it gives the impression that the majority of Muslims object to or oppose the construction of churches, regardless of how

accurate that impression might be in reality. Second, it suggests that when an organisation hides behind the name of religion, the government and police often lose the will to act against them.

Social Factors

- There are indications that the high level of intolerance among the religious majority towards minorities plays a role in church disputes in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. This intolerance is caused by a number of reasons that cannot be explored further in this preliminary research. What is clear, however, is that both the religious majority and minorities, and especially the government, are responsible for educating society so as to overcome this intolerance.
- The relationship between a church and its local residents, especially community leaders, plays a significant role in determining whether the church will face obstacles or not. This relationship is also important because it affects whether the church receives enough support from local residents if outside groups challenge the church. The heads of neighbourhood and community association units are also key leaders in church disputes. Their support or lack of it influences local residents. Their position is also crucial because in practise they have the authority to confirm local support.
- Ethnicity or economic status does not influence whether local residents will object to or accept a church. Rather, community leaders who respect religious freedom are influential. These leaders are different to other leaders because they continue to speak out in defence of churches when others are silent. For instance, the majority of local residents might not object to the presence of a church. If this majority remains silent, however, it is not very helpful.
- Involving local residents in the construction of a church helps

decrease the possibility of opposition. What is important is that local residents should be employed based on from the recommendation of local leaders (particularly the heads of the RT and RW units). The wrong choice of employee can complicate relationships with local residents, because they may feel that the church is favouring certain people at the expense of others.

- The internal solidarity of the church can influence the dynamics of state regulations and social factors. Lack of internal solidarity makes it difficult to fulfil state regulations, and social issues may complicate relationships with those leaders or institutions that the church wishes to approach.

Recommendations

To the Government

- The police force must act firmly in response to groups who provoke others or vandalise places of worship. This research shows that opposing groups are actually scared to act if the police respond decisively. Church disputes are not the same as other interreligious conflicts, such as occurred in Poso, where revenge gave people the courage to oppose the police. In church disputes the dominant factor is dissatisfaction or misunderstanding. As feelings of dislike are less serious than revenge, sanctions or penalties are much more effective solutions.
- Regional governments must better understand and pay more attention to all the provisions of Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006. In Jakarta, for instance, the government is still using Governor's Decree No. 137 of 2002, which is no longer valid. Using the Governor's Decree means additional requirements must be met in order to apply for a permit to construct a place of worship, processes that do not exist in the Joint Ministerial Regulations.

- The central government needs to form an autonomous body to monitor the effectiveness of the Joint Ministerial Regulations, so that whenever a church cannot meet the requirement for local support in the Regulation the regional government can be called in to help facilitate the process to obtain a place of worship for the church. The Administrative Court also needs to be revamped so that its rulings are enforced and so that there are sanctions for those state institutions that ignore its rulings. This is necessary because if the Administrative Court rules in favour of the church the local government may still decline to make any significant changes or take any steps. With some kind of sanction or powers of enforcement behind the court's rulings local governments would stop delaying resolution of the issues behind disputed churches.
- FKUB needs to help churches approach groups who oppose them, at least after the church has successfully obtained the minimum requirement of local support. This is necessary to guarantee legal certainty and to ensure that protests do not automatically halt the construction of a church, especially after the church has obtained support from local residents. Furthermore, the government and FKUB must focus on the stipulations in the Joint Ministerial Regulations. When a church has obtained signatures from 60 local residents and 90 congregants then FKUB must issue a recommendation and the government a permit. This would ensure that there is no gap through which the church's opponents can influence the process. If these groups want to stop the construction, they have to do so by convincing local residents not to give their signatures in support at the outset. It is hoped that this would lead to a more balanced contest between the church and its opponents in approaching the local community.
- The government and FKUB must actively educate society

about the different denominations within Protestant and Catholic churches. This may be done through an introduction to the beliefs and institutes of the main religions in public schools at various levels. Such an understanding is important because in many cases, social resistance is a result of local residents' awareness that there is already a church in the area but not realising it is of a different denomination.

To Religious Leaders and Organisations

- Islamic social organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) must pay more genuine attention to problems concerning the construction of churches. This is evident from our finding that these organisations rarely play a role in mediating church disputes. NU, Muhammadiyah and MUI should be able to do much more to guarantee religious freedom and resolve disputes over construction of places of worship in Muslim-majority areas.
- Islamic organisations need to support the government in taking legal action against groups who act violently in the name of religion. The law must be enforced, and if these organisations support the government it will reinforce the fact that legal action against violent groups is not an act of hostility against Islam but an attempt to combat criminal groups who exploit the name of religion.
- Christian organisations, such as PGI and KWI, need to continue to promote interfaith dialogue and establish close relationships with other religious organisations. Because religious issues are sensitive and freedom of religion is difficult to enforce in Indonesia, relationships need be built not only by the majority but by minority groups as well. PGI and KWI need to have some kind of internal control mechanism in order to avoid irresponsible efforts at Christianisation by

some elements within the organisations. Such control is important because Christianisation is one of the most frequent issues encountered during church disputes.

- PGI and KWI need to train their leaders in how to build relationships with society. This is necessary particularly to rectify the understanding that resistance to the church is always about money. Emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that often money is less important than the way in which that money is given as a contribution to society. Finally, PGI and KWI must address vertical disputes (with the government) and avoid horizontal conflict or tension within society.
- Specifically to church construction committees: In order to avoid potential disputes in the future over the signatures of support from local residents, churches must not only obtain signatures but also a photocopy of each individual's national ID card and a completed form provided by the church. The church construction committee should not accept demands from brokers who promise to resolve all the church's problems for a certain sum of money. Not only are such promises unable to be guaranteed (in this research the church disputes were complex and it is doubtful that a single person or group could resolve them singlehandedly), they also set a bad precedent for the future.
- Also to church construction committees: In responding to the difficulties churches face, committees must carefully consider whether or not to involve the media. In some cases, using the media is beneficial but in others it can be counterproductive. The Research Team recommends not involving the media for small-scale issues where opponents are local residents and before outside parties have become involved. In these cases using the media only escalates and further complicates the issue.

Limitations and Generalisations

As a study that is, as far as we know, the first on the problems surrounding the construction of churches, this research certainly has its limitations. The first is the lack of literature available to give a picture of what was happening on the ground. This has meant the Research Team had to use trial and error to find out more about local dynamics. This proved to be a lengthy process.

The second limitation was restricted funding and time, which proved disproportionate to the difficulty of the conditions on the ground. More churches could have been studied if there was more funding and time. Almost half the time available was spent on collecting background information about the dynamics of the churches that were researched in depth. If additional research is undertaken, the time taken to gather background information will be decreased significantly because this research itself provides much information.

Another consequence of limited funding and time relates to the diversity of sources. The majority of informants relied on in this research were from the churches or were local residents represented by neighbourhood and community association units. Although they provided enough information to give an idea as to the background and context of the various disputes over the construction of churches (which we complimented with secondary sources), we also tried to obtain other information, particularly from the opposing parties. For future research, another Research Team should use this initial research and focus further on the opinions of the opposing parties.

The third limitation relates to balancing the number of Catholic and Protestant churches and representing the denominations within the Protestant Church. Of the 13 churches examined here, seven were Catholic and six were Protestant. This was not actually planned, and was purely a consequence of

dynamics on the ground. Of 12 churches in the four categories, we initially intended to study five Catholic churches and seven Protestant ones. The dynamics, however, forced us to make adjustments, which altered that representation. The lack of accommodation of the wide range of Christian denominations was a result of the Research Team's limited information, which led to a rather specific research sample of only a few denominations.

The final limitation relates to the generalisation of these research results. We believe that the factors identified in this research are also valid in other disputes over the construction of churches, or even places of worship in general, in other regions in Indonesia. Majority-minority relations, suspicion of others, political utilisation and socio-economic motives are general factors that can be encountered anywhere, not only in Jakarta and the nearby areas. Opposing actors require a mention in relation to the generalisation of these results, however. As discussed previously, the churches examined here were disputed by groups acting in the name of Islam, as the majority group in society. In other regions where Muslims are a minority, it is possible that other religious groups who represent the majority might act in an intolerant manner towards Muslims when they seek to construct a place of worship. For example, although unrelated to places of worship, in Manokwari several Christian groups from the majority proposed a draft Regional Regulation (*Peraturan Daerah*) declaring Manokwari as a Gospel Town, or *Kota Injil* (although it has not been passed to date). In North Sumatra, the Christian and Muslim communities interfere in the religious practices of the local Parmalim community (a mystical sect).

It is clearly apparent that a person of any religious belief can be intolerant. Only further research can reveal precisely the extent to which this is the case. This research does, however, offer a number of interesting hypotheses to be tested further.***

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Attachments

Attachments

List of Interviewees

No	Name	Position	Date
1	Rudy Pratikno	Secretary of the Human Rights Commission of the Jakarta Archdiocese and head of the Recommendations Department of FKUB in Jakarta	8 June 2010
2	Setyawan	FKUB in East Jakarta, Catholic representative	14 August 2010
3	Jeirry Sumampow	Deacon's Commission of PGI	2 June 2010
4	Gomar Gultom	Secretary General of PGI	10 August 2010
5	Hieronimus Kasman	One of the founders of St Aloysius Gonzaga Church in Cijantung	10 October 2010
6	Sugeng	Treasurer of RW 06, which is close to the Cijantung Church	14 December 2010
7	Sukirno	Head of RT 01 RW 06, which is close to the Cijantung Church	14 December 2010
8	Krissantono	Head of the Church Construction Committee of St Mikael, Kranji	14 August 2010
9	Yosef Jaga Dawam	Parish Pastor of St Mikael Church, Kranji	18 August 2010
10	Mulyadi	Head of RT 7, which is close to St Mikael Church, Kranji	16 September 2010
11	Basyuni	Head of RT 3, which is close to St Mikael Church, Kranji	16 September 2010
12	Supriyono	Head of RW 08, which is close to St Mikael Church, Kranji	16 September 2010
13	Eric Egne	Pastor at Seroja GKP	14 September 2010

14	Martin	Resident in the Seroja complex and a veteran, member of Seroja GKP	14 September 2010
15	Mellisa	Pastor at Terang Hidup GKI	13 August 2010
16	Anonim	Manager of RW 07, which is close to Terang Hidup GKI	23 September 2010
17	Gina Sutono	Head of the Jakarta Cathedral Museum	29 September 2010
18	Christina Rantetana	Head of the Church Construction Committee of St Albertus Church, Harapan Indah	4 September 2010
19	Haryono	Secretary of the Church Construction Committee of St Albertus Church, Harapan Indah	4 September 2010
20	Wahono	Head of RW 09, Kampung Tanah Apit, which is close to St Albertus Church	15 December 2010
21	Nur Hasan	Head of RT 03/09, Kampung Tanah Apit, which is close to St Albertus Church	15 December 2010
22	Samuel Bambang Heryanto	Pastor at Nehemia GKJ, Pondok Indah	6 October 2010
23	Bangun Waspodo	Head of RW 10, Pondok Pinang, Pasar Jumat Public Works Complex, close to Nehemia GKJ	18 December 2010
24	Anonymous	Church Construction Committee of St Bernadet Church, Ciledug	4 September 2010
25	Anonymous	Church Construction Committee of St Bernadet Church, Ciledug	4 September 2010
26	Anonymous	Manager of the Nurul Iman mosque, Department of Finance Complex, close to the Ciledug Church	9 December 2010

27	Anonymous	Resident at the Department of Finance Complex, owner of a street-side stall, close to the Ciledug Church	9 December 2010
28	Anonymous	Manager of RW 03, Department of Finance Complex, close to the Ciledug Church	9 December 2010
29	Thomas	Church Construction Committee of Yasmin GKI	19 August 2010
30	Anonymous	Manager of RW 08, close to Yasmin GKI	7 October 2010
31	Jayadi	Lawyer for Yasmin GKI	19 August 2010
32	Betty J. Sitorus	Elder of Cinere HKBP	2 November 2010
33	Syafii	Security guard at Cinere HKBP, local resident	22 November 2010
34	Anonymous	Manager of RT 04 RW 14, close to the Cinere Church	22 November 2010
35	Anonymous	Sub-district government officer, related to the Cinere Church	22 November 2010
36	Anonymous	Manager of RW 01, close to the Cinere Church	23 November 2010
37	Palti Panjaitan	Pastor at Filadelfia HKBP	6 September 2010
38	Bartolomeus Gatot W.	Parish Pastor at St Johannes Baptista Church, Parung	8 September 2010
39	FX Sidi Harsoyo	Head of the Church Construction Committee of St Johannes Baptista Church, Parung	8 September 2010
40	Tony	Local resident near St Johannes Baptista Church, Parung	27 December 2010
41	Gito	Local resident near St Johannes Baptista Church, Parung	27 December 2010

42	Iing	Local resident near St Johannes Baptista Church, Parung	27 December 2010
43	Joko	Head of RW 06, close to St Johannes Baptista Church, Parung	27 December 2010
44	Ferdinandus Kuswadianto	Parish Pastor of the Cilangkap Church	5 September 2010
45	Sihite Ignatius Sukirman	Treasurer of the Parish Council of St Yohanes Maria Vianney, Cilangkap	5 September 2010
46	Billy Joseph	Secretary of the Parish Council of the Cilangkap Church	5 September 2010
47	Sukidi (not his real name)	Catholic youth of the Cilangkap Church	5 September 2010
48	Ayu (not her real name)	Local resident near the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010
49	Anonymous 1	Local resident near the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010
50	Anonymous 2	Opponent of the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010
51	Anonymous 3	Opponent of the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010
52	Anonymous 4	Opponent of the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010
53	Anonymous 5	Opponent of the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010
54		Opponent of the Cilangkap Church	27 December 2010

Attachments
List of Church Addresses

No.	Name of Church	Address
1	St. Aloysius Gonzaga	St. Aloysius Gonzaga Catholic Church, Jl. Pendidikan III/2, Cijantung II, East Jakarta
2	St. Mikael	St. Mikael Catholic Church, Sekolah Strada Complex, Jl. Bintara Raya Gg. Strada 1 No.38, Kranji, Bekasi 17135
3	Seroja GKP	Seroja Pasundan Protestant Church, Jl. Tomat No. 10, Seroja Complex, Pamentas, Bekasi
4	Terang Hidup GKI	Terang Hidup GKI, Jl. Ketapang Utara I No. 19A, Krukut Subdistrict, Taman Sari District, West Jakarta
5	The Cathedral	The Cathedral, Jl. Katedral 7B, Central Jakarta
6	St. Albertus	St. Albertus Catholic Church, Jl. Boulevard Raya Kav.23, Kota Harapan Indah, West Bekasi 021-379 777 66
7	Nehemia GKJ	Nehemia GKJ, Jl. Raya Pasar Jumat, Pondok Indah, South Jakarta 12310
8	St. Bernadet	Jl. Barata Pahala 31 RT01/03, Sekolah Sang Timur Complex, Central Karang, Ciledug, Tangerang, Banten
9	Yasmin GKI	Yasmin GKI, Jl. KH. Abdullah bin Nuh, Curug Mekar, Bogor City, West Java
10	Pangkalan Jati HKBP	Pangkalan Jati HKBP, Jl. Bandung Pangkalan Jati, Cinere, Depok, West Java
11	Filadelfia HKBP	Filadelfia HKBP, Dusun III RT01/09, Jejalen Jaya Village, Tambun Utara District, Bekasi Regency, 0815-184-7304, 0813-184-21070
12	St. Johannes Baptista	St. Johannes Baptista Parish, Jl. Metro Parung No. 36, Tulang Kuning, RT01/06 Waru Village, Parung District, Bogor Regency, Telp. (0251) 8610067
13	St. Yohanes Maria Vianney	Jl. Bambu Wulung No.60, Bambu Apus Sub-district RT 33/05, Cipayung, Jakarta 13890

Institute Biographies

Paramadina Foundation

The Paramadina is a non-profit and independent institute, established by several intellectual leaders and professionals from Indonesia. This institute actively studies social and religious issues, both directly and indirectly. Its primary focus is on religious thought and advocacy of religious freedom. The institute covers a vast area of thought, as shown by the ideas of Cak Nur on Islam, modernity and Indonesian-ness. In 1998, the institute established its own formal educational institute, the Paramadina University. Paramadina Foundation was established on 31 October 1986. In the Indonesian context, Paramadina was established in anticipation of the intellectual boom among *santri* (religious students) that occurred in the 1980s as Indonesian Islamic intellectuals began to adopt an outward-looking orientation instead of the inward-looking orientation that had previously been dominant. For about 20 years, Paramadina Foundation has produced original thought during the Islamic renewal of this period. Its vast scope of thought has given room to diverse expressions of inclusive Islam and has contributed to religious freedom in Indonesia.

Masters in Peace and Conflict Resolution (MPRK) UGM

Since the beginning of the 2002/2003 academic year, Gadjah Mada University has offered a Masters Program in Peace and Conflict Resolution. This program is the first of its kind in Indonesia, and even Southeast Asia. The program seeks to give new and strategic knowledge concerning resolution of social, political and economic conflicts on both a national and international level. As a result, this program offers a philosophical and theoretical understanding of peace and conflict resolution, as well as providing practical skills to manage conflict in society. The program

may be taken by anyone involved in decision making processes, from NGO activists to business people, government officers and citizens who wish to increase their knowledge about, and better their techniques for dealing with, peaceful conflict resolution.

Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP)

ICRP is a non-sectarian, non-profit, non-government and independent foundation. It promotes interfaith dialogue and cooperation. The organisation was established by leaders of different religious affiliations in Indonesia and was inaugurated on 12 July 2000 by President Abdurrahman Wahid. ICRP promotes dialogue and development of religious life that is democratic, humane and pluralistic. Together with various institutes and individuals, ICRP also helps develop peace and conflict resolution studies, and struggles for civil rights and the right to freedom of religion and belief.

Authors' Biographies

Ihsan Ali-Fauzi is the Program Director of Paramadina Foundation and a lecturer at Paramadina Graduate School, Jakarta. In addition to Syarif Hidayatullah UIN in Jakarta, he has also taught history and politics at Ohio University, Athens and The Ohio State University (OSU), Columbus, both in the United States of America. He has written articles for various newspapers including *Kompas*, *Koran Tempo*, *Media Indonesia*, and *Republika*. Working in collaboration with other researchers, he has published "Patterns of Religious Conflict in Indonesia: 1990-2008" and "Reporting on Religious Freedom in 2008: Evaluation of the Reports by The Wahid Institute, the Setara Institute and CRCs-UGM." He is also co-author of the book *Gerakan Kebebasan Sipil (Civil Liberties Movements)* (2009) with Saiful Mujani.

Samsu Rizal Panggabean is a lecturer in International Relations and Masters of Peace and Conflict Resolution (MPRK) at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta. He studied at Walisongo and Gontor *pesantrens* in East Java, before studying Interpretation of the Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga IAIN and at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at UGM, Yogyakarta. He obtained his Masters from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University, USA. He has published "Creating Dataset in Information-Poor Environments: Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)" with Muhammad Zulvan Tadjoeuddin and Ashutosh Varshney. His books include *Politik Syariat Islam (The Politics of Islamic Law)* (2003) written with Taufik Adnan Amal.

Nathanael Gratias Sumaktoyo is a graduate of computer science and statistics from Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta. After switching to social science, his focus and interest lies in the psychology of religion and politics. Together with Prof. Dr. Hamdi Muluk, a political psychologist from the University of Indonesia, he published an article in the international journal *Archive for the Psychology of Religion* on religious fundamentalism. Another of his articles on sacred violence was published in the *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*. In addition to religion and politics, he also has an interest in methodology, modelling and advanced statistical analysis. Nathanael won a 2011 Fulbright scholarship to study applied social psychology at Loyola University, Chicago.

Anick H. Tohari is the Executive Director of the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP). He is also the coordinator for the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief (AKKBB). From 20 April to 6 May 2009, he participated in the International Visitor Leadership Program, US Department of State, Washington DC-New York-Alabama-Seattle. He has published articles in various media outlets such as *Koran Tempo*, *Jawa Pos*, *Indo Pos*, *Majalah Majemuk* and *Islamlib.com*.

Husni Mubarak is an assistant researcher at Paramadina Foundation. After studying at Syarif Hidayatullah UIN in Jakarta, he worked at the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) in Jakarta. He has been involved in a number of research projects at Paramadina including "*Pola-pola Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia, 1990-2008* (Patterns of Religious Conflict in Indonesia)." He was one of the authors of the book *All You Need is Love: Cak Nur di Mata Anak-anak Muda* (*All You Need is Love: Cak Nur in the Eyes of Children*) (2008).

Testriono is a researcher with the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) at UIN, Jakarta and is the assistant editor of the journal *Studia Islamika*, also published by the same institute. He was also one of the authors of *Para Pembaharu: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Islam Asia Tenggara (The Reformers: Southeast Asian Islamic Thought and Movements)* (SEAMUS for Freedom and Enlightenment, 2009) and *Civic Values di Indonesia: Pengalaman Pemberdayaan Pesantren (Civic Values in Indonesia: An Experience in Empowering Pesantren)* (PPIM 2010). He has co-edited several books, including: *Pembaharuan Tanpa Apologia: Esai-esai tentang Ahmad Wahib (Unapologetic Renewal: Essays on Ahmad Wahib)* (Paramadina 2010) and *Arkeologi Islam Nusantara (The Archaeology of Indonesian Islam)* (KPG 2009).

Siti Nurhayati is an assistant researcher at the Paramadina Foundation. While studying she worked as a field researcher for the Indonesian Survey Circle. After graduating she became an assistant lecturer in statistics on the sociology of religion at Syarif Hidayatullah UIN, Jakarta. She also previously worked as an assistant researcher at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) and as a data analyst at the Women's Studies Centre (PSW) of Syarif Hidayatullah UIN Jakarta.

Translator: Rebecca Lunnon is a Research Assistant at the Asian Law Centre, the University of Melbourne.

Editors: Tim Lindsey is Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law at the University of Melbourne, where he is the Director of the Asian Law Centre and the Centre for Islamic Law and Society. **Melissa Crouch** is a Research Fellow at the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne, where she completed a PhD on legal disputes between Muslims and Christians in West Java.

The Practice of Pluralism Series

This book is part of a series on 'The Practice of Pluralism' published by the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Postgraduate School, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta. It is the product of research undertaken at CRCS since 2008.

The series includes several monographs on research undertaken by CRCS's partners in different regions of Indonesia (Medan, Banjarmasin, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bali, Makassar and Papua) on the practice of pluralism in society. In addition, CRCS has also published *Pluralisme Kewargaan: Arah Baru Politik Keragaman di Indonesia* (Civic Pluralism: a New Direction in the Politics of Diversity in Indonesia) (2011), which does not specifically focus on one locality but examines the practice of pluralism from a theoretical perspective.

CRCS (www.crcs.ugm.ac.id) is a postgraduate program at UGM that was established in 2000. Through academic activities, research and public education, CRCS aims to develop the study of religion and understandings about the dynamics of religious life and social issues in the context of developing a plural society that is both democratic and just.

The Pluralism Knowledge Programme (PKP) is an international collaboration between academic institutes and civil society organisations in four countries, namely CRCS (Yogyakarta, Indonesia); the Center for the Study of Culture and Society (Bangalore, India); the Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda (Kampala, Uganda); and the Kosmopolis Institute, University for Humanistics and Hivos (The Netherlands), which organises and supports it. PKP seeks to develop and distribute knowledge that strengthens understandings about pluralism throughout these four countries. PKP's initiatives in Indonesia include publication of the Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia since 2009; facilitation of research undertaken collaboratively by academics and NGO activists on the local practice of pluralism; and the International Summer School on Pluralism and Development, which involves teachers and participants from each of the four countries. Further information is available at www.uvh.nl and www.crcs.ugm.ac.id.

Healthy pluralism requires space for all religious adherents to worship and construct places of worship in accordance with their convictions. The state should protect this right as an essential matter. Despite this normative ideal, there is still much controversy surrounding the construction of places of worship in Indonesia. In the last few years, the planned construction of a number of places of worship has been disputed, although others have been able to overcome these problems by relying on different strategies.

This research seeks to examine the factors that play a role in initiating and resolving conflict over places of worship. Places of worship are specifically limited in this study to Catholic churches and Protestant churches that are members of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, PGI). The methods used were participant observation and in-depth interviews of churches representing one of four categories: (1) undisputed churches; (2) disputed churches that have since resolved the dispute; (3) originally undisputed churches that have since become disputed; and (4) churches that have never been able to resolve the dispute.

Based on thirteen case studies, the research on which this report is based confirms the influential role of state regulation and social factors. The cases show that the obstacles some churches experience are generally related to weak government agencies due to political, social or ideological reasons. In terms of social factors, demographic factors were not found to have an influence. Resistance to churches was more often caused by a lack of communication, or provocation, or intimidation by specific groups. After describing and analysing the thirteen cases selected, this monograph closes with conclusions and recommendations.

The English edition of this book is published in cooperation with the Asian Law Centre and the Centre for Islamic Law and Society at the University of Melbourne, The Paramadina Foundation (Jakarta) and the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Postgraduate School, Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta).

